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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, I analyse my fandom for the Formula One driver, Jacques 
Villeneuve.  Despite its rampant commercialism, innovative mediation, prestige 
and popular status within global sport, Formula One is surprisingly an under-
researched topic in academia.  Moreover, „intense‟ fandom has often been 
stigmatised; at worst associating such individuals with pathological and obsessive 
behaviours or refuting their affections as merely symptomatic of the socio-
economic forces that transform fans into duped consumers.  This thesis argues 
against such simplistic disqualifications and reconceptualises fandom in light of 
how the structure/agency binary has itself been reconceptualised within media and 
cultural studies.  Rather than privileging either the determining social, mediated 
and commercial structures, or championing the „active agential‟ capacities of 
social individuals, Grossberg‟s notions of „affect‟ and „structured mobility‟ are 
drawn upon to underpin a more flexible explanation of contemporary fandom.  In 
particular, affect offers theoretical purchase for how fans form attachments with 
selective media objects and why these come to „matter‟ for specific individuals.  
Furthermore, by marrying affect with „structured mobility‟, affective investments 
are recognised for their capacity to „anchor‟ individuals in specific and concrete 
spatial/temporal „moments‟ of social reality as they navigate both the mediated 
apparatus of the sport and the structured social, cultural and economic terrain that 
shapes their mediated fandom.  Such insights are developed through a „funnelling‟ 
approach in this thesis which moves from an examination of collective Formula 
One fandom to my own, exploring the affective traces of a friction that 
Villeneuve‟s maverick status provided within the broader machinery of the sport 
and to which this fan has responded.  
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PROLOGUE 
Transforming a Passion into Research  
“Trulli is pointing towards Alonso.  When the red lights go out we will be racing 
at Magny-Cours... The French Grand Prix is „GO!!!!!!!!‟ James Allen‟s voice 
booms as twenty cars sprint off the line.  It is midnight on a Sunday and I am 
transfixed by these televised images.  Looking beyond the front rows of Renaults, 
Toyotas and Ferraris my focus locks on to the fifth row of the grid.  I am 
analysing the start of the French-Canadian, Jacques Villeneuve.  He seems to 
have got off the line well; he might even gain a place if he can get past his team-
mate.  “Go Jacques!  Push buddy, push” I mentally spur him on.  With Villeneuve 
pervading my thoughts, I am impervious to any distractions for the next hour and 
a half, avidly following his blue Sauber and consuming the spectacle of Formula 
One racing unfolding on both my television and via live timing on the internet. 
 
Racing action and its mediated coverage have been an important aspect of my life 
for over ten years (1998-2008).  I tune in to the fast-paced spectacle of Formula 
One every fortnight, often overwhelmed by a sense of awe as these men control 
their machines through complex chicanes and sweeping curves with finesse, skill 
and bravado at high velocity.  During this time I have watched a total of 181 
Formula One races televised live
1
 which, considering that most Formula One 
races are staged in Europe (translating to a midnight start time on Sunday nights 
in New Zealand), not to mention the 5am or 6am starts for races in Brazil, Canada 
and America, has been logistically no small feat.  Additionally, I also experienced 
„live‟ Formula One, attending the Australian Grand Prix (2002-2004; 2006) and 
the Canadian Grand Prix in 2005.  What has compelled me to tune in late at night 
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or in the early hours of the morning is, at least on the surface, my admiration for 
Formula One‟s spectacle of speed and skill, as well as the exhilaration and 
immense pleasure I derive from watching these drivers push their cars and 
themselves to the limit.  Most pervasive, however, and harder to explain, has been 
my fandom for the French-Canadian driver, Jacques Villeneuve (during the period 
1996-2006).  An enigmatic figure in Formula One, Villeneuve‟s combination of a 
fearless driving style, previous success and his maverick personality somehow 
resonated for me.  Villeneuve‟s participation in Formula One ensured I viewed 
every race live, predominantly to dissect and assess his Grand Prix performances, 
as well as stay up-to-date reading and consuming the plethora of media texts on 
Formula One and Villeneuve in particular.  Indeed, it is no understatement to 
suggest that my fandom for Formula One was deeply entwined with and 
understood through Jacques Villeneuve, to the point where it became an empty 
viewing experience without his presence for most of the 2004 season and for the 
final six races of 2006.  In fact, post-2006, my current „fandom‟ is marked by a 
hollow and less passionate viewing experience since his departure.  In short, my 
fandom for Formula One was essentially a fandom of Jacques Villeneuve and this 
thesis sets out to explore this relationship for what it may reveal about fandom 
generally.   
Miller (2008) is critical of academics providing such „personal‟ dimensions in 
their scholarly accounts of sport, intimating that these emphases “encourage an 
entirely misleading valuation of the personal as a sign of knowledge and 
legitimacy”, while asserting that “it buys into an affect-laden system of legitimacy 
that underpins sporting practice” (p. 542).  Mindful of Miller‟s (2008) jibe against 
autoethnographic „confessions‟ and his advocacy for a „supple blend‟ of critical 
theory, this thesis seeks to deploy its own blend of the autoethnographic and the 
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critical.  It is, therefore, in its current form, a reply to Miller.  Autoethnographic 
vignettes are sparingly inserted within the thesis to evoke concrete practices of 
fandom while, more broadly, affect is reconceptualised, via the work of Grossberg 
(1992b), as a significant socio-cultural process that shapes and anchors 
individuals within specific moments of social reality.  The thesis maps the 
resulting trajectories, in the end, through a strategy-intensity field model.  Without 
privileging the personal over theory, this thesis repudiates Miller‟s castigation of 
autoethnography as seemingly vacuous and, instead, argues for its blending with 
critical theories for analysing affective socio-cultural relationships that can be 
enriched through the inclusion of one‟s own academic-fan voice.   
 
                                                 
1
 Races in Japan and Malaysia pre-2006 were often repeated later and hence not strictly „live‟ 
telecasts.  The only race missed during this period was the 1999 Australian Grand Prix, as it was 
not televised in New Zealand.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
A Joker in the Pack?: Jacques Villeneuve, the Homoerotic and 
„Maverick‟ Individualism 
In this chapter, it is Jacques Villeneuve‟s circulation and exchange as a mediated 
and commodified Formula One sport star that is broached, not theories of fandom 
per se, which are returned to later in the thesis.  To accommodate this orientation, 
the chapter is divided into three sections.  In the first section, an „inevitable‟ 
question needs to be flagged, and so we begin with a discussion of the homoerotic 
male-on-male gaze in order to ask whether this dimension informs my attachment 
as a fan.  The second section looks at other possible explanatory frameworks for 
categorising Villeneuve‟s stardom (and, implicitly, his appeal for fans); 
considering the applicability of the terms „rebel‟ and the „bad boy‟, before settling 
on Whannel‟s (1999, 2002) notion of „maverick individualism‟.  Two traces of 
Villeneuve‟s „maverick individualism‟ are then provided in section three, 
underscoring the friction that permeated his relationship with the corporate culture 
of Formula One.  First, however, we begin this chapter with an overview of who 
Villeneuve is and some key career moments.   
Introducing Jacques Villeneuve 
Jacques Villeneuve was one of the biggest names in Formula One during his 
racing career (1996-2006), commanding the huge media attention characteristic of 
the stardom attributed to other contemporary drivers such as Michael 
Schumacher, Fernando Alonso, Kimi Raikkonen and Lewis Hamilton.
1
  
Villeneuve has had an illustrious motor-racing career, having been the Formula 
One World Champion in 1997, second in the championship in his first season 
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(1996), and the IndyCar Champion and then-youngest winner of the Indianapolis 
500 race in 1995 (see discussion of Villeneuve‟s career up to 1997 in Collings, 
1998; Hilton, 1997; Villeneuve & Donaldson, 1997).  In achieving such success, 
Villeneuve became only the fourth driver in history to have won three of the „big 
four‟ prizes in elite motor-racing (Formula One, IndyCar and Indianapolis 500; 
the other is the Le Mans 24 hour race in which he now competes since leaving 
Formula One).  Villeneuve was also one of the sport‟s biggest ever earners, with 
career earnings worth a reputed US$114 million in 2003, making him the second 
highest valued driver at the time (Beresford, 2003).  Ultimately, however, 
Villeneuve needed to reduce his salary to prolong racing in Formula One, earning 
„only‟ approximately US$2 million in 2005 and $3 million in 2006 in contrast to 
his escalating salary with BAR which peaked at approximately US$20 million a 
season (Appendix One). 
Jacques is also the son of a famous racing father, Gilles Villeneuve, who is 
reputed to have thrilled fans with a driving style that Rendall (2000) labels, 
“fearless to the brink of destruction, committed to winning at all costs” (p. 148), 
or as Allen (2000) observes, “he was the bravest and wildest driver around, and it 
was totally clear from his first Grand Prix that here was a man who would either 
be World Champion or kill himself” (p. 51).  This parentage resonates strongly.  
Gilles won six races during his Formula One career (1977-1982), and is 
considered to be a national hero to an earlier generation of fans in Canada 
(especially Québec), as well as a favourite of many fans worldwide for his fearless 
performances for the revered Ferrari team (Balfe, 2006; Collings, 1998; Vergeer, 
2004).  Gilles died participating in Formula One during qualifying in Belgium in 
1982, yet he is still fondly remembered, especially in Montreal, with the Grand 
Prix circuit named after him, and at Imola, where a corner bears his name.  
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Jacques is represented as having inherited aspects of Gilles‟ racing bravado, and 
as embracing a fearless approach to the risks and danger of Formula One despite 
his father‟s death (Donaldson, 2001; Hilton, 1997; Shirley, 2000).  While he may 
be his famous father‟s son, Jacques had a longer and more successful career than 
Gilles, scoring 235 points (including 11 wins, 13 poles and 9 fastest laps) from 
163 Grand Prix starts over ten seasons in Formula One.  During this time he raced 
for five Formula One teams: Williams (1996–1998), BAR (1999–2003), Renault 
(2004 – three races), Sauber (2005) and BMW-Sauber in 2006.  However, his has 
not been a seamless career.  In fact, Villeneuve‟s Formula One career can be best 
understood as a rise-and-fall sporting narrative (Whannel, 1999, 2001, 2002) of 
instant success confounded by failure and disappointing results (see Villeneuve‟s 
career sketch in Appendix One).  Despite his turbulent career and languishing 
further down the grid in his latter years, Villeneuve still managed to be successful 
and have longevity within the elitist and corporate sport of Formula One, as well 
as maintaining a strong fan following.  For example, on the sport‟s governing 
body, the Federation Internationale de l‟Automobile‟s (FIA - see Chapter Three) 
Formula One fan survey for 2006, Villeneuve received a 4% vote (or a placing of 
7th out of the 16 drivers that received votes) in the category of driver support; 
beaten only by (Michael) Schumacher 28%, Raikkonen 17%, Button 8%, Alonso 
7%, David Coulthard 6% and Montoya 5% (“FIA/AMD”, 2006).   
The condensed overview of „career highlights‟ is being presented here to 
make a case for Villeneuve‟s potential in exposing far more of how Formula One 
works as a cultural phenomenon than some of his peers.  In fact, as I will argue 
over the course of this thesis, Villeneuve provides an interesting study of a 
maverick and dissenting sport star who struggled to reconcile fleeting, „slippery‟ 
individualised displays of what we might think of as agency within the 
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determining constraints of the Formula One machine.  That is, his „maverick 
personality‟ (comprising appearance, dissent and risk-taking), proffered „traces of 
grit‟ within the sport‟s apparatuses (e.g., commerce, media, technology and the 
FIA) and, more broadly, his professional life seems to have been underpinned by 
a reluctance to accede to the seemingly sanitised and systematic world of Formula 
One.  While these „maverick traces‟ are developed later in the chapter (and further 
re-thought in relation to my own fandom in Chapter Seven), our attention first 
turns towards addressing a rather „obvious‟ question.   
Villeneuve as Homoerotic Spectacle? 
As a male fan of a male sport star, my mediated relationship with Villeneuve is 
inevitability confronted and even challenged by the assumption that a homosexual 
desire or a homoerotic component must underpin my investment.  A considerable 
body of work needs to be summarised before this can be addressed directly.  
Revealingly, much research on the audience/screen star interrelationship and, 
particularly, between male practices of identification and spectatorship centred 
around the screened male star image (Dyer, 1992; Gibson, 2004; Jeffords, 1993; 
Lehman, 1993; Neale, 1992, Tasker, 1993) tends to draw initially on Mulvey‟s 
(1975) landmark study of „visual pleasure‟ in the cinema.  Written from a cine-
psychoanalytical perspective, Mulvey‟s (1975) now familiar argument suggests 
that the visual pleasure in viewing a film is derived through scopophilia (the 
pleasure of looking at the screen), voyeurism (the unreciprocated nature of this 
look and pleasure in looking at another person as an object) and narcissism 
(fascination and identification with the on-screen image).  However, rather than a 
neutral visual pleasure, Mulvey (1975, 1988) argues that dominant narrative film 
is framed through the male gaze as a masculine spectatorial point-of-view.  
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Through cinematic framing, males are positioned as the active and principal 
protagonists in order to facilitate identification with the male characters, while 
women are objectified as spectacle through their framing as passive objects of 
desire (requiring the female spectator to negotiate an always problematic viewing 
position).  Although a highly influential work for various accounts of film, 
television, sport, video games, gender and audiences (e.g., Dragunoiu, 2001; 
Duncan & Brummett, 1989; Morse, 1983; Rehak, 2003; Williamson, 1996), 
Mulvey‟s initial theory was quickly challenged for only conceiving of the 
(heterosexual) male spectator.  Although Mulvey‟s later work and theorists 
influenced by it have explained same sex audience relations with screened males 
and females (e.g., see Mulvey, 1988; Stacey, 1991, 1994 on the female 
audience/star interrelationship), the possibility of the male figure as spectacle or 
object of erotic desire remained largely unacknowledged in Mulvey‟s work.   
Addressing the absence of a conceptualisation of a „male-on-male‟ gaze, film 
scholars such as Dyer (1992), Gibson (2004), Lehman (1993), Neale (1992) and 
Tasker (1993) suggest that the male body is in fact often visible and tends to be 
offered as spectacle in many kinds of cinema.  Jeffords (1993) notes that, 
US masculinity in Hollywood films of the 1980s was largely 
transcribed through spectacle and bodies, with the male body 
itself becoming often the most fulfilling form of spectacle.  
Throughout this period, the male body – principally the 
white male body – became increasingly a vehicle of display 
– of musculature, of beauty, of physical feats, and of a gritty 
toughness.  (p. 245) 
These scholars emphasise that activeness and performativity are central to 
screening masculinity, especially in „heroic‟ action-genre roles where the male 
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body is displayed as an „active‟ rather than passive spectacle.  A similar 
occurrence of display informs musicals, with the male body consistently operating 
as spectacle (Cohan, 1993; Neale, 1992), although the actual body on display is 
often clothed, concealed and imagined in distinction to the more visible 
physicality of male action-genre stars.  These observations reinforce Mulvey‟s 
(1975) notion that the cinema „classically‟ presents active men and passive 
women while at the same time recognising that the male body can be offered as 
spectacle.  Nonetheless, the distinctly „masculine‟ framing devices of cinema 
continue to make the explicit objectification of the male body problematic.  Neale 
(1992) suggests that, while cinematic framing offers the male as spectacle, “the 
male body cannot be marked explicitly as the erotic object of another male look” 
(p. 281) leading to the male body being disqualified as “an object of erotic 
contemplation and desire” (p. 281).  Often this disqualification of the male body is 
explicated through a physically „tortured‟ or suffering male body in action films 
(e.g., Colin Farrell in Hart‟s War, Daniel Craig in Casino Royale, or Sylvester 
Stallone and Bruce Willis in the Rambo and Die Hard films respectively), coupled 
with comical elements which to some degree mock the (sometimes dysfunctional) 
protagonist while he is performing his heroic deeds (Tasker, 1993).  Furthermore, 
this disqualification is usually accompanied by an extraordinariness to the male 
representation in terms of his (hyper)muscular body and/or the excessive violence, 
weaponry and scenarios through which a larger than life heroic male, and 
bloodied and bruised body, must prevail (Lehman, 1993; Neale, 1992).  The 
„unreality‟ of musical interludes also functions generically as a form of coded 
disqualification.  An additional noteworthy form of disqualification of the 
eroticised male body is the rise of male „stars-as-performers‟ (e.g., Robert De 
Niro and more recently, Christian Bale) who, through the explicit diversity of 
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acting roles taken on and, particularly, by deliberately displaying post-Method 
acting techniques, make the male body a site upon which performance is 
explicitly inscribed as the meaning (Geraghty, 2001).  Clearly, there are 
exceptions to these broad observations.  For example, although Brad Pitt is 
arguably convincing in his diversity of filmic performances, and provides a 
bloodied and battered „heroic‟ body (often offset by comic elements) in films such 
as Fight Club (Fincher, 1999), Snatch (Ritchie, 2000) and Troy (Petersen, 2004), 
it can be argued that the „disqualification‟ is loose, weak or slippery in this case; 
that Pitt‟s body does become a site for objectification and desire for both female 
and male audiences.  Gibson (2004) notes in relation to Pitt‟s „perfectly-muscled 
torso‟ in Fight Club, “our gaze is drawn inexorably towards him.  As in so many 
films, Pitt‟s body is fetishised, offered up, commodified” (p. 185).  Nevertheless, 
as has become apparent in the preceding discussion, this is a case of exceptions 
proving the rule and disqualification becomes a key concept for grasping the 
disavowal of the male body as (erotic) spectacle.  The term has broader potential 
for explaining the homoerotic in sport and will be returned to shortly.   
The ambiguous eroticisation of the male body in contemporary film (i.e., 
Brad Pitt, Christian Bale and Daniel Craig as still recognisably erotic objects of 
desire within the mechanisms of disqualification that limit the erotic) has been 
accompanied by the increasing commodification and objectification of men across 
other media forms in recent years, especially in television, magazines and 
advertising.  Reinforcing and reifying Baudrillard‟s (1998) evocation of the body 
as capital, as fetish and as the „finest consumer object‟, emerging notions of the 
„new man‟ in the 1980s and „new lads‟ in the 1990s further commercialised 
masculinity and led to a greater diversity in the (commodified) visual 
representations of male bodies (Beynon, 2004; Gibson, 2004; Mort, 1996; Nixon, 
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1996; Whannel, 2002).  However, Whannel (1993) suggests that the term the 
„new man‟ is “notoriously awkward to define” (p. 209), especially as this 
„newness‟ has undergone continual reinvention since the 1980s, most notably 
through the prominence of the related term „metrosexual‟ in the late 1990s 
(Beynon, 2004; Coad, 2008).  These emerging categories can be seen as 
„softening‟ or „feminising‟ traditional images of men, particularly in relation to 
the increasing emotional and nurturing roles men occupy but, also, due to 
„metrosexual‟ male roles being linked to “vanity, narcissism, exhibitionism” 
(Coad, 2008, p. 34).  At the same time, „new lads‟ provided a reactionary model 
of masculinity, espousing a hedonistic and reflexively aware working-class „lad‟ 
culture (see Beynon, 2004; Whannel, 2002).  New lads aside, though, a greater 
emphasis on male grooming and appearance undoubtedly accompanied the 
emergence of the so-called new man, with a concurrent rise in the numbers of 
men‟s clothing outlets and style magazines and the increased objectification and 
eroticization of the male body in commercialised visual representations (Nixon, 
1996).  Beynon (2004) notes that “the 1980s witnessed a change in the politics of 
looking as the „male-on-male‟ gaze joined the „male-on-female‟ (along with the 
female-on-male and even female-on-female) as socially acceptable” (p. 203).   
A subsidiary circulation of this „male-on-male‟ gaze is the male pin-up.  Dyer 
(1992) notes that while male pin-ups offer images of men as sexual spectacle for 
both females and males, particular attributes are embellished and emphasised, and 
they are not always what we might expect.  Evoking Mulvey‟s (1975) earlier 
cinematic analysis, Dyer argues that the „activeness‟ of men is significant, with 
men often framed as preoccupied (e.g., looking away from the camera) and posed 
as „doing something‟ to avoid giving the image an implicit passivity.  
Furthermore, there is the specific focus on and promotion of muscularity for the 
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male body within pin-ups.  Muscular men have been prominent in late nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century popular representations, stemming from the posed 
„strongmen‟ images of pioneering body-builders such as Eugen Sandow and 
Charles Atlas, Olympic swimmer Johnny Weissmuller (who played the role of 
Tarzan in twelve films between 1932-1948), through to the body-building 
physiques of actors such as Sylvester Stallone and Arnold Schwarzenegger (a 
seven times Mr Olympia) and even the contemporary hypermuscular appearance 
of professional wrestlers (e.g., Terry Bollea, better known as „Hulk Hogan‟, and 
Dwayne „the Rock‟ Johnson).  Dyer (1992) notes that, “muscularity is a key term 
in appraising men‟s bodies…Muscularity is the sign of power – natural, achieved, 
phallic” (p. 273).  Therefore, muscles are viewed as a sign of physical strength 
and a naturalised biological condition for men although, as Dyer reminds us, 
muscles are not natural but achieved.  For Dyer this offers an interesting paradox: 
the masculine body is framed through muscularity as a sign of phallic strength, 
but the penis cannot meet these expectations of power (especially in any depiction 
of a flaccid organ) and hence remains concealed, while nude male images conflate 
this power with the awkwardness of either the limp or erect penis appearing in 
juxtaposition to the (hyper)muscular body.
2
 
Eschewing the distractions of a Freudian or post-Freudian (e.g., Lacanian) 
theorisation of the phallus and the unconscious, similar interest in the significance 
of muscularity and symbolic frameworks of male power, especially through 
notions of hegemonic masculinity, have been pursued in the field of sport studies.  
In particular, sport has been predominantly represented as an often problematic 
and contested male bastion, as well as a site for male identity construction (e.g., 
Connell, 1990, 1995; McKay, Messner & Sabo, 2000; Messner, 1992; Messner & 
Sabo, 1990; Messner, Dunbar & Hunt, 2000; Pringle, 2001, 2003; Whannel, 1999, 
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2002).  The body is central to many analyses, with Duncan (1994) noting the 
obvious, that “the body is the ground for any investigation of sport or physical 
activity” (p. 48).  So the sport-body connection has been extensively dealt with in 
the sport sociology literature and need not be reviewed here (see Cole‟s [2000] 
exhaustive overview of „body studies‟ in sport).  What does need to be noted, 
despite Dyer‟s (1992) assertion that “sport is the area of life that is the most 
common contemporary source of male imagery” (p. 271), is the fact that the 
notion of the homoerotic and the male body as sexualised spectacle has received 
limited attention in the literature.
3
   
The opposite is true for women‟s sport, with scholars readily recognising that 
female athletes are often assessed in relation to their glamour, the beauty „ideal‟ or 
as the locus of an erotic spectacle, while media coverage frequently tends to focus 
on the appearance rather than performance of female sport stars (e.g., Caudwell, 
2003; Creedon, 1994; Daddario, 1998; Davis, 1997; Giardina, 2001; Hargreaves, 
2000; Harris & Clayton, 2002; Jones et al., 1999; Smith, 2006; Wensing & Bruce, 
2003).  Indeed, women‟s sport has undergone a „sexing up‟ process through attire 
(e.g., beach volleyball regulations and women‟s tennis outfits as „fashion‟), while 
the athletic female body has an increased subsidiary circulation as an eroticised 
commodity for sport, in endorsements and within male-saturated consumer 
markets (e.g., at its most blatant, Anna Kournikova, Maria Sharapova and Danica 
Patrick posed in bikinis for the Sports Illustrated swimsuit edition).  Of course, 
male athletes also circulate as non-sporting pin-ups, offering their bodies as erotic 
spectacle (e.g., in some women‟s magazines) and, through fashion endorsements, 
are often simultaneously commodifying the male body.  But Coad (2008) 
insightfully explains this as the “ubiquitous publicity of sportsmen standing or 
lying in their boxers or briefs [which] invites all men to enjoy sartorial erotics, to 
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learn seductiveness, and to take pleasure in attracting the gaze” (p. 116).  
„Learning seductiveness‟ fits the self-conscious desirability of „metrosexual‟ 
males, whose exhibitionist and narcissistic displays playfully confound Mulvey‟s 
(1975) „passive‟ or disavowed male.  For example, male stars such as Michael 
Jordan (Hanes), David Beckham (Armani) and New Zealand Rugby player Daniel 
Carter (Jockey) have been photographed only in the branded underwear of their 
respective companies.  Such advertisements offer a commodified, „metrosexually‟ 
erotic spectacle (to a self-consciously limited degree) which is, in turn, re-
masculinised through the muscular body‟s promise of strength and action (see 
also Dyer, 1992). 
Going rather more deeply into the interrelationship between sport and sex, 
Guttmann (1996) argues that the erotic is inherent to sport (especially within 
spectator responses since ancient times) yet, perversely, has been repressed in 
contemporary sport scholarship.  Tracing various elements of the erotic across 
historical periods, he notes that the sexual attractiveness of physically trained 
bodies in motion or rest was acknowledged and celebrated in ancient times.  That 
is, there was not only a homoerotic element clearly present for spectators but sport 
provided an important site for men to forge the homosexual relations that were 
valued as a higher form of friendship, in Classical Greece for instance, than male-
female relations.  Civilizing processes attempted to repress sport‟s erotic elements 
throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance, while Victorian prudery sealed its 
fate through, for example, controlling the appropriateness of female sporting 
participation and attire.  Moreover, even contemporary neo-Marxist and feminist 
scholars, concerned about the commodified sexualisation of sport in capitalism 
and patriarchy have, perhaps inadvertently, further marginalised the erotic as an 
explanatory concept in this particular social domain.  Nevertheless, across this 
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broad timeframe, Guttmann identifies numerous examples of how sport has 
aroused and stimulated sexual desire for both players and spectators through both 
the bodies on display in competitions and also the literary accounts and visual 
representations generated by sport.  Thus, although not every sport or athlete 
necessarily affords an erotic element, according to Guttmann there remains a 
fundamentally erotic pleasure in sport.  This is most pronounced through an often 
idealised body on display for both sexes which is marked as sexually attractive, 
desirable and a site for emulation for both female and male audiences (e.g., the 
muscular Greek athlete as an idealised and timeless representation of the 
masculine body, while being „fit‟ or „in shape‟ are often euphemisms for being 
sexually attractive).  So, Guttmann implies that a homoerotic element is in 
operation when male spectators watch male sports, noting, (1996) 
There is no reason to doubt in these post-Freudian days that 
there is a homosexual component in the heterosexual‟s 
responses to athletes of his or her own sex.  The frenzy of 
the mostly male spectators at a boxing match must be more 
than the excitement occasioned by the demonstration of the 
manly art of self-defence.  (p. 146)   
However, Guttmann does not pursue this homoerotic element in significant depth, 
acknowledging that narcissism and exhibitionism are clearly part of the erotic 
dimension for same sex viewers (e.g., male and female bodybuilding, as well as 
both sexes taking up sport to „perfect‟ the body) while, within male sport, team 
bonding tends to be a solidarity in hostility towards the opposition rather than a 
homoerotic bond.  So we need to look a little deeper still. 
For Pronger (1990, 1998, 1999) sport maintains and produces gendered 
boundaries, with sport providing the “aura of explicit heterosexuality and the 
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opportunity for implicit homosexuality” (Pronger, 1998, p. 283).  These gendered 
boundaries are based on a gender myth which is articulated and circulates as 
natural yet are underpinned by power relations which emphasise and reinforce the 
strength of men: women are marked as weak and subordinate through difference.  
Such gender relations are strained when homosexuality is considered.  Pronger 
(1990) reminds us that although gay images and interpretations of sport are 
readily available, homosexuality in both sport and broader society is still 
marginalised through a range of discursive practices (e.g., linguistic, legal, 
medical, etc.) which sustain a monolithic vision of masculine „normality‟.  In 
particular, while homosocial behaviour and bonding is encouraged, homosexuality 
is still often condemned through homophobic practices (see also Coad, 2008).  
This can be extrapolated to incorporate Sedgwick‟s (1992) idea of the double-bind 
that recognises a “potential unbrokenness of a continuum between homosocial and 
homosexual” (p. 1).  Thus, according to Sedgwick, the „homosocial‟ is an 
oxymoron, shaped through patterns of male friendship and bonding, but primarily 
by means that distinguish such bonding from the homosexual (e.g., homophobia).  
Moreover, male-male-female erotic triangles are often forged which deflect or 
negate homoeroticism by using women as symbolic and exchangeable property 
within patriarchal heterosexuality to solidify male kinships and their homosocial 
relationships (while, more broadly, maintaining and transmitting patriarchal 
power).   
Pronger asks, (1990) “what is the gay fascination with athletes and their 
muscles?  To begin with, this homoerotic appeal is the eroticization of 
masculinity.  A masculine body is a hard, muscular, athletic body” (p. 128).  The 
erotic interest in other athletically masculine men provides what Pronger (1990) 
argues is “at once a reverence for and a violation of masculinity” (p. 135) as the 
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traditional gender myth of opposite power (male domination and female 
subordination) is undermined by gay men desiring other physically strong men.  
The appropriation of bodybuilding by gay subcultures is a notable example, as the 
cosmetic focus on building a hypermuscular male body is then displayed in 
competitions as a “homoerotic burlesque” (Pronger, 1990, p. 170) while, 
paradoxically, disqualifying the erotic „posing‟ as „athletic‟ and an interest in 
physiques.  While insightful, Pronger‟s (1990) exploration of the homoerotic 
produces for gay audiences implicit or explicit erotic readings of the relationship 
between sport, male athletes, desire and sex.  This leads to problematic 
assumptions for heterosexual male athletes/spectators that sport is a “covert world 
of homoeroticism” (Pronger, 1990, p. 178), equating sporting competition itself 
with homosexual sex while reducing male sport spectators to „couch potato‟ 
stereotypes (e.g., lethargic, overweight and sexually sedentary).  Most 
troublesome is his summation that “the interest male sports fans have in their 
athletic heroes probably involves the deeply submerged pleasures of homoerotic 
sniffing” (Pronger, 1990, p. 187).   
Drawing back from such „submerged‟ impulses, Morse (1983) returns us to 
the notion of an overarching disavowal or disqualification through the discourses 
of sport and its televisual representation.  Morse (1983) notes that,  
If athletic bodies are the commodities of sport, the look at 
the image of male bodies in motion is what television has to 
offer the viewer.  Because this image of masculine power 
and perfection is the commodity upon which television bases 
its exchange between sponsor and viewer, it is clearly in the 
interest of the medium to maximise spectacle while 
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maintaining mechanisms of disavowal which maintain the 
sanctity of sport.  (p. 59) 
Thus, according to Morse (1983), sport maintains a “careful balance of „play and 
display‟” (p. 45), framing active men performing their athletic feats on the field 
but disavowing the elements of erotic pleasure such representations may proffer.  
In particular, she notes that while sport commentators instruct viewers to pay 
attention to these displays of athleticism and, specifically, to the male body 
demonstrating this prowess, such instructions are coded and contained within 
sporting discourses focused on evaluating performance rather than eroticising the 
male body.  Any covert, deeply buried homoerotic „sniffing‟ of males by males is 
less interesting than the carefully organised mechanisms of disavowal and 
disqualification of such impulses, if they exist at all.  The disqualification of the 
erotic is underpinned by a range of specific televisual techniques such as close-
ups and especially slow motion replays which, while paradoxically providing the 
viewer with a sense of the grace and beauty of a body in (slow) motion, are 
imbued with the scientific function of displaying this (often fragmented) body for 
analysis.  Therefore, while televisual techniques such as slow motion offer an 
aesthetic and potentially erotic spectacle of the male body, Morse (1983) argues 
that instead such techniques operate as “a very effective mechanism for 
disavowal; every look of a „man at his exhibitionist like‟ is transformed into a 
scientific inquiry into the limits of human performance” (p. 45).  Hence, although 
the athletic male body is clearly on display and presented as spectacle in sport, the 
potential homoerotic male-on-male gaze is disqualified by discourses of sporting 
performance and the male body reinscribed as a site for supposedly scientific or 
technical analysis.   
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So I would first contend that, despite my intense affective investment in 
Jacques Villeneuve, his role as a Formula One driver by definition disqualifies 
any uncontradictory homoerotic reading.  This claim rests further on the 
interweaving of two adjacent sets of relationships.  The first is Formula One‟s 
presence-absence style of televisual representation which, through this framing 
convention, accords a further level of anonymity to the already obscured racing 
driver.  Second, embodiment operates in a contradictory manner in Formula One; 
providing an „absent‟ sporting body which foregrounds technology and the de-
eroticised reliance viewers place in inanimate objects (e.g., cars, corporate logos 
and helmets) as identificatory mechanisms due to the „disappearance‟ of the 
sporting body during the majority of the telecast.  Additionally, during point-of-
view (POV) representations (Chapter Five), the corporeal driver becomes a 
temporal and spatial surrogate body which is both drawn upon and supplanted by 
the viewer in these specific instances.  Collectively these overlapping features of 
presence-absence, de-eroticisation and supplanted embodiment further disqualify 
the homoerotic as the body disappears at the most specific moments of intensity 
during Formula One race coverage.  
The first disqualifying mechanism, of televised Formula One providing a 
presence-absence, is a reversal of the concept of absence-presence in film.  
Derived from Barthes (1981), Ellis (1992) posits that cinema offers a paradox of 
signification.  For Ellis (1992), “the cinematic image (and the film performance) 
rests on the photo effect, the paradox that the photograph presents an absence that 
is present” (p. 93).  For example, unlike the immediate and direct domestic 
address of television, film provides the paradox for audiences of experiencing a 
filmic event, narrative or image that has already been (the absence) yet, 
paradoxically, is experienced first-hand in the present (as a presence).  Moreover, 
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stars are „present‟ and available for desire cinematically but are ultimately absent 
and unattainable outside of celluloid (e.g., see Dyer, 1979, 1986, 1998; Ellis, 
1992, Geraghty, 2000).
4
  However, cinema‟s absence-presence is less pervasive in 
sport since its mediation is predominantly televisual but, more importantly in the 
case of live sport, because it is contemporaneous; being shown in real time, often 
globally, to signify a simultaneous presence.  The live image, which is 
experienced contemporaneously by audiences, diminishes the cinematic photo-
effect, with its dependence on the disjuncture of real and recorded time as well as 
space (see Cubitt, 1991).   
Most pertinent for our discussion here is Formula One‟s televised framing.  
With the cameras focusing on cars, action shots (e.g., on-track battles, crashes, 
etc.) and primarily following the race or championship leaders, not all drivers can 
be seen regularly, nor is an individual driver followed continuously during a race.
5
  
Due to this framing, I would suggest that film‟s absence-presence (Ellis, 1992) is 
replaced by a presence-absence in live Formula One coverage.  Like other forms 
of live televised sport, this viewing experience is contemporaneous (a presence 
that is simultaneously the present) yet while viewers know 20 (or 22) drivers are 
circulating in the race, many are absent and/or unseen despite clearly also being 
present and actively competing in the race.  Obviously, such a phenomenon is not 
restricted to Formula One but, rather, a regular occurrence across a broad array of 
sports when it is not possible to frame all of the competitors at once (ranging from 
larger scale events, such as golf, running marathons and cycling events, to the 
inability to always see all field sport competitors in say, rugby, league or football).  
However, while Formula One is geographically and spatially challenging to 
televise, it is surprising that particular drivers can be rarely seen during an entire 
race given the numerous, sophisticated media technologies deployed in the sport 
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(discussed in more depth in Chapter Four).  Moreover, with its elite and global 
status, exorbitant costs, corporate interests and relatively small number of active 
competitors, the fact that drivers finishing in the points are not always televised is 
more astonishing (e.g., Villeneuve‟s sixth place at the 2003 Italian Grand Prix, 
largely unseen by the cameras, except during the opening and closing lap 
sequences).  While this may be read as a not disinterested observation, it should 
be noted that, economically, points finishes are potentially worth millions of 
dollars to the teams.  For example, in 2002, Villeneuve and then team-mate, 
Oliver Panis, finished fourth and fifth respectively to collect British American 
Racing‟s (BAR) first points for the season at the British Grand Prix.  This not only 
ensured the team and drivers substantial television coverage during the race but, 
additionally, was reputedly worth “$15 million in television money” (“Paddock 
confidential”, 2002, p. 14) for the BAR team.  Underlying the distribution of 
Formula One‟s „television money‟ is the assumption that points scorers will 
receive television coverage on these occasions and hence their teams are entitled 
to a specific sum of money at the end of the season, based upon the points 
accumulated (hence BAR would earn a minimum of $15 million at the end of 
2002).  Thus, with television coverage often literally equating to money for the 
teams, such a financial arrangement underscores why the concept of presence-
absence is more than a theoretical one in Formula One‟s televisual representation, 
specifically when money-earning point scorers are not framed as „present‟.   
More significantly for our homoerotic focus, due to this process of presence-
absence and the relative anonymity of drivers while racing (including visual 
signifiers which will be discussed shortly), the driver‟s name takes on greater 
significance as a referent.  In particular, it is through the use of on-screen text and 
race commentary that the name-as-referent functions to ascertain identity.  
22 
Therefore, one needs to follow the name-as-referent through on-screen text to 
know the position of drivers when they are not being visually represented.  These 
observations are salient for internet coverage, as live-timing of all sessions (see 
Chapter Three) is solely text-based and lists the names and times of each driver 
according to position.  As a result, positing viewership of the Formula One driver 
as homoerotic is triply vexed; especially when one considers that the mediated 
Formula One star image and particularly, the body, seem to operate largely 
outside of the Grand Prix sphere or through the televised dichotomy of a 
presence-absence and the star name as a textual referent.  This seems to work 
differently from most other sports where the star image/body is accessible and 
available during the live telecast (e.g., the tennis player, the footballer); Formula 
One conceals rather than displays the athletic male body, reducing the star to a 
name-as-referent and an adjoining set of technically organised visual signifiers 
during a Grand Prix.
6
  Put simply, Formula One provides so many challenges to 
realising even a subliminal homoerotic „sniffing‟ that one has to ask, why go to 
the trouble when there are more accessible objects of such interest? 
This introduces us to the second key means for disqualifying the homoerotic 
as an adequate explanatory framework for my fandom: the absence of a sporting 
body.  In fact, as will be noted at various points within the thesis, Formula One 
drivers are paradoxically anonymous when they perform in a Grand Prix.  This 
anonymity stems from not only the presence-absence style of televisual framing 
but also the racing garb they wear, which conceals their face and body.  The sense 
of anonymity and concealment is captured by Kennedy (2000), who likens the 
Formula One driver to a knight going into battle, asserting that the “symbolic 
armour and vehicle for the warrior hero is provided by the helmet, protective 
clothing and racing car, which so engulfs the driver as to completely obscure him” 
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(Kennedy, 2000, p. 65).  Televised Formula One coverage exacerbates the 
conditions of anonymity.  In New Zealand, televisual coverage only crosses live 
five minutes prior to the start of the race when the drivers are usually already in 
their racing gear and strapped into their cars.  Moreover, during the live telecasts, 
drivers remain concealed and immersed within their cars while racing, with only a 
helmet and their upper torsos visible for viewers (the car and helmet as de-
eroticised identificatory mechanisms will be developed in due course).  So, 
presence-absence, anonymity and concealment produce an absence of the sporting 
body in Formula One.   
These observations are buttressed by the role of the car and technology in the 
sport, as technology and the machine determine, to a large extent, the performance 
of drivers based on the quality of the car (as will be explored in Chapter Three).  
More importantly, the body does not only meld simply with the machine, but 
literally „disappears‟ by being cocooned within the cockpit.  This diverges from 
„cyborg theory‟ which argues for a dehumanising condition through the breaching 
of technology and nature, the increasing symbiosis of humans with machines and 
a literal reading of the human body as a machine (Haraway, 1991, 1994; Shilling, 
2005; Springer, 1996).  Despite the often „robotic‟ characteristics of many 
contemporary drivers (again, outlined in Chapter Three), I posit that, conversely, 
Formula One‟s man-machine interrelationship does not operate in the same 
manner as Haraway‟s (1994) „machine-organism hybrid‟ theorised through the 
cyborg.  Rather, the driver remains a human agent (though „agency‟ will be put 
through considerable revision as a term within this thesis); although, of course, he 
relinquishes much of his performance (and bodily) capabilities to the machine.  
These factors also have profound implications for interpretively disqualifying the 
homoerotic.  Transposing the dehumanised process of cyborg theory, the Formula 
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One driver‟s body becomes de-eroticised through its absence and literal 
disappearance within the machine: the body is rendered obsolete as a source for 
(homo)erotic spectacle, display, investment or even „sniffing‟.  This argument is 
supported by the role the car clearly plays as the primary means for viewer 
identification.  Through the absent driver‟s body predominantly concealed during 
live telecasts, viewers and fans are required to forge de-eroticised identificatory 
relations with inanimate objects and the car operates as the first layering for such 
an identificatory process.  While I will return to the role of the car in relation to 
driver performance in Chapter Three, I now want to emphasise the de-eroticised 
identificatory role of the car and other inanimate objects and how these further 
disqualify a homoerotic reading of the male on male gaze.   
Windsor (2005b) has noted the obvious, that televised Formula One coverage 
tends to focus on the cars and generally these become more identifiable than the 
drivers controlling them through their decals, colour schemes and corporate 
branding.  Clearly this is not always the case, as similar shades of red, grey and 
black meant that the McLaren and MidlandF1 cars bore a close resemblance in 
2006.  Nevertheless, car/team colour schemes become the first means to 
distinguish between teams and to identify specific drivers.  Thus, viewers need to 
construct a de-eroticised identification with the car in the first instance.  
Eschewing a Freudian over-simplification of the car-as-phallic, such a process is 
not vicissitudinous in terms of transposing the (homo)eroticism of the absent male 
body onto the machine; the car remains inanimate and de-eroticised as it is devoid 
of (or significantly reduces) the human component of engagement and functions 
solely as an identificatory mechanism for viewers.  For example, during 
Villeneuve‟s years at BAR (1999-2003), my identificatory process as a fan was 
simplified by looking for the two white-coloured cars to distinguish the BAR team 
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from the remaining cars on the grid (although BAR ran a multi-coloured car for 
the 1999 season).  Therefore, the car/team colour scheme constructed many de-
eroticised moments of simple recognition and identification with the inanimate 
machine, clearly devoid of a (homo)erotic component at those moments. 
Other inanimate objects are also drawn upon by the viewer and/or fan for 
identificatory purposes.  The second mechanism resides in the branding of the 
cars (and drivers) and, again as a fan, I was reliant on recognising the corporate 
logos of Lucky Strike cigarettes to further distinguish the white BAR cars from 
other teams (e.g., the white and blue Williams‟ cars between 2000 and 2002).  As 
inanimate symbols and decals, these corporate logos are both a ubiquitous and 
banal means for differentiating cars and teams, rather than proffering any 
eroticised opportunity in their own right.  However, on occasions, the logos are 
reinscribed with an explicit erotic function by branding the scantily-clad „pit-
babes‟ or „grid-girls‟ for promotional purposes, as will also be discussed in 
relation to „glamour‟ and gender in Chapter Three.  Although the drivers are also 
bedecked with corporate logos, I would suggest that these function as 
commodified rather than eroticised displays as, contrarily, the drivers‟ bodies are 
not available as spectacle.  Indeed, by covering, concealing and brand-saturating 
the clothed male body, these logos have a further de-eroticising effect.  Moreover, 
not surprisingly, drivers are often photographed beside the submissively-posed 
promotional females in an „active‟ manner and resplendent in their racing garb to 
potentially both legitimise and re-assert their heterosexuality, while offering a 
stereotypical means for disavowing any latent homoerotic reading.   
As the driver‟s name and/or racing number are not usually provided on the 
car (this would take up valuable sponsorship space),
7
 three other inanimate objects 
are also drawn upon for identificatory purposes and are most significant for 
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recognising the specific individual driver within a team/car.  The first of these has 
already been discussed - the driver‟s name which often reduces the driver to a text 
or sign.  For the culturally literate viewer/fan (we will return to Bourdieu‟s 
notions of literacy and capital in Chapter Six), two other inanimate objects are 
also provided as the fourth and fifth (driver-specific) identificatory mechanisms in 
Formula One.  The fourth is the colouring of the on-board-camera (OBC) above 
the air box which, since 2004, has been painted red for the lead driver and black 
for the second driver (yellow has subsequently been substituted for black since 
2008).  Clearly this signifier relies upon the viewer/fan already knowing the 
designation of driver status within each specific team in any given season.  Taken 
together, name-as-referent and OBC-as-signifier remain as inanimate objects that 
serve the purpose of providing identificatory mechanisms in the sport which, it 
would seem, are impossible to invest with any (homo)erotic dimension.   
The fifth and arguably more significant identificatory mechanism for 
discerning specific drivers is one of the few fragments of a driver‟s body visible 
above the cockpit - the driver‟s helmet.  Outside of the car/team colour 
distinctions traced thus far, the driver‟s helmet becomes the primary means for 
differentiating between teammates in any given season.  In fact, despite being an 
inanimate object, the helmet affords a degree of fan (not viewer) identification and 
investment, not through an erotic orientation, but due to its signification as one of 
the few traces of implied driver agency within the sport.  Rather than the team 
colours and corporate branding of the car and driver overalls, the helmet design is 
of the driver‟s own choosing and is one of the few visible signs of the „individual‟ 
driver in Formula One (although, simultaneously, the helmet becomes 
territorialised and commodified through team and sponsor logos).  For example, 
many of the drivers provide colour schemes on their helmets which reflect their 
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nationality (e.g., Brazilian Felipe Massa, Englishman Jenson Button and Scottish 
driver David Coulthard) while Villeneuve has drawn on his famous father‟s 
helmet design but infused this with multiple colours.  In fact, Villeneuve has had 
one of the most distinctive helmet designs during his career, providing a vivid 
colour scheme composed of blue, pink, yellow, green and red which makes him 
stand out as a driver and is instantly identifiable for his fans (and to the culturally 
literate non-Villeneuve fans knowledgeable in Formula One), as are most other 
driver helmets for knowledgeable viewers or fans.  Therefore, to a fan, 
Villeneuve‟s bright helmet design contrasted significantly with the team/car 
colours across his career (most notably with his white BAR 2000-2003 and for 
BMW in 2006) and became a crucial site for fan investment of interest.   
Although Freudian readings of the helmet (and, as noted, the car) as phallic 
provide the possible terrain for a homoerotic theorisation of fan investments, this 
perspective will be repudiated here in favour of the less reductive affective 
investments fans construct with their objects of fandom.  When watching Formula 
One either televisually or at the track, the car is often not accompanied with a 
televisual signifier (e.g., the on screen textual display of the driver name) and is 
extremely difficult to discern at velocity track-side.  Therefore, while the car 
colour and corporate logos have a primary function, it is the visible helmet that is 
drawn upon by the culturally literate viewer/fan to confirm and differentiate 
individual driver identity.  More importantly for the fan, it is the temporal and 
spatial intensity of that moment of recognition that (re)invigorates the affective 
investment (e.g., knowing that Villeneuve is on-screen or on the track in front of 
me and not his teammate).  The helmet operates as not only an identificatory 
mechanism but affords a temporal and spatial intensity of affective investment 
(Grossberg, 1992b) for culturally literate fans (these notions of affect, intensity 
28 
and literacy are developed further in Chapters Six and Seven).  Reconnecting the 
role of the helmet, as a trigger of affective investment, to the broader range of 
inanimate objects detailed thus far, we see that, collectively, the car, corporate 
logos, name-as-referent, painted OBC and the driver‟s helmet primarily function 
as entirely de-eroticised identificatory mechanisms for viewers and fans.   
The preceding discussion has argued, at the very least, that embodiment and 
identification work in contradictory ways in Formula One, with the driver 
relatively anonymous and providing an absent body due to Formula One‟s style of 
televisual representation, while embodiment is also seemingly irrelevant at times 
with the literal disappearance of the body within the machine and behind the 
corporate logos.  This final point can be further developed to consider how the 
contradictory duality of concealment and commodification itself works to further 
disqualify the homoerotic reading.  The primary evasion of the anonymous and 
absent driver/body representation is post-race, when a more sustained focus is 
provided for the top three finishers at any Grand Prix, while other drivers are 
occasionally and briefly framed post-race (e.g., exiting their cars, being weighed 
at scrutineering, etc.).  Given Villeneuve‟s lack of success during my period of 
fandom (1998-2006), I have only seen Villeneuve on the podium and in the top-
three post-race television interviews on four occasions (twice in 1998 and 2001) 
meaning that he has had limited coverage on New Zealand broadcasts.   
The other predominant visible display is driver retirements during the race.  If 
detected by the cameras, the driver is usually televised in a fleeting manner 
walking back to the pits.  Villeneuve‟s numerous retirements provided higher 
visibility outside of the car, framing him trudging back to the pits due to car 
failure (with regularity during 1999, 2002 and 2003), walking after a crash (e.g., 
Italy, 1998; Canada, 2000 and Germany, 2006) or, most spectacularly, leaping 
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from a car which was on fire (e.g., Austria 2002; Bahrain, 2006).  The 
representation of Villeneuve outside of the car due to retirements provides a 
paradox by offering higher visibility (albeit fleeting) for television viewers yet 
still confounds any theorising of the male as spectacle.  Problematically, although 
Villeneuve is now observable outside of the car, there is not an athletic body on 
display as he remains covered and concealed in his racing overalls.  In fact, as 
posited earlier, the spectacle provided is not eroticised but commodified, as the 
overalls are emblazoned with sponsored logos and corporate branding and 
symbolically transform the driver into a walking billboard.  Thus, for example, 
during Villeneuve‟s years (and numerous retirements) with the BAR team, his 
overalls had resplendent Lucky Strike logos on both his legs, mid-section, at 
throat level and on either his helmet or team cap.  Corporate logos literally 
commodified Villeneuve‟s entire body while the body itself remained concealed 
and de-eroticised, unavailable for objectification or display.  Villeneuve as a 
specific example especially problematises the concealed body in any case, as his 
predilection for baggy and loose fitting overalls (and team gear more broadly) 
made the recognition of his specific physique less overt than for the majority of 
the other drivers who, through their preference for tight-fitting apparel, arguably 
made the shape and form of the male body easier to discern.   
The eyes become a key identificatory mechanism on the racing grid when 
cameras zoom-in on the driver‟s open visor and the eyes operate as another 
individualised layering to the representation (see also Kennedy, 2000).  
Nevertheless, as the driver‟s face and eyes are predominantly shielded by helmets 
during the telecast, as well as drivers often utilising tinted visors (further 
contributing to a sense of anonymity), these displays are an irregular occurrence.  
At best, the eyes afford only a fleeting identificatory mechanism, potentially to 
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pique audience attention and anticipation at the start of a race (e.g., the 
representation of „focused‟ driver‟s eyes) and are difficult if not impossible to 
interpret in terms of (homo)erotic attention.   
As will be evident through the detailed discussion in Chapter Five, the point-
of-view (POV) representations provided by the OBC do become significant for 
viewer identification.  While the body is generally absent during a Formula One 
telecast, the OBC presents a temporal and spatial driver‟s body for display.  Thus, 
the OBC seemingly reverses the absence and disappearance of the body.  
However, rather than eroticising, it will be argued that the re-appearance and re-
presentation of the body serve a specific temporal and spatial identificatory 
function.  On the one hand, the driver‟s body stabilises the coherence of the racing 
image and Grand Prix narrative by providing a „real‟ driver to make viewers 
aware of the contemporaneous, „real‟ racing action being screened before them.  
On the other hand, with only fragments of the driver‟s body framed, such as 
moving arms operating the steering wheel (and still concealed by racing overalls, 
gloves and helmets), this is operating outside of the eroticisation of fragmented 
body parts typically utilised in other media (e.g., the emphasis on women‟s legs or 
cleavage as erotic spectacle, or on isolated forms of muscularity for men 
discussed earlier).  In fact, these fragmented bodies afford the spatial 
identificatory mechanism of „placing‟ viewers within the cockpit and facilitate a 
seemingly „shared‟ visual Grand Prix driving perspective during these OBC shots.  
We will discuss this process (and the use of POV in cinema more broadly) as the 
construction of „mutual embodiment‟ in Chapter Five, as this allows viewers of 
either media to simultaneously share and occupy the first-person, embodied 
perspective and space of the POV protagonist.  Nevertheless, this also functions as 
a de-eroticised form of supplanted embodiment.  Through the processes of both a 
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mutual and supplanted embodiment, the OBC, paradoxically, re-contributes to the 
disappearance of the body while rendering it visible in a fragmented form.  As the 
viewer can share the screen space and fragmented body of the driver, they 
conceivably also supplant and replace the actual driver being framed.  This also 
displaces the homoerotic potential of the represented driver, if it exists, as his 
body and subjectivity are also jettisoned during such perspectives.  In this respect, 
as a temporal and spatial identificatory mechanism, as well as a mediated form of 
embodied occupation, supplanted embodiment arguably makes the fragmented 
body „disappear‟ once more, emptying it of any eroticised effect.  
In conclusion, it is apparent that the male body is theorised as fundamental to 
(homo)erotic notions of the spectacle in films, advertising and sport.  In particular, 
the potential erotic dimension within a male on male gaze resides in the framing, 
representation and visible display of a male body for objectification.  Formula 
One problematises and ultimately disqualifies homoerotic readings of the male on 
male gaze for, unlike most visual representations of masculinity, Formula One 
reduces the visibility and role of the body during a Grand Prix.  Through the 
sport‟s specific conditions of anonymity, the athletic male body is concealed by 
layers of protective gear, is framed as an absence through a presence-absence 
televisual representational style and literally „disappears‟ within the machine.  
Conversely, Formula One proffers a set of inanimate objects for identification due 
to the absence and/or disappearance of the male body.  Thus, the car, corporate 
logos, the driver‟s name-as-referent, painted OBC and the driver‟s helmet 
function as identificatory mechanisms for viewers and fans.  With this reliance on 
inanimate objects, such forms of identification and display become de-eroticised 
and serve to disqualify homoerotic conceptualisations of desire, spectacle, 
identification or investment in Formula One.  Of course, the key point about 
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disqualification mechanisms (both within Formula One‟s construction and my 
reading of the sport) is that they recognise the existence, at some level, of the 
thing that they seek to disqualify (even if only at the level of male-on-male 
sniffing).  By denying that I spent years as a couch potato, homoerotic „sniffer‟ of 
Jacques Villeneuve, I am not denying the reality of homoerotic impulses; rather, I 
have been arguing that the disqualification is the greater truth here, that it points 
us towards a more informative reading of Formula One. 
Villeneuve‟s Sport Stardom: The „Rebel‟ and the „Maverick‟ 
The Rebel 
By disqualifying the homoerotic, a second „obvious‟ explanatory framework for 
Villeneuve‟s appeal to fans looms large instead and also needs to be addressed; 
his allegedly subversive functioning as the Formula One „rebel‟.  Dyer‟s (1979) 
landmark study of film stars considers how they „function‟, circulate (e.g., as 
images, texts and personas) and, more broadly, why stars are significant in a 
socio-cultural, economic and semiotic sense.  For our present purposes, Dyer‟s 
analysis of stars as social types provides the fertile ground for investigating a 
rebel analogy.  According to Dyer (1979), a crucial attribute for film stars is “their 
typicality or representativeness.  Stars, in other words, relate to the social types of 
a society” (p. 53).  Drawing on Klapp (1962), Dyer traces the idealized and 
collective representations that, it is proposed, offer “a typology of prevalent social 
types in America” (Dyer, 1979, p. 53), ranging across the „good Joe‟, the „tough 
guy‟, the „pin-up‟ and so on.  The „Rebel Hero‟, it is contended, provides an 
alternative or subversive type by suggesting either the rejection of, or an 
alternative vision for, the „dominant‟ values that most of these other types 
embody.  He also notes that a sub-categorical distinction is made between anomie 
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and alienation within the rebel typology.  To further elaborate, Dyer (1979) 
suggests that, 
To put the difference between the concepts crudely, we may 
say that people are said to feel „anomic‟ because they do not 
fit in with prevailing norms and/or because they see the 
latter‟s pointless, whereas people are said to feel „alienated‟ 
because the goals of society and the norms which carry them 
are the goals and norms of groups other than those to which 
the people in question belong.  (p. 59) 
Dyer (1979) finds this distinction to be essentially reductive, arguing that “the 
type itself is problematic because, firstly, most of the heroes are either actually 
anomic or largely so.., so that in the case of those that are not, the 
alienated/materialistic elements are liable to be subsumed under anomie” (p. 60, 
italics in original).  As an example, he turns to the stars, John Garfield, Albert 
Finney and Jane Fonda, to suggest that it is not through their positioning as 
immigrant, worker or woman respectively that they are rebelling, but because they 
did not fit within those particular, collective positionings.  In many respects, albeit 
as a perfunctory observation, we can suggest that Villeneuve also demonstrates 
these „anomic‟ elements; seemingly rebelling against the prevailing norms and 
structures of Formula One while finding the associated corporate ethos, 
expectations and broader complicity of his fellow drivers contestable, banal or 
„pointless‟ (see discussion of Villeneuve as reluctant commodity later in this 
chapter).   
Other broader criteria for the „rebel hero‟ are also traced, with Dyer (1979) 
noting that “most of the heroes are male in very traditional ways” (p. 61) and that 
“inarticulacy (a symptom of anomie) is the defining characteristic of the type”  
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(p. 61).
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  While, on the one hand, an argument can be made for Villeneuve 
signifying traditional masculinity through the bravado and risk-taking associated 
with race-car driving (itself steeped in a long history of being a predominantly 
male domain), on the other hand, the notion of inarticulacy does not seem to „fit‟.  
That is, the brooding, mumbled and often incoherent filmic depictions that we 
associate with James Dean, as the archetypal rebel figure in Dyer‟s sense, are not 
as readily transposed onto Villeneuve.  In fact, one of Villeneuve‟s central 
„rebellious‟ traits has been his representation as a vocal dissenter.  For example, 
many of the Formula One drivers reproduce and recycle clichéd PR statements in 
their interviews and press conferences with Pat Symonds, executive director of 
engineering for the Renault team, quoted in F1 Racing magazine as bemoaning, 
“press conferences can be as dull as ditch water – contrived questions, corporate 
answers, no real thought, no antagonism, no fighting, no one saying what they 
really mean, no bloody spark.  Dreadful” (“The future of f1”, 2006, p. 94).  By 
contrast, Villeneuve‟s reputation as a forthright, brash and, at times, controversial 
speaker was valued by some within the press, whereby he was lauded for being 
“so fabulously quotable” (Bishop, 2005, p. 85) and for providing “a welcome bite 
to the bubbles of cliché which clog the paddock” (McRae, 2005, para. 2). 
While this apparent quality of articulate outspokenness seemingly 
problematises an easy transference of the „rebel-hero‟ tag onto Villeneuve, Dyer 
(1979) also raises the point that, “the narratives of the films in which these stars 
appeared tend to recuperate rather than promote the rebellion they embody”  
(p. 61, italics in original).  In the case of Villeneuve, his „rebellion‟ is 
characterised as „free-spirited‟, „his own man‟, „standing apart‟, a „rebel‟, 
„eccentric‟ and so forth (e.g., Baldwin, 2005; Bishop, 2000; Donaldson, 2001; 
Samson, 2001, 2002; Vergeer, 2004; Windsor, 2006) but in a manner that does 
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not support an explicit critique of the corporate orientation or broader structure of 
Formula One that he seems to be „rebelling‟ against.  Thus, „rebellious‟ acts are 
dismissed as petulant displays (e.g., “The fall of”, 2002) rather than carrying 
significant weight as sport-specific critiques.  While not privileging his own 
explanation, it is interesting to note that Villeneuve has previously rejected the 
„rebel‟ label, reportedly retorting in an interview when it was suggested that he 
was a rebel,  
I disagree with that.  Being a rebel means going against the 
establishment purely for the fact of being against the 
establishment and not because of having your own ideas.  
Sometimes I disagreed with the establishment, but this is 
because I have my own ideas, which is different to being a 
rebel.  Normally a rebel is without a cause. (“Q&A: 
Jacques”, 2006, para. 1)  
Clearly, Villeneuve is evoking the James Dean archetypal filmic depiction and, 
implicitly, is refuting both the popular image of the rebel rebelling for the sake of 
rebelling,
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 and the broader assumptions of inarticulacy noted by Dyer.  
Moreover, although not discussed by Dyer, the „rebel‟ often also has a 
commercial dimension in contemporary popular culture which is discernible, for 
example, through the co-opting and commodification of rebellion in music.  As 
such, Frank (2001) is scathing of 1990s „alternative‟ music and grunge culture, 
asserting that it was merely an image of rebellion and of a counterculture but, in 
fact, was subsumed, repackaged and resold via corporate cultures (see also Seiler, 
2000).  Of course, similar arguments along similar lines have been forwarded for 
„rebellious‟ sport stars, such as Andre Agassi, Charles Barkley and Dennis 
Rodman, and their complicit relationships with large corporations, most notably 
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Nike, in the 1990s (e.g., Boyd, 1997; Brookes, 2002; Dunbar, 2000; Kusz, 2001, 
2007; Lafrance & Rail, 2000, 2001).  Pursuing this line of thought does not seem 
to take us very far as, categorically, Villeneuve is always already a commodity 
given the corporate structure of Formula One and hence is co-opted, exchanged 
and so forth (whether codified as the „rebel‟ or not).  None the less, while he does 
not „fit‟ the rebel typology, Villeneuve affords residual elements which, traced 
through his appearance, dissent, reluctant commodification and risk-taking across 
the thesis, may still provide a degree of friction within the smooth corporate 
machinery of Formula One.   
„Bad Boys‟, Marketable Difference and Maverick Individualism 
Another explanatory means for understanding the behaviour of some male sport 
stars has been offered under the label „bad boys‟.  Whannel (1999, 2002) 
associates the „bad boy‟ phenomenon with morality and the work ethic, 
suggesting that the public discourse of a „crisis in masculinity‟ has been linked to 
numerous causes, including the „new laddism‟ culture discussed earlier in this 
chapter.  In relation to sport stardom, Whannel (1999, 2002) notes that the „bad 
boy‟ transgresses the surveillance and discipline prominent in elite, contemporary 
sport through an array of behaviours that range from hedonism, off- and on-field 
indiscretions, self-centredness and an undisciplined private lifestyle and approach 
to sport.  Whannel (1999) lists „bad boy‟ sportsmen as “self-centred, petulant, 
hedonistic and undisciplined” in contrast to the “team-orientated, focused, 
abstinent and disciplined” „good‟ sportsmen (p. 262).  Case studies focused on 
English footballer Paul Gascoigne reflect this bad boy conceptualisation, with 
Gascoigne‟s career sketched in relation to a hedonistic lifestyle and undisciplined 
on- and off-field behaviour involving a range of alleged weight problems, poor 
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fitness, reckless tackles, alcohol abuse, brawls and domestic violence.  In 
theorising Gascoigne, Giulianotti and Gerrard (2001) suggest that he epitomises 
an obtuse Barthesian myth of the postmodern English footballer and provides a 
seductive absurdity for the masses while, according to Whannel (2002), 
Gascoigne is symptomatic of an emerging bad boy sport star narrative of rise, fall 
and redemption based upon the increasing scrutiny and punishment involved in 
media surveillance and the professional discipline of elite sports.  
In addition to the bad boy, other authors, primarily from North America, have 
conceived of an oppositional binary relationship between notions of the „good‟ 
versus „bad‟ star.  This binary is most succinctly explained through Kellner‟s 
(1996) notion of “marketable difference” (p. 459) which, he suggests, is cultivated 
through a distinct set of values, primarily in relation to race and morality, around 
which the star‟s commodification and circulation is based (see also Boyd, 1997; 
Brookes, 2002; Dunbar, 2000; Jackson, 1998a, 1998b; Jackson & Meier, 1999; 
Lafrance & Rail, 2000, 2001; Sloop, 1997; Spencer, 2001; Wilson, 1997).  Often 
this „marketable difference‟ is articulated by contrasting the representation and 
on- and off-field antics of „good‟ stars (e.g., Michael Jordan or Tiger Woods) with 
„bad‟ stars (e.g., Dennis Rodman or Mike Tyson).  Therefore, despite Jordan‟s 
polysemic and, at times, ambiguous representation in relation to his corporate 
connections and endorsements, Kellner (1996) suggests that,  
On the whole, I believe that Jordan is positioned in media 
culture as the „good Black,‟ especially against the 
aggressiveness and visual transgressions of teammate Dennis 
Rodman, who with his bleached and undisciplined hair, 
earring, fancy clothes, and regularly rebellious behaviour 
represents the „bad‟ Black figure.  (p. 462) 
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However, neither the bad boy label nor notions of the good versus bad star seem 
readily attributable to Jacques Villeneuve‟s star image.  While Villeneuve 
arguably courts controversy, this is seldom to do with any off-field indiscretions, 
hedonism or an undisciplined lifestyle, although his work ethic has been 
questioned when he performs poorly (Bishop, 2005; Pitpass expose, 2005b).  On 
the track, Villeneuve has received penalties for common driving infringements 
that the other drivers also receive; for example, not slowing for yellow flags in 
1997 or speeding in the pit-lane (e.g., Austria 2002).  Nevertheless, Villeneuve 
has never been accused of or punished for cheating or serious misconduct which 
contrasts with Michael Schumacher, whose successful yet controversial career is 
punctuated by accusations of deliberately ramming title rivals off the track (Allen, 
2000) and punishments for intentionally impeding other cars, such as during 
qualifying at the 2006 Monaco Grand Prix (Bishop, 2006a).  Of course, while 
Schumacher‟s indiscretions are debated within Formula One circles (Bishop, 
2006a) they do not appear to be widely recognised in the broader public 
consciousness (e.g., Schumacher is not publicly perceived to be the bad boy of 
Formula One).  Additionally, as Villeneuve operated in the elitist, rich and white 
sport of Formula One between 1996 and 2006, the good versus bad concept does 
not particularly map onto questions of race (although the first black driver, Lewis 
Hamilton, debuted in 2007) while, in relation to ethics, Villeneuve is not 
contrasted with Schumacher, although he is sought after by the press as one of the 
few drivers willing to publicly condemn Schumacher‟s driving indiscretions 
(Bishop, 2006a, 2006c).  
Having challenged the conceptual terms discussed thus far (e.g., the rebel, 
bad boy or marketable difference as convincing explanations), Whannel‟s (1999) 
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notion of the maverick may be found to be more appropriate for explaining 
Villeneuve‟s stardom.  In defining the maverick, Whannel (1999) notes that,  
Maverick masculine individualism is something that 
coaches, and governing bodies are concerned to root out.  In 
a world that is constrained, maverick sport stars appear to 
offer the power to live a life of masculine individualism – 
defying constraints, rebelling against regulation, whilst still 
performing.  (p. 262)   
Whannel links the constraints on maverick individualism to the three spheres of 
authority, the domestic and the feminine.  With the exception of authority, these 
constraints appear less characteristic of Villeneuve‟s circumstances, as he is 
represented as fiercely protective of his private life and any domestic or sexual 
indiscretions have not been widely publicised.  However, Whannel (1999) also 
acknowledges the emergence of corporate influences for sport stardom, arguing 
that, “maverick masculine individualism also increasingly conflicts with the new 
corporate paternalism, whereby institutions become the moral guardians of their 
employees, supervising the way they live” (Whannel, 1999, p. 262).  Therefore, in 
relation to the emerging pattern of corporate paternalism, Whannel (1999) 
suggests that, “the constraining of maverick masculinity is not being done in the 
interests of gender relations but of the success and profit of large corporations” (p. 
262).  Villeneuve‟s version of maverick individualism has been most pronounced 
in relation to the constraints imposed by multinational corporations as, although 
his private life still appears unrestricted by corporate influences, Villeneuve‟s 
public and professional life as a Formula One driver is shrouded in an uneasy 
tension and an apparent reluctance to embrace the corporate expectations and 
ethos of the sport.   
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Villeneuve‟s strained commercial and commodified relationship can be traced 
through the various sources of public friction and ambivalence that he provided; 
for example, by adopting a „maverick‟ appearance that was distinctive from his 
peers and by having contracts in place that limited the number of public relations 
days he would do (points that we will return to).  Villeneuve also acted as a public 
dissenter, in terms of being a forthright speaker who frequently avoided the 
predictable „corporate-speak‟ of his peers while dissenting on rules, regulations or 
other aspects of Formula One (Balfe, 2006; Bishop, 2005, 2006c; McRae, 2005).  
In broader terms, these instances do lend themselves to Whannel‟s (1999, 2002) 
notion of the „maverick‟ and, accordingly, examples of Villeneuve‟s apparently 
maverick style are both dispersed throughout the remainder of the thesis and re-
assembled as part of an explanatory framework for my own fandom in Chapter 
Seven.  For our present purposes, two preliminary sketches of Villeneuve‟s 
uneasy relationship with corporate culture will suffice.  First, his alleged 
„maverick‟ appearance within Formula One is described, while the second 
example considers Villeneuve‟s seemingly reluctant commodification.  It should 
also be noted that the career overview in Appendix One supplements and 
contextualises these examples by providing greater specificity to the details 
discussed, in terms of concurrent team, performance, press and monetary 
relationships.   
Villeneuve‟s „Maverick‟ Image and Appearance 
Villeneuve caused some friction within the machinery of Formula One by 
contrasting with the corporate appearance of most of the other drivers.  As 
Whannel (2002) observes, “audiences want entertainment and charismatic stars 
provide a break from the mundane” (p. 195).  Whannel (2002) elaborates further 
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by noting that, in contemporary sport, “promoters want characters who will attract 
the crowd and satisfy the television.  However, often such characters are also 
difficult to handle – disputing line calls, or abusing codes of dress or behaviour” 
(p. 197).  While there is no official dress code in Formula One, the drivers are 
emblazoned in their team and sponsor clothing (which presumably operates as an 
imposed and mandatory dress code) and are immaculate in their dress and 
grooming (e.g., clean-shaven and short styled hair).  However, due to this 
uniformity, the drivers often become bland and staid, especially as generally 
indistinguishable, corporately-clothed, drones.  Villeneuve resisted such 
expectations, often appearing more rugged and scruffy than his peers, favouring 
stubble, messy (often bleached) hair, spectacles and baggy (rather than tight-
fitting) apparel.  Although other drivers also periodically displayed a degree of 
„individuality‟ to contrast with their otherwise „uniform‟ attire and appearances 
(e.g., Eddie Irvine‟s dyed blond hair with Jaguar in 2000 and 2001, Jarno Trulli‟s 
long hair with Toyota 2005-2007, or drivers sporting facial hair, such as 
Barrichello, Button or Alonso), only Villeneuve remained consistent in adopting a 
non-conformist style across his career.   
For example, during his three years at Williams, especially from 1997 
onwards, Villeneuve differentiated himself from the pack by dying his hair blond, 
as well as an assortment of other colours at different times, including blue.  
Vergeer (2004) suggests that key sponsors had become infuriated by the 
“eccentric, variable colour of his hair” (p. 198), while in Brazil in 1998, 
Donaldson (2001) notes that FIA officials had told Villeneuve, 
Wearing his habitual „high grunge‟ clothing, sporting a 
scraggly beard and with his hair dyed a bizarre shade of 
blonde, that he should clean up his act and pay more 
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attention to his appearance because he was bringing the sport 
into disrepute.  (p. 56) 
Between 1999-2003 as the BAR lead driver, Villeneuve continued to sport various 
hair colours and seldom was without stubble, even on occasions growing a full 
beard, leading Clarkson (1999) to suggest, “Sink or swim.  Brown, blond, purple 
or auburn – JV is motor-racing‟s answer to rock„n‟roll” (p. 84).  Moreover, 
Bishop (2000) noted that, “Jacques Villeneuve remains a rebel, remains his own 
man, and F1 is better for it.  Michael Schumacher aside, no one has a stronger, 
more defined image” (p. 46).  Of course, it is fair to assert that Villeneuve‟s non-
conformist appearance was also being further encouraged and capitalised upon by 
BAR and its key sponsors as a marketing ploy; for example, to promote 
Villeneuve as their „rebel‟ star.  Nevertheless, while the hair dyes declined post-
2003 as his hair receded, Villeneuve continued to maintain a scruffy appearance 
with his baggy clothing and permanent stubble still prominent with Sauber in 
2005 and BMW-Sauber in 2006.  For example, Windsor (2006) observed that, 
“Jacques is by contrast much more of a free spirit.  He drives his way, behaves his 
way…Blue hair.  Pink hair.  No hair.  Contacts.  Glasses.  No free appearances.  
Catch him if you can.  That was – is – his persona” (p. 59).  Thus, across his 
Formula One career, while Villeneuve also wore team and sponsor branded 
clothing, he resisted the broader Formula One machinery of conformist 
appearance: inflecting a „personalised‟ display on to the corporately imposed 
clothing while providing an „individualised‟ style often bereft of corporate 
grooming practices.   
To further demonstrate this point, the German driver Nick Heidfeld offers an 
informative contrast.  Heidfeld has been in Formula One since 2000 yet, 
associated with generally limited results prior to joining Williams in 2005 and 
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then BMW-Sauber in 2006, he did not seem to possess „charisma‟ (Dyer, 1979; 
Whannel, 2002) or „personality‟ to distinguish himself from the other drivers or 
the familiar machinery of Formula One (e.g., he literally embodied the robotic and 
bland corporate-driving-machine to be further discussed in Chapter Three).  For 
example, F1 Racing magazine identified Heidfeld as lacking a marketable 
personality, with Cooper (2006) suggesting the need for drivers to “avoid the 
„Heidfeld Syndrome‟ – a facelessness that borders on invisibility to F1 talent 
spotters – by cultivating a larger, more potent profile” (p. 78).  Additionally, 
Bishop (2006b) indirectly contrasts Heidfeld‟s dull mediated public personality 
with Villeneuve after his departure from BMW, suggesting that, “for many 
reasons – yes, including reasons connected with marketing and PR as well as 
outright pace…F1 Racing reckons Jacques would have been a better bet in ‟07 
than the quick-ish, but un-PR-able and un-marketable, Nick” (p. 6).  While 
teammates at BMW-Sauber in 2006, Villeneuve‟s „personality‟ and „rebel‟ 
appearance remained apparent in contrast to the clean-cut, bland and „faceless‟ 
Heidfeld (the contrast is observable at BMW publicity events, such as the team 
launch).  Interestingly, with Villeneuve‟s departure, Heidfeld re-appeared in 2007 
(and 2008) sporting a beard which smacked of an attempt by Heidfeld, BMW or 
their efforts combined to revamp Heidfeld and give him more „personality‟.  
Indeed, given the timing of this transformation, as well as Bishop‟s (2006b) 
opinion above, Heidfeld‟s beard can also be read as a possible attempt to make 
him more „PR-able‟, more „marketable‟ and, potentially, to reinvest Heidfeld and 
BMW with some trace of the „maverick‟ image lacking since Villeneuve‟s 
departure.   
F1 Racing magazine discusses the „rebel‟ potential of drivers‟ beards, with 
Roberts (2007) noting, “then there‟s the political beard – Fernando Alonso‟s, for 
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instance – which excites thoughts of rebellion.  His gesture of defiance in Turkey, 
thrown at clean-cut, corporate McLaren, was eloquently pointed” (p. 63).  
Although Alonso did not sport a „beard‟ as alleged (merely light stubble compared 
with many of Villeneuve‟s more extravagant growths),10 Roberts‟ comment 
indicates how driver stubble and facial hair, far from being as trivial as they seem, 
offer a symbolic challenge to the machinery of Formula One by resisting 
expectations of clean-cut, corporate grooming (akin to the „expressions of 
individuality‟ that Whannel [2002] equates with the hair styles of sport stars).  
This symbolic gesture (whether codified as rebellion or not), punctuates 
Villeneuve‟s career (1996-2006), Jacques being the only driver in contemporary 
corporate Formula One to regularly display excessive stubble or a beard.  For 
example, Villeneuve‟s scraggly beard was prominent on the podium at Spain in 
2001, even leading F1 Racing magazine to observe later in the season that “JV 
smartens up” for his new girlfriend and that “it must be love – he‟s brought his 
razor out of retirement and started shaving” (Pitpass, 2001a, p. 28).  Additionally, 
the permanent stubble with Sauber in 2005 led Todd (2005) to remark on 
Villeneuve‟s return to Montreal, “The beard is regulation length, making you 
wonder if the guy owns a razor that shaves so that it always looks like a four-day 
growth” (p. A1).  Ironically, Roberts‟ (2007) article on Heidfeld seems 
corporately complicit in attempting to project a „personality‟ onto him, and even 
naively suggests that Heidfeld was the first driver to make beards fashionable in 
Formula One.  In fact, Heidfeld appears to be cloning aspects of Villeneuve‟s 
„maverick‟ appearance, apparently with BMW‟s (and their sponsors‟) connivance 
(e.g., teams such as McLaren do not permit facial hair – hence Alonso‟s 
„rebellion‟; so BMW must be complicit in allowing this to occur or possibly even 
requested/recommended it).  Whatever the imitators or corporate appropriations, 
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Villeneuve‟s appearance retains a claim to originality in providing traces of grit 
within the polished or „clean-cut‟ corporate machinery of Formula One. 
Villeneuve as Reluctant Commodity 
Our next example considers Villeneuve‟s apparent resistance to the corporate 
pressures from sponsors and the associated expectations for publicity and 
marketing as a star Formula One driver.  This is not to overstate his resistance or 
reluctance however as, clearly, Formula One is a transnational, corporate sport 
which, through its associated practices and processes of commercialism and 
commodification, positions Villeneuve as always already a commodity.  
Therefore Villeneuve cannot simply „opt out‟ of wearing the branded garb, 
attending to media and/or public relations duties or being paraded before his 
various teams‟ transnational sponsors; it is both an expectation and contractual 
obligation for a Formula One driver.  Nevertheless, in his discussion of maverick 
individuals, masculinity and commercial morality, Whannel (2002) observes that,  
Major sport stars take on the character of floating signifiers, 
whose connotations cannot be neatly contained by the needs 
of either sport institutions or moral entrepreneurs.  The 
corporate world will always yearn for a Pete Sampras or a 
Tiger Woods, but the public are always likely to be more 
intrigued by an Andre Agassi or a Dennis Rodman.  (p. 213) 
Allegedly protective of his image, Jacques Villeneuve‟s relationship with 
sponsors and corporations was also widely represented as abrasive.  For example, 
even in his first Formula One season in 1996, Donaldson (2001) recalls 
Villeneuve being rushed into a publicity event by a new energy drink sponsor but 
being unwilling to endorse the drink as he had not tried it.  Donaldson (2001) 
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notes, “the hopeful master of ceremonies suggested „we assume you believe in 
this sort of product?‟ „Not really,‟ the reluctant pawn replied” (p. 59).  Such an 
unexpected stance exemplifies his reluctance to pander to corporate and sponsor 
expectations (even upon first entering the sport), with Villeneuve being quoted by 
Donaldson (2001) as saying, 
PR is an obligatory thing that comes with racing, so I will do 
what I have to do.  I race to drive a car, not to be in the 
spotlight.  I‟m willing to do a bit of it – just to get people off 
my back.  But I will only do things I believe in.  Anything 
else I am uncomfortable with.  (p. 59) 
Although mindful of the degree of obligation that underpins the commercial, 
corporate and commodified practices for a Formula One star, Villeneuve presents 
himself as a reluctant commodity by resisting overt attempts to manufacture his 
star image in compliance with sponsor expectations or excessive forms of 
branding.   
Moreover, Villeneuve refused to perform extensive public relations duties 
despite its obligatory contractual status for the drivers.  For example, most teams 
require a set number of PR days from their drivers, estimated to equate to 20-30 
days per year for “promotional or other sponsor-schmoozing duties” (Bishop, 
2001b, p. 68) which, of course, Villeneuve had to attend throughout his career.  
However, after leaving Williams in 1998, Villeneuve redefined the exact 
conditions for his involvement and obligations.  His initial contract with BAR is 
reported to have contained the important clause “no promotional commitments for 
sponsors outside of GP weekends” (Clarkson, 1999, p. 79), while Villeneuve also 
limited his number of press commitments per race weekend.  Based upon my 
reading of Formula One practices derived from the sources outlined in Chapter 
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Three, such a clause is extremely rare, if not unprecedented.  Villeneuve‟s 2000 
contract with BAR also limited his PR duties, with Clarkson (2000) alleging that 
his new contract only permitted four PR days a year for team owners British 
American Tobacco (BAT) and included numerous sub-clauses, such as less than 
five hours work a day and a 10am start.  Furthermore, Villeneuve was reputedly 
knocking back attempts from BAT to buy more PR appearances at $125,000 a day 
(Clarkson, 2000).  Commenting on these PR contractual arrangements, Bishop 
(2000) suggested that Villeneuve, 
Enjoys his down time, but his professional life is focused on 
racing.  He‟s often criticised for his reluctance to carry out 
more than a few days of sponsorship work per year, or for 
imposing a strict limit on the number of press interviews he 
holds over a race weekend.  Truth be told, others envy him: 
he minimises extraneous commitments to keep his approach 
to racing – the details of his job in the cockpit – uncluttered.  
(p. 45)  
When re-signing with BAR in 2001, Villeneuve was reported to have still limited 
the number of PR days he was required to do over the next three seasons, although 
he now obliged sponsors with a „handful‟ of PR days.  Nevertheless, Windsor 
(2005a) surmised that during Villeneuve‟s BAR years (1999-2003), “never had an 
F1 driver been paid so much to do so little out of the car … for the sponsors”  
(p. 59).  However, Villeneuve‟s attitude is a double-edged sword within Formula 
One; having implications both for his commodification and his star status by 
equally attracting or repelling potential sponsors and contract offers.  For 
example, Samson (2002) notes that, “one of the top teams would have happily 
flung open the door for Villeneuve if only he‟d toned things down a bit, worked 
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on his image, played the F1 game” (p. 73).  McLaren was one such team, although 
McLaren imposed a pre-requisite of 80-90 promotional days annually (Bishop, 
2001b), while the irreconcilability of the corporate style of McLaren and 
Villeneuve‟s „rebel‟ image were also frequently cited as preventing such an 
arrangement (Peagam, 2002; Rowlinson, 2003).   
More broadly, Villeneuve‟s frequent dissenting public outbursts were critical 
of the commercialised and commodified orientation of the sport, with Villeneuve 
quoted in Formula 1 Magazine as stating, “F1 has become a corporate sport and 
corporations don‟t want human beings driving, they want robots.  Nobody sees the 
difference” (“Other comments”, 2003, p. 146).  Therefore, at various stages of his 
career, media coverage highlighted Villeneuve taking aim at the corporate 
structure of Formula One, the focus on young, cheap and corporately groomed 
drivers (“Villeneuve sympathises”, 2006), the lack of character among his fellow 
drivers (“Other comments”, 2003) and, Buxton (2003) suggests, his attacking “the 
young stars of the sport for being corporate mouthpieces without the guts to speak 
their minds” (p. 71).  Villeneuve was represented as being particularly scathing of 
the manufacturing of driver images, asserting to the Guardian newspaper that, “all 
these corporations don‟t want their drivers to ruin their image so you can‟t say 
what you think.  You‟re basically not allowed to have a personality.  How can you 
have any heroes if you don‟t allow personalities?” (Villeneuve in McRae, 2005, 
para. 1).  Villeneuve reportedly singled out McLaren‟s Finnish driver, Kimi 
Raikkonen, noting that, “It‟s sad that you don‟t see drivers being real people.  
Kimi‟s image is so obviously fabricated because he‟s not the Ice Man.  It goes 
back to the corporations.  You end up fabricating this image because that‟s what 
they want” (Villeneuve in McRae, 2005, para. 5).  Therefore, in this second 
example we again have an exposition of the „maverick‟ individual in operation 
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within the sport.  Through his reluctant commodification and dissent, Villeneuve 
again provides friction and traces of grit by rescinding, albeit in a limited 
capacity, the commercial and corporate machinery of Formula One (e.g., in this 
case, PR and sponsor expectations) despite his own inescapable situatedness, 
commodification and exchange within its corporate structures.   
More broadly, embedded within these accounts of Villeneuve seems to be an 
allure, a curiosity and an enigmatic figure for fans, in varying degrees, to „engage‟ 
with.  Whannel (2002) notes that, “the persistent fascination with the errant, the 
maverick and the erratic suggests at some broader unwillingness simply to 
embrace the routinised professionalism of work-ethic-driven sport stars” (p. 142).  
By using Villeneuve as an exceptional but fragmentary and contradictory 
example, we will work our way through the broader mechanisms (or routines) of 
collectivism that Formula One provides, before returning once more to 
Villeneuve‟s maverick status in order to consider why this served as the locus for 
my own fandom.   
Looking Forward 
This thesis seeks to achieve a „funnelling‟ of fandom from collective audience 
„experiences‟, in terms of the structures, processes and practices afforded by 
Formula One, towards the distillation of a personal, atomised and affective 
investment in the sport (which coalesces around Villeneuve in my own fandom).  
Therefore, the early chapters present some of the determining, collective socio-
cultural, mediated and commercial Formula One-specific „structures‟ as the initial 
framework for the thesis.  In particular, Chapter Two provides a preliminary 
theoretical exploration of the structure/agency binary, introducing Grossberg‟s 
(1992b) concepts of „structured mobility‟ and „affect‟ to articulate a more fluid 
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(but not merely „active‟ or free-floating) subject position within structural 
formations.  „Structured mobility‟ also becomes a key theoretical concept for 
implementing the smooth transitional shift from interrogating the collectivity of 
Formula One‟s determining structures towards an increasingly atomised account 
of audience and intense fan engagements with the sport and its star drivers.  Thus, 
the mediated public and popular „narratives‟ of Formula One are first discussed in 
Chapter Three, leading to an examination of the framing of Formula One‟s 
televised global representation and its implications for generalised audience 
positionings and viewer engagements (Chapter Four).  This thread is continued in 
Chapter Five via a refined focus on Formula One‟s innovative and „participatory‟ 
first-person representations.  Such technologies, on both televisual and gaming 
formats, construct new mobile and affective (e.g., first-person and embodied) 
forms of viewer placement, identification and engagement both for collective and 
increasingly atomised, „subjective‟ audiences.  This gradual movement towards 
potential „individual‟ viewer experiences traces an increasingly atomised, yet 
socio-culturally situated and context-specific, experience of fandom.  Therefore, 
in Chapter Six, it is my own „affective‟ fandom that is analysed, evoking a 
structured mobility to investigate some of the specific determined positions that I 
occupy in relation to Formula One‟s apparatuses, as well as the mobile spaces and 
contradictory practices that my affective attachment to Villeneuve facilitates.  A 
central premise of this thesis is that, by shifting towards an interrogation of my 
own affective investment and relationship with Jacques Villeneuve, the structured 
mobility of an individual can be traced and is made concrete in the specific 
spatial/temporal trajectories and „moments‟ of affective fandom.  These points are 
then mapped in Chapter Seven, via a strategy-intensity field model, both 
supporting a reassembling of my fandom and as an explanatory framework for the 
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significance of Villeneuve‟s maverick traces of grit which, in a sense, will also be 
reassembled there.  The present chapter has cleared the way for this work by 
dealing with the two most „obvious‟, but ultimately limiting, explanatory 
frameworks.  
 
                                                 
1
 As an example, using the „Google‟ advanced internet search engine yielded 2,800,000 hits for 
sites “with all of the words” „Jacques Villeneuve‟.  Retrieved November 9, 2006, from 
http://www.google.co.nz/search?as_q=jacques+villeneuve&num=10&hl=en&btnG=Google+Searc
h&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&lr=&as_ft=i&as_filetype=&as_qdr=all&as_occt=any&as_dt=i&as
_sitesearch=&as_rights=&safe=images. 
2
 Lehman (1993) suggests Dyer‟s findings can be applied to the naked male in film.  The naked 
body (and occasionally visible penis) are presented as an object yet the naked male retains his 
subject position through the „preoccupied‟ framing conventions of the male pin-up.  Additionally, 
far from a role reversal of the male gaze, Lehman suggests a women‟s point of view is often 
denied by rendering any female character present as visible and looking on admiringly as the male 
oscillates between both object (the male body) and subject (chief protagonist). 
3
 The male sports body has been analysed through a range of concepts and themes: such as; as a 
weapon (Trujillo, 1995), as a racial signifier (e.g., Andrews, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 1998; Boyd, 
1997; Jackson, 1998a; Kellner, 1996, 2003; Sloop, 1997) in relation to national identity (e.g., 
Carrington, 2001; Cole & Andrews, 2000, 2001; Jackson, 1998b; Jackson & Meier, 1999); or as 
problematic due to violence (e.g., Messner, 1992; Messner & Sabo, 1994; Pringle, 2001, 2003), 
injury (e.g., Pringle & Markula, 2005; Young, 2004; Young & White, 2000; Young, White & 
McTeer, 1994) or gendered „ambiguities‟ (e.g., Dunbar, 2000; La France & Rail, 2000, 2001; 
Whannel, 2001, 2002).   
4
 Of course, one could argue that contemporary versions of film stardom possibly reduce the 
significance of the absence-presence paradox.  That is, films are more frequently produced and 
publicly displayed than the „classical‟ period that Dyer and Ellis analysed, films are no longer only 
viewed in cinemas and, most pervasively, there is more subsidiary information available on both 
the public and private lives of stars-as-celebrities globally and instantaneously via the internet and 
other publications. 
5
 The only occasion when a driver was followed continuously was in the single flying lap 
qualifying format (2003-2005), although qualifying was not broadcast in New Zealand between 
1999 and 2005.  This is not to say a viewer can not invest in, or identify with a particular driver 
and follow their progress throughout the race.  However, this process will be not assisted by the 
sustained televisual coverage of any one driver.  At the circuit such a process is also elusive as the 
driver is seen hurtling past the spectating point but then disappears from view for the rest of lap 
(and hence the spectator, like the television viewer, is also reliant on footage via the big screen). 
6
 Of course, there are moments when the star image is more accessible, such as at the specific race 
track through both mediation on the big screens and during the drivers‟ parade for „live‟ attendees, 
such as at Canada in 2005 (DVD Example 4).  In fact, through my own attendance at the 
Australian Grand Prix (2002-2004), I personally observed their preparation for the drivers‟ photo, 
parade and during the 30 minute grid formation prior to the race start from my seat in the Fangio 
Grandstand while, at the 2006 event, I also attended an autograph signing session where Jenson 
Button, Anthony Davidson, Nick Heidfeld and Jacques Villeneuve were present (DVD Example 
6).  Moreover, there are clearly the images of drivers outside of Grands Prix; such as in magazines, 
posters and on the internet.  Nevertheless, in each of these realms the driver is still primarily 
represented in his commodified racing overalls or associated attire which, collectively, 
predominantly conceals rather than displays his body.  
7
 If provided, the racing number and driver‟s name is a relatively small decal, such as placing the 
driver‟s name on the side of the airbox (which becomes indiscernible during televised coverage).  
The most significant and overt disruption to the absence of a driver‟s name was used on occasion 
by McLaren when races, such as at France, Canada or Britain, banned tobacco logos.  Hence, the 
„West‟ cigarette livery was replaced by branding the cars with either „Mika‟ (Hakkinen) or „David‟ 
(Coulthard) between 1998 and 2001, or post-2001 with „David‟, „Kimi‟ (Raikkonen) or „Juan‟ 
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(Pablo Montoya) dependent on who was driving the car in a given year, while clearly offering an 
identificatory mechanism for the particular drivers on these exceptional occasions. 
8
 Of course, Dyer is aware that this problematises the role of rebel women, suggesting that Jane 
Fonda, for example, oscillates in terms of the extent and the assuredness of her rebellion.  
Furthermore, he acknowledges that it remains inconclusive whether to simply exclude females 
from the rebel category; there is, for example, a separate „independent woman‟ typology. 
9
 For example, the famous lines from The Wild One - “what are you rebelling against, Johnny?” to 
which Marlon Brando responds, “Whaddya got?”. 
10
 Roberts (2007) also appears to have mistaken Turkey for the 2007 European Grand Prix at the 
Nurburgring in Germany, where Alonso‟s stubble was more prominent. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Structured Mobility, the Slippery Subject and Formula One 
This chapter will introduce what will be a core concept for the thesis as a whole – 
that of structured mobility.  Further, it will be suggested that „structured mobility‟ 
needs to be understood as „layered‟ and that three layers, the territorial, the textual 
and the autoethnographically evoked subjective layer, need to be examined in 
relation to each other.  The separation of text, audience and meaning in many 
theoretical and methodological approaches will be critiqued in order to suggest 
that a reassemblage of these layers is needed in the end.  In this chapter, 
Grossberg‟s (1992b) concept of „structured mobility‟ is introduced to explore the 
broader structure/agency debate concerning the role of either structural formations 
or subjects as „agents‟ in shaping, influencing and determining our contemporary 
social reality.  The conditions of social reality are also examined in the context of 
the contemporary global media, and we will map how „structured mobility‟ can 
inform „our‟ understanding and experience of social reality and can explain 
Villeneuve‟s construction as a point of tension between structure and agency (e.g., 
his alleged „maverick‟ status evoked in the previous chapter).  These explanations 
of „structured mobility‟ and contemporary social reality will also inform the 
remainder of the thesis in relation to the mediation of Formula One (Chapters 
Three, Four and Five), Formula One fandom (Chapter Six) and through 
reassembling my experiences of fandom in light of the traces of Villeneuve‟s 
maverick status that permeate the thesis more broadly (Chapter Seven).  In the 
final section of this chapter we will outline the „bricolage‟ of mixed methods 
utilised to construct this research project.  As a context for that, we begin this 
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chapter with a discussion of „structured mobility‟ and the broader structure/agency 
debate.  The following material will be heavily dependent on Grossberg‟s work. 
Structure and Agency 
Grossberg (1992b) argues that “there is no single structure which stitches every 
relationship, every practice and every identity into place; there is no pattern 
indelibly etched into the fabric of history” (p. 99).  Conversely, evoking Marx, 
Grossberg (1992b) also notes that “people are never simply free to produce any 
articulation imaginable…for if human beings make history, it is always under 
conditions that they do not control” (p. 114).  These perspectives capture the 
essence of what is commonly known as the structure/agency debate concerning, 
on the one hand, the role of structures (i.e., social, cultural, political, economic 
and historical formations) and, on the other hand, the role of human subjects as 
actors or agents in defining and shaping their reality within the given 
circumstances of contemporary life in the social world.  Grossberg views 
structuralist approaches as too „determining‟ in relation to the assumed certainty 
and universality of structures and their effects on social reality, as well as often 
not acknowledging the complexity and contradictions either ingrained within such 
structures or in terms of how they implicate, integrate or impose themselves on 
human subjects/agents within such formations.  However, alternately, human 
agency is often unrealistically celebrated as a site of resistance (especially within 
accounts of everyday life), in which human actors actively take control of „their‟ 
lives and, allegedly, operate unrestrained and seemingly oblivious to any 
„imposing‟ structural formations.  Grossberg champions neither perspective, 
instead advocating a cultural theory of „structured mobility‟ which merges broader 
concepts of politics and power (e.g., structural theories) with an awareness of 
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passion (the notion of affect rather than simply agency) in contemporary life.  For 
Grossberg (1992b), this requires an analysis of “particular configurations of 
practices” (p. 45), and relies on contextuality and a “materialist theory of 
effectivity” (p. 46) to explore the complexities and contradictions embedded 
within structural/subjectivist interrelationships, especially within popular culture.  
It is from this theoretical perspective that we will map how „structured mobility‟ 
and “particular configurations of practices” (Grossberg, 1992b, p. 45) play out in 
general terms, before further developing the notion of „structured mobility‟ 
through practices specific to Formula One mediation, stardom and fandom (as 
well as other instances of contemporary mediated sport) in the remainder of the 
thesis.   
Structures 
We have loosely located social, cultural, political, economic and historical 
formations within structural theories of social reality.  Together, these formations 
shape and influence our contemporary social reality.  Grossberg (1992b) cautions, 
however, against assuming the intrinsic relationship between a structure and its 
presupposed effects.  As Grossberg (1992b) argues, “one must also question a 
more basic assumption: a principle of interiority or essentialism which locates any 
practice in a structure of necessity and guarantees its effects even before it has 
been enacted” (p. 52).  For example, although in contemporary societies 
capitalism pervades and shapes familiar processes of commercialism, 
commodification and consumption, the actual set of experiences associated with 
these practices is not preset and is not as universal as might first be assumed.  
Therefore, while useful for analysing a range of socio-economic practices and 
relations, the determining effects of commodities described by Marx (1976) are 
56 
not universal; having particular historical, temporal and spatial flexibilities which 
are also impacted on by other social, cultural and political formations.  So 
labelling Villeneuve a „commodity‟ does not actually take us very far in itself.  
Moreover, these varied practices and effects variably impact on subjects, ranging 
from the hailing of „individuals‟ and interpellating (Althusser, 1977) them into 
specific relationships as subjects (e.g., „determined‟ by capitalist ideologies and 
socio-economic positions, such as the „exploited‟ labourer, „duped‟ consumer, 
etc.) to, potentially, reinscribing them with levels of agency through the resources, 
capital or commodities available to them (e.g., the clichéd consumer „empowered‟ 
by the use and/or pleasure derived from consumer goods).  Hence, while 
Grossberg (1992b) recognises that “economics (in a narrow sense) must always be 
addressed in the first instance” (p. 100) due to the material conditions (e.g., 
capitalist, commercial and consumptive) of most contemporary societies, he also 
counters (1992b) “we cannot assume that, somehow, economic relations have 
already defined the outcome, nor that they will somehow resolve all the 
contradictions in the end” (p. 55).  Significantly, Grossberg (1992b) extends this 
approach to all totalising and universalising structuralist theories, noting that 
power cannot be “reduced to one single system of social difference” (p. 100) in 
order to reject a conceptualisation of social reality derived solely through an 
explanatory framework of, for example, desire (Freud, 1986), capitalism (Marx, 
1976), ideology (Althusser, 1977) or socio-cultural identity and difference (e.g., 
theories of race, class or gender).   
Grossberg‟s (1992b) repudiation of grand theories or „metanarratives‟ of 
social reality reflects part of a broader „postmodern‟ epistemological challenge to 
previously dominant modes of theorising.  As we know, postmodernism 
(articulated here as both a cultural theory and attitude) critiques the modernist 
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perspective of foundationalism, and the notions of rationalism, progress and 
universalism dominant during the Enlightenment (Lyon, 1994; Owen, 1997).  
Enlightenment foundationalism believed in progress and, through the application 
of scientific knowledge, asserted that the world was able to be captured, known 
and explained due to its givenness and the ability of rational thought to know and 
interpret it (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Giddens, 1974, 1979b; Popper, 1968).  
Conversely, Lyotard (1984) defined the postmodern as “incredulity towards 
metanarratives” (p. xxiv), by which he meant scepticism towards the principles of 
reason, teleology and universalism inherent in foundationalism.  Lyotard (1984) 
advocated that we “wage a war on totality” (p. 82) to recognise the loss of 
„certainty‟ within meaning construction, to allow for a plurality of language and to 
avoid the (re)production of metanarratives, discourses and universalistic claims in 
research and knowledge production.
1
  More pertinently for our purposes here, 
Lemert (1997) notes that “postmodernity is that culture in which those 
metanarratives are no longer considered completely legitimate and, thus, are not 
universally held to be completely credible” (p. 39), while Pringle (2003) observes, 
“postmodern social theory can, therefore, be thought of as a rejection of the search 
for universal „social‟ truth” (p. 23).  Of course, postmodernism has also been 
challenged and critiqued as a social/cultural theory in the form of accusations of 
overdone pessimism, a loss of „values‟ and a perceived undermining of 
knowledge, coherence and rigour in „proper‟ academic research (e.g., Habermas, 
1987; Jarvie & Maguire, 1994; Nixon, 1994; Schroeder, 1997; Simons & Billig, 
1994; Strinati, 2004); accusations that postmodern research can not always defend 
itself against (e.g., see Kohn & Sydnor‟s (1998) banal, relativist and unstructured 
„postmodern‟ ramble about their daily encounters with „the hegemony of sport‟).   
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Grossberg‟s work shares a postmodern stance of an „anti-essentialist‟ 
approach to grand theories, but importantly for the present project, also extends 
beyond epistemological critique to analyse the contextual and effectual structures, 
articulations and relations of specific (social) practices.  Thus, while asserting that 
analyses of politics and passion (and more broadly, articulations of 
structure/agency) within popular culture cannot be “guaranteed in advance” 
(Grossberg, 1992b, p. 53), „structured mobility‟ as a concept simultaneously 
recognises the continuing utility of structuralist modes of social theory.  
Grossberg (1992b) suggests that,  
Structures have to be located within concrete contexts, both 
in terms of their own social and historical determination, and 
in terms of the ways their effects are articulated.  They are 
real, but their reality is defined by their articulations at 
specific levels of abstraction or concreteness.  (p. 58) 
This is an important conceptual signpost for the present project.  Grossberg‟s 
„challenge‟ is not a rejection of „totalising‟ theories; rather that grand- or „meta‟- 
theories of social reality need to be located in „concrete contexts‟ to understand 
how these various social, cultural, political, economic and historical formations 
impact upon, influence, limit or facilitate degrees of human subjectivity and/or 
agency.  For example, the historical specificity of structures, practices and effects 
needs to be acknowledged on both a broader abstract level (e.g., language, 
relations of power, social identity, visual cues and codes, etc., all antedate and 
need to be „learnt‟ by the individual/subject – see Bird, 2003; Butler, 1990, 1993; 
Foucault, 1977, 1980, 2000; Hall, 1996; Heidegger, 1962; Lacan, 1977; 
McLuhan, 1964; Muller & Richardson, 1982), while also being interrogated 
within their specific, concrete contexts.  „Gender‟, for example, universally 
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„functions‟ as a categorisation for social identity and/or difference, yet it clearly 
operates in disproportionate ways within various social, economic, political, 
cultural and historical climates and contexts which require specific articulation.  
This will become more evident through the discussion of the problematic 
gendered roles and divisions in contemporary Formula One (Chapter Three), 
which are clearly not „generic‟ or „inherent‟ to all contemporary sport. 
Agency 
In a pendulum swing in the other direction, as it were, rediscoveries of the subject 
as agent can become celebratory in assigning an „empowering‟ status to agency 
that locates individuals in curious bubbles seemingly independent of the 
surrounding structural formations (e.g., as momentarily ahistorical, asocial and/or 
apolitical beings).  Evident for example in Sartre‟s (1991a, 1991b) late-career 
attempt to reconcile Marxism and existentialism, individuals tend to be framed in 
a voluntaristic manner, conceived as living in bubbles where they can adopt 
practices through „free will‟ or of their own volition.  Problematically, what is 
jettisoned is any consideration of how power infiltrates every aspect of 
contemporary life and circulates in every context, practice and relationship.  The 
term „subject‟ becomes crucial to relocating individuals more subtly and usefully 
within the structure/agency debate.  Mansfield (2000) defines the concept of the 
subject as, 
An abstract or general principle that defies our separation 
into distinct selves and that encourages us to imagine 
that…[we are] sharers of common experience.  In this way, 
the subject is always linked to something outside of it – an 
idea or principle or the society of other subjects…One is 
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always subject to or of something.  The word subject, 
therefore, proposes that the self is not a separate and isolated 
entity.  (p. 3, italics in original)   
Such a relationship is clear in the cultural practices which „produce‟ the subject, 
as with Althusser‟s (1977) notion of interpellation, in which an „individual‟ is 
hailed to take up a particular subject position and/or cultural identity.  For 
example, I am hailed to recognise „my‟ cultural identity as a New Zealander in 
relation to „my‟ nation-state, while being interpellated into a range of social 
practices and relationships through this cultural identity, a perspective I develop 
later in this chapter in relation to globalisation.  Furthermore, Foucault (1977, 
1980, 2000) observes that „individuals‟ have „subject‟ positions constructed for 
them via discourses.  Discourses not only construct, circulate and legitimise 
knowledge (and, by extension, power) but, also, produce specific discursive 
practices for the „subject‟ (e.g., Foucault‟s bio-power, which categorises, 
disciplines and regulates the „subject‟ via specific discourses, such as medical, 
legal, scientific, etc.).  Nevertheless, Foucault (1988) also recognises a degree of 
agency or autonomy for the „subject‟ (a position not clearly articulated by 
Althusser, 1977), with Foucault (1988) suggesting that „technologies of the self‟ 
allow the subject to negotiate various positions in relation to discursive practices 
and power relations which construct and constrain subjectivity (see also Markula 
& Pringle, 2006).  Foucault‟s recognition of both the forces external to the 
individual (i.e., the structural formations and discourses which the individual is 
„subject‟ to) and the possibility for a limited but none the less real sense of human 
agency, continues to be influential on notions of the subject, power and agency.  
For example, „postmodern‟ theorists point to fragmentation, destabilisation, 
discontinuity and fluidity as characteristics of a „postmodern‟ subjectivity (see 
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Jameson, 1991; Lemert, 1997; Lyon, 1994; McRobbie, 1994; Rail, 1998; 
Rodaway, 1995; Walkerdine, 1995).  Therefore, the „subject‟ becomes an „agent‟ 
of a restricted or scavenged bricolage or, as Eagleton (1996) surmises, “if the 
postmodern subject is determined, however, it is also strangely free-floating…if 
this subject is slippery, it is because it acts as the friction between clashing 
cultural forces (pp. 90-91).   
Villeneuve‟s approach to racing provides, on a fairly straightforward and 
literal level at least, an example of the „slippery subject‟ (codified here as 
maverick).  Widely regarded as a risk-taker, „daredevil‟ or „macho racer‟ in 
Formula One circles (Benson, 2000; Donaldson, 2001), danger and the possibility 
of death were emphasised as part of Villeneuve‟s attraction to racing.  For 
example, early in his Formula One career Villeneuve is quoted as saying, “I also 
need the danger.  I need to be in that situation where I know one mistake could 
kill me” (Villeneuve in Shirley, 2000, p. 130).  Villeneuve‟s pleasure in risk-
taking and his regular dissent on proposed safety and technological regulations 
positioned him, albeit somewhat literally, as a „slippery subject‟ within the 
structural formations of Formula One.  Dismissive of the encroachment of 
proposed or imposed safety measures by the sport‟s governing body, the FIA, as 
well as the acquiescence of his fellow drivers to such changes, Villeneuve is 
quoted as observing that, “the risks drivers take now are 10 times less than they 
were a few years back and we make 10 times more money” (Donaldson, 2001,  
p. 55).  In particular, Villeneuve acted “as the friction between clashing cultural 
forces” (Eagleton, 1996, p. 91) in relation to, on the one hand, the safety 
discourses being promulgated and imposed by the FIA, as well as on the other, the 
socio-cultural expectations and behaviour of the other drivers in relation to his 
attitude and conduct (e.g., as the „maverick‟, „risk-taker‟ or „dissenter‟).  Thus, his 
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views were reportedly considered as a „death-wish‟ by fellow driver Damon Hill 
in 1997 (Collings, 1998; Vergeer, 2004) and marked him as different within the 
sport, with Shirley (2000) suggesting that he was derided by the FIA, some fellow 
drivers and sections of the press as “an arrogant adrenaline junkie, a space cadet, a 
shock jock, a suicide case” (p. 142) due to his distinctive stance and attitudes.  
Nevertheless, Villeneuve persistently remained as a slippery subject within the 
Formula One infrastructure.  He continued to act as an off-track dissenter, in spite 
of an early-career official reprimand from the FIA in 1997 for his use of bad 
language after being quoted in the German magazine, Der Spiegel, describing the 
proposed grooved tyre regulations for 1998 as „shit‟ (Collings, 1998; Donaldson, 
2001).  Furthermore, Villeneuve provided an on-track display of bravado through 
his fearlessness, „hard-charging‟ driving style (Hughes, 2004) and self-imposed 
annual challenge of taking the notorious Eau Rogue section at the Spa-
Francorchamps circuit in Belgium „flat‟ (i.e., without lifting off the accelerator),2 
despite „spectacular‟ crashes at over 180mph in both 1998 and 1999 (Donaldson, 
2001; Shirley, 2000).  However, as I have noted elsewhere, new electronic 
systems and „driver-aids‟ (e.g., traction-control) post-2001 allowed every driver to 
take Eau Rouge „flat‟, with these technological impositions “forcing Villeneuve to 
adapt his driving style and relinquish elements of his risk-taking until his 
retirement in 2006” (Sturm, 2007, p. 206), reinforcing the literal notion of 
Villeneuve as a „slippery subject‟ that had to be contained within the structural 
formation of Formula One (points that are expanded upon in Chapter Three).  This 
is still, however, something of an overly literal reading of the phrase „slippery 
subject‟.   
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Structuration, Morphogenetic Cycles, „Mobilities‟ and Reflexivity 
It is necessary to move beyond Eagleton‟s evocation of the „slippery subject‟ if 
we are to find theoretical and methodological means for detailing the specifics at 
work around Villeneuve as a revealing instance in the domain of sport.  
Grossberg‟s (1992b) notion of „structured mobility‟ affords a more fluid and 
dynamic reconceptualisation of the structure/agency binary than has been traced 
thus far.  In particular, „structured mobility‟ facilitates the recognition of social 
individuals navigating the structured terrain of daily life but conflates the inherent 
structure/agency binary by privileging neither the determining power of structures 
on the one hand, nor the autonomous individual actively creating his/her social 
world on the other.  While Grossberg arguably offers a compelling theorisation of 
the overlap, co-existence and co-dependency of these often apparently 
oppositional explanatory terms, his contribution should not be read as providing a 
possible resolution to the binary.  Indeed, that is not an intended objective of this 
thesis, as attempts at reconciliation will remain arbitrary and problematic in any 
academic exercise concerned with social power relations.  Nevertheless, 
Grossberg‟s (1992b) central premise seemingly provides us with fertile ground for 
conceiving of a post structure/agency divide.  First, however, other key 
approaches that complement and advance social theories of daily life beyond 
reductive structure/agency binaries are now traced, before returning to 
Grossberg‟s recognition of mobility within the structure.   
Giddens (1979a) offered a significant attempt to marry the two opposing 
terms through his structuration model.  Conceived as a „duality of structure‟, 
Giddens sought to theorise a role for both structures and human „agents‟ while 
being seemingly intent on privileging neither by implying that action and structure 
presuppose each other.  Thus, Giddens‟ duality approach collapsed structure into 
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agency and vice versa, analysing both the historical features that reproduce social 
structures and how agents exist within these structured conditions (e.g., agents 
instantiating „power‟ through action, albeit within a social structure).  Despite his 
admirable work, ultimately Giddens‟ favours the structure within structuration 
theory; defining structures as a continuous process which also provide the 
conditions for society.  Conversely, human agents are secondary despite his 
efforts to grant them a degree of agency (e.g., he suggests that there is a mutual 
constitution of action and structure and, ontologically, these presuppose each 
other).  Most problematic in Giddens‟ structuration theory is the absence of a 
spatial and temporal dimension.  While Grossberg (1992b) recognises a fluid 
mobility that is anchored within specific temporal and spatial moments of the 
structure, Giddens‟ champions social continuity, identifying continuity in how 
structures operate and are enacted.  Therefore, his model offers fluidity but in a 
reductive manner, conceiving continuity to be both static and remaining constant 
over time.  Clearly, this renders social/individual mobility and navigation within 
structuration theory problematic too. 
Most significantly, Giddens‟ fails to admit the specificity of practices and 
concrete contexts by neither acknowledging nor integrating the temporal within 
his approach.  Both Archer (1985, 1988) and Carlsnaes (1992) are highly critical 
of this absence in structuration theory.  For example, Archer (1985) notes in 
relation to Giddens,  
What he misses is time as an actual variable in theory.  In 
consequence Giddens asserts that „social systems only exist 
through their continuous structuration in the course of time,‟ 
but is unable to provide any theoretical purchase on their 
structuring over time.  (p. 72, italics in original)  
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Instead, Archer and Carlsnaes advance a morphogenetic model in which the 
temporal is the locus for understanding what Carlsnaes (1992) refers to as the 
„dynamic interplay between agents and structures” (p. 255, italics in original).  
Focusing on morphogenetic cycles, both authors reconfigure structures in relation 
to intervals and the specificity of systematic properties, rather than the assumed 
continuity of Giddens‟ structuration.  Archer (1985) suggests that, “the 
morphogenetic perspective is not only dualistic but sequential, dealing in endless 
cycles of structural conditioning/social interaction/structural elaboration – thus 
unravelling the dialectical interplay between structure and action” (p. 61).  
Essentially, morphogenetic cycles seek to account for the variables in structures 
(and in a pluralistic, not universal or unilateral sense), by considering the interplay 
of structures and the structuring of agents over time through analyses of specific 
temporal structure and action relationships (e.g., Carlsnaes‟ considers Sweden‟s 
contemporary conceptualisation[s] of „neutrality‟ through past and present 
Swedish foreign policies).  Thus, morphogenetic cycles recognise that such 
relationships are interactive and dynamic, while affording the analysis of what 
Carlsnaes (1992) terms “a series of complex, reciprocal agent-structure 
interactions” (p. 266). 
As will be evident, the morphogenetic cyclic approach espoused by Archer 
(1985, 1988) and Carlsnaes (1992) shares Grossberg‟s (1992b) orientation to 
temporal and context specific analyses, while clearly advancing beyond 
previously static (and often binary) models.  While morphogenetic cycles provide 
purchase for interrogating these „dynamic interplays‟, the actual application of 
this model seems more abstract than Grossberg‟s structured mobility.  For 
example, Grossberg explicates the navigation and anchoring in specific moments 
in daily life through the concept of affect (and the accompanying set of theoretical 
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terms, such as investment, intensity and excess, through which affect is enabled, 
enacted and circulates – see later discussion here and Chapters Six and Seven).  
Archer‟s and Carlsnaes‟ theorisations are less clear in practice (although 
Carlsnaes tries to transpose this interrelationship to foreign policy analysis as a 
means to elaborate on the array of situational-structural factors that intervene in 
foreign policy and hence why temporal and context-specific factors need to be 
taken into account).  Nevertheless, while the temporal dimension and specificity 
of morphogenetic cycles affords fluidity to the traditionally statically conceived 
interrelationship, isolating the temporal in such analyses is also fraught with 
problems.  For example, Urry (2000) is critical of the explicit temporal focus of 
morphogenetic cycles.  In particular, Urry argues that morphogenetic temporal 
analyses actually problematise time for it is always conceived as linear (e.g., the 
pre- and post- date focus) and undercuts the oscillating nature of this „dynamic 
interplay‟.  Furthermore, he suggests that the distinction between time and the 
„power‟ that these different time formations can exert is not accounted for in 
morphogenetic cycles.  That is, Urry (2000) conceives of distinctions between 
various forms of „time‟; noting, for example, the temporal regularity of „clock-
time‟ which tends to standardise, timetable and potentially constrain activities, or 
„instantaneous time‟, and the compression of time (and space) via the 
instantaneous speed of emerging information and communication technologies, a 
point we will return to later in this chapter.  Finally, Urry is flummoxed by the 
eventual downplaying of space and spatial relations in these temporal-driven 
cycles.  In fact, he offers an important theoretical readjustment that complements 
Grossberg‟s (1992b) work. 
For Urry (2000) mobility (and its plural, mobilities) is today reconstituting 
the social world and moving us away from inert models of stability and 
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understanding (e.g., class, nation-based, economic and broader social structures - 
these still exist but in a less certain and deterministic way).  In fact, Urry (2000) 
argues that the hybrid flows (in both a spatial and temporal sense) of individuals, 
as well as images, technologies, ideas and other „objects‟ (e.g., monies, 
corporations, wastes, etc.) are “materially reconstructing the „social as society‟ 
into the „social as mobility‟” (p. 2).  Because these flows operate across and 
through numerous scapes and networks, he suggests that notions of power become 
vexed; it is dense, complex and often contradictory organisations of 
temporal/spatial relations that „govern‟ or organise these mobilities.  As such, 
Urry proffers a discontinuous process of „roaming‟ within the domains of civil 
society, the state, nature and the global, as constitutive of the twenty-first century.  
Hence, rather than a stable, reproducible social realm, he likens contemporary 
mobility to a distinction between „gardening and game-keeping‟.  Urry (2000) 
notes that,  
The new global order involves a return to the gamekeeper 
state and away from that of the gardener.  The gamekeeper 
was concerned with regulating mobilities, with ensuring that 
there was sufficient stock for hunting in a particular site but 
not with the detailed cultivation of each animal in each 
particular place.  Animals roamed around and beyond the 
estate, like the roaming hybrids that currently roam in and 
across national borders.  (p. 189)  
Thus, in what he labels a “post-societal, post-gardening epoch” (Urry, 2000,  
p. 189), the state and its „society‟ are no longer carefully tended to through 
explicit ordering, regulation and legislation (the gardening analogy) and, although 
some of these aspects clearly persist, the production and control of corporeal 
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mobility is less overt.  In contrast, social individuals are less inhibited to „roam‟ 
local and global territories, such as through the process of automobility, in which 
private vehicles allow individuals to traverse public spaces in a less deterministic 
fashion (e.g., public roads govern „where‟ you may go but not necessarily when, 
how or what your final destination will be).  Additionally, information and 
communication flows further contribute to this sense of mobilities.   
Re-grounding us in the broader collapse of the old structure/agency debate, 
Urry (2000) observes that,  
In sociological thought the millions of individual iterative 
actions are largely subsumed under the notion of „structure‟ 
(such as that of class structure, or the structure of gender 
relations or social structure).  Such a structure does not then 
have to be further examined; it is „ordered‟ and will be 
reproduced through continuous iteration.  (p. 206) 
However, Urry (2000) counters that iteration over time may “generate 
unexpected, unpredictable and chaotic outcomes” (p. 207) and, therefore, it is “a 
variety of human and non-human actants that constitute the typical mobile, 
roaming hybrids” (p. 207).  While Grossberg (1992b) does not jettison the social 
as relatively fixed structures so readily as Urry, there is considerable overlap in 
their work in terms of social forms of mobility, the salience of temporal and 
spatial factors, and how these forms of mobility disrupt and deterritorialise 
relationships, engagements and daily lives (all of which will be picked up in 
relation to Grossberg in due course). 
Additionally, Archer (2007) shares Urry‟s orientation towards the increasing 
mobility of social individuals (although he is not directly acknowledged in her 
work).  In particular, Archer‟s emphasis is both on the decline of routine and the 
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role that reflexivity plays in guiding and shaping individuals in contemporary 
times.  Archer (2007) suggests that, “reflexivity is the means by which we make 
our way through the world.  This applies to the social world in particular, which 
can no longer be approached through embodied knowledge, tacit routines, or 
traditional custom and practice alone” (p. 5).  In essence, she is arguing for an 
increased awareness of reflexivity as a personalised process that, while couched in 
broader socio-cultural structures and contexts, also allows individuals to have a 
deliberative and „active‟ role in ruminating on their specific cluster of concerns.  
Hence, Archer (2007) posits that social individuals have the “reflexive ability to 
design (and redesign) many of the projects they pursue” (p. 7) through their 
internal conversations and the deliberative elements that reflexivity contains and 
proffers (again, embedded in specific socio-cultural moments).  The deliberative 
properties of reflexivity and internal conversations, which share „moments‟ with 
Grossberg‟s (1992b) core concept of affect, will be revisited later in the thesis to 
illuminate both the intensities and strategies that underpin fandom as a social 
process and to further break down the structure/agency binary (Chapter Seven).  
In fact, a mapping of my fandom‟s trajectories at that point will „apply‟ all the 
theoretical insights derived from the present discussion.  For our present purposes, 
though, Archer‟s emphasis on a decline of routinisation has a significant bearing 
on our approach.   
Archer (2007) provides the succinct proposition, “no reflexivity; no society” 
(p. 25), espousing a need to reconceptualise sociological reflexivity not as a 
concept of self but as pertaining to a „sense of self‟.  Nevertheless, she is 
equivocal in her alignment with other sociological accounts of a contemporary 
society marked by rapid change and transformations (e.g., Bauman, 1998; Beck, 
1992; Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994); some of which are traced later in this 
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chapter.  In fact, despite not referring to Urry (2000), Archer implicitly supports 
his assertion of a nomadic or „roaming‟ existence by emphasising the decrease in 
routine action or routinisation in contemporary times.  That is, she alludes to the 
„traditional‟ structures that once governed societies now being marked by 
discontinuity, destabilisation and ongoing restructuring (e.g., in terms of kinship, 
family, communities; or theoretical classifications such as class, status, gender, 
race, etc.).  Moreover, Archer (2007) asserts that, 
Reflexivity depends upon a subject who has sufficient 
personal identity to know what he or she cares about and to 
design the „projects‟ that they hope (fallibly) will realise 
their concerns within society...Deliberation consists in 
people evaluating their situations in the light of their 
concerns and evaluating their projects in light of their 
circumstances.  (p. 34) 
However, many of the other contemporary evocations of the „reflexive‟ tend to 
under-examine agential deliberations.  That is, these „conflationists‟ 
predominantly privilege structural powers over agential properties.  For example, 
Archer takes issue with Beck‟s (1992) and Beck et al‟s (1994) notions of 
reflexivity and „reflexive modernization‟ respectively.  In both accounts, 
individuals are characterised as having an anxious or ambivalent personhood, 
framed as subjects of social constraints, circumstances and consequences, and 
seemingly have no resources or responsibility to navigate their social terrain.  
Moreover, Archer suggests that Bourdieu‟s (1977, 1984, 1990, 1992, 1993) notion 
of habitus and individual dispositions fails to adequately address reflexivity in 
contemporary society by being contingent on routinised practices and embodied 
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processes that prolong contextual continuity.  If we are to employ any of Archer‟s 
critique, we must first consider Bourdieu‟s position carefully. 
Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 1992) theorises a relationship based on „individual‟ 
selfhood, in terms of the set of (durable and transposable) dispositions, practices 
and knowledge which form an individual‟s habitus.  However, Bourdieu is not 
assuming that habitus is derived via volition or free will; rather structural 
formations and the cultural trajectories of an individual/subject (e.g., inclusive of 
but not limited to class, race, gender, geography, history, etc.) construct the 
habitus.  Additionally, “the habitus is always constituted in moments of practice” 
(Webb, Schirato & Danaher, 2002; p. 38), being called upon and „enacted‟ in 
various guises in relation to broader social contexts, structures and practices.  
Hence people with a particular cultural identity, such as a New Zealanders, may 
have similar dispositions towards certain sports rather than others (e.g., a 
knowledge of and preference for rugby in comparison to, say, handball), although 
clearly not all „individual‟ dispositions will be the same.  For Bourdieu, the 
broader societal context is also significant to understand how habitus and the 
interrelationship with humans as potential „agents‟ play out.  Bourdieu notes that 
the social world is divided into specific cultural fields, each of a kind which 
Schirato and Webb (2004) refer to as “a discrete area of social practice” (p. 195), 
and each with particular structural formations and laws of functioning (e.g., the 
cultural „fields‟ of business, media and sport are distinctive, with specific 
formations, institutions, knowledge and rules in operation).  Cultural fields are 
also fluid and dynamic, interacting with and impacting upon other cultural fields 
(e.g., despite its „distinctiveness‟, the „field‟ of sport has become increasingly 
influenced by the fields of business and media in contemporary times, points 
developed further in relation to Formula One in Chapters Three and Six).  
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Furthermore, Bourdieu also theorises the role of various forms of „capital‟ and 
„literacy‟ that assume significance within specific cultural fields, but we will hold 
off on exploring this particular line of thought until the fandom chapters (Chapters 
Six and Seven).   
In contradistinction to these concepts, Archer (2007) asserts that “the new 
array of shifting, temporary and precarious positions is too fluid to be 
consolidated into correlated dispositions, which are inherited and shared by those 
similarly positioned” (p. 38).  Thus, even though Bourdieu conceives of the 
transferable and transposable nature of individual dispositions in the habitus, 
Archer questions how readily this strategically can be achieved due to rapid 
changes that both exceed acquired forms of knowledge and capital, and move 
beyond acquired habitual practices and routines.  Moreover, while Bourdieu is 
insistent on containing human action within societal structures (i.e., the habitus as 
representative of human subjectivity), Archer counters that this external 
orientation seemingly leaves people with no distance at all from their own habitat 
for reflexive deliberations on their circumstances.  Such reflexivity may not be 
easily achieved but neither, says Archer, should it be theorised out of existence at 
the outset.  More broadly, both Archer and Urry seem to agree on discontinuous 
and oscillating forms of social mobility or mobilities that do not simply „fix‟ 
individuals to specific, universalised and continuous forms of socialisation.  There 
is both a concession and a resistance to Bourdieu here.  Both authors concede that 
forms of social containment are real but argue that they do not close down all 
mobility today.  Thus, while the adaptable quality of habitus is acknowledged, its 
total orientation towards contextual continuities and routinisation is disputed by 
both authors, who suggest that human „subjects‟ are not absolutely pinned to 
historically-static and culturally-determined social positions and have an agential 
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capacity to mobilise themselves in their social terrain more flexibly than 
Bourdieu‟s habitus and dispositions allow.  But it is Grossberg who provides us 
with the better evidence for such positions. 
„Structured Mobility‟ and Affective Relations  
Grossberg‟s (1992b) „structured mobility‟ shares Archer‟s (2007) and Urry‟s 
(2000) theoretical remobilization of determined subjects while, through his 
concept of affect, he also queries the assumptions about collective subjectivities 
that some scholars, such as Bourdieu (1984) with his notion of taste, evoke.  In 
particular, Grossberg, (1992b) advances the term „structured mobility‟ to explain 
this structure/agency interrelationship, suggesting that the concept “defines the 
spaces and places, the stabilities and mobilities within which people live” (p. 
107).  Thus, he finds trajectories (Bourdieu, 1992), apparatuses (Foucault, 1977) 
or vectors/planes (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977) useful for mapping social reality and 
the „configurations of practices‟ of individual subjects/agents.  Such layered maps 
facilitate the analysis of cultural fields in a multidirectional and multidimensional 
capacity, especially the mechanisms which construct social difference within and 
outside specific fields (e.g., „differentiating machines‟ which construct binaries of 
self/other, normal/abnormal, etc.) and locate the individual (e.g., „territorializing 
machines‟ to explore the significance of time, places and spaces in people‟s lives).  
In this vein, Grossberg (1992b) argues that „structured mobility‟ incorporates the 
role of differentiation and territorialisation for “these produce daily life as the way 
in which people live the always limited freedom to stop in and move through the 
various realities within which their identifications, identities and investments are 
mutually constructed” (p. 106). 
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Focusing on popular culture and daily life, Grossberg observes that „social 
individuals‟ occupy diverse positions and roles in their engagement with popular 
culture (primarily through texts), as well as in the practices and routines of „their‟ 
daily lives.  Rather than being reduced to a binary of either „empowered‟ agents or 
„disempowered‟ subjects, however, Grossberg suggests that „structured mobility‟ 
merges these structure/agency distinctions and recognises that power is more fluid 
and dynamic in its circulation, as too are the very concepts of „subjectivity‟ or 
„agency‟.  Grossberg (1992b) argues that,  
A different conception of power would acknowledge that it 
operates at every level and in every domain of human life.  It 
is neither an abstract universal logic nor a subjective 
experience.  It is both limiting and productive: producing 
differences, shaping relations, structuring identities and 
hierarchies, delimiting complexity, drawing boundaries, 
reducing contradictions, but also enabling practices and 
identifications and empowering social individuals.  (p. 96) 
These observations broadly reproduce the central theses of both Foucault and 
Bourdieu.  For example, Foucault conceived power to be neither static nor 
imposed from top-down (e.g., channelled by structural formations) but, rather, as 
circulating within and around the social world; with discourses and associated 
discursive practices constructing, constraining (as well as potentially rescinding) 
knowledge, power and „subject‟ positions for the individual.  Similarly, 
Bourdieu‟s work reveals how „individual‟ dispositions can also be „shared‟ 
through habitus and cultural trajectories, while power relations are never 
guaranteed nor fixed within the social world due to the disproportionate means 
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through which forms of capital operate, fluctuate and enhance/decrease value 
within diverse cultural fields.   
Significantly, however, Grossberg offers a point of departure from both 
Foucault and Bourdieu by seeking to „reinvest‟ pleasure and passion into analyses 
of the social, the individual and structural formations.  This offers a key point of 
orientation for the thesis.  Grossberg (1992b) suggests that, 
The questions I want to pose involve the relationship 
between popular culture - the popular culture people are 
offered, the popular culture they care about and the popular 
culture they reject – and politics.  How does each inform and 
shape the other?...These questions go to the very heart of the 
significance of culture and of that part of people‟s lives 
which seem most personal: tastes, pleasures, commitments.  
But such domains are not outside of the social and political 
arenas.  Nor are their meanings and relationships 
transparently available to critics.  (p. 37) 
Focusing on popular culture and daily life, Grossberg observes that a focus on 
meaning has been a dominant critical mode for analysing human reality and, 
consequently, that culture has often been reduced to texts and lived reality has 
been reduced to constructions of meanings.  Grossberg reminds us that this is far 
too simplistic, as meaning is never innate but, rather, complex, constructed, 
contradictory and multiple in its variations.  In particular, he points to the 
construction of „the audience‟ as a shared taste or shared identity, a construction 
which occurs often both prior to and/or outside of any particular interaction with a 
text.  Problematically, Grossberg notes, this creates a unified audience either in 
76 
relation to the text (taste) or independently of the text (identity), while forgoing an 
analysis of how texts also construct their audiences.   
For Bourdieu (1984) and Bourdieu-inspired scholars, taste is a significant 
marker for distinction, contributing to an individual‟s capital (and broader 
habitus) within a cultural field through his/her acquired „tastes‟ (e.g., high-culture 
musical „tastes‟ would probably include classical and operatic forms in contrast to 
„middle-class‟ tastes in rock, pop and possibly jazz, or even supposedly „working-
class‟ tastes for punk, metal and/or rap).  Furthermore, Bourdieu-influenced 
analyses also tend to provide an external reading of „individual‟ identity (e.g., in 
relation to their social or class position) as an explanatory framework with, in this 
instance, the above musical genres being linked, albeit arbitrarily, to a specific 
social identity within class.  Although not attacking Bourdieu directly (and clearly 
Bourdieu is not the only theorist or theoretical approach providing these 
classifications), Grossberg critiques the use of either shared taste or identity in 
analyses of the audience.  As he (1992b) argues,   
Taste reveals nothing about how people connect into the 
texts, and the fact that a group of people share a taste for 
some texts does not in fact guarantee that their common taste 
describes a common relationship.  Taste merely describes 
people‟s different abilities to find pleasure in a particular 
body of texts rather than others…On the other hand, if an 
audience fraction is defined externally, by a common set of 
interests and experiences related in some way to its social 
position, how can such simple identifications deal with the 
complexity of an individual‟s social identity?  Since any 
individual occupies a number of different social 
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positions….how can one possibly know which social 
position is most relevant in constructing a specific audience 
and in understanding their relation to a specific text?  (p. 42) 
Therefore, Grossberg proposes mapping how affective relationships operate 
within daily life.  Affect encompasses the pleasures and passions of an individual 
while recognising that pleasure, like meaning, is also polysemic and cannot easily 
be delimited within a particular set of values or actions.  For example, Grossberg 
notes that „pleasure‟ may be conceived in relation to or response to the „text‟, 
which itself is experienced through different degrees of intensity or investment 
(e.g., inclusive of happiness, enthralment, but may also involve lack of interest, 
boredom, etc.), or can be from the activity surrounding the ‟text‟, such as exertion 
or its lack.   
While the concept of affect is examined in more detail later in the thesis as a 
means for analysing fandom (Chapters Six and Seven), a preliminary definition is 
required here.  Grossberg (1992b) argues that, “affect identifies the strength of the 
investment which anchors people in particular experiences, practices, identities, 
meanings and pleasures but it also determines how invigorated people feel at any 
moment of their lives, their level of energy or passion.” (p. 82).  The „anchoring 
of experience‟ is also crucial for Grossberg who suggests that affective 
relationships are an investment in reality, with affect locating the „individual‟ in a 
particular set of social practices and relations (e.g., territoralization), while 
rendering social differentiation through the multiple affective relationships (e.g., 
formed, engaged in, rejected, etc.).  Fandom is clearly a strong example of this 
process.  For example, Formula One fandom brings diverse „individuals‟ together 
which provides social differentiation in multiple ways.  Therefore, on a macro-
level, a social distinction operates between Formula One fans and non-fans (and 
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possibly extends to sport versus non-sport fans).  Additionally, on a micro-level, 
more refined distinctions also exist, such as fan allegiances with specific Formula 
One teams and/or drivers, as well as fan access to and/or the visible display of 
Formula One merchandise.  Formula One fandom also has numerous implications 
for territoralization through the array of communal practices and relations 
available to and engaged in by fans around the world.  Therefore, time, space and 
place become significant for Formula One fandom in relation to whether fans can 
actually attend the „live‟ Grand Prix location, what mediated form(s) Formula One 
is consumed through (e.g., live or delayed telecasts, the internet, radio, etc.), as 
well as the degrees of communality accorded and taken up (e.g., live telecasts at 
midnight on Sunday evenings in New Zealand are less conducive to social 
gatherings than a Sunday afternoon screening in Europe; nevertheless, a 
communal‟ aspect still underpins live telecasts due to the assumed global 
mediated community also tuning in simultaneously).  Affect clearly inflects these 
social relationships also, in terms of the differing intensities and investments taken 
up, engaged in and/or demonstrated at specific moments by „fans‟(and even these 
„moments‟ can differ, e.g., within a race, season or on other non-race specific 
occasions – see further discussion in Chapter Six).   
Therefore, rather than a „shared‟ taste or identity, Grossberg (1992b) notes 
that “affect has a real power over difference, a power to invest difference and to 
make certain differences matter in different ways” (p. 105).  Grossberg‟s concept 
of „structured mobility‟ and his use of „affect‟ as a means to situate pleasure 
within a broader socio-cultural analysis of popular culture are key ideas that will 
shape the remainder of the thesis.  In particular, the concept of affect will be 
drawn upon to analyse „my‟ relationship with Villeneuve (the fan-star 
relationship) while examining the sense of „structured mobility‟ which underpins 
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both Villeneuve‟s „maverick‟ star status within Formula One and „my‟ (social, 
communal, commodified, etc.) experience of fandom in Chapters Six and Seven.   
Contemporary Social Reality: Images and Audiences 
In the opening lines to his essay entitled „postmodern virtualities‟, Poster (2001) 
identifies two significant developments in contemporary social reality.  As Poster 
(2001) notes, “on the eve of the twenty-first century there have been two 
innovative discussions about the general conditions of life: one concerns a 
possible „postmodern‟ culture and even society; the other concerns broad, massive 
changes in communications systems” (p. 71).  In the following section of this 
chapter, I will develop notions of the „postmodern‟, before then tracing some of 
these „massive changes‟ in communication, in order to explore how the 
structure/agency debate and the notion of structured mobility play out in 
contemporary culture.  The intention here is to locate the specific phenomenon of 
Formula One within this broader context. 
The Postmodern and Postmodernity 
It is now commonplace to note that our social world is in a state of flux, 
punctuated by rapid technological and social change (Archer, 2007; Lyon, 1994; 
McGuigan, 2006; Owen, 1997; Rail, 1998, 2002; Turner, 1990b; Urry, 2000).  
Indeed, many of these changes appear as rapid transformations rather than rational 
progressions, a conundrum aptly captured in Markula, Grant and Denison‟s 
(2001) articulation of contemporary „postmodern‟ culture as “an ongoing ordered 
disorder, a continuous discontinuity” (p. 258).  Moreover, aspects of bricolage, 
pastiche and ironic playfulness underpin the (re)combining of diverse elements 
into new social and cultural formations, with a blurring of styles and genres 
apparent in contemporary cultural forms (from hybrid architectures and eclectic 
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fashion to intertextual television shows) and even in signifying the nation, with 
Whannel (2008) noting an emerging „parodic playfulness‟ in popular articulations 
of national identity in relation to sport (e.g., cricket fandom for international 
men‟s teams, such as the English „Barmy Army‟ supporters or the New Zealand 
„Beige Brigade‟).  Collectively, many of the authors cited above consider these 
social characteristics to be „postmodern‟ while, as noted earlier, others deem the 
postmodern conceptualisation to be a redundant, reductive, clichéd or depthless 
approach either to analysing specific social conditions or as a general cultural 
theory.  Featherstone (1988) suggests that,  
Any reference to the term „postmodernism‟ immediately 
exposes one to the risk of being accused of jumping on a 
bandwagon, of perpetuating a rather shallow and 
meaningless intellectual fad.  One of the problems is that the 
term is at once fashionable yet irritatingly elusive to define.  
(p. 195) 
Furthermore, as Lyon (1994) asks, “is postmodernity an idea, a cultural 
experience, a social condition or perhaps a combination of all three?” (p. 4).  The 
distinction between the terms postmodernity and postmodernism lies in their focus 
on social changes and culture respectively, with postmodernity referring to a new 
set of social conditions, while postmodernism is the cultural theory about, or 
cultural stance towards, these social changes (Lemert, 1997; Lyon, 1994).  
Nevertheless, the „postmodern‟ remains difficult to define or to reach a critical 
consensus upon (Bauman, 1988; Hebdige, 1988; Smart, 1993).   
We have employed the notion of postmodernism earlier in this chapter, noting 
the epistemological „challenge‟ to the certainty and universality of Enlightenment-
derived grand knowledge-carrying narratives, expressed most influentially in 
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Lyotard‟s (1984) repudiation of totalising accounts or „metanarratives‟ of social 
reality.  Turning to the related concept of postmodernity, Featherstone (1988) and 
Smart (1990) suggest that it is useful to consider society in three distinct phases as 
a means for conceptualising postmodernity as periodisation and to distinguish 
postmodernity from what preceded it.
3
  The first phase is termed pre-modern, 
traditional or antiquity, identifying periods that were predominantly nomadic, 
agrarian, imperial or feudal in their organisation.  Modernity is the transition from 
this social world to industrialisation, with the growth and development of urban 
centres, the rise of capitalism, surveillance, the military, bureaucracy, 
rationalisation and alienation (Lyon, 1994).  Smart (1990) notes modernity 
ushered in the development of “science, morality and law, and art in accordance 
with their respective inner logics” (p. 17) to rationalise everyday life.  Turner 
(1990a) is even more explicit in describing this social transformation, suggesting 
that “modernity was about conquest – the imperial regulation of land, the 
discipline of the soul, and the creation of truth” (p. 4).  Postmodernity is most 
widely represented as a break, separation or move away from modernity and the 
modernist intellectual thought and culture which predominated (Featherstone, 
1988).  The implication of such a break for our understanding of structured 
mobility will be a key concern as this chapter progresses. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the concept of postmodernity as a 
significant societal transformation has remained divisive for scholars engaged in 
understanding our contemporary social situation.  Not all theorists are convinced 
that we have either firstly, moved beyond modernity or, secondly, that 
contemporary society remains or ever was „postmodern‟.  Indeed, the sociology of 
postmodernity is divided as to when postmodernity originated (if it did) and 
whether our contemporary social condition is postindustrial (Bell, 1973, 1976), 
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postmodern (Lyotard, 1984), represents the cultural logic of late capitalism 
(Jameson, 1991), or is a version of a second, high, radicalised, reflexive or critical 
modernity (Beck, 1992; Beck et al., 1994; Bernstein, 1985; Giddens, 1991; 
Habermas, 1987; Jencks, 2007).  An additional problem with conceptualising 
postmodernity is the use of the prefix „post‟.  The literature is divided as to 
whether „post‟ indicates a deep continuity with modernity or if the changes to 
social reality outlined above suggest a clear (albeit contested) demarcation from 
modernity.
4
  Therefore, the periodisation debate and concept of postmodernity as 
a period of significant social change is problematic and contested.  Due to this 
contestation, we will eschew using references to postmodernity favouring, instead, 
merely the „contemporary‟ to label our current social reality in the period under 
consideration.  The debates around postmodernism and postmodernity deliver to 
the present argument an interest in new forms of representation, regulation and 
subject positioning that will cluster around the question of structured mobility and 
its relevance to understanding Formula One.  Technology will be the core theme. 
Technology, Images and Audiences 
Lemert (1997) suggests that,  
The media, notably television, are literally media (or, more 
simply, tools) through which we gain a „sense of the world‟.  
That sense may be expanded, displaced, distorted, perverted, 
intensified, and more.  It may be, in our view, good or bad.  
But the important fact is that when we live in a culture where 
culture is mediated our sense of reality is, to some important 
degree, mediated.  (p. 28) 
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Since the 1980s the exponential growth of an array of new media and 
communication technologies has not only further contributed to a more intensely 
mediated existence but is the specific context in which we can see new regimes of 
representation, regulation and subject positioning taking shape.  For example, the 
„traditional‟ media have diversified and sport-only newspapers, with their long 
history, such as La Gazzetta dello Sport in Italy since 1896 and L‟Equipe in 
France since 1946 (previously published as L‟Auto from 1900-1940), have been 
joined by a multiplicity of sport-only formats in print (e.g., most popular sports 
have a specialist magazine, such as F1 Racing or Rugby League Weekly), 
televisual, digital and online media.  For example, video games construct 
sophisticated „virtual‟ worlds for player engagement across an array of popular 
sports, while mobile mediated technologies like i-pods, cell phones and personal 
computers allow users to (de)territoralize spaces in both public and private realms, 
easily receiving, storing and potentially sharing sporting images and information 
in diverse temporal spaces and places (e.g., Formula One results and images 
„streamed‟ to and/or stored on cell phones).  Whether or not we label any of this 
„postmodern‟, it clearly characterises a contemporary social reality deeply defined 
by new mediated relations.  Furthermore, access to the worldwide web through 
many of these technologies exacerbates this sense of deterritorialization, as users 
can access a plethora of information in diverse spaces, as well as these 
technologies often facilitating a sense of global connectedness for an „audience‟, a 
point developed in relation to globalisation later in this chapter.  With the media 
colonising and dominating “virtually every aspect of the social, cultural and 
political fields in the contemporary West” (Schirato & Webb, 2004, p. 174), 
audiences are constantly called upon to allocate their attention to particular media 
forms in a saturated and highly competitive media-marketplace (we also develop 
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theories of audience attention and the media-audience interrelationship later in 
this chapter).  In a sense, in contemporary developed societies, tuning out from or 
escaping mediation is futile, with Whannel (2008) noting that “it is not a matter of 
choosing to consume media images, but of the virtual impossibility, at least in 
urban landscapes, of avoiding them” (p. 187).  Such unavoidability is a basic 
condition for the structured mobility that will be described more precisely in 
relation to Formula One in due course. 
Media Images  
Given the unavoidability of media images, some theorists argue that life is 
increasingly defined by these fragments of information that condense 
representations of social life into a disconnected series of signs and symbols and 
often these images are treated as more important than the reality they are supposed 
to signify (Baudrillard, 1983b; Debord, 1994; Denzin, 1991; Eco, 1986).  This is 
especially the case with electronic media, such as television, where life is 
dissolved into and then (re)articulated through televised images of the world 
(Lyon, 1994; Lemert, 1997); hence, for example, we primarily know about 
contemporary world events, including sport, through television coverage.  So too 
with video games, which transform „real‟ sport into a representation of televised 
sport to be played on a video game console (Poole, 2000).  Such a process 
arguably blurs distinctions between the „real‟ sport and its intertwined levels of 
representation via ever more sophisticated game formats (an aspect we revisit in 
Chapter Five). 
Simulation and Hyperreality  
Baudrillard (1983a, 1983b, 1987, 1988a, 1990a, 1990b, 1993, 1994b)
5
 has been 
especially influential in articulating the relationship between media images, signs 
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and reality.  Baudrillard (1983a, 1983b, 1994b) theorised that, rather than merely 
being influential in representing or shaping social reality, the media and images 
have replaced social reality through simulations and hyperreality.  Baudrillard 
emphasises the importance of the sign in mass culture although he repudiates 
Marxist theory (Baudrillard, 1975, 1981) in order to conceive of signs outside 
notions of use and exchange value; rather, signs are concerned primarily with 
appearances.  As a result, with the profusion of signs and images, and their 
constant (re)production and circulation through media and communication 
technologies, reality is difficult to ascertain behind the image or sign.  
Fundamentally, as defined in his genealogy of simulation, Baudrillard 
conceptualises four key distinctions between image, representation and reality. 
Detailing these will take us a step further in grasping the new forms of 
representation available to be accessed by a structured mobility.  For Baudrillard 
(1983b), the successive phases of the image are: “1) it is the reflection of a basic 
reality; 2) it masks and perverts a basic reality; 3) it masks the absence of a basic 
reality; 4) it bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure 
simulacrum” (p. 11, italics in original; numbers added).  Essentially, this first 
phase is what Baudrillard (1983b) refers to as “good appearance” (pp. 11-12, 
italics in original), as the image is an exact representation of reality and not 
associated with simulation.  Baudrillard considers exact representation with 
reference to the role of icons in the Byzantine era, suggesting that these icons 
were understood as both representations of, and exchangeable for, divine 
identities.  Villeneuve is no Byzantine icon (!).  The second phase is the first-order 
of simulation which Baudrillard links to a counterfeit order of appearance 
prominent since the Renaissance period and which can best be understood as a 
recognisably false, re-produced image distinct from the real image.  As an 
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example, Baudrillard discusses the proliferation of stucco since the Renaissance 
as a synthetic re-production and blending of other materials such as wood, velvet 
and concrete.  While stucco mirrors these other materials, it remains distinctly 
counterfeit or a recognisably false re-production of these other materials.  
Television images of Villeneuve in action are anything but counterfeit in what 
they implicitly claim to represent.  The third phase of the image (second-order 
simulation) is associated with the industrial era, in which appearance is mass 
produced and increasingly blurs distinctions between image and reality (e.g., the 
mechanical and serial production of art).  It is tempting to stop here with our 
understanding of what Villeneuve‟s image means; to note simply the ambiguity 
involved in posing the question „is he real or just an image?‟ (a point indirectly 
addressed in Chapter Seven). 
But, according to Baudrillard (1983b) we have moved into a third-order 
simulation which stems “from the radical negation of the sign as value” (p. 11, 
italics in original).  The endless cycle and circulation of an abundance of signs 
and images distorts reality to the point where Baudrillard asserts that everything 
has become simulation or the simulacra (Baudrillard, 1983a, 1983b, 1994b).  In 
this third-order simulation, the process of reproducibility constructs a world 
without origin, absorbing and replacing reality through its own constant 
reproduction; “the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a 
hyperreal” (Baudrillard, 1983b, p. 2).  Baudrillard‟s simulation theory offers an 
insight into the relationship between images and reality, as played out in many 
contemporary mundane examples.  Suntans have moved from simply exposure to 
natural sunlight, to being a third-order simulation of a suntan produced by lamps, 
to pills and sprays which change skin pigmentation to give the appearance (or a 
simulation) of a suntan (Horrocks & Jevtic, 1999).  Arguably, each of these third-
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order techniques not only changes the skin colour but produces a suntan that is 
more real than the real, i.e., a more „authentic‟ suntan more free of blemishes, 
imperfections or dangers (e.g., skin cancer) than can be achieved naturally.  The 
exchange of money no longer requires either real money or a real exchange but, 
rather, is based on an electronic (or virtual) transaction between machines and 
banks.  And so on. 
Butler (1999) and Merrin (2005) argue that Baudrillard‟s simulation theory 
must not be read as a denial or loss of reality and point to the futility or 
depthlessness of only defining Baudrillard‟s simulation theory in relation to “a 
copy without an original” (Merrin, 2005, p. 29).  Both authors argue for an 
awareness of the historical dimensions to simulation (which Baudrillard traces 
through anthropological, theological and philosophical conceptions of the image), 
especially in relation to the power of the image and how images have been 
historically cast as a threat to reality, with copies needing to be clearly 
distinguished from originals to banish their „demonic‟ qualities (see also 
Baudrillard, 1988b).  The question of the potential power of the audience (e.g., as 
argued for in Hall‟s (1996) „culturalist‟ approach) is something to which we will 
have to return.  Rather than merely a vacuously „postmodern‟ or nihilistic 
rendering of the image/reality relation, Butler (1999) and Merrin (2005) argue that 
Baudrillard is drawing upon established theories of the image to advance a new 
understanding of contemporary social reality.  Rather than opposing the real, 
therefore, Merrin (2005) suggests that “Baudrillard appeals to the real as a critical 
force against the simulacrum” (p. 30) privileging the symbolic as a lived reality to 
critique the “„real‟ as a semiotic category” (Merrin, 2005, p. 31), while 
“demonstrating how our experiential reality has become a modelled, 
precessionary, semiotic production” (Merrin, 2005, p. 32) which filters and 
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processes the world around us (Merrin, 2005; see also Baudrillard, 1981, 1993, 
1998).  Merrin‟s (2005) description of how events implode into precessionary 
models for media transmission and for consumption at a distance and in comfort, 
affords some key insights.  As Merrin (2005) notes, Baudrillard‟s argument, 
Demonstrates how individual use and choices are irrelevant 
in considering the media‟s operation, while his claims 
regarding their precessionary, semiotically processed output 
alerts us to how many of our responses are produced and 
coded in advance.  Active audience theories, therefore, 
valorize behaviour that is of limited significance in 
comparison to the effects of the form and structure and 
operation of the media.  Indeed, Baudrillard‟s work reveals 
that much of this behaviour – our individual reception and 
pleasurable use of the media – forms part of that process of 
„personalization‟ that he sees as operating within 
contemporary consumption and, as such, as representing not 
an expression of individuality and freedom but only of our 
precoded production and integration into a system of social 
control.  Thus we can reverse the common assumption in the 
discipline that Baudrillard is a postmodernist, uninterested in 
questions of media power, to see instead that the Marxist-
Culturalist project of Hall ends in the postmodernism of 
active audience theories, whose naïve individualism is 
exposed by Baudrillard‟s critical emphasis on form, effects 
and power.  (pp. 24-25) 
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Merrin (2005) then goes on to note that, for instance, “if digital sports channels 
now offer a more individually tailored, attractive and leisurely experience than 
actual attendance, with a choice of views making more reality available in the 
home than those in the stands” (p. 25) this pseudo-personalisation only serves to 
tighten the grip of the coded system on the experience.  The notion of the 
„precessionary‟ nature of this grip is crucial though.  The „modelled, 
precessionary, semiotic production‟ always precedes anything else but the notion 
of preceding presupposes the possibility of something „after‟.  As Merrin (2005) 
argues, “if, however, Baudrillard‟s media theory pushes us towards a pessimism 
regarding the processes of contemporary media, it is a pessimism that is never 
complete” (p. 26).  This incompleteness of the precessionary modelling of reality 
by media affords a tantalising glimpse of the „mobility‟ in structured mobility, 
without slipping back into the naïve individualism of more simplistic notions of 
the active audience. 
To summarise, Merrin is identifying Baudrillard‟s conceptualisation of the 
reduction of reality to not only signs, but to the absence of an external reality 
through an internalising process (the precessionary model) where signs reflect and 
reproduce other signs in an internal and self-contained, precessionary manner.  
For Baudrillard, the media have a salient role in this process, as the media produce 
an „experiential reality‟ which is modelled on to the media‟s own previous images 
of reality.  Thus, the „precessionary model‟ constructed by the media evacuates or 
eclipses reality and „real‟ subjective experiences, while remaining contained 
within the media‟s pre-existing, precessionary semiotic production of such 
experiences.  This also leads to an „implosive‟ effect in the media, whereby media 
neutralise and replace „lived reality‟ through what Baudrillard (1998) refers to as 
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“a multiple universe of media which, as such, are homogenous one with another, 
signifying each other reciprocally and referring back and forth to each other”  
(p. 123).  Thus, rather than an explosion or richness of meanings drawn towards 
an external reality, the media fold into themselves via implosive and internal 
models that constantly reproduce their own precessionary reality and suck „raw 
material‟ into a vortex of simulation (e.g., stripped of external „experiences‟ as 
media content implosively reproduces and sustains itself).  Two examples 
demonstrate this process.  First, Baudrillard‟s (2000) often critiqued assertion that 
the Gulf War did not take place (e.g., see Norris, 1992) recognises the 
precessionary modelling within the „event‟, in this case war as a mediated event.  
Baudrillard (2000) was not literally asserting that a conflict did not occur but, 
rather, that the Gulf War became a virtual war of information, electronics and 
images which shaped the „real‟ war.  Such a view is supported by Horrocks and 
Jevtic‟s (1999) and Patton‟s (2000) contention that even many at the „front‟ were 
being informed about what was happening through CNN coverage.  Furthermore, 
Baudrillard sees the Gulf War as in one sense merely a simulation of war derived 
from its own precessionary model; as both a media model (war as technology 
which both abolishes and simulates „real‟ communication), as well as a 
contemporary war model in which deterrence and the simulation of war are the 
most effective strategies (rather than a „real‟ conflict).  Baudrillard‟s (2000) 
supplementary idea that the „real‟ event of war was already simulated by the 
military through their own precessionary models of meticulous simulated 
scenarios is also useful for my second example.   
Although I will avoid pursuing a „Grands Prix do not take place‟ 
overstatement, Formula One clearly replicates many of Baudrillard‟s points.  In 
particular, Formula One offers an „implosive‟ effect, with media coverage 
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converging to reflect Formula One back onto itself through its own „modelled, 
precessionary, semiotic production‟ seemingly devoid of an external reality.  
Thus, for the spectator or fan not in attendance, television coverage is the „event‟, 
while attendees are also informed that they are privy to an „event‟ in front of them 
through the trackside presence of visual mediation (e.g., large public screens) 
which they in turn are reliant upon to follow and understand the race, as well as 
demonstrating that they constitute a „crowd‟ through their mediated performances 
(literally seeing themselves) as a live audience (see also Schirato, 2007b).  The 
implosiveness of the Formula One telecast also insists on the precessionary model 
for the „event‟ being screened: diverse technologies, camera angles and 
commentary combine to reproduce and perfect their own representation (and 
potentially eclipse any notion of an external, „real‟ event that is personally 
„experienced‟ through and beyond the media‟s own effective simulation of it).  
Furthermore, the internal and reproductive dynamic of the precessionary model 
inscribes a self-contained significance onto the event for viewers to discern and 
form an appreciation that transcends the reality of cars repetitively lapping a given 
circuit.  This modelling at the level of the media effectively counterbalances 
Formula One‟s own precessionary models of meticulous planning, simulated 
strategies and scenarios which often risk the event becoming something of a non-
event in relation to the actual racing or „competition‟ on offer; for example, only 
the top two or three teams and a handful of drivers are likely to win races during a 
given season.   
The „real‟ Grand Prix has already been modelled or simulated numerous 
times before the teams even arrive for the race weekend (supporting Butler [1999] 
and Merrin‟s [2005] contention that, nevertheless, Formula One presents a „real‟ 
to critically counter these versions of the simulacra).  For example, teams 
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regularly test at various tracks to (im)prove new car parts, often re-configuring 
test tracks to replicate the layout or dynamics of another circuit on the Grand Prix 
calendar while „simulating‟ the Grand Prix experience through race strategy and 
car set-ups for an event different from the actual locality where they are present.  
Other notable „Grand Prix experiences‟ further demonstrate the level of third-
order simulation prevalent in Formula One.  Teams use computer, machine and 
wind tunnel simulations of Grand Prix conditions for stationary cars (or even 
computer simulations of their wind tunnel simulations, see Hings, 2007), as well 
as computer simulations of particular race and track dynamics to predict wear 
rates and optimum fuel and race strategies.  Additionally, some of the drivers 
actually prepare for races on either team car-computer simulations or „compete‟ 
on Formula One video games to familiarise themselves with circuits („Playstation 
helps Ant‟, 2007; see also Chapter Five).  These forms of event modelling, deeply 
embedded in Formula One‟s own practices, underpin the layer of mediated images 
that then make these practices accessible.   
For Baudrillard (1988a), the „ecstasy of communication‟ has had an 
implosive effect in the media, creating a self-perpetuating web of interconnected 
meanings and mediations through the speed, intensity and extensiveness of media 
technologies.  The challenge that Baudrillard sets us is how to maintain some 
notion of the „mobility‟ in structured mobility that does not slip back into 
simplistic ideas about the „active‟ audience somehow operating in a bubble that 
deflects the determining structures surrounding it.  To think about this requires 
some sense of how debates about the audience have evolved (see next section), 
but we should note Baudrillard‟s own solution first, as well as its limitations for 
the present purpose.  As Baudrillard (1988a) suggests, “everywhere one seeks to 
produce meaning, to make the world signify, to render it visible.  We are not, 
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however, in danger of lacking meaning; quite to the contrary, we are gorged with 
meaning and it is killing us” (p. 63).  Therefore, Baudrillard confounds one 
version of the structure/agency debate by suggesting that audiences are being 
overloaded with meaning, rather than being producers of excess meanings 
themselves.  Clearly, Baudrillard allocates „power‟ to media signs in this 
relationship, rendering the social (and by implication audiences/subjects/agents) 
redundant.  But Baudrillard (1983a, 1990a) also conceives of „fatal strategies‟ as a 
symbolic means for subjects/agents to simulate their own conformity to 
social/structural formations.  This is the only „mobility‟ that Baudrillard himself 
allows and will be further elaborated in relation to media subjectivities and the 
audience in the next section.   
Baudrillard‟s views on meaning-saturation have become even more relevant 
since the time of writing, especially given the breadth of new media technologies 
and the largely unregulated flows and exchanges of „information superhighways‟ 
(Poster, 2001) such as the internet.  Additionally, Cubitt (2001) notes that the 
media increasingly manufacture their own „events‟ that have no reality outside the 
media (e.g., television news „reporting‟ on an „event‟, such as the latest Dancing 
with the Stars television series winner, which is often screened on the same 
television network) and encourage communicators (e.g., Bernie Ecclestone) to 
prepare events, such as Formula One races, for the media.  Furthermore, media 
networks often converge on a particular story/event (e.g., the death of Princess 
Diana), producing an intense focus or „vortextuality‟ effect which sucks in and 
absorbs diverse media forms within the coverage of such an event (Whannel, 
2002, 2008).  The representation of Formula One reflects many of these elements 
of meaning saturation, manufacture and vortextuality.  For example, the array of 
global Formula One mediations and information disseminated via these diverse 
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forms (televisual, magazine, internet, etc) make it impossible to read and/or access 
all Formula One coverage while „gorging‟ audiences with information in the 
process.  Formula One representations are also self-perpetuating in relation to the 
role and reliance upon mediations within the sport (e.g., viewers often „need‟ to 
complement live televisual images with internet coverage; physical attendance at 
races with large trackside screens, etc.).  Finally, occasionally the media get 
sucked into processes of vortextuality in coverage of star drivers, such as the 
regular and intensive focus on the public and private life of Lewis Hamilton since 
his debut in 2007 by the British media, although the media vortex surrounding 
footballer David Beckham is still perhaps a stronger example of this process (see 
Whannel, 2001, 2002, 2008).   
Crucially, structured mobility can be read into such practices, as determining 
external information is taken up, invested in, rejected and/or re-used in multiple 
ways through the access by Formula One „subjects‟ to the plethora of information 
that is not a structured whole so much as a terrain of image-based saturation, 
manufacture and vortextuality.  But to understand this more precisely requires a 
better theorisation of the audience.  In particular, we will need to map such ideas 
about re-use, rejection, etcetera onto the various debates about the audience, but 
clearly they run the risk of sliding back toward the very forms of simplistically 
conceived „activity‟ by audiences that Baudrillard‟s theoretical insights have 
challenged.  On the one hand, Baudrillard‟s own conception of fatal strategies as 
the best that audiences can do operates at an abstractly philosophical level where 
it is very difficult to see actual practices in actual situations, such as those of 
interest here.  The mimicry of their own conformity by audiences (e.g., in the 
Formula One fan‟s obsessive displays of the paraphernalia of fandom) can only be 
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our starting point for the further elaboration of theoretical underpinnings for the 
„mobility‟ in structured mobility as realised in the context of Formula One. 
Media Subjectivities: The Debates about the Media Text/Audience 
Relationship 
As noted earlier, Grossberg (1992b) has critiqued many constructions of the 
„audience‟, as problematically these often occur both prior to and/or outside the 
text, while audiences are often also categorised as „sharing‟ an assumed „taste‟ or 
„identity‟ (in addition to often being determined by the text).  The 
structure/agency debate thematically underpins conceptualisations of the media 
text/audience relationship, with some theorists articulating a structural framework 
for media texts which have a determining effect on the audience, while other 
theorists categorise „individual‟ audience members as either „subjects‟ or „agents‟ 
dependent on the autonomy accorded to audiences within this mediated 
relationship.  Understanding what is at issue here requires an overview of the 
relevant debates. 
The „Determined‟ Audience: Media „Effects‟, Formalist Film Studies, Political 
Economy and Baudrillard 
Much of the early audience research in the 1960s and 1970s was derived from a 
mass communication, psychological perspective which essentially set up a 
dichotomy of the audience as either „passive‟ or „active‟ (Seiter, 2004).  Notions 
of the „active‟ audience, savagely critiqued by Baudrillard, will be discussed later 
in this section, while the audience as passive recipients of mediated texts was 
characterised early on by „effects‟ research.  „Effects‟ research suggested that the 
media was a hypodermic needle which has „effects‟ on its audiences.  In fact, 
according to Morley (1989), the primary focus of the „effects‟ research was on the 
96 
power of the media to “„inject‟ their audiences with particular messages which 
will cause them to behave in a particular way” (p. 16).  These „behaviourist‟ 
studies primarily emphasised the negative „effect‟ that the media had in relation to 
violence and other graphic content (e.g., offensive language and sexual content) 
through, for example, the infamous „Bobo doll‟ study in which children „acted 
out‟ the mediated violence they had seen by hitting a Bobo doll (Bandura, Ross & 
Ross, 1963; see discussion of „effects‟ debate in Barker & Petley, 2001; Seiter et 
al., 1989).  Hence, through „effects‟ research the media is presented as providing a 
determining structure over „subject‟ audiences, emphasising that power resides 
solely with the media text to have an „effect‟ on the passive audience.   
The formalist and structuralist film studies of the 1970s, though unconcerned 
with effects per se, evoked a similar determining structure for films and their 
relationship with audiences.  Such formalist and structuralist approaches 
attempted both to understand how films „worked‟ and, also, how the techniques, 
structures and screened image positioned the cinematic audience (J. Smith, 2004).  
Bordwell (1988) suggests that the film theory of this period can be characterised 
as „SLAB theory‟, by which he means “Saussurean semiotics, Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, Althusserian Marxism and Barthesian textual theory” (p. 385; see 
also Nichols, 2000).  Semiotics and psychoanalysis were particularly influential 
on theories of the film audience, as both focused on the structures or „apparatus‟ 
of the film to elaborate how particular techniques and structures governed both the 
film and, more importantly, determined the audience through viewer positioning 
(Metz, 1973, 1974, 1982; Mulvey, 1975, 1988).  Such analyses also drew on 
theories of ideology and the text to further „reveal‟ how audiences were both 
influenced and determined by the filmic image, structure and its „ideological 
effects‟ (Baudry, 1970).  Collectively, these studies tended to universalise the 
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cinematic audience and all cinema viewers were conceived to be determined in 
similar ways by the filmic structures which, Kothari (2004) asserts, “tended to 
reduce the audience to a set of textually inscribed subject positions” (p. 50).  In 
particular, the theorisation of „individual‟ film experiences, distinctions, or 
concepts of the „active‟ film audience were notably absent during this period (but 
see the discussion of phenomenology later in this chapter). 
Most televisual and filmic studies of the audience have moved away from a 
strictly semiotic or psychoanalytical approach since the 1980s, with many 
embracing a cultural studies perspective (particularly Hall‟s [1996] 
encoding/decoding model evoked by Merrin and which I discuss shortly).  
Nevertheless, the focus on the ideological „effect‟ of the media remains salient.  
Frankfurt School-inspired perspectives on media, such as the political economy 
perspective which focuses on media ownership and ideology (Strinati, 2004), 
tends to privilege the production of the media text over the audience.  While these 
political economy approaches avoid ascribing the psychologically-derived 
„effects‟ of the media onto audiences, they produce a similar yet subtly different 
account.  In particular, political economy is an example of what Grossberg 
(1992b) refers to as the audience existing “outside of a particular interaction with 
the media” (p. 41).  Thus, political economy approaches often overlook audience 
reception or consumption, tending to conceptualise audiences as a collective 
spongy or passive mass „duped‟ by media owners, networks, messages or 
ideologies (Grossberg, 1998).  In many respects, despite his radical departure 
from Marxist theory, Baudrillard (1983a, 1990a) arrives at a similar 
conceptualisation of the audience, albeit while leaving open the possibility that 
audiences will mimic their own conformity.   
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Thus, for Baudrillard (1983a, 1990a), the masses are either duped or simulate 
their existence as an apathetic and passive mass who employ fatal strategies to 
acknowledge their own passivity and inertia (Giulianotti, 2004; Rodaway, 1995).  
Baudrillard‟s first position of a „duped‟ audience which, as Merrin (2005) 
suggests, positions “„the masses‟ as passive, stupefied consumers of media 
„spectacle‟” (p. 151), seems to replicate „effects‟ based research to a degree by 
ignoring any „active‟ engagement or polysemic renderings of the audience/media 
interrelationship: all power is centred on the media.  However, Baudrillard‟s 
(1983a, 1990a) fatal strategies manipulate the structure/agency debate by 
ascribing a degree of „agency‟ to the masses in an unconventional manner; the 
masses‟ symbolic acknowledgement of the nature of their own existence remains 
important.  Baudrillard suggests that by simulating their existence as an audience, 
the masses also simulate their own „hyperconformity‟ and seemingly participate in 
the mediated, commercial and commodified practices of contemporary life as a 
silent and inert „consuming‟ mass.  In actuality, Baudrillard (1983a, 1990a) 
argues, the masses are deploying apathy and their hyperconformity as a fatal 
strategy to play games with and deceive those that seek to know them, reduce 
them to media subjects and have them consume.  Thus, the masses seduce those 
who seek them (e.g., including sociologists, opinion-pollsters, advertisers, etc.) 
but, ultimately, are apathetic to such advances and engage in playful games, ruse 
and artifice to remain unknown.  The possibility of remaining unknown at the 
very heart of perceived conformity is Baudrillard‟s highly abstract allowance for 
„mobility‟ within the structured.  We will revisit this fatal strategy when 
reassembling the processes of fandom and the maverick traces of Villeneuve in 
Chapter Seven. 
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The „Active‟ Audience: „Uses and Gratifications‟, Cultural Studies and 
Phenomenology   
Other audience approaches have theorised a more „active‟ role for audiences.  
These approaches often ascribe an enhanced degree of „agency‟ to audience 
members although problematically either conceive of the audience outside of the 
text or as having „shared‟ attributes of identity (independent of the text) or taste 
(in relation to the text).  For example, „uses and gratifications‟ audience research 
was a reaction to the „effects‟ research of the 1960s and 1970s, shifting emphasis 
from the power of the media to the power of individual audience members who, it 
was claimed, used the media to „satisfy their needs‟ (Seiter, 2004).  Hence, „uses 
and gratifications‟ research ascribed „agency‟ to the audience although often 
ignored the actual media content or what the text offered.  Rather, influenced by 
psychologically-based analyses of goal-orientated behaviour, „uses and 
gratifications‟ primarily attributed different audience responses and uses to the 
variations in an individual‟s personality or psychological make-up (Morley, 
1989).  Therefore, such an approach overstated the notion that „individual‟ 
psychological traits allow audiences to „actively‟ use the media for their own 
purposes, often devoid of any analysis of the mediated content.  
Hall‟s (1996) encoding/decoding model, developed during the 1970s, moved 
away from a psychologically-based assessment to a theorisation grounded in 
cultural studies.  Focusing primarily on television, Hall posited that the media do 
not constitute the simple sender-message-receiver loop of mass communication 
theory but, rather, require a range of technical and knowledge-based processes to 
both encode a message at one end and decode its meaning structure at the other.  
Thus, Hall rejected the mass communication assumption that power resides solely 
with either the text or the individual and, instead, recognised that there were dual 
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processes at play in both „producing‟ a mediated message (which he suggests is 
encoded with a preferred reading by its producer), as well as audiences needing to 
make sense of this message.  Most importantly for audience research, Hall 
realised that these audience decodings of the text were not the same (c.f., the 
universalistic assumptions of „effects‟, political economy and formalist film 
research), with Hall theorising that audiences have three possible decoding 
positions in relation to the mediations they receive.  The first of Hall‟s audience 
responses is hegemonic, where the audience accepts/agrees with the preferred 
reading of the producer/message; the second is a negotiated reading which 
essentially means the audience accepts parts of the preferred meaning but rejects 
others; while, finally, in the third decoding position of oppositional reading, the 
audience goes against or rejects the preferred meaning of the producer and/or 
message.   
While re-theorising the balance between media texts and audience reception, 
Hall notes that a power dynamic still exists by ascribing an ideological basis to 
this mediated relationship.  Seiter (2004) notes that, “the encoding-decoding 
model insists on the struggle involved in gaining people‟s agreement with 
ideology” (p. 465), as Hall asserts that socially determined „producers‟ encode 
their own preferred and ideologically coloured meanings within the text which 
then positions audiences in one of three ways through their decoding responses to 
this ideologically encoded message.  Hall‟s argument has been critiqued by 
Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) for the binary positions it creates for 
audiences, in terms of an either incorporation/resistance relationship to the text, 
while others have questioned the forms that the „preferred reading‟ actually takes 
(e.g., is it a property within the text?) and whether it is applicable across various 
mediations (Morley, 1989).  Furthermore, I agree with O‟Sullivan, Dutton and 
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Rayner (2003) that there may be more than three audience positions for decoding 
a message as, for example, a fourth possible position is misunderstanding or 
failing to comprehend/decode the message (e.g., not an intentional, ideological 
reworking of the preferred meaning as an oppositional reading, but failing to 
grasp the meaning entirely or being culturally „illiterate‟ in Bourdieu‟s [1984] 
terms in reading a text within a specific cultural field).
6
   
For other researchers, cultural studies signalled a move away from the 
determining analyses of media texts, such as the (neo)Marxist emphasis on 
production (e.g., the political economy approach), Hall‟s (1996) ideological 
encoding/decoding of messages which audiences incorporate or resist, or an 
emphasis on the formal structures of the text (e.g., psychoanalytic or semiotic film 
theories).  Cultural studies research has certainly emphasised aspects of media 
production but, more significantly, keeps returning to the „active‟ consumption of 
the media by audiences.  In particular, cultural studies has stressed the notion of 
„active‟ audiences who are neither determined or „effected‟ by the text in a 
universalistic sense but, rather, are culturally situated and actively make sense of 
the media in multiple ways through their engagement with the text and its 
encoded content (Morley, 1989, 1992; Seiter et al, 1989; Seiter, 2004).  The 
acknowledged significance of the reciprocal and negotiated exchange between the 
media text and audience engagement also distinguishes the cultural studies notion 
of an „active audience‟ from the earlier „uses and gratifications‟ active audience 
research based on individualised psychological traits.   
Four key research directions for studying the audience have emerged from 
within the cultural studies „active audience‟ paradigm.  The first has already been 
discussed in relation to the encoding of a „preferred meaning‟ and the ideological 
positions through which audiences decode this message/preferred meaning (Hall, 
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1996).  The second key theory is based on approaches to textual analysis that 
consider both what the text offers to the audience and how audiences respond to 
this text (Bertrand & Hughes, 2005; Jutel, 2004; McKee, 2001).  In relation to 
what the text offers audiences, textual analysis of this sort primarily focuses on 
the technical attributes of the text (Hartley, 2002) by connecting broader social 
theory to a particular text (e.g., using feminist theory to examine soap operas) or 
by analysing a particular editing, framing or other technique to reveal its function 
(e.g., to produce an ideological or gendered „text‟, etc.).  The „audience response‟ 
textual analysis research tends to investigate the social production of meaning, in 
terms of how audiences engage with, respond to and construct multiple meanings 
through their „reading‟ of the text (McKee, 2001).  Clearly both textual analysis 
approaches are reliant on a binary distinction between text and audience, as well 
as a potential binary that separates the „determining‟ role of the text from an 
„autonomous‟ audience response.  Morley (1989) suggests there are limitations to 
such an approach, as textual analysis tends to produce speculative assumptions as 
to what the audience does with the text based on the implications of spectator 
positionings and the assumptions of the academic researcher.   
Finally, for our summary purposes here, there are two strands of cultural 
studies which collectively examine the audience under the rubric of reception 
studies.  The first of these has primarily been influenced by the work of Fiske 
(1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1993) who eschews the structure/agency debate by 
dismissing the emphasis on the media text and, instead, promotes audience 
autonomy.  Fiske prefers to focus on what the audience brings to the text, which 
he suggests allows audiences to create their „own‟ meanings and pleasures and 
„empowers‟ audiences to dismiss ideological or preferred readings, such as the 
various seemingly „free‟ readings of Madonna made by teenage girls (see also 
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Jenkins, 2000).  Not surprisingly, many critics view Fiske‟s work as grossly 
overestimating the autonomy of the audience (Morley, 1989), while parading an 
ignorance of structural formations and how human „agency‟ is always bound to 
specific socio-cultural contexts.   
The second strand of reception studies has turned to ethnography as a 
methodological means to explore audience „uses‟ of media texts across a range of 
socio-economic and cultural settings (e.g., Jhally & Lewis, 1992; Morley, 1980, 
1986, 1989, 1992).  Rather than abstractly theorising the audience, these 
approaches incorporate the audience experience through qualitative methods such 
as interviews and participant-observation to reveal the complexity of actual 
audience-text relationships.  Still, the ethnographic audience reception research 
often reduces audience „experiences‟ to collective group responses, simplifies 
audience diversity and, simplistically, politicises audiences (e.g., Jhally & Lewis‟ 
[1992] account of „enlightened‟ racism for audiences viewing The Cosby Show).  
Furthermore, despite Hall‟s (1996) insistence that the media message is “a 
structure produced and sustained through the articulation of linked but distinctive 
moments – production, circulation, distribution/consumption, reproduction”  
(p. 51), critics have noted that this process has not always been conceived of in its 
entirety when studying media audiences (Kellner, 1997).  Often, only one element 
of Hall‟s (1996) „distinctive moments‟ is privileged, with many of the cultural 
studies analyses (including the textual analyses and reception studies strands) 
accounting for the text as a site of reception yet often failing to consider the other 
„moments‟, such as production (Stoddart, 1994) or distribution (Cubitt, 2005b).   
Although a neglected tradition in film studies, phenomenology attempts to 
describe the “perceptual, imaginative, and aesthetic experience” (Andrew, 1985, 
p. 628) for cinematic audiences.  With its focus on the audience experience, 
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phenomenology has been perceived as filling a void in the universalistic and 
deterministic theories of film spectatorship derived from psychoanalysis, Marxist 
analysis and semiotics.  Sobchack (1995) notes, 
In a search for rules and principles governing cinematic 
expression, most of the descriptions and reflections of 
classical and contemporary film theory have not fully 
addressed the cinema as life expressing life, as experience 
expressing experience. Nor…viewers viewing, engaged as 
participants in dynamically and directionally reversible acts 
that reflexively and reflectively constitute the perception of 
expression and the expression of perception.  (p. 38, italics 
in original) 
The filmic phenomenological perspective, therefore, focuses on the sensory and 
haptic aspects of the film experience for viewers (Marks, 2000, 2002), outlining 
how embodiment is literally involved in the dynamics of film as an apparatus (but 
distinct from the „apparatus theory‟ of a determined and ideological viewing 
position) and as an embodied experience that the viewer experientially engages 
with through their own bodily responses to the cinematic representation 
(Sobchack, 1992, 2004).  For Marks (2000, 2002), film provides a haptic skin 
which viewers touch and engage with through their senses, making film viewing 
and the pleasures on offer a profoundly sensory and mutually embodied 
experience.  Through this embodied process, viewers engage with the skin of the 
film as a living thing while simultaneously recognising their own embodied 
experience of the film through haptic feedback, sensory stimulation and the 
activation of memory.  Sobchack (1992, 2004) suggests it is the relationship 
between vision, embodiment and viewer identification which shapes the audience 
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experience.  Sobchack notes the interrelationship of the cinematic eye, the 
viewer‟s physical visibility (eye) and subjective position (I), emphasising an 
embodied linkage between vision (cinematic and physical) and subjectivity.  
Accordingly, viewers rely on their carnal knowledge, as it were, of memory and 
physical experiences to subsume and engage with the filmic image, while 
experiencing these pleasures and emotions through their embodied reactions to, 
and sensory perceptions of, the on-screen image (Sobchack, 1992, 2004).  
Phenomenology offers a compelling complement to the ideologically determined 
or gendered cinematic viewer positioning of earlier film theory (Baudry, 1970; 
Metz, 1973, 1974, 1982; Mulvey, 1975, 1988), some of which (e.g., postfeminist 
psychoanalytic approaches) did focus on the body but only as the site of inscribed 
meanings, not the means for embodied engagements with media.  The embodied 
linkage between vision and subjectivity is something to which we can usefully 
return in due course (Chapter Five).   
Grossberg (1992b) is critical, one way or another, of all of these approaches.
7
  
While often avoiding singular accounts of texts, audiences and meaning, 
Grossberg suggests that, collectively, cultural studies (and post-structuralist 
notions of difference) create and rely upon a structural gap between the text and 
audience as separate and distinct.  And meaning operates in an equally distinct 
way between the other two.  He argues, (1992b) 
With that assumption – that every instance (e.g., of text) has 
a unified identity which corresponds or relates in necessary 
ways to another equally unified term (e.g., of meaning or 
audience) – the whole game (especially the outcome) is 
guaranteed in advance.  Here is a text, unique and complete 
unto itself.  Here is the meaning that corresponds to that text, 
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that is necessarily produced by it.  Here is an audience which 
also has its own proper identity guaranteed to it in advance.  
And here is the experience of that audience, necessarily 
resulting from its particular social position or its unique 
cultural history.  (p. 39) 
In light of the foregoing discussion of the conceptual underpinnings for the 
present research, it becomes clear that such assumptions need to be challenged 
and that a methodological framework is needed that will achieve this.  More 
specifically, this chapter has brought us to the point where we can recognize six 
key methodological requirements for the present research: First, that embodiment 
(the phenomenological insight in a sense) is crucial to avoiding the separations of 
text, meaning and audience on which many of the previous approaches have 
relied.  Second, that „intense‟ fandom is an instance par excellence of a fatal 
strategy in Baudrillard's sense, as the fan experiences his/her own mimicking of 
coercion in so many acts of fandom, from the buying of 'too much' fan 
paraphernalia to glimpsing one's own 'obsessions' through others' eyes, and that 
fandom presents, therefore, a more rigorously demanding challenge to theories of 
the active audience than perhaps any other way of describing an audience.  Third, 
that fandom is a highly determined form of 'active' audience engagement and that, 
with Baudrillard's rigorous suspicion of loose evocations of audience 'freedoms' 
always in mind, a focus on fandom in this sense will help the research to avoid 
sliding back toward any such loose evocations.  Fourth, that there are 
contradictions within the 'system of social control‟ which Baudrillard also evokes, 
as the „media‟ are not uniformly consistent in either their forms or „effects‟ on 
audiences, and an analysis of fandom would need to encompass the multiple 
forms of media both available to and utilised by fans, as well as providing an 
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understanding of the use and „effects‟ of specific media in specific „concrete‟ 
contexts (Grossberg, 1992b).  Fifth, such findings would need to recognise the 
contradictory and „slippery subject‟ positions and roles occupied by fans and/or 
audiences at any one time.  Thus, an acknowledgement of emerging audience and 
fan research is required.  In particular, Abercrombie and Longhurst‟s (1998) 
notion of the 'diffuse‟ audience (where we are always members of multiple 
audiences at one time); Jenkins‟ (2006b) „interactive‟ audiences (that audiences 
are „interactive‟ and perform a range of roles as an audience – for example, critic, 
consumer, producer, etc), and Hills‟ (2002) „performative-consumption‟, which 
recognises that fans are determined by socio-economic structures as mediated 
consumers yet, nevertheless, redeploy the processes and products of mediated 
consumption to sustain their performances as fans.  Finally, sixth, Grossberg‟s 
(1992b) concept of affect becomes crucial to understanding why social individuals 
„choose‟ to engage with specific media texts and form affective relationships only 
with selected aspects of popular culture.  Using Formula One and my „own‟ fan 
practices as a case study, affective relationships are significant for understanding 
and exploring the specific investments taken up by the fan and the varying 
intensities of affect that shape and „colour‟ the socio-cultural „experiences‟ of 
fandom (Chapters Six and Seven).   
These six methodological characteristics need to be focused around the 
question of structured mobility; the question of whether Baudrillard‟s stark but 
incomplete picture of subjection to the precessionary systems of simulation and 
coercion allows some room for manoeuvre without slipping towards any of the 
loose conceptions of the „active‟ audience.  As the thesis‟ subsequent argument 
will be that this structured mobility is best conceived as a layered phenomenon, 
the present chapter might usefully finish by describing a „base layer‟ as it were.  
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This derives from some of Formula One‟s most distinctive „territorial‟ 
characteristics as a global sport. 
A Globalised Sport: The Nation-State and „Mobile‟ Subjectivities 
Formula One is a global phenomenon and one that articulates a complex sense of 
the national through team and driver „nationalities‟ that are often recognisable 
without mapping onto the idea of the national team that characterises so many 
other sports at this level.  The global media environment in which Formula One 
operates has been extensively discussed in general terms (see McLuhan, 1964; 
Poster, 2001; Virilio, 1986, 1995).  The „compression‟ of time and space through 
the interconnectedness of this global media environment raises two major 
implications.  First, the role of nation-states in contemporary times, and 
particularly notions of national identity under the sway of globalisation become 
problematic.  Second, the significance of global commercialisation, 
commodification and consumption become especially salient to understanding and 
articulating our contemporary social lives, a point we shall return to shortly.  
Globalisation reflects the altering relationship between the local and global, an 
interrelationship that exposes contradictions between a perhaps mythical shared 
sense of national identity, on the one hand, and a more fluid notion of global 
citizenship and connectedness, on the other (Bauman, 1998; Maguire, 1999).  
Although the origins and specific nature of globalisation are contested (e.g., 
global trade or travel is not a new or „postmodern‟ phenomenon), the sense of new 
forms of global connectedness is primarily facilitated through the media, other 
communication technologies and a late capitalist marketplace (e.g., free trade 
agreements, transnational companies, franchises and products).  Whannel (2008) 
suggests that “four significant developments have contributed to the identification 
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of globalisation as a process” (p. 198) in contemporary times.  These four 
developments are: first, “major corporations have moved from being multinational 
to transnational”; second, “deregulation has fostered a much greater international 
division of labour”; third, the role of branded goods in a consumer culture has 
intensified and, finally, there is the “unprecedented global mobility of people 
during the twentieth century” (Whannel, 2008, p. 198).  Collectively, these 
developments point to new processes operating both through but also externally to 
the nation-state (e.g., transnational corporations and/or production processes 
independent of nation-state regulations), in addition to the movement of people 
that is reconstructing markets, impacting on local economies, and potentially 
transforming some national subjects into global citizens through the ease of 
(primarily) air travel.  
Clearly, the concept of the nation-state still has some currency in 
globalisation, whether it be geographical, symbolic or imagined.  For example, 
part of my identity is articulated through being a „New Zealander‟, with 
connections to a particular geographical location (the south Pacific), symbolic 
imagery (New Zealand as a „green‟, ecological „utopia‟- the land of the „long 
white cloud‟ cliché), while there are imagined „shared‟ national traits to „being a 
kiwi‟ (e.g., embracing aspects of Maori culture, such as the haka, while 
traditionally white New Zealand males have been stereotyped through an interest 
in „rugby, racing and beer consumption‟ – see Phillips, 1996).  The media and 
technologies have a significant role in these processes, constructing what 
Anderson (1991) refers to as „imagined communities‟ based upon myths, images 
and discourses/narratives of some „shared‟ sense of national identity and unity 
(e.g., some of my examples above point to an imagined New Zealand 
community).  Moreover, based on the social construction of my identity in 
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relation to New Zealand as a nation-state, Althusser (1977) would argue that as a 
„New Zealander‟ I am both hailed as a subject and interpellated into a wider set of 
existing social relations.  What, then, does it mean for me to be a Formula One 
fan, with neither a race in „my‟ country nor „national‟ team and/or driver? 
Sport and Formula One in particular offer useful insights into how the 
interrelationship between the local and the global play out in relation to this kind 
of question.  Despite assertions about weakened nation-states (e.g., see Bauman, 
1998), sport remains one of the primary sites for staging contests between nation-
states (especially global competitions such as the Olympics or football World 
Cups), for symbolic displays of the nation (New Zealand teams tend to use 
national symbols of either native fauna or wildlife, such as the „silver fern‟ and/or 
the „kiwi‟ on predominantly black uniforms) and for articulations of the nation as 
an „imagined community‟; for example, strong performances are often linked to 
some perceived national identity, prosperity or character; such as notions of 
overcoming „odds‟ (financial, geographical or resource-based constraints) or 
„punching above their weight‟ when New Zealand athletes participate in global 
events (Billig, 1995).  As a „New Zealander‟ I am being „hailed‟ to recognise my 
particular national identity when a New Zealand team or individual compete, as 
well as being interpellated into a range of relations and practices derived from this 
subject position (e.g., expected to watch New Zealand play, „care‟ about the result 
and read/view the contest through a nationalistic lens which often expresses a 
binary sense of communal solidarity as well as difference from the opposition).  
This nationalistic ideology operates in a contradictory manner, affording some 
structured mobility within such practices.  For example, I support certain New 
Zealand teams (e.g., men‟s cricket or rugby league) which can be understood and 
recognised as a display of nationalism through such acts and tied to broader, 
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potentially determining structural formations of the nation (e.g., despite the 
affective relationship I have with these particular teams, the intensity of affect is 
most likely constructed through this nationalistic association).  But, conversely, I 
reject other New Zealand teams, shunning the All Blacks and men‟s rugby due to 
its media and cultural saturation as „our national game‟; I affectively reject this 
nationalist discourse and its ideology of expectation.  However, structural 
formations clearly underpin such practices and, by re-mobilising my hailed 
subject position as a New Zealander, I am interpellated into another set of 
processes, such as my (often unwanted) exclusion from communal opportunities 
to socialise through viewing games or discussions of the All Blacks.   
My engagement with Formula One has also brought this notion of the nation 
and interpellation into stark contrast, as one specific example will demonstrate.  In 
2004, Jacques Villeneuve was without a race seat for much of the season.  At the 
same time, New Zealand driver, Scott Dixon, was competing in the rival 
American series, the Indy Racing League (IRL).  An article, derived from Reuters 
international newswire but reproduced for a local (and national) audience in The 
Waikato Times (Hamilton city‟s regional newspaper), purported that both drivers 
were in contention for a Williams Formula One seat in 2005 (“Williams owner 
ducks question over Dixon”, 2004).  However, the story was geared towards a 
nationalistic reading through its heading (referring only to Dixon), layout (two 
columns; one and half columns dedicated to Dixon), content (the „story‟ focused 
on whether Dixon had a future with Williams or not; Villeneuve was presented as 
secondary) and accompanying images/captions presenting Dixon first (“Scott 
Dixon: not distracted; Villeneuve: a possibility”).  Indeed, the „story‟ itself was 
Frank Williams declining to comment on whether Dixon had a possible future 
with Williams, before providing Dixon‟s reactions as he prepared for the Indy500.  
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In contrast, although receiving less coverage, the Villeneuve section seemingly 
had more substance, providing confirmation that Williams had been in discussions 
with him.  Such a representation was hailing the assumed New Zealand reader by 
clearly identifying Dixon as a New Zealander while interpellating the significance 
of his possible drive (as an IRL champion moving to Formula One) and 
presenting the Villeneuve link for „balance‟, as secondary and in a more 
condensed format (e.g., mentioned as former Formula One champion, former 
Williams driver and as Canadian).  Despite the nationalistic overtures which 
clearly engaged my national identity through these textual and visual 
arrangements, these processes of interpellation were re-mobilised and jettisoned 
due to my „affective‟ fandom centred on Villeneuve and in spite of his articulation 
here as the „other‟ (e.g., Canadian) and the „competition‟.  Therefore my reading 
of this article (and its associated nationalistic discourse) was both negotiated 
8
 and 
ultimately oppositional (Hall, 1996).  While seeing a New Zealander competing in 
Formula One again would be a significant achievement (i.e., here I am being 
hailed to articulate nationalistic sentiments and interpellate displays of patriotism 
for a „fellow‟ New Zealander), I rejected the nationalistic speculation surrounding 
Dixon, wanting Villeneuve to get the race-seat ahead of any other driver, 
regardless of their nationality.   
As a „global‟ sport, Formula One seems to both draw upon the nation-state 
and nationalistic sentiments, while paradoxically also favouring a sense of 
structured mobility through deterritorialization.  As will be elaborated in Chapter 
Three, Formula One annually comprises of approximately 20 drivers who are 
identified primarily in relation to their nationality (e.g., Michael Schumacher is 
German; Jacques Villeneuve is Canadian, although often specifically identified as 
French-Canadian), while most teams also have a distinctive nationality (e.g., 
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Ferrari is Italian; McLaren and Williams are British).  As a primary reading, it is 
fair to assume that for spectators or fans of Formula One, levels of support 
probably follow nationalistic allegiances (e.g., the British fans follow the British 
drivers and/or teams, Italians follow Ferrari and the Italian drivers).  Clearly, the 
process can be more complex than this though, in terms of team/driver 
combinations (e.g., the Italian tifosi supporting the „national‟ Ferrari team yet 
also, paradoxically, a German driver; Michael Schumacher between 1996-2006), 
while allegiances can cross geographical or „imagined‟ borders (my own fandom 
for a French-Canadian driver has no obvious national or social connection).   
Formula One seems to embrace this form of mobile or „deterritorialised‟ 
fandom, constructing the sport as a global phenomenon which not only stages 
races at diverse localities around the world but conducts these in an ephemeral 
manner.  For example, the Formula One community is in constant transit around 
the globe, with only three days of track action in any Grand Prix locality before 
„jet-setting‟ back to the factory, to a scheduled test (often at a European track) or 
on to the next Grand Prix within a fortnight (and repeating this trend throughout 
the season).  Furthermore, not only is the annual presence of Formula One in a 
locality ephemeral in terms of the on-track action and short stay, but host nations 
are regularly culled or replaced, and many of the emerging host-nations (e.g., 
Bahrain, China and Turkey) have a limited or non-existent motorsport tradition.  
Hence, Formula One fandom is globally dispersed and loosely linked to place, 
with many countries not having a national team or driver representative (e.g., New 
Zealand and the emerging host-nations listed above), requiring from fans what we 
might term mobile, transnational allegiances (while teams and/or drivers are also 
given national identities while simultaneously being depicted as „global‟).  
Villeneuve is identified as French-Canadian yet primarily has resided in either 
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Monaco or Switzerland during his Formula One career, as well as in Japan, Italy 
and America prior to entering Formula One, speaks four languages and of course 
is regularly in transit to the next Grand Prix or test location which makes any 
ongoing assertion of his „French-Canadianness‟ problematic.   
Clearly, Formula One‟s ephemeral nature leaves the sport to be constructed 
primarily as a media event, with most spectators and/or fans primarily 
experiencing Formula One, remaining up-to-date and constructing/facilitating 
their mobile (trans)national allegiances through the global telecasts.  This reflects 
in specific ways Grossberg‟s (1992b) broader notion of structured mobility, with 
fandom being constructed through specific mediated structural formations, while 
fans inflect and mobilise „their‟ fandom with varying degrees and intensities of 
investment and affect.  Furthermore, as few spectators or fans have the means to 
physically attend all the events (in a financial, social and temporal sense), there is 
a sense of global connectedness and a transnational community at play within 
Formula One.  Thus, although I may be alone in my Hamilton flat watching the 
live telecast on a Sunday night, I am also part of an imagined and mediated 
Formula One community (and, I assume, not the only Villeneuve fan outside of 
Canada).  Given Formula One‟s diverse localities, ephemeral nature and reliance 
on global mediation, spectators and/or fans also experience a temporal dislocation 
which allows for both national allegiance (e.g., British fans cheering for a British 
team and/or driver regardless of whether the actual race is at Silverstone in 
Britain, Suzuka in Japan or Albert Park in Australia) and transnational allegiance 
based on the „placelessness‟ of Formula One.  Cynically, one could also point to 
the absence of the nation in telecasts that deliberately blur the actual locality.  For 
example, with the most notable exception of Monaco, many of the circuits are not 
readily identifiable with their host nation, although some circuits are permitted to 
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„locate‟ themselves (e.g., the „Melbourne‟ billboards at the Australian Grand 
Prix).   
Additionally, most teams/drivers lack national signifiers and are instead 
branded by transnational corporate logos.  In fact, like other sports where global 
teams replace national teams (e.g., the Tour de France and America‟s Cup, 
although the America‟s Cup comprises of corporate-sponsored „national‟ 
syndicates, such as „Emirates‟ Team New Zealand, alongside corporate 
syndicates, such as „BMW Oracle Racing‟), one could argue that Formula One 
pits transnational companies, especially car manufacturers post-2005, against one 
another, rather than being a competition between nation-states.  Therefore, it 
would be easy to read the competition between McLaren and Ferrari as not a 
constructor‟s contest, nor in terms of the nation (Britain versus Italy respectively) 
but in terms of a transnational competition between either the car manufacturers 
(DaimlerChrysler Mercedes versus Fiat respectively) or the tobacco corporations 
of Reemtsma and Philip Morris (e.g., the liveries of West versus Marlboro 
cigarettes between 1996-2005).  Therefore, Formula One offers a densely layered 
realisation of globalisation.  But at the same time, it affords examples of what 
look like structured mobility in action.  Reflecting discrepancies between the local 
and the global, Formula One hails „subjects‟, interpellates the nation-state through 
teams and drivers, and inscribes nationality with apparent meaning yet, 
paradoxically, such meaning is ultimately meaningless on closer inspection and 
coexists with the deterritorialization of fandom and the placelessness of specific 
localities.  Moreover, as a global, mediated sport, Formula One emphasises the 
salience of mediation in facilitating a sense of global connectedness and 
constructing an imagined, global Formula One community (Chapters Three, Four 
and Five).  Thus, Formula One provides a broader determining structural 
116 
formation through the nation-state, globalisation and mediation which spectators 
and/or fans fluidity navigate to anchor and mobilise „their‟ affective relationships 
in specific practices and intensities of investment.  The fact that transnational 
corporations also have a significant role to play in these global media 
representations and constructions of identity (imagined, national or global) 
requires further consideration, which it will receive in relation to fandom in 
Chapter Six.   
Methodology 
The six requirements that this research must meet methodologically, in light of the 
theoretical underpinnings furnished by this chapter, lead to the following methods 
for dealing with texts and audience.  By deploying structured mobility as a central 
theme within this thesis, a recognition of structured mobility as a layered 
phenomenon requires a method for identifying, describing and re-assembling 
these layers.  Denzin and Lincoln (2005) observe that,  
The qualitative researcher as bricoleur, or maker of quilts, 
uses the aesthetic and material tools of his or her craft, 
deploying whatever strategies, methods, and empirical 
materials are at hand.  If the researcher needs to invent, or 
piece together, new tools or techniques, he or she will do so.  
Choices regarding which interpretive practices to employ are 
not necessarily made in advance.  (p. 4) 
There is a sense of the bricoleur at work in my research as structured mobility 
provides for the occupation of multi-layered positions within the research process, 
as both a researcher assembling the fragmented objects of inquiry into a coherent 
narrative and as a subject or object of the research in relation to „my‟ own 
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Formula One fandom.  Therefore, I employ mixed methods to distinguish and 
then re-assemble the layers of a structured mobility within the specific context of 
Formula One. 
In my examination of the determining Formula One „texts‟, which are rooted 
in its „popular narratives‟ (Chapter Three), televised coverage (Chapter Four) and 
the implications of the first-person point-of-view (POV) representations derived 
from the On-Board-Cameras (Chapter Five), I turn to a combination of textual 
analysis (Bertrand & Hughes, 2005; Jutel, 2004; McKee, 2001) and 
compositional/image analysis (Lacey, 1998; Rose, 2001).  More broadly 
conceived as semiological analysis by Whannel (2000), I am combining these 
methods not only to „interpret‟ the public dissemination of its popular narratives 
but, more significantly, to theorise the collective audience viewing experience 
afforded by these televised Formula One „image‟ and „text‟ based structures, 
which provides a funnelling transition from the collective (global audience) to 
more atomised (fan) experiences mapped across the thesis.  Therefore, this 
semiological analysis details how televised Formula One is framed and produced 
through its particular compositional dimensions (i.e., camera work, editing, sound 
and the use of graphics), as well as the significance of these dimensions for the 
global spectacle of (and audience for) Formula One racing.  By recognising the 
technological, aesthetic and production basis for the televised Formula One 
image, my research counters sport studies‟ critiques of textual analysis for 
focusing solely upon the text and its supposed reception which, as Stoddart (1994) 
suggests, is “read „off the screen‟, with little reference to the complexities of the 
delivery system” (p. 77; see also Gruneau, Whitson & Cantelon, 1988), while also 
providing analysis that goes beyond mere description of specific framing 
techniques.  Moreover, film phenomenology (Marks, 2000, 2002; Sobchack, 
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1992, 2004) is also used in these „textual‟ analyses.  Phenomenology provides the 
complementary acknowledgement of embodiment in the framing and viewing 
processes for audiences, as well as offering a „mobile‟ account of spectator 
positioning and engagement which avoids the reproduction of a universalistic 
view of the audience as entirely determined by Formula One‟s textual and framing 
structures (e.g., in relation to the POV perspectives).   
The deployment of phenomenology and the concept of embodiment also have 
increased importance for the transition to a more atomised, socio-cultural 
examination of fandom and feed into this analysis (Chapter Six).  As noted earlier, 
this research seeks to avoid pursuing either an over-determined structural 
approach or, conversely (and mindful of Baudrillard) a loose evocation of the 
„activity‟ of audiences.  Therefore, while textual analysis is utilised to examine 
„fandom‟ (Chapter Six) and the fan-star relationship (Chapter Seven) in relation to 
the phenomenon of both media audiences and media stardom as „textual‟, these 
are supplemented by broader cultural theory and analysis.  Hence, to explore 
fandom and subjectivity, I turn to the cultural theories of Baudrillard (1983a, 
1983b, 1990a, 1994b, 1998) and Bourdieu (1984, 1990, 1992, 1993), as well as 
specific emerging research on the audience as diffused (Abercrombie & 
Longhurst, 1998) and „interactive‟ (Jenkins, 2006b), in addition to the 
performative, fluid and contradictory dynamics of specific fan practices 
(Crawford, 2004; Hills, 2002).  These perspectives take us towards an articulation 
of the „slippery subject‟ positions of fandom that can be taken up or rejected at 
any one time, as well as providing a broader cultural and socio-economic analysis 
of fandom and Formula One.   
Finally, to locate fandom within the specific context of Formula One (Chapter 
Six), as well as to afford a broader reading of what Villeneuve means as a fan 
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(Chapter Seven), I combine Grossberg‟s (1992b) notion of affect with the method 
of autoethnography.  Grossberg‟s notion of affect provides a conceptual means for 
exploring the specific investments, relationships and intensities of affect that are 
constructed inside specific, „concrete‟ examples of popular culture and the 
specific forms of media text that involve Jacques Villeneuve and Formula One.  
As many of these specific practices are my „own‟, I turn to the method of 
autoethnography as a means to articulate these specific practices through an 
impressionist, first-person writing style, which is explained below. 
Methods: Autoethnography 
Autoethnography is a writing strategy which blends the personal with the cultural, 
placing the self within a social context (Bochner & Ellis, 2002; Ellis, 2004; 
Holman Jones, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Markula, 1998, 2003; Richardson, 1994, 
2000b; Sparkes, 2000, 2002).  In defining autoethnography, Ellis and Bochner 
(2000) suggest that, 
Autoethnography is an autobiographical genre of writing 
that displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting 
the personal to the cultural.  Back and forth 
autoethnographers gaze, first through an ethnographic wide-
angle lens, focusing outward on social and cultural aspects 
of their personal experience; then, they look inward, 
exposing a vulnerable self that is moved by and may move 
through, refract, and resist cultural interpretations.  (p. 739) 
Moreover, autoethnography is also conceived both to be a method and a mode of 
textual production (Reed-Danahay, 1997), with Spry (2001) asserting that „in 
autoethnographic methods, the researcher is the epistemological and ontological 
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nexus upon which the research process turns” (p. 711).  Thus, autoethnography 
produces an autobiographical account of the self as both the researcher and, often, 
as the researched.  Such accounts are personalised and seek to reveal lived 
realities while being couched in self-reflection and an awareness of the socio-
cultural contexts that situate and shape these experiences.  As a research approach, 
autoethnography is commonly associated with the „narrative turn‟ in the social 
sciences (Bochner, 1997, 2001; Daly, 1997; Denzin, 1997; Krieger, 1991; 
Richardson, 1994, 1997) which, as Sparkes (2003) suggests, recognised that 
“writing is a method of inquiry, a way of knowing, a method of discovery and 
analysis” (p. 60).  Given the often storied accounts of lives, experiences and their 
connection to the cultural in autoethnographic works, autoethnography is upheld 
by its proponents as introducing an „alternative‟, personalised voice to knowledge 
construction (Bochner & Ellis, 2002; Ellis, 2004; Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Reed-
Danahay, 1997; Richardson, 2000b, 2000c; Sparkes, 1995).   
An autoethnographic account will usually be underpinned by a connection of 
the personal with the cultural, provided in a first-person voice and represented 
through an evocative and self-reflexive style (Ellis, 2004).  However, articulating 
what does and does not constitute autoethnography is less clear, as these accounts 
can be presented through diverse forms including poetry, fiction, short stories, 
photographic essays and dance or theatrical performances (Bochner & Ellis, 2002; 
Denison & Markula, 2005; Ellis, 2004; Markula, 2003; Sparkes 2000, 2002; Spry, 
2001).  Thus, autoethnography is often considered to be a blurred genre (Holman 
Jones, 2005), with Ellis and Bochner (2000) listing sixty research variations 
which fall “under the broad rubric of autoethnography” (p. 739).  Furthermore, 
even its subject matter is contested.  For example, Ellis (2004) advocates an 
emphasis on vulnerability, pain, suffering and „breaking hearts‟ for 
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autoethnography to be effective, while other authors prefer to explore the self 
through tensions and/or contradictions in relation to the socio-cultural 
constructions and experiences of identity, power relationships and the body (e.g., 
Holman Jones, 2005; Jhally, 1998; Lessem, 1991; Markula, 1997; 1998, 2003; 
Sparkes, 1996, 2000, 2003; Spry, 2001; Tsang, 2000).  The second perspective is 
privileged in this thesis, moving away from the „emotional‟ evocations that are 
espoused by Ellis (2004) to the broader use of autoethnography as a means for 
contextualising specific, concrete practices of fandom via vignettes which are then 
critically and theoretically analysed, culminating in the final chapter‟s resituating 
of a vulnerable self.   
Given the blurred genre and difficulty of either defining or determining what 
constitutes autoethnographic work, establishing criteria for conducting and 
evaluating such work has also, not surprisingly, remained somewhat elusive.  One 
discernible trend is that many autoethnographic pieces are often simultaneously 
labelled as personal narratives, personal experience narratives or „narratives of 
self‟, with these labels fluid and interchanged regularly (Ellis & Bochner, 2000; 
Ellis, 2004; Reed-Danahay, 1997; Richardson, 2000b, 2000c; Sparkes, 1995, 
2000, 2002, 2003).  For example, Denison and Markula (2005) suggest that 
personal experience narratives in sport (e.g., Markula, 2003; Pringle, 2001, 2003; 
Sparkes, 1996; Tsang, 2000) often use,  
personal recollections as the basis of their research 
narratives…the researcher usually begins by thinking of 
moments that have in one way or another been influential in 
his or her choice of a research topic and the formation of 
specific research questions…they become the raw data for 
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one‟s personal experience narrative, not the final results.  (p. 
170)  
In a similar vein, Ellis and Bochner (2000) note that, “in personal narratives, 
social scientists take on the dual identities of academic and personal selves to tell 
autobiographical stories about some aspect of their experience in daily life”  
(p. 740).  These two works offer an insight into how to conduct autoethnography, 
in terms of identifying a particular moment or experience from one‟s life which, 
through recollection and introspection, can be made sense of and developed 
through a personalised narrative (Ellis, 2004).  Nevertheless, there remains no one 
appropriate method for constructing, making sense of or producing the „correct 
type‟ of autoethnography.   
The evaluation of an autoethnographic account reflects the dual crises of 
representation and legitimation in qualitative research (Denison, 1996; Denzin, 
1997; Sparkes, 1995).  Given the often storied accounts of lives and experiences, 
proponents assert that literary values must be considered when evaluating such 
work.  Various authors have compiled criteria or a list of „literary aesthetics‟ in 
terms of what distinguishes “„good‟ research writing from „bad‟ research writing” 
(Denison & Markula, 2005, p. 180; see also Bochner, 2000; Bruce, 1998b; 
Clough, 2000; Denzin, 1997; Ellis, 2000).  For example, Richardson (2000a) lists 
five specific criteria for evaluating ethnography: substantive contribution, 
aesthetic merit, reflexivity, impact and lived experience.  Moreover Sparkes 
(2000) asserts that, “accuracy is not the issue, since autoethnography and 
narratives of the self seek to meet literary criteria of coherence, verisimilitude, and 
interest” (p. 29).  Therefore, the merit of an account is often judged on whether 
the story is plausible, has the appearance of truth (verisimilitude) and/or resonates 
for the reader (Bochner & Ellis, 2002; Denison & Markula, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; 
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Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Holman Jones, 2005; Sparkes, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2003).  
These broader „literary aesthetics‟ arguably provide a loose set of „criteria‟ for 
evaluating many autoethnographic accounts.  Additionally, Ellis (2004), Markula 
(2003) and Richardson (2000b) place an emphasis on telling „true stories‟ of the 
self based upon the author‟s actual events and experiences rather than purely 
fictional accounts or creating imaginary events and characters which are 
considered as either novels (Ellis, 2004), fiction (Richardson, 2000b) or 
ethnographic fiction (Denison & Markula, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; Markula, 2003).  
Nevertheless, many autoethnographic researchers reject imposing a universalised 
criterion which all works must adhere to and be judged against due to the diverse 
research practices and writing styles that have emerged as broadly acceptable 
(Bochner, 2000; Bochner & Ellis, 2002; Clough, 2000; Holman Jones, 2005; 
Reed-Danahay, 1997; Spry, 2001).   
Within autoethnography, the reader and his/her sense-making processes are 
also viewed as central to assessing the usefulness, meaningfulness and validity of 
any individual work (Ellis, 2004; Holman Jones, 2005; Sparkes, 1996, 2000, 
2002, 2003; Spry, 2001).  For example, Ellis and Bochner (2000) note that, 
The usefulness of these stories is their capacity to inspire 
conversation from the point of view of the readers, who 
enter from the perspective of their own lives.  The narrative 
rises or falls on its capacity to provoke readers to broaden 
their horizons, reflect critically on their own experience, 
enter empathically into worlds of experience different from 
their own, and actively engage in dialogue…Invited to take 
the story and use it for themselves, readers become co-
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performers, examining themselves through the evocative 
power of the narrative text”.  (p. 748) 
Thus, although autoethnography is most often a personalised account of a 
particular event or life experience crafted by the individual author, the relevance 
of such work is deemed to be in its generalisability to a broader audience.  
Autoethnographic researchers stress that their own personalised experiences are 
often also applicable to, „typical‟ for or resonate with a wider socio-cultural 
experience identifiable by their readers (Bochner & Ellis, 2002; Denison & 
Markula, 2005; Ellis, 2004; Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Markula, 2003).  Therefore, 
rather than being a self-indulgent approach to research (Sparkes, 2000, 2002, 
2003), such works are crafted either to evoke an emotive response among their 
readers, or to promote a broader recognition of the social context of self through 
„shared‟ meanings and experiences, or both (Denison & Markula, 2005; Ellis, 
2004; Ellis & Bochner, 2000).   
In this thesis (and primarily in Chapter Six), I sparingly use autoethnography 
as a means to represent the concrete contexts, particular processes and the specific 
affective moments embedded in my practices as a Formula One fan.  However, 
rather than strictly adhering to a first-person narrative throughout, these 
autoethnographic moments are inserted into the research text as a series of 
vignettes.  Moreover, these moments channel an overall „funnelling‟ effect, as has 
been explained already.  Denison and Markula (2005) note that “many personal 
experience narratives are comprised of several, separate „vignettes‟: personal 
experiences or memories that highlight meaningful events or developments that 
explain the social construction of a person‟s life experiences” (p. 171).  I have 
drawn upon such vignettes to highlight these meaningful events and situate them 
within the broader socio-cultural context and in relation to the key theoretical 
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concepts under discussion.  As such, by drawing upon these vignettes, I reveal 
specific spatial/temporal moments of my fandom throughout this thesis while, 
primarily, the vignettes are deployed as a form of empirical evidence to reveal the 
concrete realisation of Grossberg‟s (1992b) theory of structured mobility in 
action.  That is, autoethnography as a method and writing tool is utilised to 
demonstrate the actualisation of my anchoring in social reality via the specific 
temporal and spatial moments of affect.  These are the kinds of moments that, 
typically, have inflected and characterised my Formula One fandom over the past 
ten years.   
More broadly, the vignettes provide a means for contextualising specific, 
concrete moments and affective investments that encapsulate the „slippery‟, 
contradictory and mobilising practices of fandom, both anchored within and 
navigating through structured social spaces and forms.  In due course, the 
autoethnographic stance adopted at key junctures by this thesis will be re-worked 
in terms of Archer‟s (2007) 'reflexivity' and that reflexivity will be theorised in 
terms of a broader 'field' of terms that will recognise both the inevitable collapse 
of the structure/agency binary and the socio-cultural constraints on the 'agential' 
trajectory that the thesis as a whole will be tracing (Chapter Seven).  The scare 
quotes applied to the terms reflexivity, field and agential will be removed as we 
move towards a proper elaboration of each term. 
                                                 
1
 Lyotard‟s central thesis and assertion of incredulity towards metanarratives has been viewed as 
contradictory by critics such as Kellner (1988) and Strinati (2004), who suggest that Lyotard 
actually produces his own metanarrative within his work.  However, Lyotard‟s „metanarrative‟ 
may be understood as a function of the extension of incredulity to all possible explanatory 
concepts, a process which leaves the postmodernist without the option of proposing alternative 
positive conceptual totalities.  Thus, the appearance of contradiction arises from the denial that any 
concept can offer a totalising explanation of human activity. 
2
 Eau Rogue is an up-hill, left-right-left configuration, with gradient shifts, concealed exits and 
exerts up to 4.6 lateral g-forces on the driver (Peagam, 2005).   
3
 It should be noted that, although the distinct phases are discussed in the literature, they are 
relatively arbitrary, with the characteristics and definitions of each time period (as well as 
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additional periods not mentioned) contested by scholars engaged in the periodisation debate (see 
Featherstone, 1988; Smart, 1990). 
4
 Furthermore, is the term „post‟ fixed or have we already moved beyond postmodernity to a new 
cultural and social reality (e.g., post-postmodernity)? 
5
 The publication dates provided are slightly confusing as these allude to when Baudrillard‟s works 
were translated into English.  Butler (1999) notes that Baudrillard gained prominence both in 
France and English-speaking countries between 1976-1983, which encapsulates the original 
publication in French of the works Symbolic Exchange and Death in 1976 through to Fatal 
Strategies in 1983, collectively known as his period of fatal theory (see Gane, 1991a, 1991b). 
Nevertheless, Baudrillard had first published in French in 1968, while many of Baudrillard‟s texts 
have been translated into English well after the original release date in French – see references for 
clarification. 
6
 It is not difficult to imagine different degrees of „illiteracy‟ in relation to Formula One‟s 
complexities as both a sport and a media format. 
7
 Grossberg does not specifically identify film phenomenology but the basis of his critique would 
incorporate the unified and shared assumptions of film phenomenology. 
8
 For example, allied with a broader awareness of Formula One orientated websites where 
coverage of Dixon had been less favourable for a Williams‟ seat. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Other‟s Double: Formula One Machinery and Driver Agency  
The Formula One driver has a dual status: he is both an 
automatic terminal of the most refined technical machinery, 
a technical operator, and he is the symbolic operator of 
crowd passions and the risk of death.  (Baudrillard, 2002,  
p. 169)   
Baudrillard‟s statement offers an eloquent contrast between the determining 
machinery and the lived experience, a contrast of course that transcends the 
particular confines of Formula One.  Baudrillard (2002) goes on to evoke our 
attachment to “exceptional beings who are permitted to do absolutely anything” 
(p. 170) and yet, paradoxically, we know that Baudrillard, the theorist of 
contemporary culture, has also been in the vanguard of those who see only 
determining forces at work where others hope to see human agency.  As we saw 
in the previous chapter, debates about media and audiences have seen pendulum 
swings between the media‟s „determining‟ grip and audiences‟ capacity to be 
„active‟.  To permit a close examination of instances where this binary may break 
down in the media/audience relationship, we now turn our attention to Formula 
One as an assemblage of media texts.  Across the following three chapters 
detailed textual analyses of increasingly complex and refined Formula One 
mediations are provided which recognise that these texts are both the determining 
structure for audiences and the potential terrain for more specialised audience (and 
fan) usage, navigation and anchorage through their affective engagements 
(Grossberg, 1992b).  By way of introduction, this chapter compares Baudrillard‟s 
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essay on Formula One with the public representation and mediated dissemination 
of a set of „popular narratives‟ about the sport.   
Contemporary Formula One 
Baudrillard (2002) notes that, 
Formula One is a rather good example of the era of 
performance, in which the heights achieved are the work of 
man and machine simultaneously, each propelling the other 
to extremes without it being really clear which is the engine 
of this meteoric advance and which merely the other‟s 
double.  If man is haunted by the evil genius of technology, 
which pushes him to the limits – and even beyond his 
capabilities – then technology is haunted by man, who 
identifies with it and projects all his passions into it.  The 
alliance between the two, the pact between them, can be 
brought about only through an excessive expenditure, a 
spectacular sacrifice.  In Formula One, the two are 
reconciled by speed – the phantasm, the spectre, the ecstasy 
of speed – which has become an unstoppable, undeniable 
collective passion.  (p. 166) 
Technology and speed are fundamental contemporary conditions within the 
machinery of Formula One which, allied with its own globalised, mediated and 
commodified spectacle, as well as the „slippery‟ performative role of the driver, 
combine to construct a space for the „collective passion‟ of Formula One 
audiences, whether conceived here as viewers, spectators or fans.  To better 
understand this collective passion, we can begin by suggesting that there are six 
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popular narratives used to describe Formula One and frame its representation for a 
global, mediated audience.  These narratives were derived from a close textual 
analysis of the contemporary Formula One media sources (Formula One books, 
magazines, internet sites, live telecasts and general newspapers), with a 
methodological approach that will become apparent as we proceed.  From the 
outset, it should be noted that there is an underlying complexity to the assumed 
„reality‟ underpinning these six narratives, as this chapter will increasingly 
suggest, even though the narratives themselves are simple.   
Popular Narrative Number One:  Formula One is the Pinnacle of Open-Wheel 
Motor-Racing 
Specialist Formula One sources and most motor-sport publications represent 
Formula One as the pinnacle of open-wheel car-racing.  Noble and Hughes (2004) 
assert that,  
Formula One stands at the technological pinnacle of all 
motorsport.  It‟s also the richest, most intense, most difficult, 
most political, and most international racing championship 
in the world.  Most of the world‟s best drivers are either 
there or aspire to be there.  (p. 20) 
The name Formula One is derived from the formula of rules and regulations for 
competing in terms of the size, weight and power of the cars, while „one‟ signifies 
its classification as the pinnacle of the sport.  This offers a distinction from the 
lower divisions, such as Formula Three, Formula 3000 and Formula Ford, each 
with its own restrictions and regulations (Noble & Hughes, 2004).  Thus far, these 
ways of thinking about the sport lend themselves to Baudrillard‟s perspective, as 
technology and performance are key elements in defining and distinguishing 
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Formula One‟s status as elite, while recognising the centrality of the star driver in 
the sport (a point I return to in due course).  However, Baudrillard‟s (2002) 
associated concept of an „ecstasy of speed‟ is slightly more problematic, with the 
organisational machinery of Formula One imposing tight technical regulations to 
curb the pursuit of „pure speed‟ (e.g., a concept more applicable to land speed 
record holders) while its formula of rules increasingly reduces the risks involved 
in the sport (see later discussion of drivers and risk-taking).  Moreover, and 
eschewing Baudrillard for the moment, whether Formula One is the pinnacle of 
all motor-racing is debatable, as a range of motorsport formats also exist, with 
motorbikes staging their own elite series, the MotoGP, while other formats differ 
fundamentally, such as the World Rally Championship (WRC) which races on all 
surfaces, not just tarmac.  Additionally, specialist media sources for these (and 
other) motor-racing events are likely to elevate the significance of their own sport 
to sustain their audiences and may be reluctant to buy into the pinnacle status for 
Formula One (e.g., MotoGP as a fundamentally different series and the pinnacle 
for motorbikes), and not wish to actively promote a rival series.
1
   
Interestingly, while being broadly represented as the pinnacle of motor-
racing, Formula One operates within the dichotomy of being a global and public 
sport which is also shrouded in secrecy and privately guards its specific details in 
areas such as ownership, governance or financial status.  Baudrillard (2002) does 
not pursue this public-private dichotomy, nor the politics or governance of the 
sport but, I suggest, the dichotomy‟s existence may partially explain the persistent 
interest in intrigue, rumour and scandal within the Formula One media, as full 
knowledge and access to all aspects of the sport are not available.   
Formula One is governed by the Federation Internationale de l‟Automobile 
(FIA), which determines the rules and adjudicates on any matters pertaining to the 
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sport.  Formula One rules are accessible to the public although understanding the 
highly technical jargon and precise meanings is often more difficult.  The teams 
and FIA are bound by the Concorde Agreement, a classified document not 
available to the public, which outlines how the sport shall be governed, as well as 
the commercial rights of the sport and how money will be divided amongst the 
teams.  The Concorde Agreement is revised every ten years and was last due for 
renewal in 2007.  This document was the source of a fierce off-track political 
battle in 2005 which escalated between a rebel alliance of teams, known as the 
Grand Prix Manufacturers‟ Association (GPMA), and the FIA.  The GPMA called 
for greater transparency of the details within the Concorde Agreement and the role 
of the FIA, as well as a more equitable distribution of funds for all of the teams, 
and threatened to create a separate racing series outside FIA jurisdiction post-
2007 if their demands were not met (“Meanwhile in”, 2005; “Nothing nice”, 
2005; Pitpass expose, 2005a; Pitpass news, 2005a; Saward, 2005; “The 
manufacturers”, 2005).  However, conciliatory talks between both sides during the 
course of the 2006 season eventually provided a peaceful resolution and six of the 
eleven teams signed up for the 2007 Concorde Agreement late in 2006.  
Nevertheless, no current Concorde Agreement is in place as not all of the teams 
have agreed to the latest set of terms and conditions.  In fact, in 2009, eight of the 
ten existing teams again threatened to create a rival series to be run outside of FIA 
jurisdiction (this time the dispute centred primarily on proposed budget caps for 
2010).  At the time of writing, the threat appears to have been resolved with all ten 
teams agreeing both to gradually reduce costs and to adhere to upgraded 
governance provisions from the 1998 Concorde Agreement (“FOTA teams call 
off”, 2009).   
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So this „narrative‟ is a complex construction, sustained by often contested 
organisational processes behind the scenes. 
Popular Narrative Number Two:  Formula One is One of the Most Expensive 
Sports in the World 
Baudrillard (2002) suggests that the pinnacle status of Formula One, while 
promoting its elite brand of competitive racing, actually has a more explicit 
symbolic value.  He notes, (2002) “only in appearance is the circuit the site of the 
competition.  The competition takes place elsewhere – on the world car market, in 
the drivers‟ popularity charts, in advertising and the star system” (p. 167).  While 
the significance of the drivers and the star system will be discussed in due course, 
the commercial elements and value of Formula One warrant early consideration 
here.  With its prestige comes an enormous expense to fund a Formula One team 
which, as noted above, is derived from a combination of its perceived elite status, 
the symbolic value associated with Formula One for subsidiary companies, and 
due to the competitive challenge to constantly develop and improve the cars in 
relation to the sport‟s performance and technological demands.  The operating 
budgets of Formula One teams are staggering, with F1 Racing magazine 
estimating that the sport as a whole (inclusive of testing, salaries, engine budgets, 
etc.) costs the teams involved a combined total of between US$2.1 and US$2.5 
billion annually.
2
  Of the teams, Ferrari has consistently been the biggest spender, 
with an operating budget of over US$400 million per season, while Toyota, 
McLaren, Williams and British American Racing (BAR) spent approximately 
US$350 million or more annually during the 2002-2004 seasons.
3
  However, 
Phillips (2006) reports that, in 2006, Ferrari had scaled back their spending to 
$329 million, the fifth biggest spender behind McLaren ($400m), Toyota 
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($393m), Honda ($382m) and BMW-Sauber ($378m).  Nevertheless, even the 
smaller and struggling teams (in both a financial and a competitive sense), like 
Jordan and Minardi, operated at around US$40-$70 million a year to compete in 
Formula One between 2002-2004 before being sold during or post-2005.
4
  Such 
high operating costs are viewed as justified to ensure teams have a competitive 
racing package and can attract the right combination of drivers, engineers, 
designers and mechanics to make them successful.  In recent times, the FIA has 
annually devised „cost-cutting‟ measures to curb excessive spending, although 
Henry (2005) suggests that the implementation of these measures actually 
increased spending in the short term.  Nevertheless, late in 2008, due to the 
economic recession that affected global markets, as well as Honda‟s not unrelated 
shock departure from the sport in December, the FIA pushed through drastic cost-
cutting measures to reduce team budgets by at least an estimated 30% for the 2009 
season (“The future of Honda”, 2008; “The new world”, 2008).   
Given the huge costs of Formula One, maintaining the obligatory minimum 
of ten teams can be difficult.  This has also meant that either the ownership of a 
team or its ability to remain in Formula One is in constant flux.  Some recent 
examples demonstrate this.  The Stewart Grand Prix racing team emerged in 
1997; in 2000 the team had been bought out by Ford and re-named Jaguar Racing.  
The same team was then sold at the end of 2004 to become Red Bull Racing from 
2005.  Other teams have disappeared from Formula One altogether, such as Prost 
in 2002 and Arrows in 2003, as they could no longer afford to compete.  The high 
cost and difficulty of remaining in the sport was still evident in 2005, with 
Midland buying Jordan (but still racing as Jordan in 2005), Red Bull‟s acquisition 
of Jaguar (and later Minardi as a second team) and BMW‟s purchase of Sauber for 
the 2006 season.  In 2006 new patterns of team ownership had also emerged, with 
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BMW-Sauber, Toro Rosso (Red Bull‟s second team, formerly Minardi), Honda 
Racing (formerly BAR, now owned solely by Honda), Spyker MF1 (which 
operated as Midland-F1 until being purchased by a Dutch consortium in 
September 2006) and newly created Super Aguri on the grid.  In further 
developments post-2006, Spyker was sold and re-named as Force India for the 
2008 season, Super Aguri (April) and Honda (December) ceased operations in 
2008 and Honda re-emerged (and was rebranded) as the Brawn GP team in 2009.  
Baudrillard‟s (2002) essay, written in March 1995, precedes many of the specific 
examples identified, although clearly Formula One team ownership changes were 
in effect when he was writing: for example, Benetton, one of the dominant teams 
in 1994 and 1995, had emerged in 1985 after buying the Toleman team; Benetton 
was then sold to Renault in 2000 (and operated as Renault post-2000).   
So this narrative is another complex construction and Baudrillard is clearly 
aware of the symbolic business of Formula One, to which the third narrative also 
refers.   
Popular Narrative Number Three: It‟s a Business, Not a Sport; Formula One and 
Sponsorship 
Baudrillard (2002) observes that, 
The paradox is the same for the motor companies, caught as 
they are between investment and potlatch.  Is all this a 
calculated – and hence rational – investment (marketing and 
advertising)?  Have we here a mighty commercial operation, 
or is the company spending inordinate sums, far beyond 
what is commercially viable, to assuage a passion for 
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prestige and charisma (there is also a manufacturers‟ world 
championship)?  (p. 169)   
Baudrillard is confusing two key points.  First, he incorrectly applies the terms 
manufacturer (usually global car companies) and constructor (Formula One 
specific teams, which can be either an „independent‟ team, such as Williams, or a 
car manufacturer who also owns and operates a Formula One team, such as 
Toyota).  Hence the Formula One teams are competing in the Constructors‟ 
Championship (not manufacturers‟ championship), although he is right to observe 
an assumed prestige associated with being a manufacturer who owns a Formula 
One team and wins a constructors‟ title (e.g., Nissan through the Renault team).  
Second, it is important to note that sponsorship is not necessarily confined only to 
the motor companies Baudrillard identifies, as an array of transnational companies 
sponsor teams that have no apparent link to motorsport (e.g., Becks beer or 
Emirates airlines, see below).  Furthermore, since Baudrillard‟s time of writing, 
the presence, role and investment of the world‟s major car manufacturers has 
actually accelerated, especially over the last few seasons.  For example, in 2006, 
many of the manufacturers either owned their own teams (such as Toyota, Honda 
and BMW, in addition to Nissan and Fiat, who race as Renault and Ferrari 
respectively), had a significant shareholding within a team (DaimlerChrysler 
Mercedes with McLaren) or were a chief engine supplier to a team (Ford, in 
addition to Ferrari, Toyota and Honda supplying second teams).   
Therefore, Baudrillard‟s (2002) assertion that “the average TV viewer has 
doubtless never been aware that McLaren is a flagship for Honda” (p. 169) is not 
only clearly dated in relation to the team-manufacturer relationship described (and 
always undergoing regular transformation) but has now been supplanted by what 
often is a more explicit connection that is globally recognisable: the 
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manufacturers Toyota and Honda are clearly intertwined with their own Formula 
One teams.  Conversely, though, their supply of engines to Williams and Super 
Aguri respectively in 2007 arguably reproduces Baudrillard‟s idea of a blurred 
linkage between these Formula One teams and the specific car manufacturer.  
Nevertheless, it is useful to apply the essence of Baudrillard‟s argument solely to 
the manufacturers in the first instance, using the Toyota team as a specific 
example.  Paraphrasing Baudrillard, for the manufacturers, the association with 
the „pinnacle of motor-racing‟ is deemed to be good publicity, albeit an expensive 
PR exercise if the team is not successful.  The Toyota team has been singled out 
by some commentators as a case in point, with Phillips (2006) suggesting that 
Toyota is “flush with cash but not results” (para. 1) having not won a Grand Prix 
since their “$1-billion launch” (Phillips, 2006, para. 1) in 2002.  Hence, Toyota 
offers an example of a car manufacturer who, as a Formula One constructor, is 
spending inordinate sums that may not be economically viable or „a calculated 
and rational investment‟ given poor on-track results that have not translated into 
the crowning of a Constructors‟ Championship (let alone a race victory).  
Moreover, Toyota‟s investment and the team‟s lack of success have not lead to a 
“passion for prestige and charisma” (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 169) either for the team 
or among Formula One audiences, as is reflected in the negative effect on their 
publicity and support.  For example, Toyota only received a 1% vote (or a placing 
of 9th out of the 11 teams) in the category of team support from the approximately 
91,000 Formula One fans who participated in the FIA‟s Formula One survey for 
2006 (“FIA/AMD”, 2006).   
In addition to the major car manufacturers involved in Formula One, the sheer 
cost of running a team and the reliance on sponsorship from transnational 
companies makes Formula One as much a business as a sport.  In almost 
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Baudrillardian terms, team owner, Sir Frank Williams, is famous for saying, 
“between the hours of two o‟clock and four o‟clock most Sunday afternoons at 
Grand Prix races, it is a sport…The rest of the time it is a business” (B. Turner, 
2004, p. 102).  Many of Baudrillard‟s points relating to the expense and implied 
prestige for motor companies are reproduced in the practices of the transnational 
corporations that flock to the sport.  Not surprisingly, in addition to the car 
manufacturers, other key players in the automobile industry have also been 
involved in Formula One; such as fuel and lubricant producers like Shell, Elf, 
Esso and Mobil, as well as tyre manufacturers, with rivals Michelin and 
Bridgestone supplying the teams since 2001, although Bridgestone became the 
sole supplier post-2006.  Aside from the automobile industry, numerous 
transnational companies have also been involved in Formula One in recent years, 
including Becks, Budweiser, Credit Suisse, DHL, Emirates, Hewlett-Packard, 
HSBC Bank, Hugo Boss, Intel, Panasonic, Puma, Red Bull, Siemens, TAG-
Heuer, Tommy Hilfiger and Vodafone.  Figures from the July 2005 edition of F1 
Racing magazine provide an indication of what the „business‟ of Formula One 
costs sponsors, with an estimation of each team‟s most lucrative sponsorship deal 
for 2005.  Listed in American dollars, F1 Racing suggested that Marlboro was 
worth $80 million to Ferrari in 2005, Mild Seven $50 million for Renault, 
Hewlett-Packard $45 million for Williams, West $40 million for McLaren, 
Panasonic $30 million for Toyota and Petronas $28 million for Sauber.  It was 
acknowledged that sponsors with full or partial equity-holding were excluded 
from the list as they were impossible to assess, such as Red Bull, British 
American Tobacco, Honda and Credit Suisse (Pitpass business, 2005).  Given that 
Renault were crowned the Constructors‟ Champions in 2005 and 2006, they (and 
their sponsors) were bestowed with the status needed, in Baudrillard‟s (2002) 
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terms, to “assuage a passion for prestige and charisma” (p. 169).  However, many 
of the other companies and costs quoted reflect Baudrillard‟s questioning of 
inordinate corporate spending, channelling vast sums into „lesser‟ teams failing to 
contest race victories, let alone Constructor‟s Championships, during this period 
(e.g., Red Bull, Sauber, Toyota and BAR/Honda).  For example, Honda Racing 
never won a race between 2000-2005 while supplying engines to or operating as 
BAR, although secured its maiden (and only) victory in 2006 at the Hungarian 
Grand Prix.  Honda Racing never won a Grand Prix again post-Hungary 2006 
while, somewhat ironically, Honda‟s successor for 2009, Brawn GP has had 
instant success, winning six of the opening eight races.  
Additionally, as these figures reflect, sponsorship derived from the tobacco 
industry has been a significant source of revenue for Formula One, dating back to 
1968 when Team Lotus ran Imperial Tobacco‟s Gold Leaf livery at the Spanish 
Grand Prix (Pitpass expose, 2005c).  Surprisingly, Baudrillard (2002) neglects to 
either acknowledge or critique the potency of such a relationship.  It is not an 
understatement to say that, financially, tobacco sustained Formula One teams and 
Grand Prix racing for nearly 40 years.  As an example, it was reported that British 
American Tobacco deployed a budget of US$375 million over five years to 
establish its new team, BAR, in 1998, eventually spending around $500 million 
over this period (“The fall of”, 2002).  However, new anti-tobacco legislation 
came into effect on 31 July 2005 in Europe, affecting the role and future of 
tobacco firms in Formula One.  In 2005 nearly half the teams ran without tobacco 
branding, with some teams, such as Jordan and Williams, turning their back on 
former tobacco sponsorship to do so.  Williams even took the radical step of 
running the GlaxoSmithKline‟s NiQuitin stop-smoking brand in 2003.  McLaren 
ditched their Reemtsma (West livery) tobacco sponsorship at the end of 2005, 
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replacing tobacco with Johnnie Walker and Emirates in 2006, followed by 
Vodafone in 2007.  In 2006 three major tobacco firms were still involved in 
Formula One; Philip Morris (Marlboro sponsorship for Ferrari), British American 
Tobacco (Lucky Strike for Honda), and Japan Tobacco (Mild Seven for Renault), 
although these last two scaled back their investments to exit Formula One at the 
end of the season.  With legislation limiting the global display of tobacco 
sponsorship, only Philip Morris remained in Formula One post-2006, asserting 
that the colour scheme and subliminal branding would still facilitate brand 
recognition (Taylor, 2005) while, controversially, occasionally providing visible 
Marlboro regalia at races in 2007 (e.g., Bahrain and China – see “Marlboro 
explains”, 2007).   
So a third narrative and yet another complex construction underpinning it, 
with far from uncontradictory definitions at work of what the „business‟ actually 
is. 
Popular Narrative Number Four:  Formula One is Glamorous; „Glamour‟ and 
Gender in Formula One 
While Baudrillard questions the inordinate spending in Formula One, he also 
locates another layering of passion that emerges through the competition between 
the Formula One constructors (and, presumably, the practices of their sponsors) 
and contributes to the sport‟s status as an „exceptional event‟.  He notes, (2002) 
In this confrontation between manufacturers, isn‟t there an 
excessive upping of the stakes, a dizzying passion, a 
delirium?  This is certainly the aspect which appeals, in the 
first instance, to the millions of viewers…The impact of 
Formula One lies, then, in the exceptional and mythic 
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character of the event of the race and the figure of the driver, 
and not in the technical or commercial spin-offs.  (p. 169)   
I am not entirely convinced of the certainty that Baudrillard sees in the competing 
constructors‟ capacity for invoking passion among viewers.  For example, the 
corporately branded competition that accompanies the Constructors‟ 
Championship is neither the „first instance‟ nor an immediate site for my own 
affective relationship with the sport (nor do I have a team-based Formula One 
fandom per se: whichever team Jacques Villeneuve drove for I supported).  
Conversely, Baudrillard appears uninformed in discounting either the technical or 
commercial spin-offs as, although these may be more symbolic than „real‟ (e.g., 
much of Formula One‟s technology is too advanced to be redeployed within road 
car production by the manufacturers), its technological sophistication and 
exorbitant expense underpin the machinery of Formula One and its narrative 
construction as the pinnacle within motorsport.  Furthermore, this positioning 
arguably offers a more likely „first instance‟ for crowd passions in relation to 
Formula One‟s perceived elitism (while seemingly also attracting transnational 
corporate sponsorship as outlined above).  In fact, Baudrillard‟s evocation of the 
„exceptional and mythic character‟ of Formula One potentially hints at another 
salient contemporary feature of (and potential source of passion for) the sport: the 
notion and representation of glamour.   
Noble and Hughes (2004) link glamour to “impossibly fast cars driven by 
brave and handsome young men of all nationalities in a variety of exotic 
backdrops throughout the world, with beautiful women looking on adoringly”  
(p. 25).  From an analysis of the Formula One media sources (detailed later), there 
appears to be a few possible explanations for this concept of glamour; whether it 
applies to the cars as a source of glamour (due to their expense and technical 
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sophistication), the array of global locations which the sport visits, or even the jet-
setting lifestyle Formula One promotes.  Collectively, these „glamorous‟ elements 
combine to (re)present Formula One as an „exceptional and mythic‟ event.  The 
staging of a Grand Prix in Monaco certainly underpins notions of glamour, the 
exceptional and the mythic.  First, by linking Formula One glamour to wealth, 
luxury and its associated commercial spin-offs, Monaco is commercially the most 
valuable race on the calendar, with many of the team‟s most significant client 
„schmoozing‟, PR exercises and business deals being conducted over this race 
weekend.  Monaco also offers an „exceptional‟ event and „glamorous‟ spectacle 
with cars racing around the principality against a stunning background of historic 
buildings, an expensive array of yachts and boats in the harbour (often with 
„glamorous‟, bikini-clad women being picked out by the camera in television 
coverage) and the rich and celebrated in attendance.  Finally, the „mythic‟ is 
evoked through the „heroic‟ representation of the victorious driver who 
„vanquishes‟ his opponents and „conquers‟ Monaco‟s narrow streets through an 
„exceptional‟ display of driving, replete with a royal reception from Monaco‟s 
monarchy as he collects his trophy (and often beautiful women are, symbolically 
at least, included in the „spoils of victory‟ – see Kennedy, 2000).   
While these may be sources of glamour, even this brief description of the 
„mythic‟ elements at Monaco (and Noble and Hughes‟ [2004] statement above) 
hint at the problematic role of women and gender relations in underpinning 
concepts of glamour within Formula One.  Although Baudrillard (2002) eschews a 
discussion of gender in his essay, gender roles within Formula One are clearly 
defined, and the sport is almost exclusively a male preserve.  All teams are run by 
male owners or technical directors, with men occupying most of the roles either 
within teams or within the press covering races.  Not surprisingly, all the drivers 
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are currently also men, with only five women having ever competed in Formula 
One; the last in 1992.  In the foreseeable future, Formula One will also continue to 
consist of only male drivers while gendered stereotypes, phrased as concerns over 
fitness, skill and safety, remain pervasive in the sport, and sponsors seem 
unwilling to invest in a female driver (B. Turner, 2004).  The male drivers could 
be conceived of as an embodiment of the sport‟s glamour, as they get to race in 
high-powered machines all across the globe and are paid enormous sums of 
money to do so, while potentially providing a display of masculine bravado 
through their alleged risk-taking (points I expand on later in this chapter).   
With men as risk takers or team leaders, the relatively few women in Formula 
One are overwhelmingly cast in a supporting role.  Primarily, and problematically, 
they function as adornments or trophies for the men and their cars (see also 
Messner, Dunbar & Hunt, 2000); dressed in revealing lycra suits, mini-skirts or 
bikinis adorned with sponsors‟ logos, which further underlines the significance of 
corporate branding and commercial spin-offs in the sport (and may afford an, 
albeit problematic, additional layering of passion for fans).  Known as „grid girls‟ 
or „pit babes‟ (e.g., both itv-f1.com and f1-live.com have a „pit babes‟ gallery link 
on their home pages), these young and conventionally „beautiful‟ women are 
photographed either sprawled over the cars for publicity, on the pre-race 
formation grid beside the cars and drivers, or posing for „sexy‟ photos with the 
drivers (and sometimes with attendees, such as at the Australian Grand Prix).  
Kennedy (2000) notes in her narrative analysis of the 1996 Monaco Grand Prix,  
The role of „beautiful women‟ in providing that glamour is 
evident, and the plentiful camera shots of (mainly blonde 
haired) women among the spectators at balconies or 
employees of the racing teams (holding placards with the 
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driver‟s name inscribed) testify to their importance in 
creating the atmosphere.  The narrative function of closure 
provided by the „beautiful women‟ is clear….they are part of 
the prize for the victorious hero driver.  (p. 65)   
Some women also work in the public relations sector for teams, such as media-, 
sponsor- or driver-liaison, although, again, „feminine‟ qualities seem to be a pre-
requisite within the male world of Formula One.  After interviewing Michael 
Schumacher‟s media manager, Sabine Kehm, B. Turner (2004) says “she admits 
that feminine „charm‟ can be a powerful negotiating tool in Formula One.  Sabine 
is slim and blonde.  She fits the F1 criteria perfectly” (p. 159).  Therefore, while a 
range of elements contribute to glamour within Formula One, the presence of 
stereotypically beautiful women, in the form of PR managers, pit babes and grid 
girls are seemingly a vital component; providing a gendered construction of 
women as facilitators, sexy props or adornments for the bravado, jet-setting 
lifestyle and essentially masculine world of Formula One.  B. Turner (2004) 
suggests, “it is the ultimate male fantasist‟s sport: fast cars, expensive kit, global 
jet-setting and beautiful women with spray-on smiles” (p. 205).  Again, a popular 
narrative is constructed out of a complex set of factors. 
Popular Narrative Number Five: Formula One is a Television Sport 
Baudrillard‟s (2002) evocation of “the exceptional and mythic character of the 
event” (p. 169) also affords recognition of Formula One as a media event which, 
through its own mediation, contributes to these exceptional and mythic elements 
(see discussion of mediation, simulation and Formula One‟s precessionary models 
in the previous chapter).  Baudrillard (2002) suggests that Formula One relies on 
television to both redirect and project the refined technical dimensions of the 
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sport, the slippery status of the driver and commercial elements externally back 
out to its large viewing audience.  Thus, according to Baudrillard (2002), “the race 
takes place on a screen, the screen of speed” (p. 167).  This „screen of speed‟ is 
one of the significant research „problems‟ that I will address over the course of 
this thesis; particularly in relation to its „structural formations‟ – in terms of the 
specific production, technical and aesthetic practices - that the televised Formula 
One coverage provides for its global audience (Chapter Four).  The structured 
„screen of speed‟ then moves to an increasingly „agential‟ interrogation of how 
audiences potentially engage with these visual representations, especially in 
relation to Formula One‟s innovative televisual technologies and video games 
(Chapter Five).  For our introductory purposes here, it will suffice to note that 
Baudrillard is correct in his observation that Formula One is primarily a screened 
event and that television becomes the predominant site for audience engagement.  
In fact, the claimed viewing figures for the sport are phenomenal, with Formula 
One telecasts building a cumulative global audience estimated to be in excess of 
50 billion annually over the entire season (Hotten, 1999).  For example, Formula 
1 Magazine reported that 54 billion viewers had watched televised Formula One 
in 2001, with an average of 3,590 million individuals viewing each of the 17 races 
in the 2001 championship (“F1 fever grips”, 2002).  But such figures are 
overstated and unreliable, as is indicated by Hotten‟s (1999) querying of them: 
How big is Formula One‟s television audience? If you 
believe the FIA, it is ten times the world‟s population! 
According to official figures, the cumulative audience for 
the 1997 championship was 50.7 billion people…The 
statistic includes every time an item on Formula One appears 
on television, no matter how short.  (p. 200) 
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Moreover, Rowe (2004) notes that gaining an accurate or exact television viewing 
figure is problematic as “global audience figures for mega-media sports events 
have tended to be based on „guesstimates‟ and marketing” (p. 102) and, therefore, 
such viewing figures, and the means by which they are measured, should be 
treated with caution.  Despite inflated viewing figures, Rendall (2000) asserts that 
excluding news and features content, the actual race coverage still “reaches some 
5.5 billion viewers a year” (p. 8).  Formula One rates only behind men‟s football 
(soccer), the football World Cup and the Olympics in highest viewing numbers 
for televised sport (Hotten, 1999); all the more impressive considering that 
Formula One is a single series run annually, while football is contested across a 
range of national and international competitions and the World Cup and Olympics 
are staged every four years.   
Formula One is not just a television sport, however, and has embraced a range 
of media forms not mentioned by Baudrillard.  The combination of prestige, 
glamour, expense and motoring/technical innovations means that it attracts 
significant attention across global television, print and internet media throughout 
the Formula One season.
5
  Although more specific details on the Formula One 
media sources are provided later in this chapter, it is worth noting that sources 
such as monthly magazines (e.g., F1 Racing) and daily internet sites (e.g., 
grandprix.com, planetf1.com, f1racing.net and pitpass.com) provide regular 
updates on all aspects of Formula One.  Bernie Ecclestone has been a significant 
figure in the mediation of Formula One (as discussed in the next section), not only 
negotiating the global television rights but also buying Formula 1 Magazine late 
in 2002 and launching formula1.com in 2003.  Formula 1 Magazine ceased 
publishing in 2004, with B. Turner (2004) criticising the magazine for its 
advertising-driven and „press-release‟ style of reporting as it “began to resemble 
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an in-flight brochure in which many articles contained a barely concealed 
business agenda” (B. Turner, 2004, pp. 204-205).  However, the formula1.com 
website has been an invaluable source for following races, offering the public live 
timing of all Grand Prix sessions (e.g., practice, qualifying and the race).  This 
emerging technology both disrupts and amplifies Baudrillard‟s (2002) „screen of 
speed‟ as live timing provides a numeric, screened representation of all driver 
times (e.g., lap times, sector times) in real time during each session but does not 
stream any visual images of racing.  Hence, live timing complements rather than 
replaces televised Formula One coverage as an emerging, secondary „screen of 
speed‟ for the global audience.  In fact, with drivers shielded in their cars and 
protective gear, in addition to particular drivers being rarely seen on televised race 
footage (Chapter One), live timing on formula1.com affords a better 
understanding of each driver‟s performance and overcomes some of those 
conditions of anonymity (see further discussion of anonymity in relation to the 
point-of-view shot in Chapter Five).  Furthermore, a third „screen of speed‟ has 
emerged since Baudrillard‟s essay, with the previously inaccessible Formula One 
driving experience recreated through video game simulations (especially the 
official Formula One games developed by Studio Liverpool on the PlayStation 2 
format).  These video games provide an immersive, embodied and engaging third 
„screen of speed‟ for Formula One audiences, allowing gamers the opportunity to 
race as any of the current drivers and to replicate elements of the driving 
experience, especially through innovative first-person positionings and driving 
perspectives.  The fact that Formula One drivers also use video game simulations 
and that teams study the point-of-view representations offered on televised on-
board camera footage suggests the high level of realism and sophistication that 
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these technologies and „screens of speed‟ have reached in Formula One and, 
therefore, this warrants further investigation in the thesis (Chapter Five).   
Popular Narrative Number Six:  Formula One is a Global Sport 
Unlike many American sports, whose „World Championships‟ are contested 
between American cities, states and teams, Formula One is certainly a global 
series, comprising a range of team and driver nationalities, and raced at various 
locations around the world.  While Baudrillard (2002) alludes to the large virtual 
audience that tunes in to Formula One from around the world, the global aspects 
of the sport remain unacknowledged and underdeveloped in his essay.  Therefore, 
as a coda to the six narratives, I briefly sketch below some of Formula One‟s 
global dynamics, mapping its origins and, especially, the influential role Bernie 
Ecclestone has had in reconfiguring Formula One to become a contemporary 
global and mass mediated sport spectacle.  The global narrative is in a sense, 
though, the extension of the other five narrative constructions from the national to 
the international level, something that makes more sense from a historical 
perspective. 
     A brief history of Formula One  
In the typical books on Formula One history (e.g., Hughes, 2004; Rendall, 2000; 
Vergeer, 2004), motor-racing is reported to have originated in European countries.  
The first-ever road race was conducted in France, although the date for this first 
race is disputed by the sources, with Vergeer (2004) and Rendall (2000) 
suggesting the first race occurred in 1894, while Hughes (2004) asserts that this 
was merely a reliability trial for the 1895 race.  Nevertheless, the sources agree 
that the first Grand Prix was staged at Le Mans in 1906 (see also Noble & 
Hughes, 2004), with additional irregular races at various venues throughout 
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Europe during the early 20th century before the first fully sanctioned and official 
Formula One World Championship race at Silverstone, England in 1950 (Rendall, 
2000).  During these formative years the grid consisted primarily of individuals, 
known as privateers and enthusiasts, who raced in their national colours (e.g., 
British Racing Green, or Italian red) and manufactured their own cars (e.g., 
Englishmen John and Charles Cooper and, in the 1960s, New Zealander Bruce 
McLaren and Australian Jack Brabham).  The complexion of the sport changed in 
the late 1960s with the advent of tobacco and other sponsor liveries (e.g., 
corporate colours and logos) adorning the cars, as well as the increased 
involvement of car manufacturers.  Costs rose as teams pursued technical and 
performance advantages and, increasingly, these escalating production costs 
required sponsor and manufacturer backing, literally driving many privateers out 
of the sport.  In addition, Formula One had been run haphazardly from 1950 until 
the early 1980s (Henry, 1998a; Rendall, 2000).  Even in the 1970s each race was 
independent and required negotiation between teams and circuit owners for fees 
and the ascertaining of race entrants (both of which fluctuated from race to race), 
(Hotten, 1999). 
     Enter Bernie Ecclestone – The Ecclestone effect 
Initially a used car salesman and part-time racer, Bernie Ecclestone turned his 
interests to Formula One, managing drivers before purchasing the Brabham team 
in 1971.  Ecclestone sensed the commercial possibilities for the sport and, through 
his position as head of the Formula One Constructors‟ Association (FOCA), took 
on the role of organising and negotiating for all the British teams to streamline the 
sport into a single world championship series.  Hotten (1999) suggests 
“Ecclestone‟s masterstroke was to promise circuit owners a full grid of teams; 
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teams had to commit themselves to a full season of racing.  This pleased the 
crowds, it pleased the sponsors, and it pleased the television stations” (p. 29).  
However, infighting still dogged the sport, with the British teams (FOCA) and the 
Federation Internationale du Sport Automobile (FISA, the sports arm of the 
governing body, the FIA) squabbling over control of the sport.  Ecclestone‟s 
decisive moment was at the 1981 South African Grand Prix when he obtained 
television coverage and several million viewers for the race in which only FOCA 
teams competed.  This prompted many of the FISA-aligned teams to side with 
Ecclestone and he was made vice-president of the FIA in 1981.  Most importantly, 
however, Ecclestone was made responsible for negotiating worldwide television 
rights.  In an interview with Henry (1998a), Ecclestone commented,  
It was only when I began to get fully involved in the whole 
scene that I appreciated just how fragmented the television 
coverage had been.  Some people covered a few races, some 
none at all.  My initial motivation was to get the whole 
business together in an effort to get some decent overall 
coverage.  (p. 16) 
By the end of the 1980s, Ecclestone was no longer a team owner, and took on the 
role of Formula One‟s commercial rights holder (leasing these rights for 100 
years) through his company Formula One Management (FOM), while his long-
time associate, Max Mosley, became FIA president in 1991.   
Ecclestone and FOM have continued to develop Formula One as a 
commercial and global brand through a variety of ventures which entice large 
companies to finance the sport, such as track-side or title sponsorships for races 
which are arranged through an associate company, Allsport Management, which 
allegedly pays FOM an annual fee of $50 million (Pitpass expose, 2006a).  
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Additionally, countries (via national organisations with or without government 
involvement) pay large sums of money to build race-tracks and become a host-
nation for a Grand Prix event.  For example, F1 Racing magazine reports that to 
be a host-nation, most of the European locations pay FOM around $15 million a 
season on an escalating deal (usually in increments of ten percent), while “China 
is rumoured to pay over $33 million per year” (Pitpass expose, 2006b, p. 18).  
Arguably more significant for the sport‟s commercial and global success has been 
Ecclestone‟s handling of broadcasting rights and production standards for 
Formula One, with Ecclestone ensuring a television feed that is strong on 
production values and highly sought after by an array of global networks.  
Broadcasting rights are profitable for FOM, as is evident in Ecclestone‟s 
transference of the exclusive television rights in Britain from the BBC to ITV in 
1997 for an estimated £60 million (Hotten, 1999; Lovell, 2003; B. Turner, 2004), 
although Collings (2001) suggested that the deal actually “increased the five-year 
revenue from British television rights from £7 million to £70 million” (p. 130).6  
Of course being Formula One‟s commercial rights holder has also made 
Ecclestone extremely rich; he was reputedly worth an estimated US$5.96 billion 
in 2003 (Beresford, 2003).  Even though officially the FIA is the governing body, 
Ecclestone (and FOM) still exert a major influence within Formula One at all 
levels, safeguarding the sport through licenses and other arrangements to ensure a 
positive image and global brand (Hotten, 1999; B. Turner, 2004).   
Returning to our discussion of the sport as global, Formula One, nevertheless, 
still reflects its European origins, with most of the teams based either in Britain 
(McLaren, Williams, Renault, Red Bull, Super Aguri and Midland-F1/Spyker-
MF1/Force India) or other European localities (Ferrari and Toro Rosso in Italy 
and BMW-Sauber in Switzerland and Germany).  Toyota and Honda are the 
151 
exceptions, having headquarters in Japan, as well as in Germany (Toyota) and 
Britain (Honda).  Most of the drivers are also from European countries such as 
Austria, Britain, Finland, Germany, Italy and Spain; although other nation-states 
have also been represented in recent years, such as America, Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, Japan and Malaysia.  Formula One offers an 
interesting paradox in this respect, drawing on articulations of the nation-state in 
relation to teams and/or drivers, while positioning itself as a global sport through 
its mediated, commercial and geographical spread (see discussion of globalisation 
and the nation-state in Chapter Two).  For example, the „home‟ location of Force 
India in Britain seems to be a pointed example of such a paradoxical 
interrelationship, blurring articulations of the local and the global within Formula 
One (e.g., despite the team‟s nationalistic name, many of the technical staff are 
British, the drivers are Italian and German respectively, and there are few Indian 
nationals in the team).  Formula One‟s contradictory juxtaposition of the local and 
the global clearly also has implications for the sport‟s diverse audience which will 
be further refined across the remainder of the thesis through interrogating the 
media/audience relationship of televised coverage and technologies (Chapters 
Four and Five) and Formula One fandom (Chapters Six and Seven). 
The Formula One season generally consists of between 16 and 18 races, 
although a record 19 races were run in 2005 and, perhaps not surprisingly, 10 of 
these 19 races were staged in Europe.  Nevertheless, the sport is also spreading, 
staging three races in the American continent (Canada, United States and Brazil), 
as well as races in Australia, Malaysia and Japan.  In 2004, Formula One held 
Grands Prix in Bahrain and China for the first time, followed by the inaugural 
Turkish Grand Prix in 2005.  These emerging races highlight the global spread of 
the sport, with Formula One tapping into both the lucrative Asian markets and „oil 
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money‟ of the Middle East (Jones, 2004; Rendall, 2000; B. Turner, 2004).  
Nevertheless, rather than being viewed as solely an attempt to make the series 
truly global, one must also acknowledge that the 2005 European anti-tobacco 
legislation saw races shift pragmatically from Europe to nations that allowed 
tobacco advertising.  Hence, the new races in Bahrain, China and Turkey were not 
initially affected by tobacco legislation, while races in Europe have either been 
replaced or are under threat, as were other localities opposed to tobacco 
sponsorship prior to 2007.  Belgium and Canada, for example, have twice been 
dropped from the Formula One calendar in recent years.  In 2003, Belgium was 
dismissed for banning tobacco sponsorship before returning the following year 
when it overturned this ban while, in 2006, Belgium could not afford FOM‟s race 
fee (Pitpass expose, 2006b).  The Canadian Grand Prix was also initially excluded 
in 2004 for banning tobacco sponsorship before offering the compensation of “a 
$23 million deal to keep the Montreal race” (B. Turner, 2004, p. 197), although 
again has been dropped from the 2009 calendar, allegedly due to a financial 
dispute with Bernie Ecclestone (“Canada GP organizers”, 2008; “Montreal 
government”, 2008).  Post-2006, although the visibility of tobacco sponsorship 
has been minimal (with the notable exceptions of Bahrain and China in 2007), the 
global spread of Formula One continues.  Two European races at the Imola (San 
Marino) and Hockenheim (Germany) circuits were dropped for 2007, in addition 
to the French Grand Prix in 2009 due to escalating costs (“2009 French GP”, 
2008).  Moreover, with Canada‟s exclusion for 2009 and the axing of the United 
States Grand Prix post-2007, Formula One is currently (and surprisingly) left 
without a presence in North America, a key market for many of the transnational 
corporations and car manufacturers sponsoring teams.  In contrast, new races were 
staged in Singapore and at a second track in Spain (Valencia) in 2008, while a 
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new Grand Prix is scheduled for Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates in 2009.  
So the „global sport‟ narrative in fact reflects a complicated history. 
 
Collectively, these six popular narratives afford a broader understanding of 
contemporary Formula One and particularly, recognition of the apparatuses (e.g., 
technical, elitist, glamorous, commercial, mediated and global) that combine to 
produce and sustain the machinery of Formula One.  Baudrillard (2002) offers his 
own (albeit abstract and symbolic) summation of the sport, noting that,  
In a word, Formula One is a monster.  Such a concentration 
of technology, money, ambition and prestige is a 
monster…Now, monsters are doomed to disappear, and we 
are afraid they might be disappearing.  But we are not keen, 
either, to see them survive in a domesticated, routinized 
form.  In an era of daily insignificance – including the 
insignificance of the car and all its constraints – we want at 
least to save the passion of a pure event, and exceptional 
beings who are permitted to do absolutely anything.  (p. 170)  
Clearly, Baudrillard‟s conception of Formula One as a „pure event‟ is paradoxical, 
given the sport‟s complete reliance on mediation (as well as the other apparatuses, 
such as commerce and technology) to allow it to transcend geographical 
boundaries and garner a large global following through multiple media forms 
(points, of course, that Baudrillard does indirectly acknowledge in his essay).  
However, his articulation of Formula One as a concentrated monster is useful for 
recognising the condensation of the specific narrativised apparatuses (outlined 
above) which, collectively, merge, mould and determine the machinery, 
operational systems and broader structural formations of contemporary Formula 
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One.  On the other hand, Baudrillard still ascribes significance to the driver, 
seemingly affording him a degree of human „agency‟ to negotiate and navigate the 
narratives and the machinery of the sport on behalf of the audience.  Such a 
perspective seems antithetical in light of Baudrillard‟s (1983a, 1983b, 1988a, 
1990a) fatal vision of determined masses discussed in the previous chapter (see 
also Chapter Seven).  Thus, our attention turns to Baudrillard‟s (2002) notion of 
the drivers as “exceptional beings who are permitted to do absolutely anything” 
(p. 170).   
Machines or Agents?: The Formula One Driver 
By identifying the driver as both a “technical operator” and the “symbolic 
operator of crowd passions” (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 169), Baudrillard‟s essay 
seems most interested in the central, albeit paradoxical, dual roles the drivers 
occupy and perform in the sport.  Thinking of the drivers as technical operators 
provides for a dense reading of the complex interrelationship between human 
„agency‟ and the Formula One machine (although we will come in the end to 
question the implied structure/agency divide).   
Performance, Agency and Technology  
Within Formula One, Baudrillard sees both a collective fascination of a general 
sort among its diverse audience and a more concentrated focus projected onto the 
driver.  As he notes, the complex constructions we have evoked above condense 
into a single point: 
Viewed in machine terms, Formula One looks like a 
pyramid: a pyramidal synthesis of the efforts of thousands of 
people which culminate in a single car, a single man, a 
single brief, dazzling moment.  The condensation is extreme, 
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and the mirror of the race refracts all the energies deployed – 
energies all working towards one goal – into the 
performance of a single man...The collective fascination 
with the race certainly owes much to this transformation of 
all into one.  (Baudrillard, 2002, pp. 166-167) 
While the collective fascination of audiences will be considered in due course, the 
condensing „performance‟ of the driver warrants some exploration now.  With 
Formula One represented as the pinnacle of motor-racing, there is an assumption 
that the drivers are also the best in the world.  Certainly they are among the best, 
having advanced from and usually winning junior categories to get to Formula 
One; for example, various Karting titles (e.g., Fernando Alonso, Jarno Trulli), 
Formula BMW (e.g., Nico Rosberg), British Formula Three (e.g., Rubens 
Barrichello), Formula 3000 (e.g., Nick Heidfeld) or the rival American IndyCar 
series (e.g., Jacques Villeneuve, Juan Pablo Montoya).  However, gauging how 
good the drivers are is difficult due to distinctions between other motor-racing 
categories (e.g., MotoGP or the WRC) and, more significantly, the technical 
nature of both the sport and performance.  Hilton (2003) suggests that the Formula 
One driver is “unusual among sports people because for him technology plays 
such a decisive role.  Good drivers do not win in bad cars” (p. 25).  Baudrillard 
(2002) reaches similar conclusions, noting that the “car and driver are merely a 
living projectile” (p. 167), as well as observing that “in McLuhan‟s sense: the car 
becomes a tactile, tactical extension of the human body” (p. 168).  Thus, these 
ideas and Baudrillard‟s (2002) opening lines, which question whether man or 
machine is the basis of the technological performance and “which merely the 
other‟s double” (p. 166), offer a problematic reading of the driver‟s role in 
Formula One.   
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On a primary level, it is fair to assert that driver „performance‟ is so 
intertwined with the technological apparatuses and other machinery of Formula 
One that there is little room for the „autonomy‟ of the driver to manipulate and 
influence „his‟ performance and results.  Therefore, despite the proven driving 
skill and race craft of previous race winners Jacques Villeneuve and Rubens 
Barrichello, both drivers initially struggled to adapt to their new teams‟ cars 
(Villeneuve with Sauber in 2005, Barrichello with Honda in 2006), with doubts 
cast over their ability and whether the teams would persist with either driver due 
to „their‟ poor performances (Pitpass expose, 2005b; Pitpass news, 2006).  For 
both men, a friction between the role of the driver and the role of the machine, as 
it were, became apparent, affording not a seamless transition for new driver-team-
machine relationships but, rather, a struggle to overcome the technological 
imposition of electronic driver systems which constrained rather than assisted or 
enhanced „their‟ driving performances.  Therefore, with technological apparatuses 
curtailing the driver‟s role within the machinery (primarily revolving around 
braking systems for Villeneuve and traction control for Barrichello), both drivers 
were forced to adapt their own styles to suit the machine, as well as demand 
refinements to these systems to accommodate their performative roles.  Reflective 
of the way that McLuhan‟s (1964) concept of the extension of man underpins the 
driver-machine relationship, Villeneuve was quoted in F1 Racing magazine in 
2006 as saying,  
Last year we didn‟t really do any testing, and the car and I 
didn‟t really gel.  I was never comfortable.  I was always 
concentrating on having to drive the car rather than just 
being a part of the car.  This year that wasn‟t the case.  
(Bishop, 2006c, p. 38; italics in original) 
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Given the drivers‟ reliance on their machinery, in Formula One the performance 
of the driver is compared to other drivers rather than the machinery directly.  
However, teams employ „objective‟ apparatuses to assess such performances, with 
banks of team computers providing visual systems of measurement, such as sector 
and lap times, as well as driver telemetry, which traces exactly how the driver 
drives (and should drive) the machine by recording and mapping the application 
of throttle, brakes, corner entry and exit speeds, etcetera.  Through these systems 
of measurement a driver‟s performance is compared to his team-mate‟s, as there is 
an assumption that both drivers are using the same machinery and operating under 
the same conditions.  The team-mate comparison is fundamental to Formula One 
stardom as strong performances (e.g., points, podiums, race wins or 
championships in ascending order) elevate a driver‟s perceived monetary value, 
his appeal to other teams and the possibility of a top drive; conversely poor 
performances quickly affect driver reputation, value and are potentially career-
ending (Noble & Hughes, 2004).   
Furthermore, the drivers are themselves measured and disciplined through 
elaborate fitness programmes which, in a sense, attempt to transform the man into 
a machine.  Reid (2002b) notes,  
Most teams now see the driver in similar terms to the car, as 
a machine that must be kept in perfect condition to work to 
the best of its ability.  There is no point in spending millions 
of pounds on the car, only for the driver to fail to get the best 
out of the package because he tires easily.  (p. 71) 
Renault, for example, invested £2.5 million in their Human Performance Centre to 
ensure that their drivers train rigorously to achieve high levels of fitness, 
endurance and strength and can function seamlessly as a cog within the machine.  
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Therefore, despite driver performances being aligned to their respective cars, 
broader public misconceptions about the required athleticism are unfounded.  
Noble and Hughes (2004) assert that “driving a racing car is certainly something 
only the fittest athletes can do” (p. 103), while drivers also need to withstand G-
forces exerting between 1 and 5 G on their bodies while driving.  How their 
athleticism correlates to required levels in other sports is less certain, with  
B. Turner (2004) refuting the clichéd descriptions of Formula One drivers as 
„super-fit‟ or „Olympic standard‟ athletes.  Nevertheless, what becomes apparent 
through these various practices is that two levels of performance are 
simultaneously in operation.  On the one hand, the private, inner workings of 
Formula One systematically scrutinise and assess driver performance in relation to 
the machinery of the car and reconceptualise the driver/man as an integrated 
machine.  On the other hand, public mediations (and the popular narratives they 
sustain) tend to promote the human dimension of performance via its global 
mediation and emphasis on the star system, culminating in the Drivers‟ 
Championship (this human element and the individual as „agent‟ are returned to in 
due course). 
Baudrillard (2002) suggests that pleasure is consequently eroded for the 
drivers themselves, who become instrumentalised and machine-like in their 
pursuit of victory.  As he notes, (2002)  
There is no passion in this – except the passion for winning, 
of course, though that is not personal, but an operational 
passion.  It shows up in the driver‟s brain the way the 
technical data show on the dashboard.  It is in-built in the 
technical object itself, which is made to win, and which 
incorporates the driver‟s will as one of the technical 
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elements required for victory.  This seems inhuman, but to 
be honest about it, it is the mental logic of the race.  (p. 168)  
Therefore, in the pursuit of Formula One victory, there is an expectation for the 
seamless integration of the driver (himself also prepared like a machine) within 
the machine.  Such an expectation clearly blurs any consideration of the potential 
for human „agency‟ within the machinery of Formula One.  For example, while 
Michael Schumacher was revered for his work ethic, high levels of fitness and 
supreme car control through which he accumulated seven world titles (Bishop, 
2001a, 2006d), his integration within the Formula One machinery (in terms also 
of team, car, sponsors and the broader apparatuses charted earlier) seemed too 
perfect, too polished, too seamless.  In fact, such characterisations tended to 
reduce Schumacher to an uncharismatic and emotionless figure, with Allen (2000) 
noting that “Schumacher is often accused of being more like a robot than a human 
being” (p. 78).  It is no surprise, therefore, that drastic rule changes were 
implemented in 2003 to „open up‟ the competition due to the dominance of the 
Ferrari/Schumacher „machine‟ since 2000 (and especially in 2002).7  Moreover, 
this dominance, coupled with his „ruthless ambition‟ to win at all costs, seems to 
reflect the robotic, human-machine fulfilling an „operational passion‟ for winning 
devoid of „human‟ emotion and unmoved by accusations of unsportsmanlike 
conduct across his career (Allen, 2000; Bishop, 2006a; Vergeer, 2004).   
In many respects, the notions of performance, technology, operational passion 
and the robotic driver mapped thus far are further moulded and redirected by the 
commercial practices of the sport.  Most Formula One drivers are well-paid 
athletes, earning base salaries ranging from US$1 to 10 million a season, while a 
few earn over US$20 million a season (Pitpass expose, 2005d).  Therefore, if we 
pursue the Schumacher-as-robotic-machine analogy, it comes as no surprise that 
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he has not only won seven world championships (e.g., the performative man-
machine) but, also, amassed phenomenal wealth, with Schumacher estimated to 
be worth AUS$436 million in 2003 (Beresford, 2003).  Post-2004 Schumacher 
was rumoured to be earning between approximately US$70-80 million annually, 
over half of which was derived from endorsements (Pitpass expose, 2005d).  
Hence, the performing man-machine has clear commercial value for attracting 
sponsorship and becomes, as Allen (2000) notes, “a streamlined product of 
sponsors and PR men” (p. 84) offering the polished and seamless integration of 
robotic-man-machine with technological performance, corporate endorsements 
and financial rewards.   
The practices of sponsors demonstrate the way that commerce acts as another 
apparatus within Formula One, further underscoring Baudrillard‟s (2002) notion 
of „operational passion‟ by constraining driver „agency‟ and literally turning these 
men into corporate-driving-machines.  In relation to driver selection and 
expectations, transnational corporations and car manufacturers purchase a degree 
of influence through sponsorship, often favouring a particular driver‟s presence in 
the team.  Obviously high profile drivers are preferred, yet sponsors also consider 
other marketing imperatives; for example, seeking drivers from two different 
nationalities (and key or untapped markets) to broaden their appeal.  In their 
discussion of the Red Bull Junior Programme (which funds emerging drivers from 
around the world as a possible path to Formula One), F1 Racing magazine 
observes that,  
Red Bull aren‟t a racing team, they‟re a soft drinks company, 
and are in F1 only to increase sales through brand 
awareness.  As a result, the nationality of drivers on the 
Junior Programme is important.  “If two drivers are of the 
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same ability”, says Marko, “and one is from Estonia and the 
other from the USA, we‟d prefer to place the American on 
the programme because we sell more than a billion cans in 
the US”.  (Pitpass expose, 2007, p. 29) 
In a similar, Formula One-specific scenario, Sauber‟s decision to have the two 
German drivers Heinz-Harald Frentzen and Nick Heidfeld in 2003 was considered 
not to be “ideal for marketing reasons” (Mansell, 2003, p. 51).  Team owners do 
have the right to veto sponsor selections, as Peter Sauber did in 2001, opting for 
rookie Kimi Raikkonen (who would later become the 2007 World Champion) 
over then-sponsor Red Bull‟s preferred driver, Enrique Bernoldi; nevertheless, 
sponsor demands can often result in preferred drivers getting a seat at the expense 
of others.  Indeed, in 1998 Ken Tyrell, team boss of Tyrell, resigned after British 
American Tobacco bought the team and ordered that he replace Jos Verstappen 
with Ricardo Rosset, who Formula 1 Magazine described as “a no-hoper South 
American driver who would reputedly pay $5 million for the drive” (“The fall of”, 
2002, p. 25).  This practice of paying for a drive is not uncommon, with some 
drivers providing either cash or major sponsors to secure a drive with one of the 
lesser teams in Formula One.  Minardi (and Jordan between the years 2002-2005) 
previously only „employed‟ drivers who could pay for their seats; a trend 
continued in 2006 by Midland-F1 (and Spyker MF1 in 2007), while Toro Rosso 
was established as a second team to run Red Bull-sponsored drivers.  The 
presence of these drivers (commonly referred to as „pay drivers‟) dispels the myth 
that all Formula One drivers are the best in the world, as well as limiting driver 
„agency‟ through the practice of sponsors often intervening and imposing their 
will (or pay drivers) on the smaller teams.  B. Turner (2004) asserts, “Don‟t be 
fooled into thinking Formula One showcases the twenty best drivers in the world 
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– it doesn‟t.  It offers a stage to those lucky enough to carry the logos of ambitious 
multinational corporations” (p. 201).  Certainly the skilled star drivers in Formula 
One are talented and world-class (and usually hired by the top teams), yet many of 
these pay drivers in the lesser teams are simply out of their depth, as three recent 
examples demonstrate.  
Argentinean Gaston Mazzacane was a pay driver who, Peagam (2001) 
suggests, brought “more money than talent to the Grand Prix melting pot”  
(p. 101).  Despite poor performances for Minardi in 2000, Mazzacane was signed 
by Prost the following year, bringing an estimated US$41 million of sponsorship 
with him.  Peagam (2001) explains, “it all comes down to sponsorship and cash.  
PanAmerican Sports Network (PSN) hold the rights to F1 in Argentina.  They 
have around $41 million to spend in F1.  They also sponsor Mazzacane” (p. 103).  
Prost needed the money but dumped Mazzacane after a handful of races, 
appeasing the sponsors by replacing him with another South American, Brazilian 
Luciano Burti.  Similarly, Minardi ran Malaysian driver Alex Yoong due to 
funding promises of US$194 million over four years from the Malaysian 
Government, “so long as Yoong drives” (Pitpass, 2001b, p. 25).  This 
arrangement only lasted for two seasons (2001-2002) due to Yoong‟s dire 
performances, as he often trailed the field and could not always qualify for races.  
Finally, there is the Japanese driver, Takuma Sato, who has been in Formula One 
largely due to his nationality and Honda supplying engines to the teams for which 
he has driven.  Described as “wild, often looking like an accident waiting to 
happen” in his debut season with Jordan in 2002 (Jones, 2004, p. 29), Sato was 
dropped at the end of 2005 after two error-ridden and crash-filled seasons with 
BAR.  With no teams expressing an interest in Sato and a public outcry in Japan, 
Honda actually created a new team in 2006, Super Aguri, installing him as team 
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leader.  Here is a prime example of sponsors and national interests determining 
the presence of a pay driver on the grid.  F1 Racing observed,  
By our count, in 51 GP starts, Sato has made at least 28 
major errors in qualifying, practice or the race – more than 
one in every two starts.  Is this guy worth the estimated $200 
million investment needed to start a Honda-B team? We 
think not.  (Pitpass, 2005, p. 13)   
It seems fair to assert that, rather than driving talent, Sato remained in Formula 
One primarily through nationality and sponsorship, even initially gaining his seat 
with BAR in 2004 at the expense of ex-world champion Jacques Villeneuve.   
Therefore, Formula One‟s systematic layers and apparatuses persuasively 
refute Baudrillard‟s (2002) somewhat idealised representation of drivers as 
“exceptional beings who are permitted to do absolutely anything” (p. 170).  
Clearly, the drivers are located within a broader corporate-man-machine 
framework, with the Formula One structures, apparatuses and machinery tailored 
towards the seamless integration of the driver as a cog within the machine, rather 
than offering a potential site for individual expressions of agency.  Nevertheless, 
the driver as a machine cannot fully account for the collective passion of 
audiences engaging with Formula One.  Baudrillard‟s (2002) secondary notion of 
the driver as the “symbolic operator of crowd passions and the risk of death”  
(p. 169), as well as Villeneuve‟s salient role as the „maverick risk-taker‟, may 
offer more precise articulations of the actual nature of driver „agency‟ within the 
Formula One machinery.   
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Risk, Passion and the „Individual‟ 
With his conception of Formula One as a pyramid (positioning the driver as the 
focal point for „collective passion‟), Baudrillard (2002) notes, 
But this pyramid, of which the driver is simply the tip, is 
projected in its turn through the media and television on to 
millions of people – a gigantic redirection, a spectacular 
superstructure (even leaving out of account the commercial 
and promotional aspects of the operation).  High 
concentration, then high dilution.  In this way, Formula One 
encapsulates a whole – collective, technical and imaginary – 
cycle.  (p. 167) 
This „gigantic redirection‟ requires further attention.  Why do such large 
audiences tune in to Formula One?  What is the nature of this „dilution‟, or 
dispersed projection outwards from the driver/apex?  While some preliminary 
explanations have already been forwarded here in relation to Formula One‟s 
spectacle as a „screen of speed‟, its elitism, „glamour‟ and global and commercial 
layers, Baudrillard suggests that the answer also lies in the spectacle of death.  He 
notes, (2002) 
And here might be said to lie the other passion – alongside 
the passion for winning – a passion both more spectacular 
and murkier.  Connected, admittedly, with the dramatization 
of the danger by the media, but also, more profoundly, with 
the symbolic rule of the challenge and the duel: the passion 
for accidents and death.  (p. 168) 
This perspective is supported by many of the Formula One media sources who, 
collectively, promote the view that danger and the possibility of death are among 
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the motivating factors for audience engagement with the sport (e.g., Hilton, 2003; 
Shirley, 2000; B. Turner, 2004; Vergeer, 2004).  Given that these „living 
projectiles‟ reach speeds in excess of 200mph on many circuits, risk-taking, 
accidents and the possibility of death clearly underpin the spectacle of Formula 
One racing.  Paradoxically though, despite the obvious dangers, Formula One has 
become a relatively safe sport through a raft of safety measures which have 
increasingly developed since the 1960s (Sturm, 2007).  Thus, there have been no 
driver fatalities since the deaths of Ayrton Senna and Roland Ratzenberger in 
1994 and, prior to this, Gilles Villeneuve (Jacques‟ father) in 1982.  Baudrillard 
(2002) is aware of this paradox, noting, 
There was a time when not just the drivers, but the spectators 
too, risked their lives on the circuits.  Those sacrificial days 
are gone.  As the personal pleasure in driving is gradually 
disappearing from the circuits, so too is the personal risk of 
death.  Death is no longer anything but a virtual imaginary 
element.  Only the cars die, only the engines are driven to 
destruction.  Only the technical „double‟ dies...but the 
spectacle of death, shown „live‟, is unacceptable today.  
However, the definitive elimination of accidents is 
unthinkable...Even if the real risk is tiny in relation to the 
imaginary risk, it is there.  And this dimension is absolutely 
vital.  Without any random factor, without incident, 
expurgated of all its unpredictable elements, motor racing 
would lose all interest.  (pp. 168-169) 
Baudrillard‟s (2002) statement encapsulates many salient ideas which may afford 
us an insight into drivers as particular kinds of „agents‟ within the contemporary 
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machinery of Formula One.  Despite death being unacceptable for either the 
corporate sponsors or the global media audiences of Formula One, the sport‟s 
safety measures may „eliminate‟ death but cannot contain all the risks inherent to 
the sport.  Hence, big crashes every year destroy the machinery but preserve the 
driver as, for example, in the horrific crashes in 2001 of Jacques Villeneuve at 
Australia and Luciano Burti at Belgium, as well as Robert Kubica at Canada in 
2007.  In these three cases, I recall watching live televised images of these cars 
literally disintegrating as they bounced or skimmed off safety barriers and catch-
fencing before smashing to a halt (or in Burti‟s case, ploughing unimpeded at full 
throttle into a tyre wall).  What was all the more remarkable was that, although 
Burti and Kubica needed to be extracted from their cars and given medical 
attention (shielded from the cameras since the possible spectacle of death screened 
live is unacceptable), all three drivers emerged with minor injuries in contrast to 
the shattered (and scattered) remains of their cars.  In fact, despite the violent and 
fragmented images of Villeneuve‟s car airborne and skimming backwards along 
the catch-fencing, his calm demeanour and nonchalant “Yeah, I‟m okay” response 
to ITV interviewer, Louise Goodman, moments after the incident, seemed almost 
as surreal as the crash itself (DVD Example 23).  Rather than the driver‟s death, 
therefore, only the car is permitted to „die‟ in contemporary Formula One and, 
outside of the exceptional „big accident‟, it is uncommon to view a contemporary 
race on television without seeing a plume of smoke erupt from the back of at least 
one car as its engine dies while the driver, nonplussed, frustrated but uninjured, 
makes his way back to the pits.   
As „symbolic operators of crowd passions‟, these factors potentially signify 
an importance for the drivers which Baudrillard both implicitly and explicitly 
alludes to in his essay: the driver „matters‟ in Formula One.  Although thus far we 
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have seen that the driver has a problematic and almost secondary relationship with 
the machinery of Formula One in relation to technology and performance, he is 
present nonetheless and pilots these projectiles in a limited capacity rather than 
the teams literally using machines to control the machinery (setting aside earlier 
evocations of the driver as a machine).  Additionally, as the centre of the sport‟s 
attention (or „tip of the pyramid‟), it is the driver not the machine that is preserved 
and conversely (and perhaps, perversely), many tune into the sport to watch the 
drivers „cheat‟ their own deaths (or survive the death of their double, the car), 
negotiate the risks and drive their machines to the brink of mechanical 
destruction.  Most significantly, Baudrillard (2002) observes that it is the 
unpredictable elements that are vital to maintaining audience interest.  The 
unpredictability is where the drama occurs in surviving the death of the 
mechanical double.  This provides an intriguing paradox for Formula One as its 
systems and apparatuses primarily operate in ways that seek to predict, control 
and determine the seamless functioning of the sport, while the „human‟ qualities 
of unpredictability, flaws and „slippery‟ degrees of agency provide the friction and 
uncertainty within the machinery.  Therefore, audiences are tuning in to also 
watch the „individual‟ drivers compete against one another (not just the machines, 
teams, companies, etc), replete with moments of „human‟ error, folly and 
masterful displays achieved through (but also over and above) the machine.  In 
this respect, audiences are also permitted a small window through which to 
discern the nuances in driver styles and ability that the Formula One technology 
strives so hard to „perfect‟ and eradicate.  Hence, in addition to the teams, the 
team-mate comparison also „matters‟ for Formula One audiences as now the focus 
is on the „individuality‟ of two different drivers who operate identical machinery 
(e.g., the comparatively smooth/fluent versus aggressive/forceful driving styles of 
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Michael Schumacher and Felipe Massa for Ferrari in 2006, and Lewis Hamilton 
and Fernando Alonso for McLaren in 2007), demonstrate contrasting abilities 
(e.g., Mark Webber and Alex Yoong for Minardi in 2002; Jenson Button and 
Takuma Sato for BAR in 2004 and 2005), while varying degrees of driver-
machine integration are also recognisable along the grid (e.g., the initial struggles 
of Barrichello and Villeneuve to adapt to new teams/machinery discussed earlier).  
This aspect of the audience/fan relationship with Formula One (and the drivers) 
provides another significant research „problem‟ to be developed by the thesis.  
While Baudrillard (2002) has offered the „symbolic operator‟ as an explanation 
for „collective‟ crowd passions, these findings tend to be both abstract and at 
times symbolically conceived and all-encompassing theories.  Therefore, an 
examination of specific contexts and concrete practices for fan-star relationships 
will be mapped in this thesis; moving from the „collective‟ audience experience 
proffered by Formula One mediations (Chapters Four and Five), to an exploration 
of the specificity of my own fan engagements and processes (Chapter Six), and 
conceptualising why Villeneuve‟s „maverick‟ status appeals (Chapter Seven).   
The specific notion posited here, of the endlessly repeated spectacle of 
surviving the death of the mechanical other, needs further examination.  This 
notion can, perhaps, be mapped onto specific details of the television coverage for 
instance.  But first, the theme of Villeneuve as „risk-taker‟ is revisited.  The 
contention that Villeneuve provides a „maverick‟ form of individualism has 
already been traced in Chapter One.  This section redeploys the „traces of grit‟ that 
Villeneuve‟s „risk-taker‟ status affords, as briefly discussed in Chapter Two, 
arguing that his proclivity for danger acts as both a source of „friction‟ within the 
machinery of Formula One and seeks to represent such friction as a form of 
agency.   
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Unlike the smooth and „seamless‟ integration of drivers such as Michael 
Schumacher or Jenson Button, Villeneuve‟s apparent bravado and aggressive 
driving style appear to present us with an, albeit fragmented, vision of the 
„individual‟ as very much present within the machine.  Although we have already 
established that the driver generally has a secondary performative role in Formula 
One, Villeneuve tried to compensate for his often under-powered and under-
performing race cars with his „hard-charging‟ (Hughes, 2004) or attacking driving 
style.  For example, in whichever machine he was operating, Villeneuve was 
readily identifiable through driving which, although metronomic like his peers, 
exceeded their often uniform tight-driving lines (which were also championed by 
team mechanisms, such as telemetry), using every inch of the track and then some 
to gain any performative advantage (DVD Examples 2, 3, 9, 16, 19 and 22).  
Thus, Villeneuve could often be viewed ferociously bouncing over the kerbing 
(e.g., at Monza, Italy) or with his wheels far over the kerbs kicking up dust and 
dirt from his unconventional, off-track driving lines (e.g., through the fast first 
corners at both Hockenheim in Germany and at the A1 Ring in Austria), while 
stories on Villeneuve were often accompanied by similar „aggressive‟ accounts 
and/or „off-track‟ pictures of his driving style (e.g., Bishop, 2000; Hughes, 2004; 
Samson, 2001; Vergeer, 2004).  Donaldson (2001) observed,  
On the track he is mesmerising to watch, an obvious 
daredevil whose lust for speed and passion for pure racing is 
a throwback to a different age of motorsport.  When it comes 
to fighting spirit and attempted overtaking manoeuvres he is 
in a league of his own.  (p. 55) 
In this respect, Villeneuve does seem to encapsulate Baudrillard‟s (2002) notion 
of the driver as a “symbolic operator of crowd passions and the risk of death”  
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(p. 169), potentially exciting crowds with his aggressive style while his penchant 
for risk-taking allowed audiences to glimpse the possibility of death.   
Through a combination of his reported bravado, risk-taking, big crashes and 
struggles to adapt to the evolving technological machinery of Formula One, 
Villeneuve seemed to be a driver still clinging to his own pursuit of some form of 
„personal pleasure‟ in driving, despite Baudrillard (2002) noting that such 
pleasure, as well as the personal risk of death, was disappearing from the 
contemporary circuits.  For example, in response to questions from F1 Racing 
magazine readers in 2008, he was asked about his „fondness for crashing‟.  
Villeneuve allegedly retorted,  
First of all, let me say I‟ve got no fondness for crashing.  It‟s 
never fun, and it always hurts.  But, well, if you do have a 
shunt, then make sure it‟s a good one at least!  I had a couple 
of big ones at Eau Rogue but I‟m not sure which one I‟d say 
was the best.  It really depends on why you crash.  In those 
cases, I had the accident because I was trying to take the 
corner flat.  Talking with the drivers afterwards, they said, 
“You‟re mad, why are you trying to take it flat?” and there 
was a macho element that was quite good.  But if it‟s just a 
stupid crash, then there‟s no pride in it.  (Lord, 2008, p. 45) 
Moreover, Villeneuve was evidently setting himself „personal‟ challenges within 
the impersonal machinery of Formula One, which were not elements of a 
systematic „operational passion‟ or merely about performance goals (e.g., 
eschewing the robotic-driver-machine focused solely on winning).  For example, 
describing his crash at Belgium in 1997, Villeneuve is quoted in Shirley (2000) as 
saying,  
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I like to drive on the edge and I was definitely on the edge in 
that one.  I was over 290 kph at the apex of Eau Rogue and I 
was trying to do it all flat.  I just lost it.  Plain and simple.  It 
was a little scary but I would do it again.  (p. 131) 
Commenting on this particular crash, Shirley (2000) noted that for Villeneuve, 
Thoughts of slowing came late.  The deep black scars of 
rubber from his belated braking demonstrated this, before his 
car plunged across a short gravel trap and spun backwards 
into the tyres which protected the steel barriers...Villeneuve 
climbed out of the wreckage and smiled but beneath the 
cool, rather nonchalant exterior, there was anger.  Anger 
because he had lost control; beaten by the twisting speed of 
Raidillon.  (p. 131) 
This became a „personal‟ annual challenge for Villeneuve and he continued to „do 
it again‟, crashing out at Eau Rogue in both 1998 and 1999.  Thus, Villeneuve 
repetitively displayed a personal pleasure in risk-taking, while using this 
particular section of the Belgium circuit to test his „individual‟ mastery over fear, 
race-track and the machine.   
Audiences with any trace of a “passion for accidents and death” (Baudrillard, 
2002, p. 168) had a readily identifiable figure to focus on, waiting to see what 
consequences might emerge from Villeneuve‟s bravado and risk-taking.  
Although I do not share this potential audience „passion‟, I do recall personally 
experiencing the empty feeling that Villeneuve would be pronounced dead having 
seen his crash at the 2001 Australian Grand Prix „live‟ on television (DVD 
Example 23).  More broadly, watching Villeneuve offered moments of human 
error, folly and mastery within and over the machine.  Hence, his spectacular 
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driving style would bear witness to an „individual‟ at times making basic driving 
errors (e.g., his „simple‟ crashes at the 1997 and 1999 Canadian Grand Prix), 
providing demonstrations of folly (e.g., ruining both his team-mate‟s [Felipe 
Massa] and his own chances of points by colliding with him at the 2005 Monaco 
Grand Prix), „mixed‟ results (e.g., his frenetic, low-fuel assisted „charge‟ from 
seventeenth to third at one stage, captured by the television cameras, before 
retiring with a blown engine at the 2002 Austrian Grand Prix) and mastery over 
the machine (e.g., „burying‟ the throttle to execute a 900° spin and stay on the race 
track [not crash] after being clipped from behind, before then re-performing a 
180° spin to continue forward momentum at the 2000 German Grand Prix).  
Furthermore, through Villeneuve, audiences could witness the increasing 
encroachment of technology „replacing‟ the driver and his thwarted responses to 
these impositions.  For example, describing traction control at Turn One of the 
Silverstone circuit in England in 2006, Villeneuve is reported in F1 Racing 
magazine as saying, 
Even though on the one hand you had to admit it‟s amazing 
that a car can go through it so fast, you didn‟t have to worry 
about it.  You didn‟t have to worry about running a fraction 
wide or touching a kerb where you hadn‟t intended to, 
because the cars are now so good that you knew you‟d 
probably get through anyway.  If you got a bit sideways, for 
instance, you knew the traction control would probably sort 
it out.  (Bishop, 2006c, p. 41) 
Further, Villeneuve‟s „individual‟ brilliance at race starts in 2000 was replaced by 
the automated process of launch control in 2001, his „individual‟ challenge versus 
fear, race-track and machine at Eau Rogue was nullified by the machine (through 
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traction control) in 2001 and, more broadly, these electronic driver systems 
rendered many of his „pleasurable‟ risk-taking pursuits and „spectacular‟ driving 
displays obsolete as the machine increasingly reduced the performative role of the 
man.   
Sketching Villeneuve‟s risk-taking as a form of friction within the machinery 
of Formula One intimates his usefulness for unravelling the usually abstract and 
potentially only symbolic renderings of the media audience/text relationship 
provided by Baudrillard and earlier identified as a significant research „problem‟ 
for this thesis.  With this chapter mapping the machinery of Formula One and the 
duplicity of the driver as both a technical and symbolic operator, it becomes 
apparent that an, albeit fragmented and constrained, „individual‟ driver „matters‟ 
in some capacity to the viewing audience.  The remaining chapters will continue 
to probe both the media/audience relationship and the role of the „individual‟ 
driver. 
Analysing Formula One Sources:  
The Production of „Popular‟ Knowledge 
An underlying reason for focusing so far on the more „popular‟ accounts of 
Formula One is the lack of significant academic research on the sport within 
either the media studies or sport sociology fields.  There are a plethora of works 
written by journalists and ex-members of the Formula One fraternity, as well as 
numerous Formula One magazines and websites but little in academia (motorsport 
as a whole has received limited attention).  Setting aside Baudrillard‟s essay 
(2002) which has informed this chapter, the other four academic works on 
Formula One/motorsport will now be briefly reviewed.  In the first, Kennedy 
(2000) compares the gendered narratives of televised Formula One with snooker.  
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Her narrative analysis reveals that snooker offers more intimacy with the stars 
through its televisual framing and discourses, while Formula One drivers are 
comparatively anonymous and obscured by their cars and protective gear during 
the race.  Additionally, Kennedy suggests that a narrative of success underpins the 
staging of a Grand Prix, complete with a cast of active men, passive women, a 
focus on action and the hero (winning driver) all played out in the public sphere.  
Kennedy‟s (2000) notion of driver anonymity assists with an examination of 
Formula One‟s visual representations and will be developed through a broader 
conceptualisation of the sport‟s televisual technologies and „screens of speed‟ in 
Chapters Four and Five.   
In a sociological account of Formula One, Lowes (2004) focuses on the 
Victorian State Government‟s acquisition of the Australian Grand Prix in 1993.  
Utilising a political economy perspective, Lowes argues that the government‟s 
approach was autocratic and outlines the numerous transgressions of citizens‟ 
rights and public concerns involved in the acquisition of the Grand Prix.  As 
Lowes‟ chief concern is to critique the neoliberal policies of the Victorian 
Government rather than analyse the sport of Formula One, his work offers little to 
my research.  Finally, two other works provide a sociological examination of the 
American NASCAR series.  Shackleford (1999) examines the masculine rituals 
and the role of technology in the American NASCAR series which, while 
informative, has little connection to my own research given the distinction 
between both the „Southern‟ masculinity embodied in NASCAR and the 
comparatively limited technological impetus of the oval-based, American stock-
car series in relation to Formula One.  In the second NASCAR-orientated research 
article, Crawford (2006) considers the problematic representation of driver, Jeff 
Gordon, as an ambivalent masculine sex symbol.  Crawford (2006) notes that 
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Gordon‟s clean-cut image seemed out of place in the macho world of NASCAR, a 
finding which echoes but reverses my interest in Jacques Villeneuve.  Given the 
limited scope of these four articles, it should be acknowledged that Formula One 
is currently under-examined in academia, so this thesis and a survey of the 
dangers inherent within Formula One as an „extreme‟ sport (Sturm, 2007) seek to 
make a contribution to this underdeveloped literature.  
As a result, five types of more „popular‟, non-academic accounts become 
significant sources for discussing and analysing the publicly-known narratives of 
the sport, and Jacques Villeneuve specifically.  The first source is the burgeoning 
collection of Formula One books, with 23 specific books being drawn upon in this 
thesis.
8
  Three of the Formula One books have been particularly influential for my 
research, with B. Turner (2004) providing a critical rather than celebratory 
account of contemporary Formula One from her perspective as a Formula One 
television presenter, Vergeer (2004) considering Formula One through his own 
fandom and Noble and Hughes‟ (2004) providing an informative and detailed 
(albeit celebratory) contemporary overview of the sport.  The second source is the 
monthly magazine format (F1 Racing and Formula 1 Magazine), with 123 
Formula One magazines collected and analysed.
9
  Generally, the magazines are 
useful and thorough „current‟ sources for Formula One (see below), barring  
B. Turner‟s (2004) critique of Formula 1 Magazine‟s lack of independence as 
noted earlier, as well as F1 Racing‟s thinly veiled favouritism of certain drivers 
(e.g., Michael Schumacher, or Giancarlo Fisichella between 2002-2004) or blatant 
and at times unwarranted castigation of others (e.g., Eddie Irvine in 2000-2001; 
Villeneuve 2002-2005, or Ralf Schumacher in 2007); though these of course may 
have been marketing ploys to generate pseudo-debate.   
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The third source is Formula One coverage on the internet, with seven prime 
Formula One internet sites drawn upon since 2003.
10
  The content and quality of 
the websites is marked; ranging from industry-based, insider knowledge to gossip 
and, most disappointingly, either the celebratory or outdated „official‟ sites.11  The 
fourth (and arguably most prominent) source for public and popular narratives of 
Formula One is the race telecasts which I have viewed live on 181 occasions 
between 1998-2008.  Since September 1998 until the end of the 2006 season, 111 
full Grands Prix have been videotaped, forming the basis for the televisual textual 
analysis in Chapters Four and Five.
12
  During my period of viewing, these live 
telecasts from British broadcaster ITV were supplemented with commentary, most 
notably from ex-Formula One driver, Martin Brundle, as well as presenters 
Murray Walker (1998-2001) and James Allen (2002-2008).  These commentators 
enlivened the racing action but, more importantly for their audience, constructed a 
globally-disseminated form of Formula One „knowledge‟, with their popular 
narratives available across 28 countries (including Britain).
13
  On occasion, on-
line or print newspapers provide a fifth type of source for Formula One through 
their accounts of the sport.  My collecting and use of these materials has been 
most pronounced during attendance at the live Grands Prix in Australia (2002-
2004; 2006) and Canada (2005), „scavenging‟ (Jenkins, 1992) through the daily 
newspapers and only keeping items on Formula One for their supplementary and 
localised coverage of the event.
14
   
These five types of Formula One source are fundamental for discussing the 
popular narratives surrounding Formula One and Jacques Villeneuve.  Of course, 
as popular texts, each source has to be treated with caution in relation to its rigour, 
selection and presentation of Formula One knowledge or „facts‟.  Clearly, each 
source has limitations as, for example, Formula One books are already outdated 
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upon publication, as too is the monthly Formula One magazine F1 Racing, 
distributed in New Zealand up to six weeks after the events discussed.  The daily 
internet sites fluctuate in the quality and reliability of their content, while 
newspapers tend to provide results-orientated reporting and, in New Zealand, the 
coverage is both minimal and generic, derived from international press affiliates.  
Finally, the live telecasts are predominantly focused on the images they present 
for the duration of the telecast, primarily commenting on racing action with often 
only fleeting or arbitrary references to other Formula One „news‟, „anecdotes‟ or 
developments outside of the live event.   
Collectively, these Formula One texts tend to provide five types of „news‟ 
which could be categorised as: 1) results-orientated reporting, 2) the reproduction 
of official press releases (teams, sponsors and FIA) or driver statements (e.g., their 
post-race report) and, 3) reported news stories, which provide brief, „factual‟, 
descriptive stories which extend beyond simply recording results.  The fourth type 
is feature articles, which are usually lengthier pieces on a Formula One related 
topic (e.g., an internet editorial; or the driver interviews, profiles or analysis found 
in F1 Racing magazine).  Finally, the fifth type of Formula One news is intrigue, 
rumour and speculation about drivers, teams or Formula One developments which 
are often loosely-based on gossip rather than the idealised expectation of 
„objective‟ coverage integral to most forms of sports journalism (Rowe, 2005).  
The fifth type of coverage is arguably the most salient in Formula One in terms of 
its volume, active circulation and readership (e.g., there are often audience 
responses to these rumours in emails sent to internet sites, such as Planetf1.com), 
as well as its relevance for this research.  As noted earlier, despite the sport being 
conducted in the public arena, the inner workings of Formula One are very 
secretive.  With some dull racing seasons and especially dull official press 
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releases, the off-track or non-racing activities get increased press coverage.  
Therefore, intrigue, rumour and speculation envelop Formula One coverage 
concerning drivers and their fluctuating star status and performances (e.g., 
movements between teams, motivation, future prospects), teams (e.g., personnel 
changes, possible sponsors), as well as other aspects of the sport (e.g., regulation 
changes, new venues) often divulged by „insiders‟ or members of the Formula 
One community.  Even coverage which may conform to one of the first four 
categories identified above is often spliced with this fifth element, as is evident in 
the additional reporting of rumour and speculation surrounding Villeneuve‟s 
performances in 2005 (Appendix One).   
Between Construction and Myth 
This chapter has suggested, in some detail, the nature of the complex 
constructions that underpin the simple public narratives of Formula One – its 
myths in a sense (as Barthes [1993] used that term).  What has emerged in the 
space between construction and myth is the key research question of how 
someone like Villeneuve functions as an orchestrator of collective passion.  What 
is this orchestration in concrete terms?  Is it textual?  Is it about fandom?  And 
how does it relate to the intriguing matter of Formula One as an arena for 
repetitively watching the driver escape the destruction of his double, the car?  
Does Villeneuve expose more of what is going on here because he never quite 
fitted?  And what does this tell us about Formula One and its sustaining media as 
contemporary practices of popular culture?  The remaining chapters will tease out 
these questions through a funnelling approach to notions of the audience; moving 
from collective experiences to more atomised engagements with Formula One‟s 
mediated coverage (Chapters Four and Five), articulating the concrete contexts 
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and particular practices embedded within fandom (Chapter Six) and reconsidering 
the significance that Villeneuve‟s traces of grit as a „maverick individual‟ provide 
in specific star/fan relationships (Chapter Seven).  Collective passion will in the 
end be regrounded in the personal passion that it assembles and organises. 
 
                                                 
1
 I suspect that this perception would not be as evident in American publications, as American 
sport is insular in its coverage and tends to embellish the status of its own sports (e.g., „World 
Championships‟ played out only between American teams).  America also has its own popular 
stock-car racing series (NASCAR), as well as two open-wheeled championships the Indy Racing 
League (IRL) and Championship Auto Racing Teams (CART – rebranded as the Champ Car 
World Series [CCWS] since 2002) which, despite being lower categories, compete with and could 
be perceived as the American open-wheel equivalent of Formula One (Sturm, 2007).  Early in 
2008 these two open-wheeled series re-unified and now compete solely as the IRL. 
2
 F1 Racing has provided estimates for the seasons 2002-2004.  The exact figures provided are 
$2,141,100,000 for 2002 (Henry, 2003), $2,493,100,000 for 2003 (Henry, 2004), and 
$2,537,010,000 for 2004 (Henry, 2005). 
3
 F1 Racing reports that these teams spent the following in 2002; Ferrari $443.8m, Williams 
$353.3m, McLaren $304.6m, Toyota $290.4m and BAR $225.1m (Henry, 2003).  For 2003, 
Ferrari spent $418.23m, Toyota $368.51m, McLaren $359.22m, Williams $359.04m and BAR 
$309.87m (Henry, 2004).  In 2004, Ferrari spent $426.24m, Toyota $397.21m, McLaren 
$359.33m, Williams $355.59m and BAR $343.59m (Henry, 2005). 
4
 Jordan operated at around $79m in 2002 and 2003, although in 2004 they were down to $67.78m, 
while Minardi remained on $39m in 2002 and 2004, with a high of $46.58m in 2003 (see Henry, 
2003; Henry, 2004; Henry, 2005).   
5
 As an example, using the „Google‟ advanced internet search engine yielded 76,900,000 hits for 
sites “with all of the words” „Formula One‟.  Retrieved November 9, 2006, from  
http://www.google.co.nz/search?as_q=formula+one&num=10&hl=en&btnG=Google+Search&as_
epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&lr=&as_ft=i&as_filetype=&as_qdr=all&as_occt=any&as_dt=i&as_sitese
arch=&as_rights=&safe=images. 
6
 The BBC has since reacquired the television rights for Formula One on a five-year deal which 
commenced in 2009 (“BBC lands”, 2008). 
7
 Michael Schumacher finished on the podium in every race of the 2002 season (11x 1st; 5 x 2nd; 
1 x 3rd).  He had won the Drivers‟ Championship by round 11, accumulating a season total of 144 
points while his nearest „rival‟, Ferrari team-mate Rubens Barrichello, finished a distant second 
with 77 points.   
8
 These 23 books comprised: four driver autobiographies (Button & Tremayne, 2002; Hill, 1996; 
Irvine & Nottage, 2000; Villeneuve & Donaldson, 1997), one commentator autobiography 
(Walker, 2002), three driver profiles (Allen, 2000; Collings, 1998; Hilton, 1997), two team 
profiles (Donaldson, 1999; Henry, 1998b), two historical accounts (Hughes, 2004; Rendall, 2000), 
three accounts on the business of Formula One (Collings, 2001; Hotten, 1999; Lovell, 2003), two 
books on the dangers of the sport (Hilton, 2003; Shirley, 2000), one fan account (Vergeer, 2004), 
one paddock insider text (Allsop, 1998), and four general, contemporary Formula One readers 
which overview the sport (Henry, 1998a; Hill 1998; Noble & Hughes, 2004; B. Turner, 2004). 
9
 The specific breakdown of these magazines is 101 copies of the monthly F1 Racing magazine: 
1998 – 4 (September – December); 1999 – 2003 – 60 (all inclusive); 2004 – 9 (March – October; 
December); 2005 – 12; 2006 – 11 (January – October; December); 2007 – 4 (February; March; 
September; October) and 2008 – 1 (November).  Although not as readily available in New 
Zealand, 19 copies of the monthly Formula 1 Magazine were also consulted: 2002 – 11 (all 
inclusive, including a combined November/December issue); 2003 – 6 (January – March; May – 
July); 2004 – 1 (February), in addition to three Autosport magazine „Grand Prix Reviews‟ (2000–
2002). 
10
 The seven internet sites are: four daily updated and Formula One-only news sites (f1-live.com; 
grandprix.com; itv-f1.com; planetf1.com), pitpass.com, which incorporates other motorsport; the 
official Formula One site (formula1.com); and the official Villeneuve site (jv-world.com).   
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11
 Of the daily sites, grandprix.com is the most useful for informed, accurate and insider, industry-
based news; planetf1.com and itv-f1.com provide regular and entertaining editorials (or guest 
columns on itv-f1.com) and publish letters from readers/fans in addition to reporting news, while 
f1-live.com tends to be gossip-based which is salient for following rumoured driver movements, 
even if their speculation proves to be unfounded and often incorrect.  For the other sites, 
pitpass.com primarily reports publicly announced stories rather than rumours and shares the 
insider-industry focus of grandprix.com while, as the official site for the sport, formula1.com tends 
to be „celebratory‟ of the sport and offers little of news „value‟ that could not be obtained from the 
other sites (although live timing is an invaluable tool).  Arguably, the most disappointing of the 
websites is Villeneuve‟s official site (jv-world.com).  The Villeneuve site is not updated regularly 
so, despite occasional „exclusive‟ interviews or post-race comments, often apparently penned by 
Villeneuve, generally most of the „news‟ is outdated information already available on one of the 
other Formula One sites.   
12
 The specific break down of taped races per season is as follows (in order of occurrence): 1998 – 
1 (Italian); 1999 – 6 (Brazilian, French, German, Italian, European, Japanese); 2000 – 7 (Monaco, 
Canadian, French, German, Belgian, United States, Malaysian); 2001 – 11 (Australian, Malaysian, 
Brazilian, Spanish, Monaco, Canadian, British, German, Belgian, Italian, United States).  For the 
period 2002 -2005 the full race season was taped, barring Belgium 2002 (lost) and San Marino 
2004 (accidentally taped over).  Thus, for 2002 there are 16 (of 17) races; 2003 – 16; 2004 – 17 (of 
18); 2005 – 19.  For the 2006 season, all 18 races were taped, inclusive of qualifying, which had 
not been broadcast in New Zealand since 1998.  It should also be noted that during my period of 
viewing (1998-2008), Formula One had been broadcast free-to-air on TV1 (Television New 
Zealand) without qualifying between 1999-2005; while the digital television network, Sky 
Television, held the broadcasting rights in 1998 and re-acquired them as of 2006, inclusive of 
qualifying. 
13
 The exact number of countries receiving the ITV telecast is difficult to ascertain.  Nevertheless, 
Murray Walker notes that while providing live commentaries for the BBC in 1996 and ITV from 
1997-2001, that the Formula One coverage and commentaries were also broadcast in “Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Hong Kong, Singapore, India, Pakistan and 19 Middle East 
and African countries” (Walker, 2002, p. 376). 
14
 In Melbourne, a total of 45 newspapers were acquired during four trips to the Australian Grand 
Prix, the two daily papers, The Herald-Sun and The Age, were purchased as often as they could be 
obtained, as well as free copies of the MX paper, distributed in the Melbourne CBD during 
weekdays, when accessible.  The specific breakdown of these Melbourne newspapers is: 2002 – 9 
(Friday 1st March – Tuesday 5th March); 2003 – 15 (Tuesday 5th – Wednesday 11th March); 
2004 – 10 (Thursday 4th – Tuesday 9th March); 2006 – 11 (Wednesday 29th March – Tuesday 4th 
April).  During the Canadian Grand Prix in 2005, only the Montreal Gazette was purchased (as it 
is published in English), obtaining only 5 newspapers as these sold out quickly in the Montreal 
CBD (Tuesday 7th June – Saturday 11th June).  Because of the extensive coverage Villeneuve 
received in Montreal during 2005, the Montreal Gazette was accessed online during the 2006 
Canadian Grand Prix (Monday 19th June – Monday 26th June) to monitor his press coverage. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
From the Grandstand to the Cockpit: Framing the Televised Formula 
One Image, Viewer Positioning and the Significance of Emerging 
Televisual Technologies for the Televised Sport Audience. 
As noted in the previous Chapters, Formula One is widely perceived to be a 
„television‟ sport and, for most viewers, is primarily experienced through its live 
telecast.  As the prime site for the global circulation and consumption of Formula 
One, how the televisual “screen of speed” (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 167) constructs 
and re-presents the sport is critical to understanding Formula One‟s 
transformation into a specific media text.  Interestingly, cinema had a pivotal role 
in developing the screened image of Formula One racing.  Hotten (1999) suggests 
that the origins of the comprehensive and stylish televised coverage of Formula 
One (and the on-board camera technology in particular) owe much to Hollywood 
and the John Frankenheimer film Grand Prix (1966).  A visually stunning 
representation of the European Formula One races of 1966, Grand Prix used the 
latest camera technology to innovatively film and recreate the racing action.  This 
included mounting cameras on the cars for the first time.  As a result of Grand 
Prix, the sense of speed and danger was now graphically represented and available 
for the cinema audience.   
Despite this cinematic origin, Formula One‟s primary „screen of speed‟ 
(Baudrillard, 2002), its television coverage, was slower to evolve.  Indeed, 
televised coverage of Formula One continued to be sporadic at best even after the 
release of Grand Prix.  For example, in Britain, a key nation in the development 
and continuation of the sport, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) had 
begun televising limited coverage of Formula One in the 1950s yet the broadcasts 
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were a mixture of some live races, delayed coverage or highlight packages.  These 
BBC telecasts were also inconsistent in their production values or the quality of 
the screened footage (Walker, 2002).  As noted in Chapter Three, Bernie 
Ecclestone‟s efforts as president of the Formula One Constructors‟ Association 
had improved the organisation of Formula One, as well as the quality and 
potential for the sport as a global televisual spectacle during the early 1980s.  
Nevertheless, in Britain, it was not until 1996 that the BBC first provided live, 
comprehensive televised coverage of a complete Formula One season, a trend 
continued by Independent Television (ITV) since they acquired the British 
broadcasting rights for Formula One in 1997 (Hotten, 1999; Walker, 2002); 
although these rights have since been transferred back to the BBC on a five year 
deal commencing in 2009.   
In a further refinement of the media text and audience relationship developed 
in the preceding chapter, a broader analysis of the televised construction of the 
Formula One audience (e.g., viewer positioning) is essential to assist us in moving 
away from some of the universalising theories of the audience mapped and 
critiqued in Chapter Two.  Therefore, this chapter proceeds from generalised 
theories of the visual representations provided for viewers and how they are 
positioned by generic televised sport and Formula One coverage, to the 
implications of innovative and emerging technologies which are re-placing and re-
positioning viewers in non-traditional ways (and, more broadly, afford potential 
for reconsideration of traditional theories of the audience).  Guttmann (1986) 
offers an initial account for those who attend or watch sport, asserting that, “the 
sports spectator is anyone who views a sports event, either in situ or through 
visual media such as film or television” (Guttmann, 1986, p. 5, italics in original).  
While highly problematic, these „spectators‟ are then distinguished from fans 
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whom, according to him, follow sport through other means (he cites newspapers, 
magazines and radio, while implying consumption sustains and underpins 
fandom).  Guttmann (1986) notes that, 
A conceptual line has to be drawn somewhere between those 
who experience a sports event „fully‟ and those whose 
experience is partial.  I draw my admittedly arbitrary line 
between those who can see an action taking place and those 
who cannot.  The term fan refers here to the emotionally 
committed „consumer‟ of sports events.  The terms overlap 
but are obviously not identical.  In practice most fans are 
spectators and most spectators are fans, but it is logically 
possible to be one and not the other.  Some fans have never 
actually attended a sports event or watched one on 
television; some spectators stare absent-mindedly at 
televised sports without a flicker of interest, some allow 
themselves to be dragged to games that they then observe 
without any of the emotional involvement characteristic of 
the fan.  (p. 6, italics in original).   
Such definitions and distinctions are clearly riddled with problematic 
assumptions.  For example, I cannot comprehend contemporary sports fandom as 
not comprising either attendance or televised viewing of the event, nor being 
solely based on consumption.  In addition, his distinction between a „full‟ and 
„partial‟ experience derived from whether or not one „views‟ the game through 
attendance and/or television is vexed (i.e., all media texts require visualisation, 
decoding processes and forms of cultural literacy, while being „shaped‟ by an 
affective set of relations – see also Schirato, 2007b).  However, Guttmann (1986) 
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does offer us a starting point, the universalising term spectators, to account for 
those watching Formula One telecasts, while the “ideal spectator” (Whannel, 
1992, p. 96) is a key explanatory term for understanding televised viewer 
positioning.  Nevertheless, as much of this chapter deals with television and not 
„live‟ forms of spectatorship, I primarily use the terms „audience‟ or „viewer‟ to 
account for those watching or able to watch the global Formula One telecasts (and 
to avoid mapping conceptual and „experiential‟ vagaries in televised Formula One 
viewership, „live‟ spectatorship and fandom in this chapter).  I will revisit the 
suggested concerns and critiques, as well as the „degrees‟ of intensity, investment 
and affect that underpin such viewings and the practices of fandom in Chapter 
Six.   
Televised Sport 
Whannel (1992) notes, “for most of us, for most of the time, sport is television 
sport” (p. 3).  Televised sport operates within an interesting dynamic of being an 
actual event “independent of the institutions of television” (Whannel, 1992,  
p. 92); that is, sport is not a manufactured product created by or for television and, 
in most cases, has an existence separate to television.  However, sport also 
becomes circumscribed by its reinscription for the televisual format.  Television 
sport does not simply „occur‟, nor present the „reality‟ of sport (Buscombe, 1975; 
Whannel, 1992) as a range of constructed and selective processes (e.g., framing, 
editing, narrativisation, etc.) contribute to the re-presentation of sport for the 
televisual format (see Barnett, 1990; Brookes, 2002; Clarke & Clarke, 1982; 
Goldlust, 1987; Gruneau, Whitson & Cantelon, 1988; MacNeill, 1996; Messner, 
Dunbar & Hunt, 2000; Morse, 1983; Rowe, 1999, 2004; Silk, 1999; Stoddart, 
1994; Tunstall, 1993; Wenner, 1989, 1998; Williams, 1977).  Gruneau (1989) 
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observes that, televised sport involves “a wide range of processes of visual and 
narrative representation – choices regarding the images, language, camera 
positioning, and story line required to translate „what happened‟ into a program 
that makes „good television‟” (p. 135).  The dilemma that televised sport faces is 
presenting sport within an often contradictory climate of seeking to entertain as 
well as inform viewers, in addition to providing a sense of viewer omnipotence 
through actuality, immediacy or the liveness of the event (Boyle & Haynes, 2000; 
Rose & Friedman, 1997; Whannel, 1992).   
While producers of televised sport do not attempt to manufacture the results 
or disrupt the uncertainty of sport, these producers seek to retain their viewing 
audiences through a range of techniques which create and enhance the spectacle 
for viewers.  The role of entertainment within televised sport is one such aspect.  
Whannel (1992) observes that, “entertainment values organise visual images 
according to the need to highlight pleasure points – action, stars, drama – 
attempting to construct an entertaining assemblage capable of winning and 
holding an audience” (p. 94).  The convention of entertainment is also 
underpinned by actuality and realism.  Sport productions aim for a “transparency 
effect” (Whannel, 1992, p. 37), representing sport as a real event happening in 
actuality; that is, not as the product of (overt) construction or manipulation.  
Presenters and commentators assist in this process through their dual role of 
entertaining and informing viewers.  Presenters effectively position the audience 
(Whannel, 1992), informing viewers through direct address about what the show 
contains, as well as establishing and highlighting pleasure points.  During the 
telecast, commentators provide anchorage for the visual action, describing and 
assessing the on-field events, as well as informing and entertaining the viewer 
with relevant background information, elements of intrigue and further anecdotal 
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information to assist viewer knowledge (Bruce, 2004, 2005; Bryant, Comisky & 
Zillman 1977; Comisky, Bryant & Zillman, 1977; MacNeill, 1996; Morse, 1983; 
Whannel, 1992).   
The rise of a variety of subsidiary sport shows, in addition to televisual sport 
journalism, supplements this orientation towards sport as a combination of 
entertainment, actuality and newsworthy information.  Various shows circulate to 
buttress the live event, such as the creation of pre- and post-match shows 
facilitating a discussion of the events that either will or have transpired (e.g., 
Monday Night Countdown and NFL Primetime or, in New Zealand, Friday Night 
Football and Reunion).  Additionally, there are a diverse array of magazine-style 
shows which provide an informative take on particular sports, usually as either a 
serious insider perspective (e.g., Inside Grand Prix; WRC Rally Magazine), or as a 
less serious, entertaining and light-hearted show (e.g., WRC: Shakedown, NRL 
Footy Show).  Through the processes of reporting and recording, these subsidiary 
shows and especially forms of televisual sport journalism accentuate the realism 
and actuality of sport for audiences.  Often this information is supported by an 
array of non-televisual sport texts (e.g., newspapers, print magazines or internet 
websites) which provide accessible information for sport followers and fans 
(Brookes, 2002; Crawford, 2004; Real, 1998; Rowe, 1999, 2004).  However, 
within sports reporting (televisual and print), the criteria for determining the 
newsworthiness of items is becoming increasingly blurred (Rowe, 2005).  Rather 
than the traditional recording of on-field events, tabloid journalistic styles 
continue to breach the public/private divide to report on items of scandal and 
intrigue within sport, sport organisations and particularly in relation to individual 
sport stars (Andrews & Jackson, 2001; Cashmore, 2002; Giulianotti & Gerrard, 
2001; Lines, 2001; Vande Berg, 1998; Whannel, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2008).   
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The liveness of the event is another important facet for televised sport, 
providing viewers with the knowledge that they are receiving coverage in real 
time, live and direct from which ever global locality the event is being staged.  
Rose and Friedman (1997) suggest that, “in order to attract and hold its viewers, 
television discourses interpellate spectators through direct address, a sense of 
immediacy and liveness, and the illusion that those images seem to be made just 
for us” (p. 3).  Certainly this sense of liveness is prevalent in televised Formula 
One coverage as it transcends geographical boundaries in real time, on a planetary 
scale, to be simultaneously received by over 50 billion viewers (allegedly) across 
more than 140 countries worldwide (“F1 fever grips”, 2002; Hotten, 1999; see 
also critique of Formula One audience figures in Chapter Three).  These processes 
of construction, selectivity and framing within the production of sport, in addition 
to the desire to both inform and entertain through actuality, realism, anchorage, 
immediacy or liveness are all essential elements of re-presenting television sport.  
These elements also contribute to the production of the televised sport spectacle. 
The Televised Sport Spectacle 
To attract and retain viewers, televised images need to be engaging as well as 
enticing for viewers, creating what is perhaps better understood as the televised 
sport spectacle.  The effort to enhance the aesthetic pleasures for audiences is 
shared by sport administrators and the producers of televised sport alike, 
permeating all televised sport coverage whether it is packaged as live broadcasts, 
delayed coverage or the magazine-style shows.  Television directly influences the 
way sport is reconfigured and re-presented as a televisual spectacle.  Whannel 
(1992) suggests the interrelationship between a sport event and a television 
portrayal needs to be understood as a transformation due to “the constraints set by 
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the nature of the sport, and the determining effects of television‟s own code of 
representation and technological ability to recompose its images” (p. 94).  To 
enhance the televised sport spectacle, the medium of television has manipulated 
and created direct changes to some sports (Goldlust, 1987), while Parente (1977) 
notes that many sports have also “molded, adapted, and changed their rules to 
meet the desires and needs of television” (p. 128).  A prime example is the 
creation of „television timeouts‟ in basketball and American football which cut to 
commercial breaks for high-paying advertisers at key stages of the game 
(Himmelstein, 1994).   
Additionally, hybrid versions of sport or entirely new formats are created to 
meet the desires and needs of television, as well as to increase the potential 
audience for an existing sport.  The creation of one-day cricket in 1977 by 
Australian media mogul, Kerry Packer, is a prime example of devising a new 
format for televisual purposes (Cashmore, 2000; Goldlust, 1987; Harriss, 1990).  
Although variations of shorter formats for cricket already existed, one-day cricket 
was introduced as an entertaining option to the apparent staleness of test cricket 
which was played in all-white attire, over five days and usually without a result.  
Packer‟s World Series Cricket was packaged as entertainment, played under 
lights, with coloured uniforms and a white ball (rather than the traditional red), 
and encouraged a more attacking or aggressive style of play to achieve a result in 
the limited number of overs.  The shorter duration also made this brand of cricket 
appealing to television networks for scheduling, as well as enticing a broader 
audience with more action and the likelihood of a result.  In 2003, Twenty20 
cricket was introduced in English County Cricket (the first men‟s international 
was between New Zealand and Australia in 2005), providing a new format which 
effectively halved the duration of a one-day game and promoted quick-fire run-
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scoring by the batting team.  Having staged the inaugural men‟s Twenty20 World 
Cup in South Africa in 2007, Twenty20 has become a permanent international 
fixture and, one could assert, the latest format for packaging televised cricket as 
entertainment.   
Alternatively, some sports are deemed simply to be incompatible with the 
codes and conventions of television, with Whannel (1992) observing that “sports 
with high participation rates (squash, angling, badminton) have been adversely 
affected by their apparent unsuitability for television” (p. 3; see also Schirato, 
2007b).  Therefore, not all forms of televised sport are guaranteed to succeed, 
while even specifically „made-for-TV‟ sports can fail, as can be demonstrated by 
the XFL in 2001.  The XFL was launched by the World Wrestling Federation and 
broadcast on NBC, providing a hybrid version of American football spliced with 
what Rowe (2004) describes as the “hyped, parodic presentational techniques of 
the „pseudo sport‟ of wrestling” (p. 101).  The XFL lasted only one season and 
Brookes (2002) notes that the sport “lost XFL and NBC $35 million (US) each” 
(p. 14).  Nevertheless, locked out of other major leagues due to broadcasting 
rights, NBC began televising another hybrid version of American football, arena 
football, in 2003 (Rowe, 2004).   
While the televised sport spectacle may have an aesthetic connection (i.e., 
enhancing the spectacle to attract and entertain a larger viewing audience), the 
spectacle also has obvious commercial benefits for the television networks, sport 
administrators and advertisers involved (Schirato, 2007a, 2007b).  Described as a 
„dream match‟ by Cashmore (1994, 1996, 2000) and offering what Jhally (1984) 
labels „spectacles of accumulation‟, televised sport is enticing for advertisers as it 
is assumed that it delivers the elusive male audience as predictable and guaranteed 
(Andrews, 2004; Goldlust, 1987; Jhally, 1984; Parente, 1977).  Additionally, sport 
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is capable of drawing large and diverse television audiences.  Whannel (1992) 
suggests that, “at times of major events like the Olympic Games, it has a unique 
ability to win and hold large audiences even well outside normal peak viewing 
hours” (p. 3).  Buttressed by Andrews‟ (2004) observation that televised sport “is 
practically the only live television genre involving uncertain outcomes” (p. 8), the 
scale and uncertainty of televised sport guarantees the audience as a commodity to 
entice sponsors (Jhally, 1984).  Furthermore, „live‟ sport is relatively cheap to 
produce, which usually makes televised sport a stable, profitable and lucrative 
source of income for all concerned (Andrews, 2004; Cashmore, 1994, 2000; 
Parente, 1977; Tunstall, 1993). 
The economic significance of televised sport has been discussed by a range of 
authors (Boyle & Haines, 2000; Himmelstein, 1994; Rowe, 1999, 2004), who 
suggest that telecasts of major sporting events offer not only significant fiscal 
returns but, additionally, are bought and sold as an expensive commodity.  This is 
discernible when discussing broadcasting rights, as the costs for major events, 
such as the Olympics, the football World Cup and even domestic competitions 
(e.g., the American National Football League [NFL] or American National 
Basketball Association [NBA]) have skyrocketed as rival networks compete for 
exclusivity.  For example, Silk (2004) reveals that the NFL cost Fox, CBS, ESPN 
and ABC a combined US$17.6 billion between 1998 and 2005, while NBC paid 
US$2.3 billion for exclusive Olympic Games coverage (summer and winter) for 
2004, 2006 and 2008.  The fierce competition in place for broadcasting rights has 
had a positive spin-off for the televised sport spectacle, with a concurrent 
escalation in the production values, quality and use of innovative technologies as 
networks seek to make a profitable return on their investment and guarantee a 
larger viewing audience (Brookes, 2002; Jhally, 1984; Silk, 2004; Tunstall, 1993; 
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Whannel, 1983, 2008).  In this respect, all televised sport is underpinned by 
efforts to enhance the televisual spectacle; whether it is for aesthetic, 
technological and/or commercial reasons.  Televised sport does not merely 
present a specific sport on television, it is re-presented through many of the 
processes and ideas discussed earlier.  Additionally, the selectivity of images and 
elements of framing, such as multiple camera set-ups, choice of angles and use of 
commentary, assist in the transformation of sport as an event to sport as a 
televisual event (Whannel, 1992).  Therefore, even an arguably dull sport such as 
test cricket, which Cashmore (2000) describes as “television-hostile (played over 
five days, often at a ponderous pace)” (p. 289) is re-presented as a televised sport 
spectacle.  Elements of actuality, immediacy and liveness abound, while through 
multiple camera angles, shot types and especially innovative televisual 
technologies such as „stump-cam‟ and „virtual spectator‟, these techniques frame, 
select and assemble an entertaining and re-presented televised sport spectacle for 
cricket (A. Brown, 1998). 
Traditional Framing and the „Ideal Spectator‟  
Whannel (1992) notes that when attempting to visually re-present sport on 
television, most televised sport seeks to provide “maximum action in minimum 
space” (p. 95).  Although the relationship between action and space varies from 
sport to sport, it is often translated visually through camera work and cutting.  
Most televised sport draws on a prime camera or position to visually frame sport, 
with this prime camera or position providing an all-seeing perspective of events 
which also have implications for both the conceptualisation and placement of the 
television viewer.  According to Whannel (1992), the prime camera or position 
would “correspond to the position of an ideal spectator, with a perfect view”  
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(p. 96).  This prime camera or position dominates televised coverage for the ideal 
spectator, although this „perfect view‟ is supplemented and enhanced through a 
variety of additional camera locations and angles which frame the sporting action 
from „all-seeing‟ perspectives that are unavailable to the naked eye of any 
individual in attendance at the event, with the possible exception of telecasts on 
large-screens at major events (Siegel, 2002).   
Motor sport in general disrupts this notion of an ideal spectator, as it requires 
continuous transitions between multiple cameras and viewing positions to frame 
vehicles racing at high velocity around a large, geographically-diverse track.  
Formula One is also raced across a spatially diverse track, with current circuits 
ranging from between 3.3 to 6.9 kilometres long, which means that even 
spectators at the event cannot see the track in its entirety as my own footage shot 
from grandstands at the 2003 Australian Grand Prix and 2005 Canadian Grand 
Prix demonstrate (DVD Examples 2, 3 and 5).  Furthermore, the cars also travel at 
immense speeds (i.e., Formula One cars reach a top speed of between 180 and 215 
mph on all of the current circuits) which combine to make its televisualisation 
challenging.  However, for sport conducted over more spacious terrain, such as 
golf or motor sport, Whannel (1992) conceives of a “highly mobile ideal 
spectator” (p. 98), with a range of cameras placed around the course to follow the 
action and present this in a coherent manner for the viewer.  In this case, there is 
not one prime camera or position.  Whannel is also the only author to have 
specifically considered the televisual framing of circuit-based motor sport, 
observing that, (1992) 
Motor racing tends to be covered almost entirely by panned 
long shots, with cameras placed on the outside of bends and 
at the end of straights, broken only by MS (medium shots) of 
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crashed cars and pit activity.  Despite the dispersal of 
cameras it still seems quite possible to accept both a visual 
view that offers a highly mobile ideal spectator position and 
a verbal commentary that is obviously emanating from a 
fixed position.  (pp. 97-98)   
While Whannel (1992) offers a useful starting point for considering televised 
Formula One, it is not clear whether his analysis is based on Formula One 
coverage during the 1990s or which particular form of motor sport he is 
discussing.  Formula One adheres to many of these stylistic and framing 
conventions outlined by Whannel (1992), as well as his notion of the “highly 
mobile ideal spectator” (p. 98); however, during my period of analysis (1998-
2006), Formula One coverage has continued to evolve.  In fact, due to 
transformations within the sport‟s visual representation and its related 
technological innovations, Formula One also extends beyond Whannel‟s 
conceptualisation of the framing and spectatorship of televised sport.   
Methods: Textual Analysis and Compositional/Image Analysis 
Before discussing these „findings‟, I need to briefly outline what I analysed and 
how my research was conducted.  As noted in Chapter Three, derived from ITV‟s 
global feed, I have watched 181 „live‟ Formula One races between 1998 and 
2008, taping 111 Grands Prix over this period (up to 2006).  Commencing my 
Ph.D. research in 2002, the taped races post-2001 were the prime telecasts utilised 
and examined through a combination of textual analysis and compositional/image 
analysis (explained shortly), although footage from earlier seasons has also been 
drawn upon to offer a comparative dimension for analysis (e.g., each of my 111 
taped races has been re-watched on at least two occasions and, realistically, three 
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times or more).  For example, I kept a record of my (re)viewing practices between 
November 2005 to March 2006, re-watching all 19 races from the 2005 season 
and compiling a „Grand Prix report‟ on each of Villeneuve‟s races in terms of 
placings, any significant incidents, my assessment of his performances and any 
notable footage to return to for further analysis (these „reports‟ primarily inform 
my analysis of fandom and stardom in Chapters Six and Seven).  Similar viewing 
and analytical processes were undertaken for other seasons, such as Villeneuve‟s 
12 races in 2006 (conducted between October 2006 to January 2007), his 15 races 
in 2003 (March to August 2004), 3 races in 2004 (January 2005) and a „handful‟ 
of races in which Villeneuve had performed well in 2002 (e.g., Australia, Austria, 
Britain, United States, conducted in February 2005).   
Additionally, this re-viewing process was also part of my textual and 
compositional/image analysis.  Outside of recording Villeneuve‟s performances 
and my own experiences as a fan/viewer, I engaged in a systematic examination 
of particular framing techniques, such as the use of the on-board camera (OBC), 
innovative camera placements and editing.  Drawing on the approximately 50 
Grand Prix races analysed between 2002 and 2006, I engaged in a „close reading‟ 
of the Formula One telecast and particular incidents I had either noted earlier or 
observed during my close reading.  Jutel (2004) asserts that textual analysis 
“relies on a disciplinary terminology to describe forms, styles and techniques.  
Repeated viewings and the use of the freeze-frame function of VCR or DVD 
players are, for instance, necessary tools” (p. 33).  To conduct my systematic 
analysis, I paused and replayed segments or particular footage repetitively to 
analyse the visual framing, shot sequences, camera placements or editing 
techniques, took extensive written notes, copied quotes derived from the audio 
commentary, and timed specific shots or segments with a stop-watch to articulate 
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its significance for the viewing audience.  Therefore, between 2002 and 2006, 
approximately 50 Grand Prix races have been the basis for my systematic analysis 
and assessment of televised Formula One.  Given my extensive re-watching of 
races, as well as the duration of a Formula One race being approximately 1 hour 
20 minutes to a maximum of two hours long, my analysis of televised Formula 
One is based on over 500 hours of footage.  Additionally, my extensive viewing 
of contemporary televised coverage of major sports from Australia (NRL rugby 
league, international cricket), America (NFL football, NASCAR racing), the 
United Kingdom (premier league football) and New Zealand (international 
cricket, international rugby union) in multiple roles as a viewer, fan and 
academic-researcher are the basis for my discussion and comparative assessment 
of various innovative televisual technologies from a range of contemporary sports.   
Jutel (2004) notes that “textual analysis implies the concerted and meticulous 
study of a defined object in order to analyse the ways in which it generates 
meanings and, by extension, viewer‟s responses” (p. 33).  The semiotic textual 
analysis strand reveals how a combination of language and image cater to both the 
representation and audience reception of Formula One mediations but moves 
beyond a mere formalist or descriptive account of the compositional elements, as 
well as avoiding the universalistic assessment of the determined audience 
critiqued in Chapter Two.  Nevertheless, semiotic textual analysis can become too 
„rule-governed‟ (Bertrand & Hughes, 2005) in terms of locating pre-existing 
meanings through a focus on the structures of the text.  Alternatively, a post-
structuralist textual analysis interrogates what the text presents to the audience in 
terms of its content, context and intertextual elements (McKee, 2001).  The post-
structuralist approach offers a polysemic version of the text and audience 
responses by acknowledging that “viewers do not decode a pre-existing meaning, 
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but that they actively construct meaning in the process of reading” (Bertrand & 
Hughes, 2005, p. 192).  However, as a method, textual analysis is problematic due 
to its narrow focus on how audiences make sense of their world and particular 
media through an analysis of the text and its message (e.g., McKee, 2001).  
Therefore, rather than merely „interpreting‟ the televisual „text‟ or message, I also 
draw upon compositional/image analysis to uncover how televised Formula One 
coverage is framed and produced through its particular compositional dimensions, 
as well as the significance of this framing for viewers.  This has especial relevance 
for analysing audiences in this and forthcoming chapters, as it is these 
compositional elements that allow audiences (including fans) to view, interpret 
and, ultimately, engage with the Formula One text in some capacity.   
Compositional (Rose, 2001) or image analysis (Lacey, 1998) assumes that 
“the formal arrangement of the elements of a picture will dictate how an image is 
seen by its audiences” (Rose, 2001, p. 25).  Thus, compositional/image analysis 
examines the form and content of the visual image that is made available for 
audience reception.  For Lacey (1998), “form refers to how an image was created, 
including the position of the camera…content is simply what is in the image”  
(p. 14).  The framing of an image is fundamental to compositional/image analysis, 
with a specific focus on elements within the framed image, for example, the frame 
as a boundary or an edge for what is seen or, conversely, not seen within an 
image.  Framing examines the spatial and temporal organisation of the mediated, 
moving image (that is made visible) through, primarily, a focus on camera 
movement, angles and shot types, editing and sound to analyse how an image was 
created (Lacey, 1998; Rose, 2001).  Nevertheless, as Lacey (1998) suggests, “we 
use appropriate terminology to describe the image, but description is not analysis.  
Analysis describes the features of an image and shows what these features mean” 
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(p. 20).  Therefore, my analysis examines the compositional elements of camera 
work, editing, sound and the use of graphics in framing the televised Formula One 
coverage, as well as the implications of these framing and compositional 
dimensions for both the spectacle of Formula One racing and the viewing 
audience.  These elements are important for, as Clarke and Clarke (1982) note, 
televised sport provides an “invisible apparatus of media presentation” (p. 73), 
comprising of the selection of camera angles, shot types, editing, graphics and 
commentators‟ interpretations that are drawn upon to re-present the sport for 
television (Silk, 1999).  However, many examinations fail to acknowledge either 
the processes or implications of selectivity, assemblage, editing or the specific 
techniques deployed in relation to the production, circulation and consumption of 
televised sport (Barnett, 1990; Morse, 1983; Whannel, 1992; Williams, 1977).  
My focus on form and structure through compositional/image analysis recognises 
the technological, aesthetic and production basis for the televised Formula One 
image.  Nevertheless, while acknowledging that technologies are central to 
constructing, receiving and understanding the visually represented image 
(Caldwell, 1995), my examination avoids cinematic „apparatus‟ theory, which 
asserts that viewers are determined and positioned by this technology and delimits 
the audience construction of meaning (Baudry, 1970; Metz, 1973, 1974, 1982; 
Mulvey, 1975, 1988).  
Therefore, my examination of the televisual Formula One merges textual 
analysis with compositional/image analysis to examine Formula One‟s televisual 
„technique categories‟ (Gruneau et al., 1988) and to account for the circuit of 
„cultural production and circulation‟ (Gruneau et al., 1988) within a specific 
televised sport.  Equally, however, I am aware that my approach does not 
interrogate the cultural conditions of production (Silk, 1999), nor the „contexts of 
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production‟ (Gruneau, 1989), in terms of the processes and divisions of labour, 
nor the cultural and national specificity of production „values‟ and choices which 
determine how individual sports and networks transform their sport into a 
televised national or global event (Gruneau, 1989; MacNeill, 1996; Silk, 1999; 
Stoddart, 1994).  But, it is important to recognise the transformation, re-
presentation and “transparency effect” (Whannel, 1992, p. 37) in operation which 
converts Formula One from a sport into a televised sport spectacle.  Analysing the 
specific compositional dimensions or „technique categories‟ (Gruneau et al., 
1988) of framing through camera work, editing, sound and the use of graphics 
reveals what televised, moving images of Formula One are provided.  
Furthermore, with an awareness of what Formula One visual images are available, 
the possible audience responses to, and reception of, these images can then be 
theorised, in terms of how the specific Formula One televisual image permits and 
shapes various viewer positions, engagements and experiences (with particular 
implications for televised viewers and the OBC technology discussed in Chapter 
Five, and for Formula One fandom analysed in Chapters Six and Seven). 
Framing Televised Formula One (1998-2006): Cameras, Editing, Sound 
and Graphics   
Since 1998, Formula One has used numerous cameras and technical resources to 
ensure most sections of the track (and the racing action) can be covered at every 
race.  For example, Houston (2003) reports that 28 cameras were utilised to 
televise the 2003 Canadian Grand Prix while, based on my systematic analysis of 
Formula One, generally between 20-30 cameras are used at most circuits, 
excluding cameras mounted on the cars.  The 2006 San Marino Grand Prix 
provides a specific insight into the number of trackside cameras being utilised 
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(DVD Example 7).  On lap 22 the cameras followed Renault driver, Fernando 
Alonso, for a complete lap of the circuit, shot entirely through exterior (trackside) 
cameras with no transitions to other cars or his on-board camera (OBC): that is, 
for lap 22, only Alonso is framed as he visibly negotiates each part of the Imola 
track in his Renault.  Such a sustained, trackside framing of only one car is rare 
as, on every lap of a Grand Prix, coverage usually provides cuts to either other 
cars, other parts of the circuit, reaction shots of the pit-crew/pit-wall or draws on 
the OBC.  Analysis of Alonso‟s lap reveals that the visual footage cut between a 
total of 17 cameras placed at various positions around the circuit; therefore, 17 
exterior cameras were used at the Imola circuit to frame a complete lap of the San 
Marino Grand Prix.  Nevertheless, apart from car-mounted cameras, other 
cameras also frame the action at Imola, as on the very next lap Kimi Raikkonen 
pits for fuel and is framed from four different (exterior) camera positions within 
the pit-lane for the duration of his pit-stop, providing a minimum total of 21 
exterior cameras (DVD Example 7).   
Two other similar examples of a sustained trackside framing of either one car 
or racing action demonstrate the more common disruptions and transitions 
employed in Formula One.  At the 2000 Belgium Grand Prix, only Michael 
Schumacher and Mika Hakkinen are predominantly followed by the cameras 
between laps 37-42 as they battle closely for the lead.  On lap 41, 16 different 
trackside cameras follow the two competitors for almost the entirety of the lap 
through a mixture of long and medium shots.  However, three significant 
transitions occur; two separate reaction shots of the McLaren pits and Hakkinen‟s 
wife are provided immediately after Hakkinen passes Schumacher, in addition to a 
slow motion replay of the pass provided further into the lap (DVD Example 8).  
The second example occurs at the 2006 Canadian Grand Prix.  Two minutes into 
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the second qualifying session, Jacques Villeneuve is filmed for the duration of his 
qualifying lap and primarily framed through long shots from seven trackside 
cameras.  Nevertheless, these trackside cameras are disrupted by two different 
OBC perspectives, including a sustained OBC shot, as viewers „ride‟ with 
Villeneuve for approximately 19 seconds between turns 3 and 8 (DVD Example 
9).  These two examples are significant as they provide sustained footage of 
specific racing action or of only one car while, simultaneously, demonstrating that 
even this „rare‟ footage is commonly disrupted by transitions in Formula One 
coverage. 
As a televisual spectacle, Boyle and Haynes (2000) note that Formula One is 
“a difficult sport to cover – the cars on the television screen never appear to be 
travelling at their actual speed and it can become difficult to distinguish one from 
another” (pp. 74-75).  Generically, excluding the OBC, the televised Formula One 
image is framed through a mixture of long and medium camera shots which 
employ telescopic lenses and/or wide angle framing from cameras mounted on 
cranes, helicopters or generally at a distance to the track.  The difficulties with 
televised Formula One speed and car distinction are a result of coverage being 
primarily shot at a distance for, as Morse (1983) observes, “the constant use of 
extremely long lenses both narrows the angle of view and flattens space” (p. 48).  
Other camera placements are also drawn on, such as the more traditional cameras 
on bends and at the end of straights (Whannel, 1992), with these various camera 
positions combining to replicate the findings of Boyle and Haynes (2000), while 
also tending to obscure the drivers and make them appear immobile within their 
cockpits.  However, camera placement is not limited to only the outside of bends, 
as they also can be positioned on the inside of corners.  Whether located on the 
inside or outside, camera operators often employ close-ups or extreme close-ups 
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of the cars and drivers in any slow corners and, occasionally, these are also 
framed in slow motion; for example, on entry to the bus stop chicane at the 
Belgium Grand Prix.   
As a specific example of the camera positions, angles and shot types deployed 
in televised Formula One coverage, the 2006 San Marino footage of lap 22, 
framing only Alonso‟s Renault from exterior cameras, is drawn upon once more 
(DVD Example 7).  As a preliminary overview, much of the exterior footage is 
shot from cameras either on the outside of the corner and/or at the end of a 
straight, with five cameras in an elevated position to provide a high-angle shot 
looking down on the track.  There are two cameras placed on the inside of corners 
(both from a high-angle, crane shot) and only 2 of the 17 camera shots are framed 
as close-ups (one in the slow chicane entering the pit straight and the second on 
the pit straight which provides a close-up by zooming in): all other shots are 
medium and/or long shots.  Finally, at four parts of the circuit, the exact 
positioning of cameras framing from a distance on the outside of the track are 
strategically placed mid-corner (one is a crane shot) to allow these specific 
cameras to film and follow the car prior to or upon entry through to exiting the 
corner via zooming and panning camera movements; the two inside corner high-
angle, crane shots also offer a similar sustained shot of the car going through a 
corner.  Alternatively, some Formula One camera positions do reveal the speed of 
the cars, such as when cars run over cameras that are housed within kerbs and 
offer a low-angle perspective (e.g., Brazil), when cars race past the fixed position 
of a wall-mounted (e.g., Canada) or barrier-mounted camera (e.g., Monaco), or 
from the multiple cameras (and their various perspectives) located on the cars 
themselves. 
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A sense of speed is also achieved through the editing of Formula One visual 
footage.  As Formula One coverage is live, most of the obvious editing is through 
the transitions or „cuts‟ between various cameras filming the event.  Televised 
Formula One footage generally utilises quick transitions between shots, often as a 
straight cut and a match-on-action to provide a seamless representation.  For 
example, Alonso‟s lap of the 2006 San Marino Grand Prix cuts from camera to 
camera sequentially as he is filmed on each part of the Imola circuit, affording 
coherency for viewers following his lap (i.e., viewers expect to see Alonso go 
from turn 3 to turn 4, etc.).  However, as the sustained focus on one car 
completing an entire lap is rare, other techniques break what is traditionally 
known as continuity editing.  Lacey (1998) suggests that “one objective of 
continuity editing is to create a coherent cinematic space in which the action can 
take place‟ (p. 47).  Televised Formula One coverage disrupts a fluid visual 
experience of time and space through four key transitional devices.  The first two 
disruptions relate to how the cuts are executed.  First, televised Formula One often 
deploys a cross-cut, which visually cuts across space by framing another car or 
event on a different part of the circuit (e.g., following the race leaders but then 
cross-cutting to a pit-stop or a crash elsewhere on the circuit).  These cross-cuts 
are often deployed as a means to „update‟ viewers on the progress of other drivers 
or to reveal an on-track battle outside of the front-runners.  Second, the use of a 
jump-cut also provides discontinuity, as the cut “leaps over time or creates an odd 
transition” (Kawin, 1992, p. 231): in Formula One the jump-cut occurs when a 
driver is initially presented on one part of the circuit, then the footage is disrupted 
by a transitional device before returning to the driver further along the circuit.  As 
an example, on lap 3 of the 2005 French Grand Prix, viewers are provided with 
the OBC perspective from Kimi Raikkonen‟s McLaren as he speeds along the 
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short straight out of Turn 10 (DVD Example 10).  The footage then jump-cuts to a 
slow motion replay from an exterior trackside camera of Raikkonen passing 
Villeneuve for tenth place prior to Turn 6.  The footage then returns to the OBC of 
Raikkonen negotiating Turn 13.  Clearly, this footage provides a jump-cut across 
time and space by disrupting the temporal (and spatial) flow of the action 
presented.  The action is not sequential and shifts between „real‟ time and a slow 
motion replay, while the space is disjointed through a segmented representation of 
the track (and the different camera perspectives provided for the viewer) which, 
collectively, the viewer must piece together to make sense of the visual action.  
Arguably, the most obvious occurrence of a jump-cut is the „jump‟ over time and 
space when the coverage cuts to a commercial break.  When the coverage returns, 
viewers are expected to recommence their viewing and accept the new 
presentation as continuous despite the footage „leaping‟ over the unseen laps that 
have passed during the break.  Other „real‟ time transitions, such as perspectives 
from a pursuing car, an overhead helicopter, a kerb or a disorienting OBC can also 
provide a „jump‟ across time and space.   
A third way the coverage breaks the continuity of cinematic space is by 
failing to adhere to the 180° rule through its multiple transitions and perspectives.  
The filmic 180° rule advocates filming from one side of the 180° „line‟ to allow 
continuity, screen positioning and directions to remain consistent.  Bordwell and 
Thompson (1997) note that “the continuity approach to editing dictates that the 
camera should stay on one side of the action to ensure consistent left-right spatial 
relations between objects from shot to shot” (p. 480).  Most field sports deploy 
this filmic convention through the use of a dominant camera from one side of the 
field, establishing that teams always go in one direction in the first half before 
„swapping‟ sides for the second half (Whannel, 1992) or provide an on-screen 
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notification, „reverse angle‟, when this convention has been broken (Morse, 
1983).  Nevertheless, due to the multiple camera positions on both the inside and 
outside of corners (and the quick transitions between the various camera positions 
and perspectives), Formula One never provides a consistent spatial relationship on 
the screen.  Cars appear from either side of the screen (e.g., they enter from the 
left on one shot and then enter from the right on another) while, directionally, they 
are also inconsistent (e.g., cars are not always moving from left to right across the 
screen, and can also enter the screen from either the background or foreground) 
due to the multiplicity of camera positions, shot types and camera angles.  
Collectively, these three transitional devices (breaking the 180° rule, and cross- 
and jump-cuts) are common to Formula One and disrupt the continuity of a 
seamless presentation often seen in other televised sport (or films) while, 
simultaneously, evoking a sense of speed across a geographically diverse space 
through the rapid interchanging of transitions and perspectives.  
Finally, one other obvious disruption to a fluid visual experience of time and 
space is the use of replays, common in most televised sport.  On every televised 
Grand Prix since 1998, the race start has always been replayed a few minutes into 
the race.  Noble and Hughes (2004) note that, 
The standing-start acceleration burst down to the first corner 
will usually represent the best opportunity offered a driver 
all day of making up places.  Aside from being one of the 
most exciting parts of the race it also has serious 
implications on strategy.  (p. 128)  
While the start often has a bearing on where some drivers can expect to finish the 
race, it also offers one of the few occasions to frame all or most of the cars in one 
shot, coupled with the likelihood of an accident as they all negotiate the first 
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corner.  Race start replays are usually accompanied by multiple camera 
perspectives which the commentators dissect and analyse (primarily in relation to 
the front-runners), while viewers can see how particular drivers fared, re-view any 
incidents, etcetera.  Common to other forms of televised sport, Formula One also 
draws on replays for significant or „dramatic‟ (Morris & Nydahl, 1985; Whannel, 
1992) events in the race; for example, crashes, retirements, passes, errors (driver 
mistakes or a lengthy pit-stop) or other assorted incidents that contribute to the 
„narrative‟ and viewer understanding of the Grand Prix.  Televised Formula One 
replays draw on the already screened image or, alternatively, inter-cut to a 
previously unseen incident for the television audience (e.g., a car retiring or a 
pass, such as Raikkonen‟s move on Villeneuve at the 2005 French Grand Prix 
discussed earlier).   
Most Formula One replays are also framed in slow motion.  Scholars of 
televised sport suggest that instant replays and the use of slow motion usually 
either embellish the dramatic experience of the sport spectacle (Morris & Nydahl, 
1985; Whannel, 1992) or, simultaneously, offer both a scientific assessment of 
performance and/or the body as spectacle through a combination of slow motion 
framing and the close-up (Morse, 1983), a point developed in relation to the 
homoerotic and Formula One in Chapter One.  These aspects may partially 
explain the slow motion replay in Formula One; the replay providing, for 
example, an easier means for commentators and viewers to analyse the „dramatic‟ 
and often high-speed incidents (although, predominantly, there is no body on 
display during the race).  But I would argue that this technique is more functional.  
The slow motion replay offers a visual language for viewers (and commentators) 
to evoke awareness that they are watching an event that has already occurred.  
This visual language works in two prime ways.  First, the use of slow motion 
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distinguishes the replay from what otherwise replicates the footage viewers have 
been watching throughout the race (e.g., racing action framed through medium 
and/or long shots at a distance), although the transition and replay are not always 
obvious for viewers.  Second, as the replay jumps across time and space, slow 
motion is utilised as a visual language to explain this temporal/spatial disruption 
to the viewer in a simple manner.  Therefore, the deployment of slow motion is 
the visual cue that the footage is no longer live and contemporaneous but, rather, 
an earlier incident being replayed affording viewers coherency for understanding 
the Grand Prix race narrative.   
Sound also plays a significant role in the televisualisation of Formula One.  
Indeed, for the live event itself, the screaming engine noise constitutes a 
significant aspect of the racing spectacle and atmosphere.  Based upon my 
experiences as an attendee at five races, you often hear the cars approaching prior 
to seeing them, while earplugs are recommended due to the noise, which Noble 
and Hughes (2004) liken to a fighter jet taking off (DVD Examples 2, 3 and 5).  
Clearly, televised representations reduce the timbre and pitch of the engines to 
make Formula One‟s audio elements bearable for viewers.  Nevertheless, this 
ever-present sound of engines and gear changes complements the sense of speed 
already available to the audience through camera work and editing techniques.  
Another constant aspect of the televised Formula One soundscape is the ITV 
commentary team‟s reporting of the racing events.  With televised sport 
commentary discussed by some authors as either underpinning the dramatic 
impact of a televised sporting contest (Bryant, Comisky & Zillman, 1977), 
invaluable for attracting and retaining viewers (Barnett, 1990; Morris & Nydahl, 
1985; Whannel, 1992), influential on audience interpretations (Bruce, 2004) and, 
potentially, more important than the televised images themselves (Comisky, 
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Bryant & Zillman, 1977), commentary is a significant aspect of the televised 
Formula One spectacle.   
Providing a mixture of encyclopaedic knowledge, banalities, over-excitement 
and error-ridden comments, Murray Walker‟s role as the „voice of Formula One‟ 
was influential for the sport‟s televised commentary between 1949 and 2001 
(Bruce, 2005; Rowe, 2004).  Indeed, during my „naïve‟, initial phase of Formula 
One fandom (1998-2001), Walker‟s commentary had the ability to equally excite 
and repel me as a viewer.  Often his enthusiastic reporting, vast anecdotes and/or 
superfluous use of hyperbolic statements made even the most mundane parts of a 
race exciting.  In particular, Walker‟s frequent evocation of „supermen‟ to 
describe the drivers and their abilities was gripping as a new viewer learning the 
sport and initially embracing his clichéd descriptions of these „heroic men‟.  
However, he increasingly frustrated me as a viewer too, missing significant on-
screen action through his off-topic rambles or frequently identifying drivers 
incorrectly at key moments of a race.  His errors have been the subject for ridicule 
(Rowe, 2004) but, reflecting on his incorrect references to (crashed) drivers, 
Walker (2002) notes,  
Rather than wait for positive identification, all too often I 
took an instant flyer at it in my excitement and was 
frequently wrong.  No excuses.  I would rather have been 
wrong and have to correct myself than lose the impetus and 
drama of the commentary.  (p. 228)   
Fortunately, Walkers‟ mistakes were often instantly corrected by Martin Brundle.  
Brundle is a former Formula One driver (1984 – 1996) and provides 
knowledgeable commentary on the racing action directly, anchoring the visual 
image with his insightful comments (Whannel, 1992).  Brundle‟s expertise lies in 
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his ability to often identify crucial changes in lap times for key drivers, notice 
driver anomalies or off-screen incidents, as well as being able to vividly translate 
the feeling of driving a Formula One car to the viewer, especially in adverse 
conditions or through OBC shots (DVD Examples 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21).  
With James Allen having replaced Murray Walker since 2002, the encyclopaedic, 
anecdotal and occasionally over-enthusiastic commentary has remained (DVD 
Example 17), anchored by Brundle‟s expert knowledge and authoritative relaying 
of crucial information not always available to the viewer.  Indeed, it is due to this 
lack of vital race information that the ITV commentary team have a significant 
role to play for viewers of the sport.  The ITV telecasts use a range of on-screen 
graphics which regularly update positions, lap times or gaps between the drivers 
but, in general, this on-screen information focuses primarily on the top eight 
drivers at any given race (or lead drivers, such as Alonso or Schumacher, who are 
out of position) and the information is selectively used (e.g., not always present, 
nor continuously provided for the duration of a race).  For this reason, Formula 
One audiences often also need to access live timing via Formula1.com (the sport‟s 
second „screen of speed‟) to supplement ITV‟s visual images.  Live timing allows 
audiences to access all the timing variations for each driver in the Grand Prix, 
although Brundle and Allen are adept at frequently spotting significant time-
related discrepancies for the benefit of their viewing audience when these graphics 
are not provided.   
The various framing devices identified are used in televised Formula One to 
re-present the spatial and temporal dimensions of the sport for the television 
audience: that is, a live, global and contemporaneously experienced event raced 
across a large geographical space at high-speeds.  Formula One‟s multiple camera 
positionings and viewpoints would correspond to Whannel‟s (1992) idea of the 
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“highly mobile ideal spectator” (p. 98), as this framing facilitates viewer 
knowledge and engagement with the array of action taking place around the track.  
Such framing conventions allow viewers to see most of the on-track action in real 
time, supplemented with replays of incidents missed or on other parts of the 
circuit, although not all drivers can be framed continuously.  In addition to the 
rapid cuts between cameras and track positions, there is also a reliance on the 
unfolding narrative of the Grand Prix to be anchored and explained through 
broadcast commentary, as well as regular and updated on-screen textual 
information for the lead drivers.  However, five emerging televisual technologies 
(one audio and four visual) seem to move beyond Whannel‟s (1992) concepts of 
the „ideal spectator‟ and „highly mobile ideal spectator‟.   
Emerging Televisual Technologies: Formula One and Technological 
Innovations in Contemporary Sport 
Within contemporary televised sport coverage, emerging technology has had an 
increasing role which is too often overlooked or unaccounted for in the sport and 
media literature.  These technologies seek to place the viewer closer to the action, 
enhancing the spectacle and viewing experience by having almost every aspect of 
the on-field action available for scrutiny, aided by replays, various camera angles 
and miniature cameras and microphones (Barnett, 1990; A. Brown, 1998).  
Formula One has been at the forefront of some of these innovative televisual 
technologies.  Through the audio construction of viewers as privileged recipients, 
and the visual technologies of virtual representations, impossible views, 
synchronised movement and a participatory perspective, these technologies re-
present the appearance of Formula One, offer newer forms of viewer positioning 
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and have profound implications for both the representation of televised sport and 
the viewing audience in general.   
Before I consider these technologies, it is worth noting that televised sport is 
not merely viewed in a domestic setting but also within public spaces, often with a 
large viewing audience.  Even at many live sport contests, large television screens 
are often available for „live‟ spectators.  Such screens permit the duality of „live‟ 
and televised spectatorship at the event, as spectators follow the on-field action 
but also draw on the televised footage to assist and complement the viewing 
process through the enhanced viewpoints and perspectives reproduced on the 
large screen.  Additionally, Siegel (2002) suggests that their use “facilitates and 
encourages, perhaps even demands, a new mode of spectating practice, a new type 
of experiential enthrallment” (p. 66) in which the spectator‟s viewpoint shifts 
between the field and large screen to follow and understand the sporting event in 
progress.  Similar ideas may also be pertinent for other public spaces and 
collective forms of viewing (e.g., the bar or large screens in public spaces, such as 
at Federation Square in Melbourne during the 2006 football World Cup).  
However, this chapter does not explore this viewer-spectator dynamic in large 
public spaces primarily because the „live‟ Formula One images available trackside 
on large screens are similar to, if not the same as, the images broadcast globally 
by ITV (although local companies often produce the trackside footage for 
spectators in attendance – e.g., Channel Ten in Australia), as are the particular 
televisual technologies deployed both locally and globally, to which our attention 
now turns.   
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Audio Technologies 
While the role of commentary in Formula One has already been discussed, in 
recent years the sport has also introduced an audio televisual technology which 
places viewers as privileged recipients of significant on-track information.  
Formula One „team radio‟ communication was first introduced at the 2004 
Chinese Grand Prix, allowing television viewers „insider‟ access to team and 
driver comments during most races.  Through team radio communication, the 
team radios are open to the public, albeit delayed in their public broadcast (to 
censor any expletives).  Television use of the radios is not mandatory for the 
teams; for example, Ferrari and McLaren tend only to provide team radio 
communication at the conclusion of the race if they have won (e.g., self-
congratulatory communication rather than revealing strategy or tactics during the 
race).  Often the radio broadcasts are providing standard team-driver 
communication, such as relaying where a driver is losing time on the circuit (e.g., 
Villeneuve at the 2004 Chinese Grand Prix), clarifying the race order (e.g., 
Christian Klein at Monaco 2006) or encouraging the driver (e.g., Rubens 
Barrichello at the 2006 British Grand Prix).  Nevertheless, the radio has also 
revealed intriguing elements pertaining to driver performance for the viewers, as 
two specific examples demonstrate.   
First, at the 2006 Australian Grand Prix on lap 32, viewers can hear Giancarlo 
Fisichella being berated for being „too slow‟ (DVD Example 11), with his race 
engineer, Alan Permane, imploring “Giancarlo, you‟re still two seconds a lap 
slower than Fernando.  This cannot be possible.  You‟ve got the same fuel load, I 
know you have got some understeer but you cannot be two seconds slower!  
C‟mon!” (Permane, 2006).  ITV commentator, Martin Brundle, explains the 
significance of this radio communication to the viewing audience, suggesting that, 
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“That‟s going to hurt to hear that over the radio but what he is saying is that, 
„you‟ve got the same tyres, the same car, mate, but your team-mate is doing 27‟s, 
you‟re doing 29‟s, get your finger out!‟” (Brundle, 2006).  Such a „public‟ 
criticism of a driver‟s performance is rare in Formula One yet has been facilitated 
by team radio which disseminates this communication to a broad viewing 
audience (including the trackside crowd as my own attendance at the 2006 
Australian Grand Prix can confirm).  The second team radio example, from the 
2005 Bahrain Grand Prix, reveals to viewers how much assistance Takuma Sato 
receives at a race start (DVD Example 12).  Framed through an OBC perspective, 
viewers see a replay of Sato racing to the first corner of the opening lap while 
hearing Sato‟s race engineer, Jock Clear, instructing, “right, right, right, right, 
right, close on your right, it‟s a Sauber, it‟s Massa, you‟re on your right, okay, 
you‟re still on the right, and on your left, Jacques on your left, Jacques on your 
left, you got him?” (Clear, 2005).  The footage leads Martin Brundle to comment, 
“I‟ve never heard of that in Formula One.  I‟ve seen it in American style racing on 
the ovals but he was being talked down to the first corner by his engineer.  That‟s 
extraordinary!” (Brundle, 2005).   
Other forms of motorsport also use a similar version of team radio between 
drivers and the team as, for example, is the case in the Australasian V8 Supercars 
series and NASCAR.  NASCAR also provides the team spotter‟s communication, 
as the spotter views the racing action from his high vantage point overlooking the 
oval and advises the driver of gaps in the field, strategic moves, etcetera (i.e., the 
role alluded to by Brundle‟s [2005] comments on Sato‟s verbal assistance at 
Bahrain).  Increasingly, many contemporary televised sports have developed the 
prominence and significance of sound to add to the „atmosphere‟ and reveal the 
aural, on-field dynamics of an event.  For example, in most of the prominent field 
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sports, referees have microphones which provide clarification for on-field rulings 
(e.g., American football, rugby union, football) and even allow television viewers 
to be privileged recipients of players being cautioned for playing indiscretions 
(e.g., Australian rugby league allows viewers to hear the exchange between the 
referee and players).  Many sports also provide microphones which capture not 
only the vocal communication of players participating but also the broader 
„soundscapes‟ of a sport.  For example, motorsport records the pitch and whining 
of engines and gear shifts to aurally complement the visual representation of 
speed, field sports amplify the collision of bodies in contact sports through audio 
techniques, while sports such as tennis, cricket, golf and baseball capture the 
distinctive sound of a racquet/bat/club on ball (cricket‟s „snickometer‟ even acts 
as an „unofficial‟ officiating tool for the television audience to determine whether 
bat and ball have made contact).  The 2007 America‟s Cup exemplified the use of 
sound as a means for allowing television viewers to be privileged recipients by 
placing a range of microphones on-board competing boats.  With microphones 
capturing live communication between key team personnel, the intensity of 
equipment and crews being deployed to tack or jibe, and foregrounding the ever-
present blustering of wind and splashing of water against the yacht(s), the 
soundscape of yacht racing was aurally represented for the televisual audience.   
Visual Technologies 
With visual technologies in Formula One and contemporary sport providing more 
variations than the audio, these technologies are examined through the following 
categorisations: 1) virtual (i.e., superimposed information, Virtual Spectator); 2) 
impossible views (i.e., helicopter views, kerb cameras, stump-cam); 3) 
synchronised movement (i.e., tracking shots); 4) spatially diverse – up-close yet 
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free floating perspectives (i.e., Steadicam, sky-cam, ref cam), and 5) 
participatory, framed from POV perspectives (i.e., the Formula One OBC and 
primarily other motorsport footage).  The fourth visual category, spatially diverse, 
is not evident in Formula One but its increasing salience within contemporary 
televised sport is significant for contextualising and conceptualising its 
representation and implications for the viewing audience.   
1) Virtual representations.  In the first category, virtual, representations of 
„real sport‟ are suspended, moving into the virtual world of computer modelling 
and video gaming to reproduce the sporting environment.  Through its graphic 
representation, the „simulated‟ sports environment makes aspects of the sport 
more accessible to the viewer, facilitates insider knowledge and, arguably, makes 
the sport more compelling for viewers.  There are two types of virtual 
representation.   
a) Superimposing information.  In televised Formula One coverage, the prime 
superimposing of information is the innovative rev-counter which was first seen 
by viewers at the 2002 United States Grand Prix.  At this race, ITV commentator, 
Martin Brundle, revealed on lap 39 how the revs were measured, noting that 
“those numbers on the left of the screen are the revs, the rpms of the engine of 
Coulthard‟s Mercedes Benz.  That‟s recorded on a microphone and then translated 
numerically as we can see” (Brundle, 2002).  The superimposed rev-counter used 
at the United States Grand Prix was a one-off technology and not seen again until 
2004, when an upgraded version re-appeared at, and has remained since, the 2004 
Chinese Grand Prix.  The superimposed rev-counter is primarily drawn on during 
an OBC shot and gives a sense of the enormous strain the car is going through, the 
impressive power of the car (e.g., operating at 18,000 to 19,000 rpm which is 
approximately double the rpms of the highest revving roadcars; Noble & Hughes, 
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2004) and literally how drivers „drive‟ these vehicles (i.e., by representing the 
application of brakes, throttle and gear-changes around the circuit), (DVD 
Examples 19 and 20).  Since the 2005 Australian Grand Prix, a g-force meter has 
also occasionally been superimposed, often during an OBC shot, which reveals 
the physical forces the driver‟s body undergoes while racing.  Nevertheless, 
despite these innovations, Pat Symonds, executive director of engineering for the 
Renault team, is quoted in F1 Racing magazine as saying, 
The technology being used for F1 TV is archaic, so 20
th
 
century.  There‟s much more that could be done with real-
time computer graphics...the current acceleration and 
braking thing is pretty damn‟ crude.  I‟d like to see virtual 
cars, super imposition, recognition of driving lines, split 
screens.  All these things can be done.  Most teams have data 
acquisition systems that are way in advance of what‟s being 
broadcast.  (“The future of F1”, 2006, pp. 93-94) 
Therefore, the virtual televisual technology appears to still be in its infancy within 
Formula One, with additional developments and refinements likely to occur.   
In other contemporary sports, innovative virtual technologies and 
representations have extended beyond Formula One‟s current use of them.  Thus, 
broadcasters are providing various forms of superimposed information on top of 
either the televised footage or the existing field of play for televised sport viewers.  
For example, the superimposed world record pace line for swimming was first 
introduced at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games for global audiences by the 
Australian Nine network (“Nine network”, 2001).  Within the United States, the 
company Sportvision has been instrumental in designing and providing a number 
of virtual displays for both American and international sports, such as baseball, 
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basketball, NASCAR, golf and Olympic coverage (“Case study: Sportvision”, 
2003; “Sportvision”, n.d.).  One of Sportvision‟s pioneering developments was the 
„first and ten line‟ introduced in 1998 which superimposes a 10-yard line marker 
in American football onto the television screen to identify the point to which the 
attacking team needs to advance the ball in order to gain another set of downs.  
This 10-yard line is not present on the actual field or available to the stadium 
audience but, rather, is employed to assist the television audience.  Sportvision has 
also used superimposed technology to create virtual advertising in baseball, 
football and horse-racing, superimposing sponsors‟ logos either on or adjacent to 
the field of play without impeding the players or the actual playing surface 
(“Sportvision”, n.d.).  Commercially, virtual advertising is beneficial for a number 
of sports and television networks by facilitating product placement without 
usually disrupting the surface, players or sport directly (Elliot, 1999), although the 
use and placement of these ads can at times appear intrusive with, for example, 
players appearing to run around giant deodorant cans in Greek football (“FIFA 
yellow-cards”, 1999).   
b) Virtual recreations.  The second type of virtual technology moves beyond 
superimposed information to provide a virtual re-creation of the sport as a 
significant televisual and innovative technological development.  Although it is 
not currently utilised in Formula One telecasts, Formula One video games present 
a visually impressive, virtual re-creation of the sport (see Chapter Five).  An 
example of this televised virtual re-creation technology in contemporary sport is 
Hawk-Eye which provides a 3-D representation of the trajectory of the ball in both 
cricket and tennis (“Hawk-Eye”, n.d.; “Hawk-Eye enters”, 2003).  Hawk-Eye has 
been used in international cricket since 2001 to show leg-before-wicket decisions 
for the televised audience (but is not currently utilised by umpires), often 
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replacing the televised footage with either an animated or computer-generated 
„virtual‟ recreation of the sporting moment for analysis.  In 2002, Hawk-Eye was 
incorporated into tennis, assisting televised viewers with line calls as to whether 
the ball was in through virtual re-creations and, as part of IBM‟s tennis simulation 
technology „shot tracker‟, was used for the first time as an officiating tool at the 
2006 US Open (“Instant replay”, 2006).  Computer modelling and the video 
gaming industry have also added to the spectacle of televised sport through 
„Virtual Spectator‟ models and recreations.  In 1992, two New Zealand 
companies, Terabyte Interactive Ltd. and Animation Research Limited, created 
„Virtual Spectator‟ for televised America‟s Cup yachting, before introducing more 
sophisticated 3-D animations for live internet coverage (Bociurkiw, 2000; St. 
John, 2003).  In 2003, New Zealand television audiences were privy to free-to-air 
„Virtual Spectator‟ America‟s Cup yachting coverage from Auckland, with 
computer modelling and 3-D animations illustrating, explaining and enhancing the 
racing on the water for viewers of this complex and technical sport.  Animation 
Research Limited has also employed „Sky Virtual Spectator‟ within New Zealand 
men‟s cricket coverage since 2001, providing 3-D representations of the game 
(Channana, 2003) and allowing viewers to see from the viewpoint of the batsman 
scanning his surroundings to illustrate fielding placements.  This technology is 
similar to the virtual sporting worlds created in sport video games; an aspect 
revisited through Formula One video games and the player-driver experience of 
first-person POV representations in Chapter Five.  
2) Impossible view perspective.  Through this technology, the television 
audience are accorded an impossible view, seeing from a perspective that would 
not be available to them at a game, whether they were a participant or a „live‟ 
spectator.  Some obvious impossible viewpoints employed in Formula One and 
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many other televised sports are shots from an aerial perspective (e.g., helicopters, 
blimps and cranes) which would not be available to either „live‟ spectators or the 
actual participants.  Through the impossible view from these aerial perspectives, 
viewers occupy non-human positions (e.g., a god-like shot looking down on 
stadium and events), although the zoom-in perspective from a crane perhaps 
caters to an ideal spectator viewpoint.  Formula One has also experimented with 
an elevated, high-angle shot at the United States Grand Prix.  At Indianapolis, a 
high vertical „tower‟ situated on the pit-straight displays the race positions.  A 
camera has been attached to this tower which has multiple functions as, for 
example, it can zoom in and pan on cars (such as on the formation grid at the 2002 
United States Grand Prix).  More significantly, this camera also offers an 
impossible view as it can rotate approximately 150° on its axis; hence this camera 
is drawn upon to frame the cars entering the pit-straight from a high-angle shot, 
adjusting to a bird‟s eye view as the cars pass directly underneath the camera‟s 
position, before then rotating rapidly through to 150° to provide an upside-down, 
high-angle perspective of the cars racing away from the camera towards Turn 
One.  Clearly, this perspective offers an impossible (and disorientating) viewpoint 
not replicable by paying spectators while framing cars travelling at approximately 
200 mph.  In contrast, housing a camera within a kerb offers an impossible 
viewpoint from the opposite perspective; a low-angle or even the cinematic 
„worm‟s eye view‟ (Kawin, 1992) as the car literally races over the camera in a 
position viewers could neither occupy nor survive at the live event.  Some of the 
OBC camera positions also provide an impossible viewpoint from the nose, front 
wing or mirror of the car during races which is discussed in the following chapter. 
Finally, outside of Formula One, cricket provides two impossible viewpoints 
for its television audiences.  The first essentially uses an existing „ideal spectator‟ 
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perspective but provides a slow motion replay in high definition (Hi-Motion).  
Although this generally reproduces „standard‟ televisual techniques and viewing 
perspectives, albeit through a crisper image, one specific instance highlighted its 
slight yet significant advancement on existing technology.  At the second test in 
Manchester in 2008, New Zealand batsman, Daniel Flynn was hit on the metal 
grill of his helmet by a short-pitched ball from Englishman James Anderson.  
Already a nasty delivery to watch „live‟, the Hi-Motion replay, framed through a 
medium to close-up shot, allowed viewers to see not only Flynn‟s grill compress 
into his face but provided the vivid and rather unsettling sight of his dislodged 
tooth readily identifiable as it flew through the air.  Therefore, Hi-Motion 
resembles but advances on existing technology by providing a new type of 
impossible viewpoint which, in this specific instance, rendered the minutiae of 
cricket more visible.  The second televisual technology, „stump-cam‟, offers a 
more pointed example of a closer perspective (and impossible view) of the action.  
Stump-cam emerged in Australia in the early 1980s as one of the many innovative 
technologies Kerry Packer introduced for televising cricket (Barrington, 2006; 
Cahill, 2002) and is now employed in all men‟s international cricket fixtures.  
Stump-cam houses a small camera in the middle wicket and gives viewers a 
unique (and impossible) spatial viewpoint of the pitch, bowler running in and a 
sense of the action from a perspective similar to, but not the same as, the batsman.  
Hence, „stump-cam‟ is an impossible viewpoint that even the players do not share, 
located in a stump at a different position to the closest participants (i.e., lower 
than the viewpoint of a batsman and remaining fixed, as opposed to the shifting 
viewpoint of a wicket-keeper).  In recent times, stump-cam has also placed a 
camera at the base of the stumps which, through its low-angle perspective and 
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wide-angle lens, provides a behind the stump view and often frames the wicket-
keeper in an extreme close-up. 
3) Synchronised movement perspective.  The third variation, synchronised 
movement, provides a perceived „shared‟ sense of movement with cars and/or 
athletes in motion.  Rather than multiple camera positions and set-ups, the viewer 
is fixed to this perspective from one camera, although the footage is inter-cut with 
exterior shots from other camera positions.  Most commonly, the synchronised 
movement perspective draws on tracking shots, which replicate the tracking shots 
deployed in cinema.  In a tracking shot, the camera is often mounted on a set of 
two rails (i.e., literally like a mini-railway track), allowing a combination of 
stability and movement to the shot as the camera glides along these rails.  
Televised Formula One coverage has used the cinematic tracking shot by running 
a camera on a set of rails adjacent to the track, although the rails (or singular rail) 
are set up both at a distance to the track for obvious safety reasons, as well as in 
slow corners to be able to frame the cars (e.g., on the inside of Turn Nine at the 
2002 United States Grand Prix, or for a full 13 seconds through the Cotovelo 
corner at Brazil in 2006).  More experimental tracking shots have also been 
provided through the use of cameras mounted on aerial fly-by-wires.  The fly-by-
wire technology is employed in most forms of elite motor-racing (e.g., the 
American NASCAR series, DTM in Europe and V8 Supercars in Australasia), by 
mounting a camera on aerial wires that run the length of the pit-lane; the camera 
literally „races‟ along these wires to move (and shoot from a high-angle) in 
synchronisation with cars as they make their pit-stops.  The same technology has 
been used in Formula One, although with significant variations, such as the pit-
lane fly-by-wire camera facing out on to the main straight (rather than towards the 
pit-lane) and being drawn on to frame the race start at the 2005 and 2006 
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Brazilian Grand Prix through a replay.  Additionally, aerial fly-by wires have been 
placed at other locations around some tracks.  For example, at the 2006 Spanish 
Grand Prix, an aerial fly-by wire ran between Turns 10 and 11 framing the cars 
for a full 12 seconds as they negotiated these turns, while an aerial fly-by-wire at 
the Hockenheim track provided an exhilarating perspective which literally raced 
above and beside the cars for up to 10 seconds as they accelerated out of the 
hairpin during the German Grand Prix in 2003 and 2004.  
In addition to Formula One, other contemporary sports draw on various 
tracking shots to provide a shared sense of synchronised movement between 
viewers and the framed athletes.  In Olympic Games coverage since 1996, 
cameras have been mounted on a small, singular rail which runs adjacent to the 
running track in athletic events (Gallagher, 2002).  The viewpoint draws on the 
athletic body as a frame of reference, shot from a low-angle and often at torso-
level, to enhance the shared sense of speed as the camera keeps pace with and 
alongside the athlete(s) in-synchronisation.  A similar set-up and tracking 
technique is used for swimming events.  One camera runs on tracks beside the 
pool replicating the athletic tracking shot, although the swimmer is submerged in 
the pool and hence not always visible or at torso-level.  A second camera, 
„MobyCam‟, is placed on tracks on the bottom of the pool to provide a low-angle 
and often worm‟s eye (impossible) underwater view of the swimmers moving in 
real time.  MobyCam was first created for the 1992 Olympics by Garrett Brown, 
the inventor of Steadicam, Sky-cam and DiveCam (“MobyCam”, n.d.), although 
this technology is also used in Britain by the BBC and entitled „halibut-cam‟ 
(“Commonwealth services”, 2002).  Rather than the aforementioned horizontal 
tracking shots, an innovative vertical tracking shot has been used since the 1996 
Olympic Games for „live‟ diving coverage (“DiveCam”, n.d.).  Entitled 
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„DiveCam‟ (or „plunge-cam‟ in Britain), the camera descends in real time at a 
torso-level with the diver but also „plunges‟ into the pool, with the camera visibly 
breaking the water and continuing to film the competitors as they complete their 
dives and ascend back to the surface.  This provides an impossible view for the 
television audience but seems to replicate the visual „experience‟ of diving and 
was used to great effect at the 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth Games.  Of 
course, these examples of synchronised movement can overlap with other 
categories, as the vertical diving tracking shot, underwater track for swimming 
and fly-by-wire technology are also impossible viewpoints.  Additionally, 
elements of the spatially diverse (i.e., ref-cam and sky-cam) and participatory 
POV shots all „share‟ aspects of synchronised movement.   
4) Spatially diverse perspectives.  The fourth variation is spatially diverse 
technologies which offer up-close yet free-floating perspectives.  As noted earlier, 
while not currently deployed in Formula One, these technologies are significant 
for contextualising contemporary televised sport and offer a similar yet distinctive 
category in relation to the fifth variation (participatory POV perspectives).  Sky-
cam is an exemplar of spatially diverse technologies, providing a bird‟s eye view 
of games and “exhilarating images that are otherwise impossible” (Monaco, 2000, 
p. 99) by suspending a lightweight camera on wires above the action.  Although 
not at ground level, nor equivalent to the on-field perspective, Sky-cam creates a 
free-floating effect by manipulating the camera to continuously follow the action 
and provide graphic overhead shots.  By „floating‟ only metres above the players, 
Sky-cam also offers a new spatial viewing dynamic for the televised audience.  
Originating from cinema, Sky-cam was first employed in the failed 2001 XFL 
season (see earlier discussion of the XFL), before being used in American 
National Football League (NFL) coverage on a consistent basis since 2002 
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(“Skycam”, n.d.).  Post-2004, the Sky-cam perspective from above and behind the 
line of scrimmage is commonly drawn upon prior to the snap of the ball in NFL 
coverage.  Sky-cam was also introduced to Australian sport in 2004, being utilised 
to great effect during the State of Origin rugby league series and in four 
Australian rules (AFL) games (McClure, 2004; B. Smith, 2004).  American 
football‟s „ref-cam‟ also offered a unique spatial orientation.  Used sparingly in 
the NFL for a short period in the early 2000‟s,1 „ref-cam‟ placed a camera in the 
referee‟s hat, presenting viewers with an „on-field‟ representation of the play as 
the ball was snapped.  The referee observed from behind the defensive line of 
scrimmage while players set off in rapid motion all around, rushing by the referee 
(and television audience‟s viewing point) to make a play.  This viewing 
perspective may share elements of the participatory POV variation (although it is 
from a referee not a competitor) yet disrupts the traditional spatial orientation for 
viewers as sideline observers by providing an on-field and up-close perspective of 
the competitors.  Additionally, rather than the free-floating effect of Sky-cam (or 
the fluid filming of Steadicam discussed below), ref-cam was also disorientating 
due both to the intensity of bodies in motion and the referee rapidly scanning his 
surroundings in a similar fashion to the effect produced by using whip pans and 
tilts in cinema. 
From cinematic origins, Steadicam is another spatially diverse technology 
recently employed in televised sport coverage.  Steadicam are cameras worn on a 
stabilising harness by the operator which allows greater movement and flexibility 
for filming.  Geuens (1993) suggests that,  
Visually, the steadicam duplicates many benefits of 
handheld shooting without the lack of stability inherent in 
the latter practice: indeed, to the crew, it can provide speed, 
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flexibility, mobility, and responsiveness.  And, of course, it 
can also energize the film with visual dynamism.  (p. 12)   
Steadicam offers a practical application within sport representations as, unlike 
most sport camera techniques which are fixed, bulky or require additional 
equipment for assembly or use (e.g., the rails for a tracking shot), Steadicam 
offers a flexible camera that is highly mobile, less restrictive and can be deployed 
in numerous sport settings.  Steadicam also permits closer access to athletes for 
the viewer, with the camera operator able to navigate through space, frame 
athletes at close range and, overall, provide a greater fluidity to shooting the 
event.  Steadicam is employed in athletic coverage at major events (e.g., the 
Olympics), as well as on the sidelines at field sports (e.g., at the football World 
Cup, NFL and New Zealand international rugby in 2006), although the 
representations from these field sports replicates rather than transforms the 
traditional sideline, fixed-camera framing by being drawn on sparingly, shooting 
at a distance and seldom encroaching on to the field of play. 
Nevertheless, Australian rugby league has utilised Steadicam in two 
innovative ways since 2006.  First, when a try is scored, the Steadicam operator 
often enters the field, shooting the try-scorer at close-range as he walks back for 
the re-start.  Often this framing is conducted along a 360° axis, as well as from 
multiple angles.  Thus, the try-scorer is filmed from various angles (e.g., torso 
level, a low-angle tilt, eye level), with the camera position continually 
manipulated, in addition to the operator usually completing a 360° circle around 
the try-scorer during this process.  From this Steadicam perspective, viewers are 
provided with an on-field, up close and fluid framing of the try-scorer as he 
continues to walk in one direction back to his own goal-line.  The second 
innovation was first employed during the 2006 State of Origin rugby league 
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series.  For the opening two games, the operator emerged from the tunnel directly 
behind the captain leading the team out on to the field.  The operator was second 
in the player line-up, proceeding to jog out onto the field with the players as if he, 
too, was one of the players, providing a viewpoint that resembled a player‟s 
perspective for the viewing audience.  By bringing cameras onto the field and into 
the competitive space of the athletes, Steadicam offers an up-close perspective 
and access to athletes while they are in the process of competing.  This is distinct 
from notions of the „ideal spectator‟ as an on-field viewpoint is not available for 
the „live‟ spectator.  Additionally, Steadicam, ref-cam and sky-cam afford 
movement and the navigation through space that are not permitted by exterior or 
stadium cameras.  Hence, these technologies allow cameras and, by implication, 
viewers, to not only enter the field of play but, also, to navigate around the spaces 
and competitors of particular sports in a fluid and free-floating manner (or in a 
disorientating fashion with ref-cam) while continuously following the action. 
5) Participatory perspective.  Although similar ideas have been forwarded 
within variations three and four (synchronised movement and spatial diversity), 
the participatory perspective offers a distinction by locating cameras on or close 
to the athletes.  These, therefore, provide a viewpoint for audiences that is similar 
to that of the actual athlete.  Major road-cycling events, such as the Tour de 
France, achieve this by transporting cameramen on motorbikes who ride beside 
and among the competitors to film them at close proximity during race stages, 
providing a sense of what it is like being among the cyclists.  Cricket has also 
provided, on occasion, „umpire-cam‟, which allows viewers to look down the 
wicket from the viewpoint of an umpire officiating on the game.  These two 
examples share aspects with ref-cam in variation four, although the spatial 
dynamics are less pronounced (i.e., the umpire generally remains static while, in 
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Tour de France filming, the camera is fixed in its representation, less intense and 
is not fluidly navigating space despite the obvious movement on bikes).  
Nevertheless, while the motorbike cameramen, „umpire-cam‟ and „ref-cam‟ 
provide POV representations of sport, these are not strictly participatory 
perspectives.  The viewpoint is derived from officials adjudicating on the on-field 
action or a cameraman transported on a bike which is distinct from the perspective 
of an actual athlete competing in a sporting event.   
Motorsport transports the viewer closer to a participatory athletic perspective, 
with various forms of vehicular racing including Rally, jet sprint boats, dragsters, 
stock-cars and motorbikes employing cameras mounted on or fitted within the 
vehicles to provide a vicarious sense of the action, often from a viewpoint similar 
to the participant.  These cameras offer a POV perspective which facilitates a 
connection between viewer and driver in terms of a sense of participation and 
possible identification.  Viewers are restricted to a viewpoint that is similar to the 
racer and, therefore, in a visual, temporal and spatial sense, share the racer‟s 
experience and see only what the racer sees.  The Formula One OBC is at the 
forefront of this type of technology as it provides a viewpoint devoid of 
superfluous or obtrusive materials (e.g., car interiors, windscreens, bonnets); only 
fragmentary elements of the driver‟s body, the steering wheel and nose of the car 
are visible for the viewer as the car hurtles along the track (DVD Examples 16, 
17, 18, 19, 20 and 21).  The American Champ Car racing series takes this 
perspective even further, placing a camera inside the driver‟s helmet (Helmet-
Cam) with viewers usually „sharing‟ a male driver‟s viewpoint as he/we stare out 
through the dirty perspex of his visor.  Given the added realism, as well as the 
visual, visceral, spatial and, at times, embodied racing experience permitted by 
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these technologies, the POV perspectives accorded by the Formula One OBC (and 
Helmet-Cam) are the object of analysis in Chapter Five. 
Finally, this research needs to acknowledge some limitations, as some 
overseas sports are experimenting with emerging televisual technologies and 
additional POV perspectives unaccounted for in this thesis.  For example, New 
Zealand digital television (Sky Television) draws on the show EuroSport as 
overnight filler, providing cyclic and repetitive sports headlines from Europe and 
around the globe.  Before repeating these sport headlines (four times each hour), 
eclectic clips are presented as a transitional device and, in the process, reveal a 
range of innovative camera positions and angles for framing sport.  Based on a 
systematic analysis of EuroSport‟s footage over a two week period in May 2006, I 
observed that cameras were located on participants competing in various types of 
skiing, on the front of a luge, on base jumpers and even from multiple locations 
on a mountain bike (e.g., the rider‟s helmet, the bike‟s frame, the handlebars, and 
high-angle tilts looking down on the gear shifter, brake callipers and/or back tyre 
when the brakes are deployed).  These examples suggest that additional multiple 
camera set-ups, positions, perspectives and techniques are being employed 
(though differing by locality) that are not common to either New Zealand 
coverage or the dominant global sporting feeds that New Zealand receives 
through Sky Television.  As such, my analysis has its limitations, while these 
additional technologies and techniques warrant further examination in the wider 
sport media literature. 
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The Implications of Televisual Technologies: The 
Audience/Technology/Athlete Nexus in Contemporary Televised Sport 
The emerging televisual technologies identified have not been examined within 
the sport media literature yet, clearly, advance Whannel‟s (1992) 
conceptualisation of the „ideal spectator‟ in terms of their implications for both 
(re)presenting televised sport and the viewer positionings they seem to offer.  
Some scholars of televised sport suggest that the shifts in framing techniques, 
deployment of various technologies and convergence of a range of sport media 
texts can be accounted for through the notion of de-differentiation.  De-
differentiation refers to the „breaking down‟ of categorical boundaries 
(Giulianotti, 2005) or, in relation to television, “the collapse of boundaries 
between functions and genres” (Rowe, 2004, p. 189).  De-differentiation also 
leads to a „pastiche style‟ (Real, 1998) for televised sport, with an eclectic 
collection of fragmented genres (e.g., the use of animation, such as the cartoon 
duck in televised cricket) and increasing commodification (e.g., the use of 
superimposed or virtual advertising) characterising televised sport.  Real (1998) 
suggests that underlying contemporary televised sport is “the commercial 
incentive to maximize viewing audiences by promotion and titillation,...by giving 
the audience something even fancier than it hoped for” (p. 23).  This „titillation‟ or 
„fancier‟ role is evident within the emerging televisual technologies as the spatial 
relationship between sport audiences, technology and athletes is being both 
challenged and transformed through these innovations.  Not only are the 
boundaries between the audience and athlete being dismantled but, as Giulianotti 
(2005) asserts, “sport‟s mediation collapses these differences further: the on-car 
camera in motor racing, or cricket‟s stump-camera, place viewers visually inside 
the action” (p. 176).  Thus, the audience/technology/athlete nexus has an aesthetic 
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significance for the viewer who is transported into the mediated sport world via 
these technologies and its non-coherent and fragmented televisualisation.  
Viewers „share‟ not only a collective version and „vision‟ of televised sport (Bale, 
1998; Sandvoss, 2003) but, through these emerging technologies, are re-
positioned and enmeshed in the (athletic) performance via multiple perspectives.   
Nevertheless, there is a contradiction inherent to viewing sporting 
performances on television.  Rowe (2004) notes, 
Paradoxically, the new media technology is artificially trying 
to produce the „feel‟ of „having been there‟ as participant or 
spectator long after television first lured sports players and 
fans away from stadia towards the armchair.  Of course, only 
a tiny proportion of potential athletes and fans can ever be 
„actors‟ in the unique space and time of actual sports events.  
(p. 205) 
However, given the increasing proximity or, conversely, decreasing distance 
between audiences, athletes and the „real‟ event, the „unique space and time‟ of 
sport is being compressed through innovative audio and visual technologies.  
Thus, audiences share viewpoints and the mediated „experiences‟ of the athletes 
and attending spectators simultaneously, while being granted privileged 
(mediated) perspectives and access to the spatial realm of the sporting world 
itself.  Therefore, Rowe‟s (2004) assertion that through new digital media 
technologies “the passive sports media consumer may become both all-powerful 
media auteur and athlete „replicant‟” (p. 204, italics in original) is salient for 
understanding the audience relationship with emerging televisual technologies.  
Although Rowe is primarily considering internet usage, emerging televisual 
technologies are, potentially, making the audience capable of being both a 
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consumer and producer (auteur) of sport mediations through the diversity of 
viewer uses, roles and positionings (see further discussion of fan practices in 
Chapter Six).  Audiences are being transported closer to the action, entering and 
exploring the space of the sporting world, and „sharing‟ the movement and/or 
viewpoint of actual athletes competing in live and contemporaneous „real‟ 
sporting contests.  Therefore, in an aesthetic sense, the emerging televisual 
technologies not only cater to an audience fascination with replicating the athletic 
experience but, aurally and visually, permit this through innovative mediations.   
As most of the emerging televised technologies draw upon cinematic 
conventions and techniques, post-classical film theory offers an insight into the 
stylistic transformations that these technologies are providing within 
contemporary televised sport.  Within film theory, there is a contested debate over 
distinctions between a classical and post-classical form of cinema.  Some film 
theorists suggest that the „style‟ of classical Hollywood cinematic representations 
(approximately 1930-1960) has remained consistent (Bordwell, Staiger & 
Thompson, 1985) and, in fact, still permeates contemporary film (Bordwell, 1988, 
2006).  Conversely, other scholars argue that there has been a discernible shift 
from these classical representations to a contemporary post-classical cinema, 
distinctive in its use of time, space, narrativisation, characterisation and 
identification (Cubitt, 2004; Jenkins, 1995; Tasker, 1996).  In his discussion of the 
„Hollywood baroque‟ (i.e., post-classical Hollywood cinema), Cubitt (2004) 
succinctly traces the essential differences between these two cinematic styles, 
Both narrative and stylistics have been subordinated to the 
exploration of the world of the film.  If classical cinema 
operates in time, as a linear construct whose narration and 
stylistics focus on the exposure of the story, the baroque 
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takes time as its raw material.  In the Hollywood baroque, 
film is no longer a time-based medium (a function now 
occupied by television) but the medium of movement.  
Spatialization takes over from narrative the job of managing 
the film‟s dynamics.  Movement here is sculptural, 
architectural, or geographical rather than temporal, and 
space itself is malleable.  Classical decoupage – establishing 
shot, two shot, shot-reverse shot – no longer governs 
because, with one swooping sequence-shot, we can establish 
the diegetic space without stabilising it according to the 180° 
rule.  (p. 224)   
Within televised sport, the newer televisual technologies seem to duplicate many 
of the aspects that Cubitt (2004) describes.  In particular, rather than reproducing 
a „narrative-flow‟ to the sporting event (a classical Hollywood cinematic 
convention), these camera positions and perspectives move beyond the narrative-
based recording of the events to also navigate and explore the spatial dimensions 
on offer.  Clearly, narrative has an important function within the televised sport 
representation (as it still does in cinema, see Bordwell, 2006), as viewers need to 
know what is happening, set against the constraints of time and the awareness of a 
circumscribed duration for the event.  However, the new televisual technologies 
also open up and extend the spatial elements inherent within sport.  Through the 
use of impossible views, synchronised movement, up-close yet free-floating 
perspectives and POV representations, viewers are permitted to recognise and 
explore the spatial dimensions of the sport, the setting and, perhaps, even the 
participant(s) directly.  The application of post-classical film theory seems 
appropriate to this stylistic shift in the televisualisation of contemporary sport for, 
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as Kramer (2000) suggests, it is the “increased speed and intensity of stylistic 
change which the concept of post-classicism is meant to describe” (p. 178). 
Spatial elements are also disrupted through these new technologies breaking 
the classical convention of decoupage.  Decoupage offers a „continuity system‟ 
(Bordwell & Thompson, 1997) in classical cinema, stabilising the filmic world 
through techniques such as establishing shots, shot-reverse-shot and the 180° rule 
which combine to maintain a „smooth flow‟ to the use of space and spatial 
relations in classical cinema (Bordwell & Thompson, 1997).  In contrast, these 
newer televisual technologies often break classical conventions.  As noted earlier, 
Formula One‟s televised framing disrupts the filmic 180° rule by never providing 
a consistent spatial relationship on the screen; for example, placing cameras on 
both the inside and outside of corners, while the screen space that cars occupy 
oscillates and is multi-directional (e.g., car movement is framed in multiple 
directions on both a horizontal and vertical plane).  As exemplars of the emerging 
televisual technologies, Sky-cam and especially Steadicam facilitate movement 
around a 360° axis for framing multiple viewpoints of the players, space and 
action within the sporting contest.  Cubitt (2004) identifies Steadicam as a central 
technological innovation for the new spatial orientation within post-classical 
cinema, a finding which seems equally applicable to the framing and 
representation of contemporary televised sport.  Due to its flexibility, mobility and 
fluidity, Steadicam affords close proximity to athletes and the ability to navigate 
the spatial dimensions of sport.  Additionally, Formula One is at the forefront of 
pseudo-participatory televisual technologies, providing a driving/driver‟s 
perspective for the viewing audience by initially mounting cameras on the cars in 
the film Grand Prix (Frankenheimer, 1966) which was then incorporated as a 
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device into the sport via the OBC (Hotten, 1999).  Through this cinematic-
televisual migration, Formula One adapted the POV for its own purposes.   
Emerging Televisual Technologies and Emerging Viewing Positions:  The 
Ideal Omniscient Observer and the Idealised Participant 
Collectively, the emerging televisual technologies emphasise enhanced realism, 
intimacy and a more „active‟ role for contemporary sport audiences.  Thus, there 
is an aesthetic shift towards the televisual replication of athletic experiences and 
performances, as well as a stylistic (post-classical) orientation to the exploration 
of and navigation through space.  In some respects, due to these televisual 
transformations, viewers are being offered a contemporary „hyperreal‟ spectacle.  
That is, viewers may be indulging a fascination, not only with the sporting event 
as a spectacle, but with the actual mediation as its own spectacle.  Therefore, 
viewers may be intrigued by the visible presence of technology within the sport 
itself (e.g., seeing Sky-cam hovering overhead in the background or seeing the 
Steadicam operator externally before cutting to his/her on-field perspective), how 
the shots are achieved (e.g., Sky-cam or fly-by-wires) and the effects accorded by 
these technologies (i.e., free-floating or synchronised movement), in addition to 
the actual re-presentation of the sporting event itself.   
The first two visual televisual technological variations, virtual 
representations and impossible viewpoints, move away from Whannel‟s (1992) 
ideal or highly mobile ideal spectator by facilitating a non-human (e.g., god-like, 
worm‟s eye or digitalised) perspective and a viewer positioning not available to 
either a spectator or player.  In one sense this is disembodying for the viewer, who 
is positioned and presented with an impossible viewpoint.  Virtual representations 
also create a distance between the viewer and the „real‟ event by either 
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superimposing or recreating elements of the televised sport.  While both variations 
may disrupt aspects of the immediacy, realism and actuality of the event 
(Whannel, 1992), these variations also enhance the role of information and 
entertainment within televised sport.  The virtual representations and impossible 
viewpoints seemingly position the viewer not as an ideal spectator but, rather, as 
an idealised omniscient observer with the analytical tools to see the game from all 
angles and with privileged access to virtual tools onscreen, arguably allowing the 
viewer to operate simultaneously as a perfect referee.  In fact, in many respects, it 
is the combination of omniscience and the disembodied impossible or virtual 
perspectives that facilitate the analytical knowledge of the idealised omniscient 
observer. 
Conversely, rather than the virtual or at a distance idealised omniscient 
observer, the final three visual variations (synchronised movement, spatially 
diverse and participatory perspectives), as well as the use of sound technologies, 
disrupt Whannel‟s (1992) ideal spectator by transporting the viewer closer to the 
athletic realm and experience.  Within these final four technological variations, 
the viewer is visually positioned as an idealised participant, evoking a sense of 
embodiment and intimacy through the close proximity framing, navigation of 
space, sense of „shared‟ synchronised movement and, particularly, through the 
participatory POV perspectives.  Furthermore, through the role of sound 
technologies, viewers also become privileged recipients of the aural dimensions 
comprising the sporting soundscape.  By facilitating close audio and visual 
proximity to the event and/or athletes, a shared perspective of either athletic 
movement and/or athletes‟ viewpoints, and by having cameras entering the field 
and navigating diverse spaces, such technologies bring the viewer closer to an 
idealised participant viewpoint than has been articulated through the concept of 
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the ideal spectator.  Nevertheless, while these techniques potentially entwine the 
audience/technology/athlete, the perspective remains idealised.  As the viewer is 
placed or enmeshed in the action through mediation, it remains an idealised 
audio/visual replication of experience and participation, with viewers reliant upon 
these televisual technologies and, particularly, how the technology facilitates and 
frames the navigation, synchronicity and proximity of an athletic space, body and 
experience.   
In many respects, then, the framing of Formula One through camera work, 
editing, sound and graphics adheres to Whannel‟s (1992) conceptualisation of the 
ideal spectator or highly mobile ideal spectator for televised sport audiences.  
Nevertheless, the emerging televisual technologies both specific to Formula One 
and utilised in other forms of contemporary sport, also extend beyond Whannel‟s 
(1992) „traditional‟ categorisation of viewer positioning.  In particular, these 
technologies collapse the mediated boundaries between viewers and athletes by 
re-placing viewers within the sporting event, allowing viewers to re-navigate or 
re-negotiate the spatial dimensions of sport and/or the participants and by 
providing visual replications of the athletic experience.  This final visual dynamic 
is paramount for Formula One telecasts and its global audience as, through the 
OBC, the television viewer is transported away from a position of ideal spectator 
into the realm and POV of the racing driver.  By implication, viewers are not „all 
seeing‟ as the ideal spectator concept suggests but, rather, are drawn solely into 
the experience and viewpoint of one athlete: the driver in motorsport.  The 
suggestion that viewers, at some level, are also contemporaneously „experiencing‟ 
sport through the POV or first-person representation of actual athletes has 
profound implications for re-presenting televised sport, its reception by audiences 
and the sport spectacle.  Hence, having initially traced a generic to more 
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specialised conceptualisation of televised Formula One spectatorship in this 
chapter, this approach affords a gradual conceptual shift for audiences across the 
remaining chapters.  Therefore, specific audience-text relationships and 
engagements are interrogated in the next chapter, considering television (and film) 
audiences, the OBC and the increasingly embodied, first-person POV perspectives 
in Chapter Five, leading to contextualised and concrete examples of specific 
audience practices and „experiences‟ derived from their engagements with texts 
(„my‟ Formula One fandom for Jacques Villeneuve in Chapters Six and Seven).  
 
                                                 
1
 Internet searches for „ref-cam‟ have failed to uncover any substantial information on its use in the 
NFL.  From personal observations I recall seeing this technology in 2002, while it is also discussed 
on an AFL forum in 2000 (“AFL to trial”, 2000; Quindt, 2002).  Ref-cam has not been deployed 
over the past five seasons (2004-2008). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Through the Eyes of Jacques Villeneuve: Point–of–View 
Representations and the Embodied and Immersed Viewer/Fan. 
As an extension of the discussion of televised sport and emerging televisual 
technologies in the previous chapter, this chapter examines the use of the Formula 
One on-board camera (OBC).  In particular, film theories concerned with the 
point-of-view (POV) shot, as well as emerging video games research are also 
incorporated as the OBC offers a perspective which has not been accounted for in 
the sport media literature.  Collectively, these visual theories and examples are 
essential for developing a conceptual shift for audiences in relation to the viewer 
positioning and identification that such techniques potentially ascribe.  As I will 
argue, although classical cinematic POV representations were traditionally gaze-
based and limited notions of viewer identification, the emerging POV techniques 
in post-classical cinema and within both Formula One‟s OBC and video games, 
draw upon embodied and immersive perspectives to afford a particular form of 
viewer engagement and distinctive levels of identification. 
Point-of-View in the Cinema 
As a basic premise, the notion of a „point-of-view‟ in cinema is a misnomer: any 
filmic perspective is shot from a point-of-view; for example, from the point-of-
view of the director, cinematographer or, essentially, the all-seeing camera.  Most 
commonly, point-of-view (POV) in the cinema refers to a particular shot type 
(also known as a subjective camera/shot) which is employed to evoke the sense of 
a subjective link between viewers and the filmic action, seemingly „placing‟ 
viewers in the position of (or a position similar to) a character within a film.  
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Describing the POV shot, Kawin (1992) notes that “the camera adopts the 
position of the character‟s physical eye, so that the audience sees more or less 
what the character sees” (p. 73).  For Bordwell and Thompson (1997), 
“sometimes the camera, through its positioning and movements, invites us to see 
events „through the eyes‟ of a character” (p. 267), suggesting that the POV shot 
offers a „first-person camera‟ or the „camera as character‟.  In a similar vein, 
Branigan (1984) suggests that for films/directors to create subjective perception 
and for viewers to derive a sense of focused subjectivity, 
The archetypal device of this sort in film is the point-of-view 
(POV) shot, where the camera assumes the spatial position 
of a character in order to show us what the character sees; 
the camera lens, so to speak, becomes the eye of the 
character…with the result that our sensory perception is 
restricted to that of the character.  (p. 6)   
Most often this viewpoint is used sparingly or as a brief intrusion in films.  Lady 
in the Lake (Montgomery, 1946), a private detective film noir, is one of the few 
attempts to present a film almost in its in entirety from a POV perspective.  More 
recently, POV representation has been experimented with in the comedy/fantasy, 
Being John Malkovich (Jonze, 1999), and the science fiction film, Strange Days 
(Bigelow, 1995), providing vicarious, sustained POV representations that draw on 
a shared sense of embodiment.  My discussion of point-of-view in the cinema will 
draw on these three films in particular.
1
   
Two additional film genres need to be acknowledged for their use of POV 
techniques.  The first genre, collectively labelled the horror/slasher/serial killer 
genre, commonly employs POV shots to resemble the viewpoint of the killer.  
This subjective use of the camera adds to the suspense of these films, concealing 
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the killer‟s identity as she/he „acts out‟ these atrocities in films such as Friday the 
13th (Cunningham, 1980), Halloween (Carpenter, 1978) or as the Zodiac killer in 
The Limbic Region (Pattinson, 1996).  Through their use of POV, these films 
problematise the dynamic of viewer identification which, arguably, can oscillate 
between both victim and killer (Clover, 1987, 1992).
2
  The second genre is 
pornography, with POV becoming an increasingly popular way to both represent 
and enhance explicit sexual scenes (e.g., Christopher, 2003).  Viewers can view 
oral or penetrative sex from the POV of the participants (primarily the male 
participants, with obvious gendered implications for viewers), while newer first-
person versions provide an interactive dimension which allows viewers to choose 
which actresses, camera angles or sexual positions they want to see (e.g., Lauren, 
2004).  These genres require further examination in the film literature but will not 
be considered in this chapter as, although they evoke emotional and embodied 
responses through their POV perspectives, I suggest that the visual (and physical) 
enthralment of either fear (horror films) or pleasure (pornography) is distinct from 
the fear and/or pleasure derived from the first-person, embodied visual 
representation of Formula One racing.  Additionally, the specific films referred to 
for the general argument have been selected to draw attention to the distinctive 
use of POV in classical (Lady in the Lake) and post-classical cinema (Being John 
Malkovich and Strange Days), (see Cubitt, 2004; and Chapter Four for the 
distinction between classical and post-classical cinema).  Contextualising these 
two periods of film-making affords a theoretical shift in the use and implications 
of POV, as well as the conceptualisation of a new post-classical POV shot which 
is also applicable to the contemporary Formula One on-board camera (OBC) and 
video game first-person representations.  Before turning to this broader 
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contextualisation of the cinematic POV, a brief outline of methods will be 
appropriate. 
Methods: Neoformalistic Film Analysis 
Compositional/image analysis (detailed in Chapter Three) and the approach 
known as neoformalist film analysis have been drawn upon to analyse the POV 
techniques of 16 specific films (see Filmography), as well as their implications for 
the viewing audience.  As a constantly modified approach, neoformalist film 
analysis reflexively deals with films individually to provide a theoretical and 
critical analysis of their form and hypothetical audience responses.  Thompson 
(1988) notes that,  
It is not, as I have already suggested, a method as such.  
Neoformalism as an approach does offer a series of broad 
assumptions about how artworks are constructed and how 
they operate in cueing audience responses.  But 
neoformalism does not prescribe how these assumptions are 
embodied in individual films.  Rather, the basic assumptions 
can be used to construct a method specific to the problems 
raised by each film.  (p. 6, italics in original) 
Working from this conceptual basis, and steeped in the „orientation towards form‟ 
of Russian Formalist literary theory (Thompson, 1988; Nichols, 2000), 
neoformalism emphasises the active relationship between the viewer and a film, 
analysing the various cinematic devices and techniques which constitute the film‟s 
structure (e.g., camera movements/positions, audio cues, editing, etc.), and a 
hypothetic viewer‟s response to them.  Through neo-formalism and 
compositional/image analysis, I have engaged in a systematic analysis of the 15 
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films, examining the visual framing and implied viewer positionings and 
identificatory mechanisms provided in the POV sequences through a combination 
of pausing/freeze-framing, re-viewing of scenes and note-taking.  Thompson 
(1988) suggests that “a neoformalist critic works out a method in response to a 
problem posed by a specific film” (p. 169).  In this chapter, rather than a specific 
film, it is the filmic technique of POV which is analysed.  The POV shot raises 
interesting questions in relation to the representation of viewpoints, space and the 
body across diverse mediated forms, as well as having implications for the 
viewing experience in terms of placement, identification and engagement which 
are now developed through examinations of cinematic POV, the Formula One 
OBC and video game representations.   
Point-of-View in Classical Cinema 
For such a common camera technique, there has been surprisingly little attention 
or research on the POV shot (for rare examples, see Brinton, 1947; Kawin, 1992; 
Metz, 1973; Moreno, 1953; Neale, 2005; Potts, 2005; Smith, 1995).  Much of the 
POV research has centred on classical Hollywood cinema (approximately 1930-
1960), with limited conceptualising of the POV in post-classical cinema; for 
example, Rascaroli (1997), Shaviro (2003) and Smith (2003) discuss POV in 
relation to the films of Kathryn Bigelow but do not articulate a post-classical POV 
technique.  Branigan (1975, 1984, 1985, 1992) has been the most prolific writer 
on the use of POV in classical cinema, observing that the cinematic POV 
technique merges the elements of subjectivity, narration, character and first-
person visual representation.  Branigan (1984) suggests that,  
Subjectivity in film depends on linking the framing of space 
at a given moment to a character as origin.  The link may be 
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direct or indirect.  In the POV structure it is direct, because 
the character is shown and then the camera occupies his or 
her (approximate!) position, thus framing a spatial field 
derived from him or her as origin.  (p. 73, italics in original)   
However, he cautions that the POV shot is not a „naturally‟ subjective technique 
(either as a visual representation or for constructing viewer identification) and, 
instead, relies on what viewers bring to the perspective, assisted through the 
conventions of framing, characterisation and narration.   
One of Branigan‟s key research findings has been his methodical taxonomy 
of the POV shot.  Initially comprising five key elements (Branigan, 1975), he has 
refined it in later works to “six elements usually distributed in two shots” 
(Branigan, 1985, p. 673).  Branigan‟s (1985) taxonomy outlines the six elements 
of POV as: 
Shot A: Point/Glance  
1. Point: establishment of a point in space. 
2. Glance: establishment of an object, usually off-camera, by 
glance from the point. 
Between Shots A and B: 
3. Transition: temporal continuity or simultaneity. 
Shot B: Point/Object 
4. From Point: the camera locates at the point, or very close 
to the point, in space defined by element one above 
5. Object: the object of element two above is revealed. 
Shots A and B: 
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6. Character: the space and time of elements one through 
five are justified by – referred to – the presence and normal 
awareness of a subject.  (pp. 673-674, italics in original)   
Essentially, the POV shot comprises three fundamental components: the 
point/glance, which establishes from whence the viewer is looking (with POV 
often linking the viewer to a character); the point/object – that which we (camera, 
character and viewer) are looking at and, thirdly, the presence of a character from 
whence this POV is derived (so the audience knows it is from the point-of-view of 
a character and not an objective shot).  Branigan‟s taxonomy considers all the 
possibilities, transitions and variations on these points and objects, with the six 
elements being “specific instances, respectively, of the six general units of 
classical representation: origin, vision, time, frame, object, and mind” (Branigan, 
1985, p. 674).   
Branigan sketches the relationship between shots A and B in an overhead 
diagram (Figure 1).  He notes, (1985): 
Since the initial angle of shot A (point/glance) may be any 
angle, we choose shot B (point/object) as a reference and 
take the line running from the subject‟s eyes to the object as 
a reference line.  The POV structure is then classified 
according to the placement of shot B with respect to this 
line.  Figure 1 represents alternative sites for the location of 
shot B.  It displays a range of possibilities for the framing 
(element four) of the POV structure.  (p. 680)  
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Figure 1 (overhead view): Branigan‟s POV diagram of alternate sites for the 
location of shot B (Point/Object) following shot A (Point/Glance).  
 
Set–up 1: Classic POV shot – from the subject‟s eyes. 
Set–up 2: reverse angle, from behind the subject, usually 
over one shoulder. 
Set–up 2‟: just to one-side of the subject whom we do not 
see. 
Set–up 2”: angular difference increases toward 30 degrees, 
becoming less subjective and more voyeuristic. 
Set–up 3: deviant POV, “where the camera reveals an object 
which we believe a subject to be looking at but which, in 
fact, he is not” (Branigan, 1985, p. 680). 
Set–up 4: eyeline match, “it shows what a character sees and 
when, but not from where the character looks” (p. 680). 
Set–up 5: mirror image of set-up 4, crosses 180 degree line. 
Set–up 6: POV of the object. 
Set–up 7: reverse angle of the object.  Set-up 6 and 7 usually 
occur when object is a person. 
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Set –up 8 and 9: de-stabilizing shots, imply a false space for 
the subject through resemblance to set-up 1. 
Set –up 10: de-stabilizing shot, represents a jump into a new 
space or scene.  (Branigan, 1985, pp. 680–681) 
Set-up 1, the classic POV, is the most commonly employed POV shot in film 
(both classical and post-classical).  While Branigan is one of the few scholars to 
theorise this shot, he significantly overstates its location.  The classic POV is not 
from the subject‟s eyes as Branigan (1985) states but, rather, in front of the 
subject‟s eyes, with the camera occupying the space immediately in front of the 
character.  In fact, it is only the post-classical POV shots in Being John Malkovich 
and Strange Days and, particularly, emerging technologies such as Helmet-Cam, 
as well as both Formula One and First-Person Shooter (FPS) video games which 
are framed from the subject‟s eyes (see Figures 2 and 3 later in this chapter).  
Nevertheless, Branigan‟s (1984, 1985) various set-ups offer an insight into the 
multiple POV positions and perspectives available in classical cinema, many of 
which still apply to contemporary, post-classical cinema.  Branigan also provides 
an extended discussion of each of these elements to explain their significance and 
usage in relation to specific cinematic examples, as well as developing a range of 
variations on these elements, which he discusses as closed, delayed, open, 
continuing, cheated, multiple, embedded or reciprocal structures (Branigan, 
1985).   
Point-of-View in Classical Cinema: Lady in the Lake 
The classical period of cinema has numerous examples which have drawn upon 
the POV shot in diverse ways; most notably many Alfred Hitchcock films, such as 
Rear Window (1954), Vertigo (1958) and Psycho (1960), in addition to the 
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sustained POV representations for the first third of Dark Passage (Daves, 1947) 
or even an optical POV of a dead man in Vampyr (Dreyer, 1932).  Nevertheless, 
no consideration of cinematic POV can avoid a discussion of Robert 
Montgomery‟s Lady in the Lake (1946) due to its sustained POV technique (as 
opposed to the brief POV segments in most of the other classical cinematic 
examples) and its significance for the viewing audience.  Shot extensively from 
the point-of-view of private detective Philip Marlowe (Robert Montgomery), the 
viewer is only able to view the film (and unravel the mystery) by seeing what 
Marlowe sees.  Branigan (1985) observes that, 
Almost the entire Montgomery film is shot from the private 
eye of a detective.  At various times we see the detective‟s 
arms, feet, his shadow, his image in mirrors, the smoke from 
his cigarette, as well as extreme close-ups of a telephone 
receiver, lips approaching for a kiss, and a slap in the face 
which shakes the camera.  Characters also speak directly into 
the camera.  It has even been suggested that there should 
have been an intermittent blacking out of the screen to 
indicate occasional blinking of the hero‟s eyes.  (p. 677) 
There are other elements that viewers „share‟ with Marlowe which include driving 
a car, crawling through dirt, being punched, having alcohol poured on his face, 
blacking out and his distracted lustful gazing at the secretary during meetings with 
Adrienne Fromsett (DVD Example 13).  These effects, as well as a sway to the 
camera when „he‟ is walking, were created by Montgomery wearing a camera 
strapped to his chest during most of the filming (Metz, 1973).   
Employing Branigan‟s taxonomy, Lady in the Lake adheres to the classic 
POV shot (set-up 1), and would also be labelled a continuing POV, as it restricts 
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the viewpoint to one character for a sustained period.  Branigan (1985) describes 
the continuing POV shot as one in which “one character looks at several objects 
or one object a number of times.  The objects are typically rendered by cutting 
from object to object or by camera movement – the subjective traveling shot” (p. 
684, italics in original).  The use of a sustained POV for almost the duration of 
Lady in the Lake leads Branigan (1984) to suggest that “the entire film – with 
several important exceptions – is ostensibly a single traveling POV shot” (p. 7).  
Nevertheless, on four distinct occasions Marlowe is framed from a non-POV 
perspective as he speaks directly to the camera from his office to explain aspects 
of the case.  These exceptions to the continuing POV are underdeveloped by 
Branigan.  Marlowe‟s four direct addresses to the camera not only separate 
Marlowe‟s and the viewer‟s „shared‟ viewpoint temporarily but, also, make the 
viewer aware that the continuous narrative presumed to be „shared‟ with Marlowe 
is, in fact, historical and a series of flashbacks.  Therefore, these scenes are 
significant as they disrupt the sense of continuity implied by the extended use of a 
continuing POV shot (Branigan, 1985). 
Additionally, not all the representations adhere to an accurate (classic) POV 
shot in Lady in the Lake.  This occurs when mirrors are deployed to show 
Marlowe‟s reflection, as well as other examples, such as smoke rising from the 
lower half of the screen to suggest that Marlowe is smoking a cigarette.  The 
smoking scenes create a mismatch, as the smoke is in a position lower than where 
an arm would be expected to be and viewers never see any hand holding this 
cigarette.  Moreno (1953) suggests in relation to this gimmick that,  
There is no possible way to connect (those arms) to our 
shoulders.  So also, it is impossible to make the smoke 
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which surges up into the lower part of the screen convince 
me that I, the hero, have a cigarette in my mouth.  (p. 353)   
Of course, Moreno‟s statement also hints that some consideration needs to be 
given to the limits of film technology and creating an accurate and sustained POV 
representation in the 1940s, which also applies to the reflected mirror scenes.  
More importantly, these scenes break from the strict, classic POV that is implied 
through the use of a continuing POV shot in Lady in the Lake. 
POV in Post-Classical Cinema: Being John Malkovich 
Being John Malkovich (Jonze, 1999) is a contemporary, post-classical cinematic 
example that advances the POV techniques deployed in Lady in the Lake.  Being 
John Malkovich posits that a mysterious portal exists within the diegetic world of 
the film that allows occupants to „be‟ John Malkovich for fifteen minutes and see 
what he sees (DVD Example 14).  To provide this viewpoint, Being John 
Malkovich employs a continuing POV which creates a sense of subjectivity and, 
as character Craig Schwartz (John Cusack) suggests, produces the “thrill of seeing 
through the eyes of someone else” (Dragunoiu, 2001, p. 9).  This POV shot is 
framed differently to Lady in the Lake, however, and, arguably, facilitates a 
stronger connection between the viewer and character.  Galloway (2006) suggests 
that the “subjective shots are denoted by a binocular-like black oval mask that 
obfuscates the corners of the frame.  Additionally the frequent use of a wide-angle 
lens adds a sense of vertigo to the shot” (p. 48).  Therefore, distinct from the large 
square camera frame provided in Lady in the Lake , the POV in Being John 
Malkovich is shot through a narrow iris or circular matte that masks other areas 
and reduces vision to perceivably Malkovich‟s (or characters inhabiting 
Malkovich) viewpoint.   
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This restricted view, combined with wide-angle framing counters the 
awkwardness and unnatural attempts at embodiment experimented with in Lady in 
the Lake (e.g., the smoke from cigarettes).  Rather, embodiment is visually 
represented more convincingly, with parts of Malkovich‟s body, such as moving 
arms or a glance down at legs in the shower, protruding into the visual frame (and 
the audience‟s viewpoint) from a seemingly „experiential‟ angle of vision (i.e., 
corresponding with an eyeline viewpoint).  In fact, the majority of the POV shots 
seem to use the body as a frame of reference.  Malkovich actually „wears‟ a 
camera strapped on to his shoulder which allows viewers to look down on his 
body as he showers, eats at a restaurant or reads lines from a script (see 
Dragunoiu, 2001; and especially the cover image for this edition of Film 
Criticism).  Such techniques seem to answer Brinton‟s (1947) call for “a film in 
which the camera does not simply represent a character, but becomes in itself a 
character” (p. 366), (see also Bazin‟s [1973] discussion of the camera becoming a 
character in The Rules of the Game [Renoir, 1939]).  Additionally, diegetic sound 
is also muffled when viewers share Malkovich‟s perspective, intentionally 
weakening the audible quality of voices and other film-derived sounds to heighten 
the sense that viewers are „sharing‟ his (POV) perspective.  Conversely, when 
Malkovich eats his breakfast during a POV scene, his „slurping‟ of coffee and 
„crunching‟ of toast dominates the soundscape to evoke an embodied and 
internalised „shared‟ perspective for the viewer (DVD Example 14).   
POV in Post-Classical Cinema: Strange Days 
A similar embodied POV shot is also utilised in Strange Days (Bigelow, 1995).  
Set in a futuristic Los Angeles at the turn of the millennium, Strange Days 
proposes the existence of SQUID technology, which, like a virtual reality 
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machine, allows the recording and playback of people‟s experience from a POV 
perspective (DVD Example 15).  Chief protagonist Lenny (Ralph Fiennes) 
suggests to a prospective client, “This is „not like TV, only better‟.  This is life.  
It‟s a piece of somebody‟s life.  It‟s pure and uncut, straight from the cerebal 
cortex.  You‟re there.  You‟re doing it.  You‟re seeing it.  You‟re hearing it.  
You‟re feeling it” (Bigelow, 1995).  Each time someone is „jacked in‟ or „wired‟ 
to the SQUID equipment, viewers are provided with a continuous POV sequence 
as characters playback the „experiences‟ of others.  Like Being John Malkovich, 
these POV representations provide eyeline matches and a shared sense of 
embodiment.  The POV sequences incorporate moving body parts which protrude 
from realistic angles within the viewer‟s field of vision as if „we‟ have become the 
character.  Other characters, the object of the glance in Branigan‟s terminology, 
enhance this first-person perspective by returning the gaze at an eyeline match and 
engaging with the (our) character‟s visible body parts; for example, the playback 
experience of roller-skating with and then making love to Faith (Juliette Lewis).  
Unlike Being John Malkovich, the POV sequences are not framed through mattes 
or an iris to reduce the viewpoint.  Director Kathryn Bigelow uses a „visual 
language‟ so viewers know that they are in the subjective POV: through, for 
example, continuous and unbroken sequences, muffled sound and by „tearing the 
image‟ with computer-generated pixels to signify the beginning and end of the 
sequence (see Bigelow, 1995, „Director‟s Commentary‟).  Although Strange Days 
also uses other POV shots (Branigan‟s classic POV structure), these sequence 
scenes are different for, as Rascaroli (1997) points out, they “start as a canonical 
POV, but then include the character‟s body in her/his own act of viewing”  
(p. 234).   
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Post-Classical POV: The First-Person, Embodied POV Shot 
The POV representations in both Being John Malkovich and Strange Days 
advance Branigan‟s (1975, 1985) POV diagram, particularly in terms of their 
overall construction and the positioning of the camera.  On the one hand, the 
representations are Branigan‟s (1984, 1985) continuing POV shots or traveling 
subjective shots although, unlike the sustained, almost continuous POV 
representation of Lady in the Lake, the duration of these shots is limited (although 
Strange Days‟ POV sequences are long takes).  Additionally, the sequences do not 
conform to a classic POV shot, where the camera stands in for the subject‟s eyes 
(i.e., in front of the character or occupying their space).  Rather, both films are 
creating a new POV shot-type, which I label a first-person, embodied POV, as the 
camera is located on the character.  This new first-person, embodied POV shot 
provides a powerful visual sense of embodiment by both being approximate to an 
eyeline level and attached to the character‟s body.  Of the two post-classical films 
analysed, I would argue that Being John Malkovich is more effective at enacting 
embodiment, as its restrictive viewpoint forces the viewer to recognise and engage 
with their filmic body.  In fact, rather than making a link with other cinematic 
examples, I suggest that the POV technique in Being John Malkovich is closer to 
the American CART racing series „Helmet Cam‟, which places a camera within 
the driver‟s helmet, or the first-person POV representations available in video 
games, both of which facilitate the engaging first-person, embodied perspectives 
discussed later in this chapter.  
In comparison, the first-person, embodied POV sequences in Strange Days 
are effective due to the use of innovative technology and protruding parts of the 
character‟s body.  The frantic opening scene is a useful example, as the viewer 
seemingly „becomes‟ one of the bandits in the robbery of a restaurant, before 
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subsequently falling to his/our death when two arms extended out before him/us 
fail to cling on to the building he/we have just leapt to attempting to escape (DVD 
Example 15).  Bigelow‟s use of rapid camera movements and a seamless, long 
take (providing the illusion of being uncut, despite splicing in editing) vividly 
heightens the subjective experience, employing whip pans and tilts to represent 
the frantic activity and scanning of the scene by the protagonist.  Bigelow actually 
had to build a camera capable of replicating “the flexibility of the (human) eye” 
(Smith, 2003, p. 23) for her POV sequences, finding Steadicam to be both too big 
and also too “graceful and floating”, while handheld‟s were too disorientating: “if 
we simply did it handheld you‟d be throwing up in the audience watching it” 
(Bigelow, 1995, „Director‟s Commentary‟).  A helmet-cam was also devised to 
replicate the first-person, embodied perspective of ascending stairs with 
protruding arms and to allow the cameraman to leap across buildings while 
filming.  The flexibility of these custom-made cameras, in addition to the frenetic 
camera movement, intensifies the fast-paced subjective, first-person POV 
experience created in Strange Days‟ opening scene.   
Viewer Identification and POV Representations 
Conceptualising the relationship between POV representations and assumptions 
about viewer identification is often problematic in film theory.  Bordwell and 
Thompson (1997) note that,  
The history of the (POV) technique has teased film theorists 
into speculating about whether the subjective shot evokes 
identification from the audience.  Do we think we are Phillip 
Marlowe?  The problem of audience „identification‟ with a  
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point-of-view shot remains a difficult one in film theory.   
(p. 267, italics in original) 
For some authors, the apparatus itself is the most significant feature in this 
interrelationship, as the camera is the fundamental object which permits and 
shapes any form of identification with a screened image (Baudry, 1970; Metz, 
1982).  Other theorists, such as Smith (1995), see both identification and POV as 
flawed concepts.  Smith (1995) suggests that identification presupposes and 
delimits a static relationship between viewer and character (the viewer as 
subjected), while the POV shot is only an optical representation of the character 
(i.e., a viewpoint) which does not fundamentally make the viewer identify with 
this viewpoint.  A third perspective is raised by Metz (1973), who argues that the 
POV is only ever a semi-subjective shot since it relies on an association with a 
character still present.  These three divergent approaches reveal the contested 
theorisation of viewer identification during POV representations and will be 
considered further in relation to the three selected films.  First, however, it should 
be noted that, in classical cinema, viewer identification has been primarily 
conceptualised in relation to notions of the gaze.  Conversely, post-classical 
viewer identification remains under-examined primarily, I suggest, because a 
coherent theory of post-classical POV has not yet been developed.  Therefore, my 
discussion examines the gaze in classical cinema before articulating a new theory 
of viewer identification centred on mutual embodiment and multiple identification 
in the post-classical first-person, embodied POV shot. 
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Viewer Identification in Lady in the Lake – The Gaze in Classical Hollywood 
Cinema 
Montgomery‟s POV representation in Lady in the Lake seemingly invites viewer 
identification due to its sustained use rather than occasional or brief POV 
sequences.  In accordance with Branigan‟s (1985) contention that, “the sustained 
viewpoint of the continuing POV tends to implicate the viewer in the experience 
or fate of the character” (p. 685), viewers are implicated through Montgomery‟s 
POV technique.  In Lady in the Lake, viewers see only what Marlowe sees and 
encounter the range of experiences and characters solely from Marlowe‟s 
viewpoint.  The film enacts what appears to be a first-person visual experience for 
the viewer and, as Moreno (1953) asserts, “seeks to put the spectator in the 
position of a participant, involved in the world of the narrative, living as his [sic] 
own the experiences of the story” (p. 342).  However, Branigan (1992) notes that 
the POV is also paradoxical for viewer identification as such a representation can, 
conversely, be restrictive.  Thus, in Lady in the Lake, viewers only view and know 
the diegetic world of the film through Marlowe as they are tied exclusively to his 
(sustained) perspective.  This extension of restricted narration to restricted 
perception characterises the POV shot, restricting narrative knowledge to not only 
what the character knows but, as Branigan (1992) suggests, “actually limits what 
the spectator can easily know about the character” (p. 157, italics in original).   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, most critics have been dismissive of Lady in the Lake 
as a failed attempt at subjectivity and too reliant on this sustained viewpoint.  For 
Brinton (1947), “the effect was that the spectator was standing beside the hero 
rather than existing within him” (p. 360) as the spectator lacks any subjective 
connection with the character.  Moreno (1953) supports this contention, 
suggesting that “the spectator must infer him continually from the conduct of the 
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other characters” (p. 352, italics in original) and concludes that “the protagonist is 
now no more than a viewpoint, merely a look” (p. 357).  Metz (1973) produces 
similar findings, citing the lack of familiarity with the character as the reason for 
the failed attempt to provide “total identification” (p. 47), for, as he notes, “in 
order to be able to interiorise a person‟s look, one has to know the person” (p. 47, 
italics in original).  For Williamson (1996) the representation disrupts the 
voyeuristic pleasure of viewing at a distance while offering no alternatives to an 
essentially masculine gaze so that “we are not merely invited but forced to 
„identify‟ with Marlowe‟s point of view” (p. 21).  Finally, Branigan (1984, 1992) 
suggests that the film‟s effectiveness is negated by the lack of objective narration 
to assist viewer comprehension and an absence of identity creation due to the 
continuous POV shot.
3
 
Collectively, these criticisms of Lady in the Lake encapsulate the way POV 
and identification operated within the primarily narrative-driven cinema of 
classical Hollywood (approximately 1930-1960; see Cubitt, 2004).  In classical 
cinema, the POV shot is an optical device which assumes that since viewers/we 
see from the perspective of the character (the point/glance) and what they see (the 
point/object) (Branigan, 1975, 1985), then viewers/we identify with this gaze.  
However, as Smith (1995) cautions, “but the mind is not always consumed by 
what the eyes see, and what the eyes see does not itself tell us what the mind 
thinks” (p. 157).  Additionally, the sustained, classical POV shot is also 
restrictive; tying viewers to one character for the duration of the POV 
representation and only allowing viewers to „know‟ as much as this/these central 
character(s).  This use of POV can often disrupt the narrative flow or deceive 
audience construction of either character or narrative relations in classical 
Hollywood cinema: for example, Potts (2005) discusses the use of POV in Vertigo 
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(Hitchcock, 1958) which, on occasions, conveys the protagonist‟s (Scottie‟s) 
emotional desires rather than an accurate visual representation of filmic events 
(Branigan, 1985, 1992; Neale, 2005).  In Lady in the Lake, the centrality of an 
optic relationship between viewer identification and the gaze is amplified by the 
sustained use of a POV perspective which, for almost the entire film, restricts the 
narrative and viewpoint solely to Marlowe.  Therefore, as an exemplar of classical 
cinematic POV, assertions of viewer identification are problematic in Lady in the 
Lake as the audience only „know‟ characters and the diegetic world through 
Marlowe‟s viewpoint; a protagonist, paradoxically, who remains largely unknown 
to the viewer.   
Viewer Identification in Being John Malkovich and Strange Days – Embodiment 
and Multiple Identification in Post-Classical Cinema  
Being John Malkovich and Strange Days move beyond the restricted narration of 
classical Hollywood cinema.  Comparatively, viewers are provided with a more 
voyeuristic, all-seeing perspective of both the diegetic film world and the 
narrative as it unfolds, spliced with only eight POV sequences in each film.  In 
Being John Malkovich the first-person, embodied POV shot is primarily employed 
when someone has entered Malkovich‟s portal and gets to „be‟ John Malkovich 
(in addition to two brief moments when Craig reflects on whether he should 
continue to control Malkovich) while, in Strange Days, POV sequences are 
provided when someone has „jacked in‟ to the SQUID equipment.  Additionally, 
these films employ objective shots to establish or re-establish the scene, reverse 
angles to step outside this restrictive viewpoint and witness the exchange between 
characters, or utilise reaction shots to the POV representations the characters are 
viewing (this is most pronounced in Strange Days).  Through objective framing, 
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viewers are able to „know‟ the characters and diegetic film world more explicitly 
compared to the sustained (and restrictive) POV representation of Lady in the 
Lake.   
These two post-classical films also create two new dynamics for viewer 
identification through their framing and use of POV representations which have 
not been accounted for in the (classical) cinematic POV literature.  First, the body 
is drawn on as a frame of reference throughout these POV scenes.  The first-
person, embodied POV shot provides viewers with a realistic visual sense of 
shared embodiment and, hypothetically, both films enable viewers to recognise 
and engage with a filmic body.  Second, this visual sense of embodiment 
constructs a process of multiple identification.  Both films provide a surrogate 
character (and body) who occupies the identificatory position on the viewer‟s/our 
behalf so, in this sense, viewers/we identify with Lenny (a known character) who 
identifies with the POV experience (and body) of the protagonist played back on 
the SQUID equipment.  In this way, viewers engage in a process of multiple 
identification with the surrogate character, POV protagonist and their filmic 
bodies.  Multiple identification and embodiment operate in similar yet distinctive 
ways in the two films. 
In Being John Malkovich, viewer knowledge (as a key element for viewer 
identification) has already been established prior to the POV scenes with viewers 
„knowing‟ the characters, such as Craig or Lotte (Cameron Diaz), before they 
enter the portal to „be‟ or „become‟ John Malkovich.  In this sense, viewers can 
plausibly engage in a form of multiple identification; identifying with the 
surrogate character Craig inhabiting Malkovich, as well as identifying with 
Malkovich himself.  This identification with the surrogate character is further 
enacted by hearing the surrogate character‟s thoughts as they enter the portal to 
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„become‟ Malkovich.  For example, on each occasion when Lotte is Malkovich, 
viewers/we hear her reflecting on her experiences as Malkovich; whether it be 
admiring the masculine body she occupies while showering, his strong voice as he 
reads lines or her ecstatic pleasure in making love to Maxine as Malkovich.  This 
creates a sense of multiple identification for, as viewers, we are linked to the 
thoughts and experiences of those characters who are being Malkovich, all the 
while being provided with a visual POV from Malkovich‟s perspective.  The 
assumption is that this is his viewpoint, although he is also being inhabited by 
another who is simultaneously sharing his POV.  As a viewer we provide a third 
layer to this process, bringing our own subjectivities to this experience while 
simultaneously sharing the POV perspective of both the surrogate character and 
Malkovich.  That the POV shots are framed with reference to Malkovich‟s body 
strengthens the primacy of viewer identification, as the viewer is bound to and, 
like the surrogate characters, „inhabits‟ his filmic body during these scenes.  
These aspects also have profound implications for the actual „being‟ John 
Malkovich proposed in the film.  Malkovich‟s own subjectivity fades in 
importance to become merely the vessel for these surrogate characters‟ (and our 
own) subjectivities while they reside in his portal.  The „real‟ Malkovich becomes 
an absent-presence, used as a vessel or filmic body with no (or a limited) 
subjectivity of his own for most of this occupation.  The fading of John 
Malkovich provides another intriguing question for viewer identification: to what 
extent do viewers erase the subjectivity of the person they have identified with (a 
question I return to in relation to Formula One drivers, anonymity and the OBC 
later in this chapter)?  Paradoxically, the very use of Malkovich actually plays a 
salient role in establishing viewer identification despite his reduced subjectivity.  
Unlike an anonymous or fictional character (e.g., Being John Smith), viewers 
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come to the film already knowing or believing that they „know‟ who John 
Malkovich is.  Given the prominence, desirability of and, perhaps, obsession with 
stars and celebrities in contemporary culture (Cashmore, 2006; Dyer, 1979; 
Marshall, 1997, 2006; Redmond & Holmes, 2007; Rojek, 2001; G. Turner, 2004), 
the use of Malkovich as a character/portal to inhabit or „become‟ further evokes 
viewer identification, as the audience is invited to contemporaneously share a 
star‟s (Malkovich‟s) viewpoint during these POV representations. 
Conversely, this well-known figure does not exist in Strange Days.  Like 
Being John Malkovich, viewers are provided with a known surrogate character 
(Lenny in six of the eight POV sequences) who views the POV experience 
simultaneously with the audience.  However, problematically, only three of the 
first-person „experiences‟ are from known characters – Lenny‟s rollerskating and 
sex scene with Faith; and two scenes with Iris (Brigitte Bako).  The majority of 
these „experiences‟ are from unknown characters: the restaurant „bandit‟, the man 
jogging, and three scenes with the killer, who is later revealed as Max (Tom 
Sizemore).  Shaviro (2003) comments in relation to the frantic opening scene,  
On one hand, the first-person perspective of the POV shot 
evidently ties us to the action. But at the same time, this 
perspective is oddly impersonal.  For, as we watch the 
sequence at the start of the film, we do not know who the 
protagonist is; we have no idea whose point of view we are 
sharing...  It thrusts us into the action so viscerally, that it 
affords us no security whatsoever.  (pp. 162-163)   
I would suggest that, rather than countering viewer identification as argued by 
Shaviro (2003), the combined persuasive power of the POV sequences and the 
anonymity of the POV protagonist (especially in the fast-paced opening sequence) 
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draws the viewer into this perspective as a contemporaneous experience (a 
concept more applicable to „live‟ sport rather than pre-recorded films, as I discuss 
later).  Through the use of graphic scenes and framing bodies in motion, the POV 
sequences embellish experiential and identificatory processes for the audience.  
Viewers draw on carnal knowledge (Sobchack, 1992, 2004) and memories 
(Marks, 2000, 2002) of their own bodies, emotions and first-hand experiences of 
similar scenarios to those conveyed within the POV sequences.  As Sobchack 
(2004) suggests, “our experience is not only always mediated by the lived bodies 
that we are, but our lived bodies (and our experience of them) is always mediated 
and qualified by our engagement with other bodies and things” (p. 4).  With the 
exception of the Strange Days opening scene, the other POV sequences are 
intercut with reaction shots of Lenny (or others) reacting to the first-person 
experience they are viewing.  This draws on the carnal knowledge and memories 
of viewers, implicating them in the POV sequences as viewers witness Lenny 
sickened as he plays back the rape and murder of Iris, or shuddering at the death 
of the restaurant „bandit‟.  For viewers this evokes either the experiential (i.e., the 
recollection of a „real‟ robbery or murder), or, most likely, the carnal knowledge 
and memory of running and adrenalin (or, conversely, fear and abhorrence) in 
response to the first-person representation of these experiences.  
The Implications of the First-Person, Embodied POV 
Through their POV representation, both Strange Days and Being John Malkovich 
provide a newer kind of POV than the classic POV shot type used in most films 
(both classical and post-classical).  As this technique is not accounted for in 
Branigan‟s POV taxonomy, I have labelled the representation a first-person, 
embodied POV shot.  In this new kind of shot, the viewer is implicated by 
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recognising the presence and shared occupation of the character‟s filmic body.  In 
addition, viewers are provided with, and bound to, a vicarious representation of 
experience restricted to the character‟s POV.  Cubitt (2004) suggests that post-
classical cinema moved away from an emphasis on narrative to spatial 
orientations and the navigation of space.  This new first-person, embodied POV 
should also be considered a post-classical cinematic technique due to its 
implications for viewer placement, subjectivity and experience.  Although the 
POV technique is not concerned with the exploration of space, the first-person, 
embodied POV orientates the audience towards a particular space; seemingly 
sharing the space, viewpoint and body of the character concurrently.  This is a 
new POV orientation, moving away from identification solely aligned to the gaze 
(classical cinema), to identification with the body (post-classical cinema).  
Attaching viewers to the space and body of the character also permits the 
navigation of space through shared POV representations of a body in motion 
exploring its surroundings.  Both films also produce multiple levels of 
identification with known surrogate characters, as viewers are privy to their 
thoughts and viewpoints when they enter or share the POV perspective of other 
characters.  For viewers, this facilitates multiple levels of identification with the 
surrogate characters, their reactions and the protagonist‟s experiential first-person 
viewpoint simultaneously, as well as the exploration of both internal and external 
spaces.  As viewers, our experience adds a third layer to the identificatory process, 
evoking our own subjectivities to make sense of this viewpoint and visual 
experience.  Therefore, this post-classical POV style compels viewers to engage 
in multiple forms of identification, recognise their own (and filmic) bodies, and 
draw on embodied knowledge, memories and emotions to make sense of this POV 
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structure.  These examples of the use and implications of cinematic POV will now 
inform my investigation of the Formula One OBC.   
The Formula One On-Board Camera  
Although variations of on-board cameras have been utilised intermittently during 
the history of Formula One, the contemporary on-board camera (OBC) became 
more prominent during the 1980s.  Currently, the OBC is regulated, with all cars 
required to carry two of these compact cameras, housed in aerodynamic pods, at 
every race (“FIA rules”, 2006).  Additionally, teams are required to have a total of 
six camera mounting points, although only two are predominantly used.  Teams 
are required to place one camera in the chief OBC position (on top of the air box), 
and the FIA determines the second camera position in consultation with the team 
and driver (“FIA rules”, 2006).  Alternatively, teams place dummies of the same 
weight in these pods, a rule designed to negate aerodynamic deficiencies or 
weight penalties for cars using these cameras (“FIA rules”, 2006; “Nowhere to 
hide”, 1998).  The regulations are vague on the use of extra cameras.  For 
example, the Renault of Fernando Alonso provided shots from three separate on-
board cameras (the OBC, side mirror and rear wing view) during races in Spain 
and Monaco in 2005, which suggests the use of two cameras (or dummies) is most 
likely a minimum requirement.  The cameras work via a helicopter overhead 
bouncing signals transmitted from the car back to the Formula One Association‟s 
(FOA) own TV studio on the ground, which then distributes this feed to host 
broadcasters.  As this car-helicopter signal can be interrupted by the landscape 
(e.g., buildings and bridges) or bad weather, the FOA has also experimented with 
trackside receiving points which allow a continuous feed from around the circuit.  
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For example, in 2001, the FOA succeeded in providing OBC images from cars in 
the tunnel at Monaco for the first time (“A camera in”, 2002).   
Although the cars are required to have six mounted camera points, there are 
currently seven types of on-board camera shots employed in televised Formula 
One coverage, each with contrasting POV perspectives (see Figure 2).  The first 
two cameras are located on either, 1) the front wing endplate or 2) the nose of the 
car.  These offer an impossible view, placing the viewer at ground level and only 
inches above the track as the car skims along at speed yet, clearly, are far removed 
from any realistic sense of a driving perspective (suggesting the viewer was 
actually on the front wing or nose of the car). A third shot provides the reverse 
effect, 3) looking back through the rear wing to the action immediately behind the 
car, albeit from a higher, centered position.  Another two cameras are mounted in 
positions that draw on the driver as an object.  4) The first of these places a 
camera at the front of the cockpit, again providing a POV viewpoint looking 
backwards.  In this shot, the driver‟s helmet fills the majority of the frame and 
only the jarring and constant movements of his helmet and the turning steering 
wheel can be seen.  5) The other shot is provided from a camera mounted on the 
side mirror, presenting a side-on and again slightly backwards view of the driver.  
More of the driver is in the frame in this shot as viewers see his head, upper body 
and hands in action while he controls his car and gets jolted by bumps, with 
scenery flashing by in the background.  Finally, there are the two camera 
placements that provide subjective POV‟s for viewers.  6) The first of these is 
mounted onto the lefthand side of the large air box that is directly behind the 
driver.  The camera is attached at a point that appears similar to the driver‟s 
eyeline/level, although it is to the left and so does not strictly adhere to a driver‟s 
POV (this is similar to, but not exactly the same as, a cinematic over the shoulder 
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shot; e.g., between set-up 2 and 2‟of Branigan‟s [1985] POV diagram).  This 
perspective provides exhilarating shots of the racing action from a near eyeline 
match with the driver, although the particular placement is conspicuous as the 
driver is seen slightly in front, lower and to one side of the camera.  Despite its 
prominent use in 1998 and 1999, it was not visible on ITV‟s „live‟ global 
televised coverage between 2000 and 2004 (although can be seen on Formula One 
season reviews).  Red Bull Racing became the only team to use this camera 
position in 2005 and 2006 until Toyota‟s Ralf Schumacher also deployed it for the 
final three races of 2006; post-2006 the perspective became increasingly 
prominent once more.  7) The final camera location is commonly referred to as the 
on-board camera (OBC).  The POV perspective from the OBC is effective at 
locating and placing the viewer within what at first glance resembles the driver‟s 
own point-of-view.  The dimensions and implications of the OBC are now 
considered in more detail. 
Technical Description of the OBC 
As suggested, the OBC seems to provide the driver‟s viewpoint and perspective 
when drawn on in racing coverage (DVD Examples 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21).  
The camera is, in fact, above and slightly behind the driver, mounted in a fixed 
position on top of the air box, resembling a small capital „T‟.  The OBC also 
utilises a high-angle tilt to look down into the cockpit.  This camera position and 
angle falls outside Branigan‟s (1975, 1985) POV diagram, as instead of either 
replacing the character‟s (driver‟s) space, or being in front of the character 
(classic POV), the camera is placed above the driver and draws on a high-angle 
tilt to replicate his POV.  In fact, through the multiple cameras and references to 
the driver, Formula One may offer a new POV variation of the driver as both 
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subject/object in POV representations.
4
  Additionally, the Formula One OBC may 
provide what Branigan labels a cheated variation of the POV shot, as the camera 
positioning is not in the actual character‟s position (the driver in this case), but 
provides a better POV perspective than he would be accorded from his driving 
position.  Branigan (1985) describes the cheated POV as,  
A common variant (that) allows the framing of the object 
…to be somewhat closer to the object than the character‟s 
actual position – though the angle typically is still from that 
position.  This compromise gives the audience a better view 
of the object.  (p. 686, italics in original) 
The OBC is positioned higher than the driver and appears to use a wide-angle lens 
which, Monaco (2000) suggests, “has the added effect of greatly emphasizing our 
perception of depth and often distorting linear perception” (p. 7).  This cheated 
POV permits the viewer to see, with some emulation of peripheral vision, more 
than the driver can see from this elevated position and high-angle tilt.  
Nevertheless, the viewpoint is still quite restrictive so does not appear to be the 
180 degree perspective provided by a fish-eye lens.  As all Formula One races 
prior to Round 15, 2008 were staged during the day, the cameras operate under 
natural lighting and there appear to be no additional lighting or filters.
5
  Finally, 
not all OBC viewpoints are identical due to the different design philosophies and 
exact positioning and angle of the cameras on each Formula One car.   
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Figure 2: Overhead Representation of Formula One and Champ Car POV 
Perspectives 
 
1 and 2. Front nose or front wing perspective (impossible view, at ground level). 
3. Rear view looking back from car. 
4. Cockpit view looking back at driver. 
5. Side mirror perspective.  
6. Red Bull Racing OBC – located to one side of driver at near eyeline match, drawing on driver‟s 
body in framing of POV shot. 
7. OBC providing high angle tilt POV, looking down over driver. 
8. Helmet Cam (from Champ Car) located inside visor at eyeline match with driver‟s right eye, 
although at a 30 degree angle, predominantly focusing on a point between middle of the steering 
wheel and the left side mirror.  
9. Formula One video game subjective camera-car (resembles first-person shooter) with camera 
and car becoming entwined at a zero degree angle (see discussion of Helmet-Cam and Formula 
One video games later in this chapter). 
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Figure 3: Side-On View of Formula One and Champ Car POV 
Perspective
 
1 and 2. Front nose or front wing perspective (impossible view, at ground level). 
3. Rear view looking back from car. 
4. Cockpit view looking back at driver. 
5. Side mirror perspective.  
6. Red Bull Racing OBC – located to one side of driver at eyeline match, drawing on driver‟s body 
in framing of POV shot. 
7. OBC providing high angle tilt POV, looking down over driver. 
8. Helmet Cam (from Champ Car) located inside visor at eyeline match with driver‟s right eye, 
although at a 30 degree angle, predominantly focusing on a point between middle of the steering 
wheel and the left side mirror.  
9. Formula One video game subjective camera-car (resembles first-person shooter) at zero degree 
angle. 
Use of the OBC in Formula One Coverage 
The OBC shot is not deployed in a generic way within Formula One coverage.  
The dominant method would adhere to Branigan‟s (1985) model of establishing a 
point/glance before providing a POV shot, in addition to its distribution in two 
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shots.  Through the dominant OBC technique, the specific Formula One car is 
established as a point through exterior establishing shots from trackside cameras, 
before the transition to a POV shot from the OBC of this car.  This is usually 
followed by a re-establishing shot of the car through an objective camera to re-
emphasise the privileged POV viewers have just „shared‟.  Therefore, in these 
cases as viewers we „know‟ this was the POV of this specific car through the 
establishment (and re-establishment) of a point, the two shot structure and 
transitional devices.  However, the OBC of a specific car is not always established 
through such means.  A variety of other framing conventions can occur which 
disrupt this dominant OBC technique, such as; cross-cuts to different cars or parts 
of the circuit, cuts from one OBC to another car‟s OBC without transitions, 
deviant establishing shots (objectively framing one car as a possible point/glance 
but cutting to the OBC of another, often without establishing this car) and even 
temporal disruptions, with replays framed through an OBC representation.   
These occurrences disrupt Branigan‟s six elements for a POV shot.  However, 
the OBC is used selectively, primarily to splice the objective framing established 
by exterior shots and trackside cameras.  In this sense, the OBC operates like the 
cinematic POV employed in the films Lady in the Lake, Being John Malkovich 
and Strange Days, to provide a continuing or traveling POV shot.  However, the 
duration of the OBC shot is not consistent.  Based on a systematic analysis of 
televised coverage between 1998 and 2006 (and still applicable until at least the 
end of the 2008 season), an individual OBC viewpoint usually has a minimum 
duration of three-to-five seconds and does not exceed two minutes without cuts or 
transitions.  The longer duration OBC shot is usually the sustained POV of one 
car for an entire lap which is often discussed as “a lap with” Rubens Barrichello 
(United States Grand Prix, 2000) or David Coulthard (British Grand Prix, 2000) 
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by ITV commentator Martin Brundle.  As televised Formula One coverage 
requires a range of camera positions, quick cuts between these and, even regular 
cross or jump cuts to other parts of the circuit, the OBC is not operating in a 
distinctive or deviant way compared to other aspects of the televised coverage.  
Rather, the OBC complements the coverage by allowing an inside view of the 
action: the POV perspective from the car/driver. 
Viewer Uses of and Identification with the OBC 
With its restrictive viewpoint, the OBC tends to implicate viewers in terms of 
audience positioning and notions of viewer identification.  In fact, I suggest that 
the OBC works in a similar manner to the POV sequences in Being John 
Malkovich and Strange Days; implicating viewers through embodiment, evoking 
viewer subjectivities and permitting multiple levels of identification.   
Identity, Anonymity and Experiential Formula One 
The concept of identity is problematic in Formula One, with drivers to a certain 
extent becoming anonymous during the race coverage.  Baudrillard (2002) notes, 
“the driver, for his part, is alone.  In his cockpit he no longer is anyone.  He 
merges with his double, the car, and so no longer has an identity of his own”  
(p. 167).  Driver identity is obstructed from all angles and viewpoints, with drivers 
immersed in their racing cars, bodies concealed in overalls and faces shielded 
behind helmets with tinted visors.  Kennedy (2000) suggests that,  
Intimacy with the drivers is approached via the machines 
they inhabit, which could be considered to vitiate such 
attempts.  The drivers themselves speak very little and are 
most in view when only their eyes can be seen behind their 
protective gear.  (p. 66)   
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Due to this anonymity, viewers (most likely the more informed viewers or fans) 
use the signifiers of car colour, team branding and helmet design to recognise and 
„know‟ which driver they are viewing (especially „live‟ spectators at the Grand 
Prix event).  Television broadcasts offer some assistance to this viewing process 
through the use of text to establish the identity of the driver and car on-screen, in 
addition to the well established role of commentators in sport providing anchorage 
for the visual action and assisting viewer knowledge.  Nevertheless, a degree of 
anonymity permeates Formula One racing.   
The problematic role of identity is compounded by the experiential aspect of 
Formula One racing which is, largely, an inaccessible „real‟ experience for 
viewers.  Essentially, Formula One is an elitist and non-participatory sport as far 
as the mass audience is concerned.  The actual driving experience is limited to 
only the current 20 or 22 drivers at any one time (and reserve or test drivers), and 
they race in technologically-advanced, hybrid cars that are simply incomparable to 
road cars in terms of power and performance.  Noble and Hughes (2004) observe 
that,  
A Formula One car… is a very different beast to anything 
else you see on the road.  It is the ultimate prototype 
machine, featuring design ideas, technology, and materials 
that many people associate more with a modern day fighter 
jet than with an automobile…their design has been centred 
on the quest for speed rather than comfort, and they are 
almost literally rockets on wheels.  (p. 13)   
These two elements of driver anonymity and Formula One as an inaccessible 
driving experience make notions of viewer identification problematic.  Like Lady 
in the Lake, the character (driver) is often unknown, while we have no carnal 
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knowledge (Sobchack, 1992, 2004) or tactile memory (Marks, 2002) of the „real‟ 
experience; that is, of driving at these speeds or in any comparable form of car 
although, of course, most of us have, or have been, driven in a car. 
The POV perspective from the OBC overcomes aspects of this inaccessible 
experience by permitting a visual replication and representation of driving a 
Formula One car.  In this sense, viewers are visually (and literally) invited to „ride 
with‟ real Formula One drivers and placed in what appears to be the driver‟s 
position in the cockpit.  Through this POV representation, the OBC seems to fulfil 
Moreno‟s (1953) notion that “the subjective camera serves the purpose of 
bringing this world closer to the spectator, of placing it within the reach of his 
[sic] hand” (p. 346).  Furthermore, the ITV race commentary of ex-Formula One 
racer Martin Brundle works to make the POV perspective a more experiential 
(and less anonymous) visual representation for the viewers.  During OBC shots, 
Brundle frequently slips between modes of first, second and third-person address, 
inviting viewers to ride on-board and suggesting „we‟ or „you‟ are negotiating the 
course concurrently with the driver.  An example of this first-person mode of 
address occurred during the 2003 Canadian Grand Prix (DVD Example 18).  On 
lap 58, Martin Brundle places viewers as occupants of two different cars, inferring 
that, as viewers, „we‟ were temporarily the drivers in each circumstance racing for 
the lead of the Canadian Grand Prix.  In the first instance, an OBC shot is 
provided for the Ferrari of Michael Schumacher.  Brundle says, “You‟re leading 
the Grand Prix.  On the edge of your seat, you‟re heading down towards turn 
eight” (Brundle, 2003).  The action cuts to a long shot of Schumacher 
approaching turn eight and Brundle now advises the audience of the difficulties of 
this particular turn.  Seconds later the footage cross-cuts to an OBC from the 
Williams driver Juan Pablo Montoya.  “Now you‟re P3.  And you‟re looking at 
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the two leaders, the two Schumacher brothers, and that‟s all you‟ve got to do is 
get past those two little dots to win this Grand Prix this afternoon” (Brundle, 
2003).   
Obviously Brundle does not assume the viewer actually replaces the driver 
through the OBC shots.  Nevertheless, having an ex-Formula One driver 
providing these comments reiterates the sense of realism in OBC coverage and 
has ramifications for viewer identification.  Brundle‟s comments are reinforced by 
the POV representation that the OBC provides, for, as Branigan (1975) says, “the 
POV structure is a mechanism whereby we experience contemporaneously with a 
character” (p. 64).  Much like the first-person POV sequences in Strange Days, 
these OBC representations are compelling for the viewer, providing a visual first-
person experience which to some extent overcomes the problem of driver 
anonymity (or character anonymity in Strange Days).  Although anonymous 
figures, the POV sequences in both formats are persuasive and engage the 
viewer‟s sensory perceptions as a contemporaneous experience.  This is more 
pronounced with the Formula One OBC as the footage is actually 
contemporaneous; being transmitted „live‟, in real time and through a global feed 
simultaneously as the event transpires.  Therefore, despite being either unfamiliar 
or unknown to the viewer, the OBC, POV representation provides a „real‟ sense of 
experience and a „real‟ driver for viewer engagement.  The combination of 
graphic visual images, a live global feed and Brundle‟s comments invite viewers 
to contemporaneously experience and identify with (or indeed replace) an often 
unknown driver and unfamiliar experience during the OBC footage. 
The use of POV in live sport, and especially through the OBC, is significant 
for theories of stardom and identification.  For stardom, the photo-effect of an 
absence-presence for stars in cinema (Ellis, 1992) is nullified by the liveness of 
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televised sport as a presentation in real time, while the close-up as a conventional 
framing technique for providing imaginary spatial proximity with stars is 
substituted by the OBC, POV perspective.  Rather than conventional „star-gazing‟ 
(Mayne, 1993) framing, therefore, the POV shot seems to allow viewers to see as 
the actual „star‟ athletes, transforming the imaginary proximity to an embodied 
and contemporaneous POV spatial proximity with the star broadcast live and in 
real time.  The live and contemporaneous broadcast thus facilitates a temporal 
synchronicity with the driver who, although he has a name, is visually represented 
as an anonymous, fragmented body without a subjectivity.  Arguably, this creates 
a shift for viewer identification from either the imaginary psychological 
subjectivity of fictional characters of cinema or the „real‟ subjectivity of the driver 
towards an embodied articulation of identification with the driver‟s body due to 
the temporal synchronicity of the live broadcast.  Whether timeshifting (the 
recording and/or re-watching of the POV sport telecast) alters or has implications 
for viewer identification as a non-live experience is less certain (Cubitt, 1991).   
Mutual Embodiment 
Like the POV sequences in Being John Malkovich and Strange Days, there is an 
implication of space and viewer placement, in addition to a screen body to 
occupy, when viewing the OBC.  In a certain sense, viewers first identify with the 
car, as the tub of the car provides an important frame of reference for the OBC 
perspective.  With the car as an exterior frame of reference, the OBC, POV shot 
implies that viewers occupy the remaining central screen space and have been 
placed in the cockpit of a Formula One car.  A second level of identification is 
provided through the presence of a human body.  Two arms extend forward from 
the bottom of the frame (usually with elements of the driver‟s helmet also visible) 
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to operate the steering wheel.  This evinces a sense of mediated embodiment 
although, as parts of the driver‟s body are obscured, viewers are provided with an 
incomplete body for identification.  The absence of a complete body assists the 
visual representation and viewer positioning during the OBC, suggesting that it is 
not only the viewpoint viewers are sharing with the driver (i.e., notions of the 
gaze in classical cinema), but also an embodied identificatory process (post-
classical POV identification).  The vividly compelling POV representation also 
offers the possibility that these visible screen bodies can be inhabited by the 
viewer.  For example, during the Ferrari OBC, it is primarily two arms extended 
that viewers get to see, with only a faint trace of the driver‟s helmet.  With large 
gloved hands turning the steering wheel, this framing lends itself to the 
assumption that the viewer is simultaneously occupying the space and body of the 
driver (see discussion of video games later in this chapter).  The presence of a 
„real‟ driver is also important for creating a realistic visual POV representation of 
the Formula One driving experience.  Viewers need to know a „real‟ driver exists 
and that they (the viewers) are sharing the space, body and viewpoint of an actual 
Formula One driver racing a real Formula One car in a real Grand Prix.   
Multiple forms of Identification 
Thus far, I have suggested that the Formula One OBC facilitates viewer 
identification through the concept (and viewer positioning) of mutual 
embodiment.  Additionally, the OBC‟s contemporaneous and graphic 
representation overcomes the inaccessible driving experience for viewers, with the 
anonymity of a „real‟ driver potentially becoming a gateway to identification.  
However, it should be noted that the OBC facilitates multiple forms of 
identification; be it with the apparatus (the camera), the car as a mobile 
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technology or with the driver.  In the first two instances, a viewer may identify 
solely with the camera as the source of the screen image, although through its 
POV representation and clarity of vision, the OBC seems to be catering to the 
physical emulation of a physical experience (the driving experience of a driver) 
rather than purely a representation of speed or a navigation of space.  One could 
argue that this physical emulation is tied to the car, facilitating identification with 
the car as a highly mobile object which is probably more pronounced for cameras 
mounted on the front wing or nose – i.e., the POV of the car.  In OBC footage, the 
car acts as a mobile tripod on which the camera is mounted and, through its 
shaking and other evidence, provides a guarantee of the authenticity of the footage 
and thence of the experience.  As noted earlier, Branigan (1984) suggests that the 
POV is not a naturally subjective technique and relies partly on what viewers 
bring to the representation.  The OBC seems to present complex „layers‟ for 
identification as viewers engage with the camera-car-driver- and, finally, their 
own subjectivities.  These identificatory „layers‟ do not operate in a universal or 
generic way and, in relation to driver identification, oscillate between notions of 
objectivity and subjectivity.   
Objective Identification 
As an objective function for identification, the OBC allows viewers to recognise 
and perfomatively judge the driver (whether they are an anonymous or „known‟ 
driver).  The OBC permits an objective admiration for driver skill, control and 
ability by revealing,  
The driver‟s own ability in all kinds of situations, the 
stresses and strains that he is subjected to, the amount that he 
can see, particularly in terms of spray on a wet track.  They 
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can show the speed of his reactions when the car gets out of 
shape.  (“Nowhere to hide”, 1998, para. 7)   
Such admiration does not necessarily connote any sense of subjective 
identification and, like its global audience, Formula One teams can also indulge in 
an objective admiration for the ability of certain drivers.  For example, former 
Jaguar team boss, Neil Ressler, suggests that “you can see a lot from the on-board 
camera...I love watching Michael (Schumacher) doing extraordinary things, 10 
laps in a row” (Windsor, 2000, p. 45).  Additionally, teams also use this OBC 
technology for objective assessments; permitting teams to gauge and adapt race 
strategies, as well as understand both the car control and technical functions that 
rival drivers employ when racing (“Nowhere to hide”, 1998).  For example, 
disclosing his use of the OBC footage from the McLaren drivers in 1998, Ferrari 
technical director, Ross Brawn, reveals that, 
You can quite clearly see them pressing certain buttons 
before they enter certain corners and they repeat that every 
lap, so there‟s obviously some function of the chassis, 
engine or gearbox that they are changing. Those things are 
quite interesting.  (“Nowhere to hide”, 1998, para. 9)  
For viewers, the OBC is also a useful source for replays or live coverage of on-
track battles, passing moves or crashes.  The OBC permits viewers to make an 
objective assessment of how well a particular driver performed, how a driver 
made a pass, or who was to blame for a crash through this POV representation.  
Indeed, like the use of television referees in sport (e.g., third umpires in cricket – 
see A. Brown, 1998), Formula One officials draw upon OBC coverage to make 
decisions on racing incidents.  For example, two controversial incidents between 
the two main contenders for the World Championship in 1994 and 1997 were 
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scrutinised by Formula One stewards using OBC footage.  In 1994, the race 
stewards cleared Michael Schumacher of deliberately running into Damon Hill at 
Adelaide to claim the title, repeating this judgment at the title deciding race at 
Jerez in 1997, when Schumacher appeared to ram rival Jacques Villeneuve.  The 
1997 decision caused a backlash from within the press and public who had viewed 
the race and OBC footage.  Allen (2000) noted that, 
In the Piazza Liberta in Ferrari‟s home town of Maranello, 
7,000 people turned away at once.  A giant diamond-vision 
screen, which had been erected for the townsfolk, repeated 
the incident from several different angles: the head-on shot, 
the side shot, on-board with Villeneuve and then, worst of 
all, on-board with Schumacher.  From this angle there was 
no doubt what had happened, and the more they showed it, 
the harder the verdict became.  (p. 31) 
It is fair to suggest that the OBC implicated Schumacher and was influential in the 
Formula One governing body later overturning the stewards‟ original decision, as 
well as excluding Schumacher from the 1997 championship standings.   
Subjective Identification 
Of course, subjective identification is also afforded by the OBC as, overlaid on 
the notion of anonymous driver identification, is identification with a known 
driver.  This subjective identification is articulated through extra-televisual 
knowledge, the advanced level of cultural literacy of specific Formula One 
viewers and, arguably, is most profoundly experienced when the viewer is also a 
fan of the driver being framed (see Chapter Six).  For example, as a fan of Jacques 
Villeneuve, I am permitted the opportunity to vicariously experience and 
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seemingly „stare through his eyes‟ when presented with his OBC, POV racing 
perspective (DVD Examples 16 and 19).  Multiple identification underpins 
this/„my‟ experience of the OBC.  Not only do I „share‟ the perspective with 
Villeneuve, I also replace his subjectivity with my own: bringing my feelings of 
excitement, nervousness and apprehension to the viewpoint (Marks, 2000, 2002; 
Sobchack, 1992, 2004); feelings which I assume Villeneuve does not „share‟ as an 
experienced racer.  Moreover, I am also aware that Villeneuve exists outside 
myself as a subject and separate entity; therefore, while I both share and replace 
him, Villeneuve clearly remains intact and separate to me during the OBC 
footage.   
In some ways, the POV provided from OBC shots potentially offers the 
televisual version of a „portal‟ that exists in the film Being John Malkovich.  The 
OBC footage from Villeneuve‟s car is my „Jacques Villeneuve portal‟ that 
facilitates my „being‟ Jacques Villeneuve in a temporal, visual, spatial and 
experiential sense.  This shot restricts my experience of the race to his visual and 
embodied perspective and only permits his view/version of the racing action.  
This overcomes the problem of character identification highlighted in criticisms of 
Lady in the Lake for, as a fan of Villeneuve, I already „know‟ my protagonist and 
actively seek access to his viewpoint and racing experience.  In this respect, the 
restrictive viewpoint of the OBC does not carry negative connotations but, rather, 
grants fans access to the generally inaccessible experience of Formula One stars. 
Champ Car–„Helmet-Cam‟ 
The opportunity for access to a driver‟s viewpoint and racing experience is taken a 
step further in video games, which replicate this visual representation of the OBC 
but now allow the player to control the racing car.  However, before discussing 
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Formula One video games, recent camera technology from the Champ Car World 
Series warrants consideration.  Champ Cars, an American open-wheel series, uses 
camera technology that operates on the boundary between the „real‟ racing world 
and game representations, even blurring such distinctions.  Champ Cars run with 
an OBC similar to Formula One, but also employ a camera entitled „Helmet-Cam‟ 
(also known as „Visor-Cam‟ post-2003), which offers an even more vivid 
representation, vicarious experience and sense of participation for viewers.  
Helmet-Cam „places‟ the viewer directly inside the driver‟s helmet, offering an 
almost identical view as the driver (although the camera‟s focal point is slightly 
off-centre), presented at an eyeline match.
6
  In fact, with the miniature camera 
attached to the inside of the helmet, only millimeters from the driver‟s eye, it is 
hard to envisage placing the camera any closer to a driver‟s eye POV without 
replacing his own retina with the camera.  Utilising Branigan‟s terms, Helmet-
Cam is, again, a continuing POV shot, although like Being John Malkovich, the 
camera location has not been accounted for in Branigan‟s (1975, 1985) POV 
diagram, being worn inside the helmet of the driver (character) at eye level and 
approximately a 30 degree angle.   
Helmet-Cam‟s representation is visually groundbreaking, permitting viewers 
to feel as if they are the driver and participating in the action entrenched inside the 
helmet and from this (his) restrictive viewpoint.  From this perspective, motion 
and the moving body are far more vivid than the OBC, with the footage providing 
a vicarious, often blurry, bumpy ride as the car races around the track at speed 
(DVD Example 1).  Indeed, the helmet is repeatedly jolted by bumps in the track, 
under braking and buffeted by winds which the viewers experience 
contemporaneously from their distorted viewpoint.  Viewers stare out through the 
visor of the driver‟s helmet and see an image seemingly identical to what he sees 
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– that is, for example, the dirty Perspex screen of the visor, bottom portion of 
helmet, large steering wheel and hands in motion dominating their viewpoint, 
large side mirrors and front tyres, flashing lights on the steering wheel (reflecting 
gear shifts and rev limits), and a fragmented vision of only the immediate track in 
front that the driver sees as he negotiates the course.  A sense of mediated 
embodiment is also implied through the large hands constantly turning the wheel 
in front of the viewer, while there is the faint outline of the driver‟s nose 
discernable in the middle-left of the frame, much like the largely unnoticed 
presence of our own nose when we view objects.  The sound of the engine pitch 
as the car accelerates and decelerates also accompanies the viewpoint, although 
engine noise is muffled to allow audible televised commentary to dominant the 
soundscape.  Through these visual and audible techniques, Champ Car‟s Helmet-
Cam blurs the viewer-driver divide and has major implications for demarcating 
real racing experiences from their visual representation.  This technology is 
certainly far removed from Whannel‟s (1992) “highly mobile ideal spectator”  
(p. 98) and not yet accounted for in sport or media research.  In fact, rather than 
other televisual sport or cinematic representations, Helmet-Cam seems to have 
more in common with video game representations and experiences.   
Video Games 
The images of Formula One racing on consoles such as PlayStation (2 and 3) and 
X-Box are becoming increasingly life-like, replicating many elements of the 
televised representation and appearance of Formula One, inclusive of similar 
views of the track, drivers and even advertising logos.  In general, sport video 
games are commonly made to look like their televisual equivalent for, as Poole 
(2000) notes, “the modern sports game is no longer a recreation of an actual sport 
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so much as it is a re-creation of viewing that sport on television” (p. 39).  Of 
course, at times the reverse is also true, with televised sport seemingly replicating 
a video game, as ITV commentator Martin Brundle occasionally intimates when 
discussing OBC perspectives (e.g., „riding with‟ Barrichello at the 2000 United 
States Grand Prix – DVD Example 21).  Moreover, Whannel (2008) observes,  
It is notable that, with technological advances, computer 
football games mimic television‟s framing, angles, styles of 
cutting and modes of commentary.  The rising crane shot 
looking through the goal net now used in both live action 
and on video games has come to look eerily unreal on 
television as it makes the live coverage look like a video 
game.  (p. 190)  
The blurring of technologies and representations of sport seems to reflect efforts 
both to enhance the „perfect view‟ for the traditional, televisual “ideal spectator” 
(Whannel, 1992, p. 96), and underscores the increasing distortion of spatial and 
experiental elements within the audience/technology/athlete nexus in 
contemporary sport (e.g., the emerging ideal omniscient observer and the 
idealised participant viewer perspectives) developed in the previous chapter.   
Within sport video games, the replication of sport (both „real‟ and televisual), 
its appearance and a sense of realism are also being applied to other aspects of the 
gaming experience.  For example, real team and player names are provided, 
various sport-specific options are accorded, such as managerial (e.g., squad 
selection, training and monetary based) and tiered levels (e.g., domestic and/or 
international competitions within a sport), while the star system is reinforced by 
clearly demarcating „stars‟ from other athletes within games (e.g., through skills, 
attributes, salary, etc.) and through branding (e.g., „Jonah Lomu‟ rugby; „Ricky 
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Ponting‟ cricket; „Tony Hawk‟ skateboarding; „Colin MacRae‟ rally, etc.).  
Attention has also been paid to player appearance and attributes (including facial 
features, skin colour, body proportions, etc), with some games modelling 
movements and frames on „real‟ players so that, according to Crawford (2004), 
“the game player can control the movement of players as they would actually 
move and react” (p. 147).  In Formula One games, the driver gets less attention 
than the cars (or his mechanical double in Baudrillard‟s [2002] terms) in relation 
to the modelling of appearance or attributes.  Early Formula One games on 
PlayStation 2 (e.g., 2001-2003) provided 3D representations that had been 
modelled on the drivers and, in some respects, resembled their appearance.  
However, the later games of 2005 and 2006 moved away from such perspectives, 
providing only a photographic head shot of the driver.  Both representation styles, 
nevertheless, were insignificant as his image or avatar generally only appeared in 
the selection menu when choosing a team and driver.  Therefore, much like the 
televised and „real‟ Formula One racing experience, the driver‟s avatar becomes 
cocooned in the cockpit and is an absent-presence during the driving/gaming 
experience.   
Instead, the primacy of appearance and movement modelling has been 
accorded to the representation, handling and performance of the cars.  Thus, in 
Formula One video games, the cars are resplendent with their colours and sponsor 
liveries modelled on their „real‟ appearance.  Moreover, reflective of their „real‟ 
performative distinctions, there are noticeable differences in the driving 
experience of a top car (e.g., a Ferrari) as opposed to a lesser car (e.g., a Minardi) 
for gamers.  Of course, Formula One video games offer not only another visual 
representation of the sport for viewers but, also, the opportunity to „participate‟ in 
the racing by controlling the simulated car during game play.  Poole (2000) 
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observes that such games are “a more serious kind of racer, usually modeled on 
Formula One cars and real Grand Prix circuits, and in spirit more of a simulation 
than a pure videogame” (p. 26), suggesting this promotes “in certain genres 
(driving, flight games) the primacy of supposed „realism‟ over instant fun”  
(p. 27).  As Formula One‟s third “screen of speed” (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 168), 
these ideas are salient for considering Formula One games.  Realism is implied 
through the options available for players, ranging from arcade-style races to full 
„simulations‟, in which gamers can either compete over a race weekend or in all 
races towards the championship.  Within the simulation option the race weekend 
is replicated in full, complete with accurate track configurations, timing sectors 
and all practice and qualifying sessions (including the option of doing full race 
distances with pit stops – roughly 50-78 laps).   
Although discussing PC or computer game versions of Formula One, 
Newman (2002) suggests that such games provide a reproduction of tracks as “a 
representation almost indistinguishable from its referent” (p. 413).  Therefore, any 
serious gamer needs to spend considerable time experimenting with car set-ups 
(which are very responsive to changes), participate in practice sessions and know 
every section of the track by memory to be competitive.  When played on the 
highest levels with all options on (i.e., damage, tyre wear, failures, fuel usage), 
maintaining control of the car and avoiding damage, failures or wear requires 
intense concentration, precision and skill.  Interestingly, many current Formula 
One drivers actually use these game simulations to learn tracks or practice, 
particularly rookie drivers.  For example, prior to the 2004 season, PlanetF1.com 
reported that Christian Klien was, 
Busy learning the layout of the 18 circuits that he will race at 
in 2004 and preparing for his debut season in the modern 
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way - playing PlayStation.  The Jaguar driver is using 
PlayStation's F1 games to learn the various circuits that he 
has yet to race at.  (“Klien hopes”, 2004, para.1).   
Although clearly also a marketing ploy, the use of PlayStation games by „real‟ 
Formula One drivers hints at the precision and visual accuracy that such game 
„simulations‟ are reproducing, in addition to further blurring boundaries between 
game versions and the „real‟ (and televisual) sport.   
Methods 
Before turning to an examination of Formula One video games and the driving 
viewpoints they provide, I need to briefly outline my methods.  For this analysis, I 
have drawn upon the official Formula One video games released annually on the 
PlayStation 2 console by Studio Liverpool (2001-2003; 2005-2006) since 2001.
7
  
These Studio Liverpool games were selected as they are, arguably, the most 
graphic and realistic Formula One games currently available on the PlayStation 2 
format and are readily available in New Zealand.  In a similar manner to the 
examination of live and taped televised Formula One races, the video games 
footage has been approached through a combination of textual analysis and 
compositional/image analysis (detailed in Chapter Four).  In particular, the full 
season of the F1 2005 game (which replicates the 19 races of the 2005 season) 
was completed, taping each full race for ease of re-viewing and analysis.  This 
taped video game footage provided approximately 28 hours of material which was 
analysed in two ways.  First, I conducted a systematic analysis of the visual 
framing, exploring the first-person representation and implications for screened 
and embodied space through pausing/freeze-framing images, replays and 
prolonged viewing of the visual image while taking notes.   
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My second form of systematic analysis drew on viewing the taped footage 
and my own experiences of the game through game-play, as well as taking notes 
on the gaming experience and producing my own Grand Prix narratives of 
competing in a PlayStation 2 Grand Prix season.  I estimate that, through the 
frequency of my game playing, I accumulated over 1,200 hours as an experiential 
basis for analysis between 1998 and 2008.  My initial playing was confined to 
PlayStation One as a naïve fan 1998-2001, as well as Formula One 2001 on the 
PlayStation 2 console.  However, post-2001, through the purchase of a 
PlayStation 2 and the Formula One 2002 game, as well as the subsequent annual 
versions released on PlayStation 2 (excluding F1 2004 which I did not play or 
purchase as Jacques Villeneuve was not a driver option), both my game-playing 
and analytical engagement increased.  In fact, as my video gaming was often on a 
daily basis between 2002 and 2006, my estimation of 1,200 game-playing hours is 
a conservative approximation.   
Formula One Video Games: First-Person Positioning and the Subjective-Camera-
Car 
The Studio Liverpool games provide between three and five driving positions 
across their different game versions.  One viewing/driving option replicates the 
televisual Formula One OBC, facilitating for players a driving experience similar 
to the coverage provided on televised broadcasts.  However, since the 2002 
edition, the games have also incorporated a more genuinely first-person POV, 
with players assuming the driver‟s position and having only two hands and a 
steering wheel as their main frame of reference.  This viewpoint is more akin to 
the Helmet-Cam of Champ Car, although the very real presence of a helmet is 
removed in the PlayStation game and, through an in-focus, 0 degree perspective, 
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the player becomes the driver.  Based upon my taped PlayStation 2 season, Studio 
Liverpool‟s F1 2005 version is used here as a case study for analysis.  Within the 
F1 2005 first-person driver viewpoint, the tub is a frame of reference and 
replicates the OBC, POV shot (DVD Examples 24 and 25).  However, the 
(implied) camera is lower, with the viewing position replicating the driver‟s 
viewpoint, presented as an eyeline match and level to the driver‟s seated viewing 
position.  From this perspective the driver is absent, with the player‟s view framed 
through the tub of the car (and front tyres) which fill most of the bottom half of 
the screen.  Fixed mirrors and the presence of large moving arms and a steering 
wheel occupy the bottom centre of the screen.  Filling the remaining space in the 
frame are the track, kerbs and other cars immediately in front which the player 
must negotiate when racing around the circuit.  Additionally, flashing rev lights 
and a digital speed read-out on the steering wheel further evoke the driving 
experience, as does the use of a „blurred vision‟ of the foreground to denote racing 
at high speeds and to visually represent the slipstreaming effect of closely 
following another car.  Finally, information is also constantly updated on-screen, 
such as sector and lap times, track position and gaps to other drivers (reinforced 
by audio updates from the team and commentators).   
Such a viewpoint clearly differs from the OBC televised footage, providing 
the appearance of being in-car rather than looking down over the driver in OBC 
shots.  In fact, the car, and particularly the moving arms and steering wheel, 
operate in a similar fashion to the gun in first-person shooters (FPS).  These 
position the player to occupy the character‟s space (as either shooter or driver) as 
an active participant in the game world (Darley, 2000; Klevjer, 2003; Lahti, 2003; 
McMahan, 2003; Rehak, 2003).  Conceptualising player involvement is an 
emerging theme in game studies, with a range of authors attempting to account for 
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and define this through a diverse set of terms such as immersion, presence, 
interactivity, embodiment, first-person representation, engagement or simulation 
(see Atkins, 2003; Darley, 2000; Grodal, 2003; Klevjer, 2003; Lahti, 2003; 
McMahan, 2003; Newman, 2002; Nitsche, 2003; Rehak, 2003).  Still in its 
infancy, such conceptualising has been problematic, with no consensus on 
definitions and variations in terminology and the application of these concepts.   
Much of the games research on player involvement has drawn on FPS games 
which utilise a first-person visual representation to „place‟ the player as the avatar 
or on-screen character.  Klevjer‟s (2003) term the „subjective camera-gun‟, which 
he describes as “a weapon fixed to the frame, as if mounted to the subjective 
camera” (p. 8) provides the primary reference point within a FPS, POV and is 
especially relevant to the Formula One video game first-person perspective.  
Unfortunately, Klevjer does not develop his concept in more detail; nevertheless 
the term „subjective camera-gun‟ evokes the perceptual thrill of bodily movement 
and disorientation through the first-person technique in these games.  As the 
Formula One first-person driving viewpoint has not been considered in the games 
literature, Klevjer‟s concept can be adapted to the Formula One videogame, which 
operates as a subjective camera-car.  The camera in this sense has replaced the 
driver and occupies his space, with all engagement facilitated through the 
movements (and POV) of the car.  Car movement is manufactured in terms of 
obvious propulsion forward, yet a sense of subjectivity is also created by the feel 
of roll through corners as, visually, the steering wheel, front tyres and arms are 
always in motion and the car „feels‟ unbalanced (often at acute angles) when 
negotiating corners.  In addition, the car lurches and slides under braking, 
providing players with a subjective visual sense of instability while operating a 
racing car (DVD Examples 24 and 25). 
288 
Through this perspective and „in-car‟ positioning, the concept of immersion is 
also a useful way of understanding the Formula One viewpoint and playing 
experience.  The term presence is favoured by authors such as McMahan (2003) 
and Rehak (2003) to explain the relationship between player and avatar, 
particularly in relation to the FPS.  However, although the driver is absent like the 
central shooter in these games, the visual framing differs significantly: players 
occupy a distinct screen space that is visually present and not an absent-presence 
implied through a visual gun.  This is also a significant distinction from Formula 
One‟s first “screen of speed” (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 168), television coverage, as 
the (albeit fragmented) driver-avatar is always visually present in video games for 
occupation, unlike the televisual absence-presence of the often unseen driver, who 
becomes only intermittently available for „occupation‟ if he is framed through 
OBC shots.  In this sense, Formula One video games offer an immersive first-
person driving POV and position that visually immerses or places the player 
within the cockpit for the duration of this viewpoint.  Of course, the representation 
also implies a sense of embodiment through arms extending out to control the 
steering-wheel.  The player assumes that these disconnected arms stem from a 
body, which can be conceived to be either the avatar-driver‟s arms or possibly as 
extensions of the player‟s own arms while driving the car.  The terms immersion 
and embodiment appear to be salient for this visual POV, immersing the player in 
the cockpit where the gamer would expect the driver‟s body to be but also as 
occupier of that body.   
Other non-visual aspects of the game also make the concept of immersion 
appropriate.  Sound enhances this immersive element on F1 2005, with the 
realistic pitch of Formula One V-10 engines screaming and whining at high 
speeds, supported by variations in pitch and timbre denoting the engine at 
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different stages of idle, acceleration or under duress at full throttle.  In this way, 
sound complements the visual representation and, as a source, seems to be housed 
just behind the cockpit, providing an incessant din to further evoke the immersive 
element to this driving POV.  Additionally, the fact that players are actively 
controlling these cars immerses them as participants in the experience.  The role 
of controls and player manipulation has commonly been conceived as interaction 
or interactivity in games research (Darley, 2000; Grodal, 2003; McMahan, 2003).  
However, interaction is a generic term for any human/interface contact and 
perhaps superfluous for all games: indeed, this chapter constitutes a form of 
interaction with a screen and keyboard which, clearly, is far removed from the 
Formula One gaming experience.
8
 
The manipulation of controls evokes a sense of immersion for players as they 
„drive‟ these Formula One cars.  Often mastery of the controls takes considerable 
practice and effort (Darley, 2000).  Newman (2003) observes that to compete in 
the popular car-racing game Gran Turismo, players must “understand the vagaries 
of the relationship between the controls, the track model, the physics engine and 
so on” (p. 138).  In this sense, players rely on immersing themselves within the 
game to understand its dimensions and, in the case of Formula One, learn the 
tracks and how to both set-up and drive their cars by „feel‟.  A stronger sense of 
immersion is provided through the additional functions that controllers provide 
and, in the case of Formula One games on PlayStation, the vibration of haptic 
devices such as the dual-shock controller or steering wheel.  The controller or 
steering wheel vibrating in player‟s hands when running over kerbing and 
especially for any off-track excursions serves to “augment and reinforce the 
audio-visual stimuli” (Newman, 2002, p. 416), providing a sense of experiential 
feedback and further immersing the player in the game.  Additionally, involuntary 
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movements by the player outside of the game world (Lahti, 2003; Newman, 2002) 
enhances the immersive and embodied aspects of Formula One video games, as 
players lean into corners and or crane their heads unconsciously while being 
immersed in the racing action from their own viewing position in front of the 
screen.   
Nevertheless, while players may feel immersed in these games, there is a 
sense of unreality to the experience.  Physically, of course, players are not being 
transported at 200mph on race tracks nor feeling the bodily sensations of G-
forces, heads buffeted by winds or the discomfort of these various forces being 
exacted on their bodies while racing.  In this sense, gamers does not have their 
eyes “squished” (Corby, 2006, p. 60) or internal organs “shaken around” 
(“Coulthard would not”, 2004, para. 2) as they immerse themselves in the game.  
Most importantly, the possibility of injury or death is clearly not an aspect of the 
game version.  Big crashes are often replayed for enjoyment, players can easily 
restart or skip sessions, and there is the possibility for indulging in other „non-
sanctioned‟ activities (e.g., doing „wheelies‟, racing the wrong way around the 
track, or intentionally taking other competitors out with few consequences).  
Therefore, players can experience the thrill (and viewpoint) of racing and driving 
fast that are reproduced on the sport‟s third „screen of speed‟ but not necessarily 
the „realities‟ of Formula One in terms of „real‟ sanctions, danger, injury or death.  
One final aspect that contributes to immersion and embodiment in Formula 
One games is the role of identification, with multiple identificatory positions a 
fundamental aspect of video games.  On the one hand, players can have no prior 
knowledge of particular teams or drivers but merely want to play which is 
permitted by Formula One games (especially in arcade modes).  This may even 
suggest that in some cases that player identification is redundant.  Characters and 
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characterisation in video games are problematic anyway for, as Newman (2003) 
suggests, ultimately they become “equipment for play; a vehicle through which 
the player gains access to the gameworld” (p. 143).  Underscoring the multiple 
identificatory positions in video games, the Studio Liverpool games post-2003 
have also catered to a „career‟ mode in which gamers can create their own 
driver/profile and work their way up from test driver to a leading driver with a top 
team.  So, potentially, gamers do not need to be culturally literate in Formula One 
and can merely play as themselves or another self-selected alias/avatar.  
Alternatively, subjective identification is enhanced for gamers who have that 
cultural literacy and already „know‟ who these drivers are.  Hence, through 
subjective identification, the dilemma of character identification in POV 
representations is overcome for gamers in a similar way as it is for knowledgeable 
viewers of the Formula One OBC.  In the case of fans, this rare driver viewpoint 
provides not only welcome access to their stars but blurs the distinction between 
fan and star in the game environment.  For example, I have access to Jacques 
Villeneuve by choosing to be him in the video game yet, as I alone have control of 
his racing experience and outcome, I potentially also replace Villeneuve through 
choosing to race as/in place of him.  Finally, subjective identification can also be a 
motivating reason to not play as, in my own case, without Villeneuve as a driver 
option I could not bring myself to „be‟ or identify with another driver in the 2004 
game.  As the sport‟s third screen of speed, Formula One video games make the 
sport more accessible to its global audience, affording multiple forms of 
identification, embodiment and player immersion in the Grand Prix experience. 
In this chapter I have discussed the POV shot and its implications for 
understanding the structures of representation and identification in relation to 
selected films, televised coverage of Formula One, and recent Formula One video 
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games.  In particular, a shift in theories of viewer positioning and identification 
has been outlined, noting that the restrictive POV of classical cinema (e.g., Lady 
in the Lake) limits rather than enhances notions of viewer identification by 
aligning viewers solely to the gaze of the central character.  In contrast, post-
classical cinematic POV (e.g., Being John Malkovich and Strange Days) moves 
towards an embodied identification, drawing on the constructed presence of the 
character‟s body to evoke a sense of mutual embodiment, as well as providing 
both a surrogate character and protagonist to permit multiple levels of 
identification during the POV sequences.  Therefore, through this first-person, 
embodied POV, viewer identification is more compelling, permitting viewers to 
share the space, viewpoint and body of multiple characters during the POV 
sequences.  The Formula One OBC has similarities with these films and the post-
classical POV technique; providing a visual first-person, embodied POV which 
also draws on and shares the driver‟s space, body and viewpoint, while affording 
multiple levels of identification. 
Most significantly, the first-person, embodied POV of the OBC (paralleling, 
to an extent, techniques of post-classical cinema) moves away from the 
psychologically-grounded basis for identification with the protagonist in classical 
cinema.  In its place is an embodied articulation of identification between star and 
fan through the self-conscious mediation of cameras (especially live broadcast 
cameras), the cars and driver anonymity.  Real-time synchronicity replaces the 
classical POV technique of spatial proximity, while identification with the skilled 
athletic body replaces identification with the imaginary psychological subjectivity 
of fictional characters.  Helmet-Cam and the Formula One video game 
representations blur the distinction between viewer, driver and the „real‟ 
experience even further.  In a sense viewer identification is almost complete in 
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Formula One video games, as now the player is the driver, immersed in a first-
person, embodied driver POV controlling the performance and outcome of the 
Formula One driving experience.  Therefore, through the OBC (and especially 
within video games), such technologies and participatory perspectives advance the 
traditional „ideal spectator‟ in televised sport, granting the subjective possibility of 
contemporaneously experiencing with or becoming the driver („being‟ Jacques 
Villeneuve in a temporal, visual, spatial and experiential sense).  The implications 
of such identificatory frameworks and how they inform, shape and contribute to 
the specific practices and experiences of Formula One fandom are traced in the 
remaining chapters.   
Thus far, this and the preceding chapters have emphasised the more structural 
components of Grossberg‟s (1992b) „structured mobility‟ in relation to Formula 
One.  In particular, Chapters Three and Four have provided, at a first-level, a 
structural layering of the media text/audience relationship.  Therefore, Formula 
One‟s primary screen of speed, its televised coverage, has been considered 
through the compositional elements that construct and constitute televised 
Formula One as a „text‟ and „structured‟ site for engagement.  Furthermore, a 
conceptual shift in audience interrelationships with the text has also been traced, 
moving from „traditional‟ notions of the televised sport viewer (e.g., the „ideal 
spectator‟) to more fluid audience positions and engagements afforded through 
emerging televisual technologies and the participatory perspectives of Formula 
One (e.g., the OBC and video games).  In particular, the first-person, embodied 
POV shot seemingly implicates the viewing audience through a visual first-person 
perspective, immersive and embodied positionings and engagements, and multiple 
(and at times, oscillating) identificatory processes.  Therefore, these kinds of 
layerings for/of audience „mobility‟ within the textual structure require further 
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consideration.  Our focus now turns to fandom as a specific site of audience and 
textual interaction; locating and examining the „mobility‟ of fans within and in 
relation to the structured text of Formula One through the affective investments, 
intensities, engagements and experiences that are embedded in the concrete 
practices of being a fan.   
                                                 
1
 Two additional POV films warrant mentioning.  The first is Russian Ark (Sokurov, 2002), which 
claims to be a film shot in a single take from the POV of an unknown protagonist viewing 300 
years of Russian history.  While experimental, viewers hear but never see the protagonist whose 
POV viewers are purported to be „sharing‟.  Additionally, the protagonist is unseen to all but one 
„guide‟ character who engages in direct address with the camera as a talking subject.  Despite the 
intended effect, without the physical presence of a protagonist, the POV is disembodying (i.e., not 
connected to a particular character or body) and seems to operate more as the POV of the all-
seeing camera navigating the film‟s diegetic space.  The second is a cinematic representation of 
the video game, Doom (Bartkowiak, 2006).  Shot primarily through „objective‟ cameras, the film 
provides a brief POV sequence near the end which replicates the first-person shooter (FPS) video 
game perspective.  As the brief filmic POV sequence equates to Klevjer‟s (2003) notion of the 
„subjective camera-gun‟, discussed in relation to POV and FPS video games later in this chapter, 
the cinematic version of Doom (as well as Russian Ark) are not examined in this chapter. 
2
 Clover (1987, 1992) suggests that identification in slasher films oscillates between both the 
„killer‟ male and female „victim‟, often reinforced by a representational shift in POV as the camera 
increasingly reveals the victim‟s perspective during the course of the film.  Although not generic, I 
suggest that POV representations in horror and slasher films tend to make the viewer identify (or 
empathise) with the victim, as the killer/monster is often unknown and its identity is often 
concealed through the POV shot (Kawin, 1992; Shaviro, 2003). Through narrative and filmic 
establishing conventions, the victims are already known to us.  Alternatively, serial killer films 
tend to focus on the killer as protagonist and, in the case of „true‟ accounts of famous killers, retell 
their crimes through filmic representation, with the POV representations offering us an insight into 
how (and perhaps why) they conducted their brutal acts.  With the victims often unknown, they 
usually also become meaningless; thus, as viewers we „identify‟ with the killer, although I assume 
many viewers find this troubling and still empathise with the victims.  Suggestive of the levels of 
multiple identification in operation, I find myself „identifying‟ with the killer in both horror and 
serial killer films and relish the POV perspectives for macabre scenes.  These paradoxical findings 
suggest more research is needed on POV representations and the implications for viewer 
identification in these genres. 
3
 These findings by film theorists were oppositional to my „reading‟ of Lady in the Lake.  Rather 
than lacking identification, I found its sustained use of POV both compelling and engrossing.  As a 
viewer, I too had an „active‟ role in the film, being thrust directly into the narrative and seemingly 
participating in these events as they unfolded.  Perhaps this reflects my historical and cultural 
situatedness in a video games generation in which sharing viewpoints with characters is a common 
and personally alluring experience.  While permitted to „share‟ Marlowe‟s viewpoint for almost 
the entirety of the film, one clear distinction was a lack of control over what course of action 
Marlowe decides, which is a crucial component to the video games experience. 
4
 With the multiple cameras and viewpoints in Formula One, there may be no single object as 
represented in Branigan‟s diagram.  Object is placed at the front of the car with a question mark in 
Figures 2 and 3 because, although this may be the object for the forward facing cameras, these 
other camera positions and viewpoints (4 and 5) draw on the driver as an object, position 3 frames 
behind the car, while other positions (6, 7, 8, and 9) seem to utilise the driver as both a subject and 
object.  
5
 My OBC analysis covers the period 1998 – 2006 and excludes Formula One‟s first night race, the 
2008 Singapore Grand Prix. 
6
 Helmet-Cam technology does exist in Formula One, it simply has not been drawn upon in the 
ITV global coverage.  For example, promotional footage can be viewed on youtube.com for 
Renault and BMW post-2005 which provide Helmet-Cam perspectives.  Additionally, for the final 
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Formula One race of his career, David Coulthard utilised a Helmet-Cam variation at Brazil in 
2008.  Unfortunately, Coulthard was involved in a crash at turn one of the opening lap so global 
viewers had one fleeting replay through which to view this technology.  Fan forums implied that 
Coulthard‟s perspective had been available in Britain for the practice sessions, although many 
complained about the view; intimating that this was from chin/mouth level rather than an eyeline 
match.  I suspect Helmet-Cam variations will become increasingly prominent in future global 
Formula One coverage. 
7
 The Studio Liverpool Formula One games were released as Formula One and the relevant year 
2001-2003 (e.g., Formula One 2002); the games from 2004-2006 have used the abbreviation F1; 
for example, F1 2005.  It should also be noted that no Studio Liverpool Formula One games were 
released post-2006, allegedly due to a financial dispute with Bernie Ecclestone, although the rival 
company, Codemasters, have signed up to release Formula One games on multiple platforms from 
2009. 
8
 Cynically, one could assert that interaction is always in operation for the drivers who are 
constantly engaged in button-pushing due to the reliance on technology and driver aids in modern 
Formula One: for example, Brawn‟s comments on the McLaren drivers (“Nowhere to hide”, 
1998); see also Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
JV and Me: The Affective Practices and Performances of Formula 
One Fandom in Everyday Life 
The previous chapters have examined the mediated apparatus of Formula One, as 
well as traced a „funnelling‟ approach to the collective viewing experience it 
affords its global audience, orientating us towards a recognition of the 
increasingly atomised possibilities that these telecasts and technologies may 
generate for individual viewers.  By accounting for the socially constructed 
affective investments of fandom in this chapter, the „funnelled‟ distillation to an 
individual‟s experiences of Formula One (e.g., to the intensity of actual fandom) 
is now investigated, with my fandom becoming the central object of enquiry for 
the remainder of the thesis.  To afford such an analysis, the „layers‟ to my 
Formula One fandom (see the first section of Chapter Two above for a discussion 
of layers in this sense) are mapped in relation to the diverse mediated, 
consumptive and affective practices undertaken by a fan; interrelated processes 
that, as has been argued, are under-examined in sport and media research.  In 
particular, this chapter establishes how fandom is shaped through mediation; 
determined by consumption and, finally, how affect permeates the performances, 
practices and lived moments as a fan in daily life.  First, however, the three 
„moments‟ or „waves‟ of studies of fandom and fan cultures (Hills, 2006; Jenkins, 
2006b; Sandvoss, 2005) are acknowledged and detailed. 
Early Theories of the Fan: Pathology, „Active‟ Audiences and Resistance 
Literature on fandom was „relatively sparse‟ during the period 1960-1990 (Jenson, 
1992) and, reflecting a deterministic structure of „effected‟ audiences versus 
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simplified notions of audience „agency‟, not surprisingly the psychologically-
derived studies of media „effects‟ or „uses and gratifications‟ were influential in 
early studies of fandom.  Deviance or fandom as pathology was the initial and 
prime framework from which all fandom was understood, with Jenson (1992) 
noting that, essentially, fans were categorised as either the obsessed (loner) 
individual or as part of a hysterical mob often through their positioning and 
responses to the mediated representation of celebrities.  So, obsessive fans that 
stalk or even kill celebrities, as well as „frenzied‟ and „hysterical‟ mobs (e.g., 
music crowds or football hooligans) were (and often still are) cited in academic 
and popular texts (e.g., Cashmore, 2006; Drucker & Cathcart, 1994; Hornby, 
1992; Rojek, 2001; Schickel, 1985; Vermorel, 1985).  Thus, drawing on „effects‟-
based research produced reductive categorisations of the fan which not only 
overlooked the multiplicity and diversity of fandom (e.g., in terms of people, 
practices and sites for engagement) but also had dangerous consequences by 
marking all fans as disturbed and deviating from some supposed norm (Jenson, 
1992).  Not surprisingly, assertions of „active‟ audiences (e.g., Jhally & Lewis, 
1992; Morley, 1980, 1986, 1989, 1992) and fandom as a subversive or resistant 
practice (e.g., Fiske, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1993) shaped the first „wave‟ of 
fan studies‟ reaction to these stigmatised and pathological representations of the 
fan.  Thus, Jenkins (2006b) notes that the „ethnographic‟ turn and notions of the 
audience as „active‟ were salient to constituting and shaping the field from a 
cultural studies perspective.   
The second wave of fan studies drew on these approaches, revealing greater 
complexity to fandom than mere pathological traits by investigating fan identities 
and providing a voice for this marginalised group.  As Jenkins (2006b) notes 
retrospectively,  
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We‟re trying to find a way to alter that perception based on 
insider knowledge of what it is to be a fan, and struggling to 
find a language to articulate a different perspective that 
comes out of lived experience and situated knowledge.   
(p. 12) 
Hence, seminal fan studies works by Bacon-Smith (1992), Jenkins (1992) and 
Lewis (1992) were both politically motivated in terms of a politics of 
representation and were “concerned with issues of cultural power” (Hills, 2006,  
p. 100), (e.g., by theorising fandom through an incorporation/resistance 
framework such as Hall‟s [1996] encoding/decoding model).  While subversion or 
resistance were often over-emphasised in these first and second „wave‟ fan 
accounts (especially Fiske – see critiques in Chapter Two), the second wave 
introduced the key concept of fandom as a performance which would not only 
shape emerging concepts of the audience (e.g., Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998; 
Alasuutari, 1999; Jenkins, 2006a), but would underpin the contemporary third 
„wave‟ of fan studies in cultural studies.  These emerging concepts of 
performance, the audience and contemporary fan studies will be developed 
shortly.  First, however, the various conceptualisations of sport fandom will be 
traced as the relevant works generally provide overlapping findings, although they 
were often grounded in mainstream sociological analysis and produced 
independently of the emerging media studies/cultural studies academic canon. 
Sport Fandom: „Uses and Gratifications‟, Typologies and „Active‟ Audiences 
In relation to sport, analyses of fandom generally eschewed the early pathological 
links although still provide problematic renderings of „fans‟.  Many early authors 
turned to „uses and gratifications‟ research to understand fandom, focusing on the 
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spectating practices, viewing habits and/or behaviours of fans in relation to their 
uses of television.  While these studies provided a sociological rather than 
psychological framework for analysis, such studies only locate „fandom‟ in 
relation to one medium, fail to examine the „delivery system‟ of television in any 
depth and still share the behaviourist perspective of fandom through their 
application of a „uses and gratifications‟ model.  Therefore, reflecting Grossberg‟s 
(1992b) critique of an audience studies which creates unified audiences and 
reduces lived reality to constructions of meaning (discussed in Chapter Two), 
such accounts establish the routines and behaviours which fans engage in and 
apply these to particular societal functions and viewer motivations (a critique 
equally applicable to the cultural studies second „wave‟ of fan studies).  In 
accordance with these studies, researchers assert that television sport spectatorship 
becomes a „ritual‟ for fans (Eastman & Riggs, 1994) which draws on viewing 
behaviours and routines (both personal and collective) to shape or alter their sport 
viewing experiences.  Television sport spectatorship also offers a supposedly 
„mythic‟ identification and ritual for the „deep fan‟ (Real & Mechikoff, 1992), 
while providing a temporary community for fans when viewed, for example, in 
sport bars (Eastman & Land, 1997).  Viewer motivation is also a salient theme for 
these studies, noting the appeal of a favourite team or player, as well as the 
unpredictability of the contest (Wenner & Gantz, 1989), the greater investment 
and involvement of fans over non-fans (Gantz & Wenner, 1995) and the gendered 
viewing hours, patterns or appeal of specific sports (Sargent, Zillman & Weaver, 
1998; Wenner & Gantz, 1998).   
Other research attempted to characterise, measure and determine who is and 
what makes a sport fan through psychologically-based accounts.  Fandom and its 
functions are measured through various devices purported to account for a fan‟s 
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motivation, as well as the impact and effect of specific mediations, sports, teams 
and stars.  For some studies, this facilitates the production of set psychological 
typologies and circumscribed functions to be determined for fans and spectators 
(e.g., Jones, 2000), as well as having specific implications related to the selection 
of certain „heroic‟ types.  As an example, Wann, Melnick, Russell and Pease‟s 
(2001) research mentions Jacques Villeneuve (who, incidentally, is bracketed with 
„daredevil‟ stuntman, Evil Kenevil), suggesting that fans of either of these two are 
most likely to be „sensation seeking‟.  The authors do not define what „sensation 
seeking‟ means yet have based their analysis around emulation and “the interplay 
between personality traits and hero selection” (Wann et al., 2001, p. 86).  Thus, 
through a reductive and therefore problematic typology, the fandom of Villeneuve 
or Kenevil is reduced to an inferred „risk-taker‟ or „daredevil‟ mentality and 
psychological make-up which, as a primary explanation, seems contestable, 
contradictory and too simplistic for theorising my affective fan relationship with 
Villeneuve (e.g., see broader discussion of why Villeneuve „matters‟ in Chapter 
Seven).  Other empirical works provide similar, deductive findings, with sport fan 
motivation deemed to operate within the binary of being either a team or 
individual orientated fan (Wann, Schrader &Wilson, 1999), while Jones (2000) 
assigns football fans to specific behavioural types in relation to their levels of 
social identification as fans.  Although less positivistic in orientation than the 
works cited, other authors have linked fandom to consumption (e.g., Crawford, 
2004; Giulianotti, 2002; Gruneau & Whitson, 1993; Guttmann, 1986; Sandvoss, 
2005) which will be returned to in due course here, through a consideration of 
consumption as a significant layer within contemporary fandom and fan practices. 
Influenced by the ethnographic turn in the social sciences, as well as notions 
of „active‟ audiences, many sport researchers turned to qualitative methods and 
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cultural studies to counter the previously psychologically-derived or universalistic 
accounts of sport fandom.  Thus Trujillo and Krizek (1994) explore fan 
identification through the fan‟s emotional attachment to community as expressed 
through ballparks in baseball, while works on football fandom consider the 
shifting sense of self-identity among fans (A. Brown [Ed.], 1998; Redhead, 1997; 
Sandvoss, 2003), the broader dynamics of identification, machoism and 
surveillance culture embedded in football hooliganism (Armstrong, 1998; 
Armstrong & Harris, 1991; Giulianotti, 1995; Giulianotti, Bonney & Hepworth, 
1994) and the increasing fan ambivalence towards changes taking place in 
contemporary football competitions (Williams, 2007).  Additionally, the gendered 
nature of fandom is explored in sport, with Bruce (1998a) and Duncan and 
Brummett (1993) emphasising sources of empowerment and socio-cultural 
identity formation for female fans shaped through their negotiation with and 
reconstruction of televised sport representations, while Gmelch and San Antonio 
(1998) draw on similar themes to analyse female participation in the stigmatised 
practice of being baseball „groupies‟.   
For some researchers, the ethnographic turn also facilitated a self analysis of 
one‟s own fandom.  Therefore, Jhally (1998) explores the tensions and 
contradictions at play in fandom through his own temporal discomfort in 
supporting the English football club Chelsea during the period that they were 
sponsored by Coors, the American beer company then associated in their 
organisational practices with racial intolerance and bigotry.  For Lessem (1991), 
becoming an adult sport fan exposes contradictions he was less aware of as a child 
and, as a sports reporter, his childhood obsession with athletes has been 
transformed to disillusionment through his encounters with many high profile 
athletes.  Rowe (2000, 2003) turns to ethnographic fiction to unravel the 
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pathological stigma behind individual fandom, providing an imaginative and 
hyperbolic account of the over-identification and excessive consumption required 
by an obsessed football fan.  Finally, Farred (2002) considers mediation, identity 
and emotional affiliation through his own long distance fandom of the Liverpool 
Football Club.  Farred reveals that his fandom has been profoundly mediated, 
residing in South Africa yet supporting Liverpool for 30 years without ever 
having seen them play live in-person.  Nevertheless, despite this geographical 
distance and reliance on mediation, Farred (2002) suggests that, since childhood, 
“I learnt the pain and pleasure of living and dying with every Liverpool result”  
(p. 13).  Farred‟s work in particular has clear implications for my own research on 
the territorialization of fandom, as well as mediation as both a facilitator of 
fandom and for identity construction, which will be returned to in discussions of 
mediation and mediated engagement as a significant first layer(ing) for fandom. 
The Contemporary „Third-Wave‟ of Fan Studies: Consumption, Performance and 
Affect  
As noted earlier, the second „wave‟ of fan studies signposted a significant 
theoretical orientation for understanding fandom; the role of performance.  Thus, 
these earlier scholars (e.g., Bacon-Smith, 1992; Brooker, 2002; Fiske, 1987, 
1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1993; Harrington & Bielby, 1995; Jenkins, 1992; Lancaster, 
2001; Tulloch & Jenkins, 1995) conceptualised both an „active‟ and productive 
role for fans, suggesting that rather than being merely duped by or simply 
consumers of media, fans reintegrate these texts with productive elements.  
Therefore, fans scavenge, poach, (re)appropriate and reconfigure media texts 
through their close engagements, encyclopaedic knowledge and diverse uses of 
them.  Additionally, fans often produce their own texts related to but separate 
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from an existing „official‟ or original media text producing, for example, fan art, 
fiction, slash/fiction and fan zines.  Focusing on these „active‟, performative and 
productive roles, the second wave scholars argued that fan media were significant 
for constructing new meanings and pleasures previously overlooked in the fan 
literature (e.g., Bacon-Smith, 1992; Fiske, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1993; 
Jenkins, 1992; Lancaster, 2001).   
Sandvoss (2005) notes that, 
More than a decade later, the need for such a partisan 
representation has disappeared...with the proliferation of 
multi-channel television and the arrival of new information 
technologies such as the internet, fandom seems to have 
become a common and ordinary aspect of everyday life in 
the industrialized world that is actively fostered and utilized 
in industry marketing strategies.  (p. 3) 
Therefore, the third wave of contemporary fan studies comes to an already 
established academic field, as well as a seemingly „self-evident‟ phenomenon (see 
further definitions of fandom shortly), inclusive of emerging socio-cultural 
theories of the „performativity‟ of sport fans (see Crawford, 2004; Sandvoss, 
2003, 2005).  In this third wave, notions of „active‟ audiences and multiplicity are 
assumed and ground the analyses, as often does an openness about one‟s own 
fandom without what Jenkins (2006b) labels the “obligation of defensiveness” (p. 
12) around asserting one‟s own position.  In this respect, the interplay among fan 
performance, identity, consumption, media texts, technology and everyday life 
provides the terrain for third wave scholars to navigate, negotiate and theorise 
contemporary fandom.  However, rather than a uniform set of criteria or 
definitional terms, many authors favour conceptualising a more fluid and dynamic 
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fandom which fluctuates and undergoes continuous change.  As Hills (2002) 
cautions, “fandom is not simply a „thing‟ that can be picked over analytically.  It 
is also always performative; by which I mean that it is an identity which is (dis-) 
claimed, and which performs cultural work” (p. xi).  Therefore, these approaches 
allow scholars not only to foreground the consumptive practices of fans 
(Crawford, 2004; Hills, 2002; Jenkins, 2006a, 2006b; Sandvoss, 2005), but also to 
understand fandom as performative (Hills, 2002; Jenkins, 1992, 2006a, 2006b; 
Lancaster, 2001; Sandvoss, 2005), as operating through sensibility and affect 
(Gray, 2003; Grossberg, 1992a, 1992b) and fan culture as a social career 
(Crawford, 2004).  Moreover, recent fan studies recognise even more the 
importance of fandom in everyday life, revealing mundane and „ordinary‟ aspects 
of fandom, as well as the significance of their everyday practices (Crawford, 
2004; Crawford & Rutter, 2006, 2007; Gray, Sandvoss & Harrington, 2007; Hills, 
2005; 2006; Jenkins, 2006b; Sandvoss, 2003, 2005) rather than just the 
„exceptional‟ or „dedicated‟ fans documented primarily in the second wave of fan 
studies (e.g., Bacon-Smith, 1992; Brooker, 2002; Jancovich, 2002; Jenkins, 1992; 
Tulloch & Jenkins, 1995). 
Emerging Concepts of the Audience - The „Diffused‟ and „Interactive‟ Audience 
Alongside the seminal works of the second wave of fan studies, Abercrombie and 
Longhurst (1998) have been influential in shaping the contemporary orientation 
towards performance in fan studies.  In particular, Abercrombie and Longhurst 
(1998) suggest that a new paradigm for audience research has emerged based on 
the centrality of the spectacle in society and notions of audience performativity.  
This differs to Goffman‟s (1959) ahistorical notion of performance as a universal 
human condition (Sandvoss, 2005) by identifying performativity as a specific 
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contemporary and mediated condition linked to the concept of the spectacle.  
Coining the term the diffused audience, these authors note the pervasiveness of 
multiple, overlapping forms of mediation (mediascapes), suggesting that “the 
media and everyday life have become so closely interwoven that they are almost 
inseparable” (Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998, p. 69).  As I noted in Chapter 
Two, mediascapes construct and shape social reality, with Sandvoss (2005) 
arguing that there is a tendency for “spectacle to replace any direct experience of 
the world with mediated representation” (p. 52; see also Debord, 1994; Kellner, 
2003).  Therefore, not only are we simultaneously consumers and members of an 
audience through processes of commodification in (late) capitalist societies but, in 
addition, we are always already members of an audience reliant on performativity 
(e.g., adopting various „active‟ forms of participation to „perform‟ as an audience 
member) to facilitate our engagement with these multiple media spectacles.  
Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) observe that, “in contemporary society, 
everyone becomes an audience all the time.  Being a member of an audience is no 
longer an exceptional event, nor even an everyday event.  Rather it is constitutive 
of everyday life” (pp. 68-69).   
By reorientating the conceptualisation of audiences to notions of spectacle, 
performativity and everyday life, Abercrombie and Longhurst‟s diffused audience 
moves away from previous models focussed either on the addressing of the 
message (a specific focus on the „dominant‟ text) or an incorporation/resistance 
relationship to the text (a specific focus on the „dominant‟ audience).  In fact, the 
diffused audience concept often collapses the apparent distance between audiences 
and performers suggesting that, for example, at „live‟ music concerts and sporting 
events not only do the „stars‟ provide a performance but audiences simultaneously 
perform their role as audience members for others to observe (e.g., these 
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„audiences‟ watch and are being watched concurrently).  Furthermore, the diffused 
audience also provides a broader recognition of audience multiplicity through an 
awareness that we are not only audiences all the time but comprise multiple 
audiences at any one time.  Such a perspective is supported by other theorists, 
with Alasuutari (1999) suggesting that being an audience member relies on a 
cultural performance of identity.  Moreover, Abercrombie and Longhurst‟s shift 
from the „exceptional‟ to quotidian performances of audiences is discernible in 
other „postmodern‟ audience texts, which focus on the „everyday‟ experiences of 
the audience (Bird, 2003), as well as the often contradictory and shifting media 
subjectivities of audiences engaged with various media texts (Ang, 1996).  
Finally, Abercrombie and Longhurst‟s diffused audience accommodates the 
diversity and geographical spread for audiences, as well as explaining the paradox 
of being fragmented yet also collectively part of multiple, overlapping audiences 
(e.g., spatially as local and global, or public and private audiences).   
Through a more explicit investigation of the interactive relationship audiences 
have with the media, Jenkins‟ (2006a, 2006b, 2007) concept of interactive 
audiences complements the diffused audience paradigm.  In particular, Jenkins 
(2006a, 2006b) advocates recognising the interactive, participatory and 
knowledge cultures that are forged around the convergence of media texts, 
technologies and socio-cultural groupings in contemporary society.  As Jenkins 
(2006a) notes,  
I will argue against the idea that convergence should be 
understood primarily as a technological process bringing 
together multiple media functions within the same devices.  
Instead, convergence represents a cultural shift as consumers 
are encouraged to seek out new information and make 
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connections among dispersed media content...Convergence 
occurs within the brains of individual consumers and 
through their social interactions with others.  (p. 3) 
Paramount to Jenkins‟ theorising is reorientating the producer/consumer binary to 
an interactive and potentially overlapping (although clearly not always equitable) 
relationship which can flow among media consumers, between media consumers 
and media texts, and between media consumers and producers.  Thus, in 
contemporary society, audiences (or consumers) can simultaneously be producers 
through not only do-it-yourself technologies (e.g., digital cameras, photoshop 
software/programmes, etc.), but can also “archive, annotate, appropriate, and 
recirculate media content” (Jenkins, 2006b, p. 135), while being encouraged by 
media conglomerates to access content across multiple media formats.  However, 
he shuns ascribing complete autonomy or agency to the audience given the 
unlevel media playing field in which most interaction takes place, especially in 
terms of the ownership, distribution and control of most mainstream media by 
corporations or specific individuals.  Nevertheless, Jenkins (2006b) views 
audiences as more critically aware and discriminating in their use of the media 
and, as members of an audience, he suggests that they can potentially occupy the 
diverse roles of media consumer, fan, producer, distributor, publicist and critic 
simultaneously.  Additionally, through their interactivity with texts, producers and 
each other, audiences are more socially connected in their consumption (or 
production), use and exchange of media texts and technologies, while forging 
both unified and diverse groupings around these practices.  Underpinning Jenkins‟ 
argument is not only a shift from „passive‟ audiences but also a critique of 
assumptions about either their unity or audiences as mere receivers of media 
content.   
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Moreover, Jenkins (2006a, 2006b) recognises the participatory cultures that 
arise out of these interactive relationships, particularly noting the formation of 
knowledge cultures that allow for voluntary, temporary and tactical affiliations 
among their members.  According to Jenkins, through such knowledge cultures, 
interactive audiences can contribute to many communities at once (often on a 
global scale) and can determine and define the scale of their own membership 
(based primarily on affinity and emotional investment), while these communities 
become sites for „collective intelligence‟ which pools and shares the collective 
interest and mutual production of knowledge for a specific phenomenon (e.g., fan 
communities for specific media texts).  Therefore, such knowledge cultures offer 
audiences of specific media content/texts broader networks of „expertise‟, forums 
for debates, channels for lobbying producers and “multiple and unstable forms of 
recontextualisation” (Jenkins, 2006b, p. 140).  Additionally, the creation of 
numerous on-line communities has afforded a greater fluidity for audience 
interactivity in terms of circumventing many of the previous temporal and spatial 
limitations through the immediacy and the deterritorialising characteristics of the 
internet.  Finally, while Jenkins (2006a, 2006b) cautions against celebrating or 
overstating the „power‟ that these interactive audiences wield in relation to 
„traditional‟ media producers, he points out that, collectively, these interactive, 
participatory and knowledge cultures produce and circulate dispersed forms of 
knowledge that media outlets cannot completely control.   
Defining Fandom 
Having traced the three „waves‟ of fan studies, as well as two key emerging 
conceptualisations of the audience, defining the field of study more exactly is also 
required here.  Despite the widespread use of „fan‟ or „fandom‟ in both popular 
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culture and academic texts, fandom remains elusive to definition or categorisation, 
especially in relation to what constitutes an „authentic‟ fan or articulating 
distinctions between levels of fandom (Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998; 
Crawford, 2004; Hills, 2002; Jenkins, 1992, 2007; Sandvoss, 2005).  This is 
reflected in both sport and television, where some authors have tried to articulate a 
distinction between „live‟ attendance and television spectatorship (e.g., Guttmann, 
1986; Wann et al., 2001), sport spectatorship and fandom (e.g., see discussion of 
Schirato [2007b] later in this chapter), sport „fans‟ versus „consumers‟ (e.g., 
Giulianotti, 2002; Gruneau & Whitson, 1993) or distinctions between „viewers‟ 
and „fans‟ through their uses of television (e.g., Bacon-Smith, 1992; Gray, 2003; 
Jenkins, 1992).  Others, such as Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) have 
attempted to map fan distinctions along a continuum related to media use, 
connectivity and the object of focus.  While useful for explaining distinctions 
between the intensities of engagement and investment, Abercrombie and 
Longhurst (1998) ultimately (and simplistically) equate fandom with low 
investment and high consumption (see also Giulianotti, 2002; Gruneau & 
Whitson, 1993), while they use the term „cultist‟ to describe what for many 
appears broadly to mean fandom (e.g., defined through explicit attachments to 
stars or particular media).  For example, Sandvoss (2005) suggests „cultist‟ does 
not seem applicable for many genres, observing that his research participants refer 
to themselves as football fans which can be broadly transposed across other forms 
of sport fandom (e.g., „cultists‟ seems nonsensical as a definitional term in sport).  
This perspective is reinforced by Hills (2002), who observes that “it seems faintly 
unhelpful to produce a taxonomy in which the definition of „fan‟ is at odds with 
the use of this term in almost all other literature in the field” (p. ix).  Most likely, 
the term cultist has been adapted from the large body of work which originated in 
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and generally focused on fandom and cult media (e.g., Bacon-Smith, 1992; 
Brooker, 2002; Hills, 2004; Jancovich, 2002; Jenkins, 1992; Lancaster, 2001; 
Tulloch & Jenkins, 1995).  Problematically, however, these scholars have often 
only located and conceptualised fandom in relation to cult media while 
overlooking how fandom operates in other forms of popular culture, such as sport 
and music (see Crawford, 2004; Ehrenreich et al, 1992; Hinerman, 1992; 
Nightingale, 1994; Sandvoss, 2003, 2005). 
For others, fandom is „common knowledge‟ and does not necessarily require 
specific definition.  Indeed, Hills observes that most authors „assume‟ that readers 
already know what fandom is, providing his own useful definition when he 
surmises that, (2002) 
Everybody knows what a „fan‟ is.  It‟s somebody who is 
obsessed with a particular star, celebrity, film, TV 
programme, band; somebody who can produce reams of 
information on their object of fandom, and can quote their 
favoured lines or lyrics, chapter and verse.  (p. ix)  
Thus, given the „commonality‟ of fandom, some authors have noted that fan self-
identification may also be applicable (e.g., Crawford, 2004; Hills, 2006; Jenkins, 
2006b; Sandvoss, 2005) since drawing conceptual and definitional boundaries 
around fandom and fan practices on others‟ behalf is vexed (e.g., limiting fandom 
to only cult media, or avoiding the previous pathological links).  Moreover, as 
Jenkins (2007) argues, to some extent „we‟ all have become fans through 
engaging in contemporary society‟s interactive, participatory and knowledge 
cultures.  Clearly, however, not all people are „fans‟ or are comfortable with being 
labelled „fans‟.  I would suggest that six distinct influences appear to underpin and 
shape contemporary fandom.  These influences are: 1) fandom operates largely in 
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popular culture, 2) fandom is reliant on mass mediation (texts and technologies), 
as well as 3) popular identities (celebrities and stars), and fandom is increasing 
influenced by 4) commercialisation, 5) commodification, and 6) the socio-cultural 
performances and practices of fans (with their temporal/spatial implications).  
Hills (2006) correctly observes the “„intense‟ relationship” (p. 100, italics in 
original) that fans have with the media, shaped through their engagement with 
texts, famous individuals and their array of consumptive and/or performative 
practices.  This is supported by Sandvoss‟ (2005) useful definition of fandom, 
which he suggests is “the regular, emotionally involved consumption of a given 
popular narrative or text” (p. 8, italics in original), whether the „narrative‟ or 
„text‟ is either a specific media text (e.g. book, television show, film, etc.) or more 
broadly applied to other popular „texts‟ such as specific sport teams or 
stars/celebrities (who, of course, operate primarily as star images or texts anyway 
– e.g., see Dyer, 1979, 1986; McDonald, 2000; G. Turner, 2004; Whannel, 2002). 
While it is difficult to adequately capture and theorise „emotional 
involvement‟, or audience pleasures as a closely related notion (see Hills, 2002; 
Jenkins, 2006a; Ruddock, 2007; Staiger, 2005; Whannel, 1998), I would suggest 
that the notion of fan „intensity‟ can most usefully be understood through 
Grossberg‟s (1992a, 1992b) concept of affect.  In particular, affect offers a 
vocabulary for articulating the emotional attachment to and investment in media 
objects/texts by fans, the affective relationships and practices fans engage in, and 
the temporal, spatial and embodied dynamics which underpin the intensities of 
such investments.  Therefore, although fandom is an “essentially contradictory 
process” (Hills, 2002, p. 182, italics in original), I will draw upon Grossberg‟s 
concept of affect to articulate fandom as a shifting project of the social self which 
draws upon an embodied, emotive and affective relationship with a media 
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object/text.  In the process, the „fan-self‟ undergoes constant reinvention through 
his/her intensities of experience, fluctuating levels of energies and engagement, 
performative and consumptive (re)affiliation(s) with the media object and wider 
communal interactions within a broader cultural, economic and mediated social 
structure, all of which are embedded within the specificity of spatial and temporal 
„moments‟.   
Mediated Fandom and Formula One 
As my previous chapters have argued, Formula One is a profoundly mediated 
sport and, for most of its global audience, is „experienced‟ primarily through its 
televised coverage.  Therefore, although both Chapters Four and Five theorised 
how televised Formula One is constructed through its compositional elements, as 
well as some of the implications these have for viewers (especially through 
innovative televisual technologies and the „participatory‟ point-of-view 
perspectives from the on-board cameras), specific and concrete instances of 
viewer engagement with these televised images were absent from my prior 
analysis.  To „flesh out‟ an analysis of mediated fandom, such examples are now 
required to demonstrate my own „engagement‟ with the Formula One text as a 
fan, conceived within the theoretical framework I have just elaborated.  Therefore, 
in this section on mediated fandom, two „generic‟ examples of my televised 
Formula One viewing are provided to reveal some of the more specific practices 
and engagements that underpin my televised viewing as a fan.   
It‟s nearly midnight.  The last few hours have seemed endless but now the 
evening is about to start.  Bolting upright from my reclining position on the couch, 
I reach for the remote controls.  As „we‟ cross live to the Grand Prix I press 
record on my VCR and turn the volume up on the television.  I hope my 
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neighbours are asleep or at least accustomed to the excess noise I generate on 
Sunday nights.  While the commentators highlight key things to watch for, I leap 
across to my computer and ensure the website is running.  The live timing screen 
pops up with all the names listed on the starting grid.  I glance back at the 
television as the cars embark on their formation lap.  I see Jacques‟ BMW for the 
first time. “He‟s so cool,” I exclaim to myself, staring at his distinctive helmet; 
the bright blue, pink, yellow, green and red colours resplendent against the white 
backdrop of his car.  Pride and expectation wells up inside me.  “Let‟s go 
Jacques,” I whisper, hopeful he can produce something today.  I can‟t sit down, 
pacing back and forward between couch and computer, anticipating Jacques‟ 
start.... 
Returning to the edge of the couch I watch the light sequence begin.  My 
focus is on Villeneuve‟s start from 10th.  The lights fade.  Springing to life, 22 
cars explode off the grid.  “Go JV!”  Unsure if that was an internal thought, I 
catch myself yelling, “Yes.  Go Jacques go!” as Jacques negotiates the first 
corner and battles with Trulli and Schumacher for position.  The camera cuts to 
the front runners.  Perched on the edge of my couch I am eager to know whether 
he is ahead of these two competitors.  Leaping over to the computer I await the 
first sector times, while rapidly rechecking the on-screen televisual action.  There 
is a BMW in the background but the focal point is the race leaders and I can‟t 
make out the helmet from this shot.  Like a slot-machine spitting out coins, the 
computer instantly updates positions with a flurry of names and numbers leaping 
on the screen.  P8.  “Thataboy!!! C‟mon Jacques!!”  JV has jumped Heidfeld and 
Trulli.  He is just behind Schumacher, but not by much… 
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Although a „generic‟ account of a „typical‟ viewing experience for myself, 
such an autoethnographic narrative offers an insight into both mediated fandom 
more broadly, and Formula One fandom specifically.  One of the first insights this 
vignette provides is the solitary nature of my Formula One viewing practices.  As 
I noted in Chapter Two, locality and place clearly impact on viewing televised 
Formula One in New Zealand, with a midnight start on Sunday nights for most 
European races not affording many opportunities for socialising or viewing in a 
communal setting.  Such an occurrence goes against the significance of communal 
settings for fandom established both in the sport literature (e.g., Crawford, 2004; 
Eastman & Land, 1997; Sandvoss, 2003, 2005; Trujillo & Krizek, 1994; Wenner 
& Gantz, 1998) and increasingly being emphasised in more recent research on fan 
communities (e.g., Gray, Sandvoss & Harrington, 2007; Hills, 2002; Jenkins, 
2006a, 2006b).  Of course, that is not to say that all races have been viewed in 
solitude as, on occasion, I have met up friends (or they have joined me) to watch 
Grands Prix but the majority of my viewings have been alone (friends like to 
remind me that they have „real jobs‟ to go to Monday mornings too).  Of course, 
on a broader theoretical level, despite the absence of other people within the 
confines of the specific locality for the majority of my viewings, Formula One‟s 
mediation through live screened images and the role of commentators work to 
transform the telecast into an event that I „share‟ simultaneously with a large 
global audience.  Thus, these processes hail, interpellate and position me as part of 
a collective and „imagined‟ Formula One community (Althusser, 1977; Anderson, 
1991) while facilitating my „shared‟ reception and use of the dominant (televisual) 
Formula One text.  This also provides, at a macro socio-cultural level, both a 
„structure‟ and a communal element to my supposedly „isolated‟ or „solitary‟ 
viewing: the ITV global Formula One telecast.  For example, through social 
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encounters with either other people in my locality (or through accessing Formula 
One internet sites) after the race, there is a single, dominant televised and global 
Formula One text that, collectively, as viewers (or internet users) „we‟ understand, 
reflect on and can comment upon even if „our‟ experience, memories, meanings 
and even uses or pleasures of that text differed.   
However, on a micro-level, „my‟ narrative reveals some discrepancies and 
specificity to my patterns of viewership.  For example, while I am reliant upon, 
and both use and „share‟ the dominant global televisual text, the attention I devote 
to this one text is often of a more diffused, dispersed or interactive form.  This 
reflects but also differs from theories of the distracted glance when viewing 
television (e.g., Caldwell, 1995; Cubitt, 1984; Ellis, 1992; Gray, 2003), as my 
viewing is not distracted by either the specifics of my domestic setting (e.g., 
attending to domestic „chores‟ or other family/household members while 
viewing), nor due to „channel surfing‟ through other programming options, 
although I am clearly engaging in other activities while viewing.  Rather, the 
diffused or dispersed attention is derived from the “„intense‟ relationship” (Hills, 
2006, p. 100, italics in original) that I have with Jacques Villeneuve.  As he is the 
explicit object of my attention during a Grand Prix, my attention is piqued as part 
of the televisual audience when either Villeneuve‟s image or name is on offer 
(e.g., through screened images, commentary or graphics).  However, the dominant 
global telecast also needs to continually hail, evoke and „work for‟ my attention as 
an audience member (Cubitt, 2005a) due to my fragmented viewing practice of 
drawing on contemporaneous live timing from the internet.  In fact, due to 
Villeneuve‟s absent-present representation on televised coverage (elaborated in 
Chapter One), the primacy of my attention is devoted to the live timing screens on 
which Villeneuve is always present and, through my „cultural literacy‟ in the 
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sport, I can garner a greater understanding of how he is performing in a given race 
than the televised coverage often permits (of course if Villeneuve retires from a 
race, live timing is no longer relevant and the televised coverage becomes my 
prime „screen of speed‟ [Baudrillard, 2002] again).   
It would be easy to overstate a degree of fan „agency‟ here (as clearly live 
timing also becomes a „dominant‟ text that I do not „control‟) yet, through these 
diffused and distracted viewing processes, I am navigating specific media texts 
with the intensity of my attention orientated towards Villeneuve, often either 
reinforced by or in spite of whether the global telecast is actively facilitating such 
an engagement with him.  Unfortunately, at this juncture, it is easy to fall into a 
celebratory trap for fandom as either an example of the „active‟ audience or fan 
practices as resistant which the third wave of fan studies has sought to move on 
from.  Nevertheless, assumptions about fan „agency‟ will continually be examined 
in this chapter, specifically in relation to both the affective relationships and fan 
practices mapped through Grossberg‟s (1992b) theory of affect.  For now, a 
second vignette both reinforces the ideas traced thus far and offers further insights 
into my mediated fandom. 
Lap 17.  The cars are spreading out, although Schumacher is merely half a 
second ahead of Jacques.  Playing amateur strategist, I am feverishly dissecting 
each sector time and the gaps to surrounding drivers in an attempt to deduce what 
fuel loads each driver is running in the race.  The director has obviously noted 
their duel, cutting to a shot of Schumacher being pursued by Villeneuve.  My focus 
switches to the television as I listen to the commentators and see JV attacking for 
position.  Returning to the live timing, I see he is consistently improving his sector 
times.  Hearing the commentators mention JV, my head swivels back towards the 
television.  I feel a chill travel up the back of my spine as they refer to his strong 
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performances so far this season.  They remind the viewers that „we‟ are 
witnessing a tussle between two former world champions.  With a broad smile I 
leap to my feet and clap as JV pulls out of Schumacher‟s slipstream and lines up a 
pass.  The images show JV deftly overtaking Schumacher in the second corner. 
“Yes,” I cheer, punching my clenched fist in the air.  “He‟s done it!” JV has got 
the place.  I am ecstatic.  JV is returning to form and the commentators have 
noticed, praising his efforts.  I intently examine the times as the camera cuts to 
other race action.  This duel is going to be close….    
 
Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) suggest that fans are “those people who 
become particularly attached to certain programmes or stars within the context of 
relatively heavy mass media use” (p. 138; see also Drucker & Cathcart, 1994).  
Clearly, with my complete reliance on mediation to „consume‟ and follow 
Formula One, as well as my explicit focus on Villeneuve, this definition of 
fandom is applicable to my own practices.  Moreover, the nature of my 
„attachment‟ to a media star is reinforced through the work of numerous scholars 
who articulate the central role that stardom plays in attracting sport media 
audiences (Lines, 2001; Whannel, 1999, 2008), how mediation constructs and 
represents sport stardom (e.g., Andrews & Jackson, 2001; Boyle & Haynes, 2000; 
Brookes, 2002; Drucker, 1994; Rowe, 1995, 1999; Vande Berg, 1998; Whannel, 
1992, 2002) and the broader „intimate‟ (and economic) connections derived from 
mediated stardom and celebrity culture in contemporary society (e.g., Dyer, 1979, 
1986; Holmes & Redmond, 2006; Hopkins, 2002; McDonald, 2000; Rojek, 2001; 
Sconce, 2007; Sturm, 2008; G. Turner, 2004).  Unfortunately, however, often the 
research links such star/audience connections to commodification and the 
exploitation of stars (and of course, by implication, audiences too) for commercial 
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purposes, leaving the pleasures and levels of intimacy for audiences relatively 
unacknowledged (for a rare exception see Redmond, 2006).  While I turn to a 
discussion of fandom and consumption shortly, the intimate connection facilitated 
through mediation requires further attention at this point.   
Farred‟s (2002) account of his long distance love (LDL) for the Liverpool 
Football Club seems to encapsulate the „intense‟ attachment to a particular media 
text/object that I have evoked in my second narrative.  Seeking to explain his 
position, Farred (2002) argues that, “fandom will not do as a description of my 
relationship to Liverpool.  LDL is what happens when you overidentify” (p. 9), 
before going on to suggest that his version of LDL is of “enduring love, blind, 
rock-solid faith, and abiding passion” (p. 10).  Farred evokes a sense of 
verisimilitude with „my‟ experiences by revealing a long distance love which has 
been fostered through mediation, conducted in „solitude‟ (see earlier critique) 
while being experienced as an intensely passionate and emotional investment for 
over 30 years.  Despite the duration of my fandom having been shorter, aided by 
attendance at a sprinkling of live Grand Prix events and constructed through an 
attachment to a specific star rather than a team, his passionate and emotional 
attachment resonates for me.  Indeed, one could arguably read into my two 
narratives aspects of Farred‟s own experiences of televised fandom, especially 
when he cautions that “it is best not to watch Liverpool games with me, not unless 
you are as pathologically invested or exceedingly generous with the mentally 
unbalanced” (Farred, 2002, p. 13).  While his „disclaimer‟ is clearly also intended 
as humorous, the pathological link Farred makes has negative associations with 
earlier assumptions of „deviant‟ fans and continues to be reproduced in accounts 
of „obsessive‟ football fans in both popular (e.g., Hornby, 1992) and academic 
texts (e.g., Rowe, 2000, 2003); assumptions which require redress.   
319 
Nevertheless, on a primary level, notions of „overidentification‟ or the 
„obsessed‟ fan can be read into my own practices and the „excessive‟ orientation I 
have towards Villeneuve both inside and outside of mediated Grand Prix 
coverage.  Arguably, my girlfriend of six years, referred to here as Tina, 
experienced the „intensities‟ of my fandom first-hand and most profoundly during 
our relationship.  Images and narratives of Villeneuve were an everyday part of 
„our‟ relationship; with news, updates and personalised „Grand Prix‟ reports 
regularly discussed, while even (often mocking) future plans incorporating home-
built go-kart tracks and potential baby names of „little Jacques‟ were mooted but 
dismissed by her outright.  This is not to overstate my „obsession‟ though; rather, 
it is reflective of the gendered politics and gentle teasing that play out in 
relationships.  That is, Tina took an interest in Formula One and accommodated 
my „Villeneuve focus‟ despite not being a fan, while Villeneuve and Formula One 
became subjects or objects for both of us to invest in to varying degrees through 
discussions, jokes and other activities.
1
  To further develop the „obsessed‟ fan 
layering being traced here, I often wondered whether Tina avoided watching 
Formula One with me.  While race viewing was often not practical for Tina due to 
her early start on Mondays for work, I am sure the few viewing experiences we 
had together were blighted by my inability to sit still or remain calm during a race 
(as is demonstrated in my vignettes).  With Formula One coverage, Tina saw the 
full range of emotions I went through as I interacted with the television (and 
Jacques); cheering loudly and bounding around the room during a good 
performance, castigating Jacques when he made a mistake, lashing out by kicking 
or punching furniture during misfortune, or needing consoling as I sulked in the 
corner due to a poor performance or another blown engine robbing him of points.  
No doubt she was accustomed to the intensity of my passion for Jacques, although 
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she often reminded me, “He can‟t hear you!”  Indeed, reflective of the allegedly 
„obsessed‟ fan, I have a nagging suspicion that my viewing practices were an 
emotional roller coaster she preferred not to ride.   
However, linking the excesses of my own fandom to notions of 
„overidentification‟, „obsessiveness‟ and the pathological as sketched above does 
not seem to take us very far.  What is apparent in my second narrative (and 
implied in the relationship with Tina) are emotive and passionate dimensions that, 
while clearly „intense‟, are not usefully explained in terms of deviance or 
pathology (i.e., are not symptomatic of asocial, antisocial or potentially dangerous 
or harmful behaviours more generally).  Underpinning my fan vignettes are the 
mediated relationship and, particularly, the mediated engagement with diverse 
media texts (television and the internet) and media objects (Villeneuve and 
Formula One).  While I will develop and map Grossberg‟s (1992a, 1992b) 
concept of affect in due course as a means for exploring „pleasure‟ and emotional 
investment in popular cultural forms, a framework for theorising the mediated 
engagement with texts and objects is offered through the concept of embodiment.   
At a basic level, the media can be conceived as „extensions of self‟ 
(McLuhan, 1964) which expand our perceptory senses through the amplified 
functions particular media offer our embodied selves (e.g., our eyes, cameras and 
the resultant enhanced perception of vision through visual images; or our ears, 
audio technologies and their implications for hearing and sound).  Unfortunately, 
however, despite conceptualising the media as an extended nervous system, 
McLuhan (1964) rejects an all encompassing theory of embodiment; suggesting, 
rather, that the physical stresses endured through these extensions of self require 
„self-amputation‟ to block out such a physical overloading.  For example, in our 
contemporary mediated environment, we regularly rely on „self-amputation‟ to 
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„switch off‟ or „tune out‟ from the visual and audio „barrage‟ confronting our 
senses in spaces such as shopping centres or malls (see also Sandvoss, 2005).  
Clearly, within my own fandom, an array of media forms (metatexts) afford my 
entry into and experience of Formula One and/or Villeneuve.  Thus, although both 
of my vignettes have centred on television as the prime Formula One media text 
(as well as the overlapping salience of the internet), my fandom is more broadly 
reliant on an array of metatexts; such as magazines, newspapers, video games, 
posters, images, models/toys and even text messages or emails (e.g., the often 
abbreviated Formula One conversations with Tina via those last two 
technologies).  This process of „transmediality‟ (i.e., drawing on a diverse range 
of media) is recognised as commonplace in contemporary fan practices (see Hills, 
2002, 2006; Jenkins, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Sandvoss, 2005), while other authors 
have suggested that new media technologies, such as the internet and video 
games, offer important contributions to the representation and experiential 
reception of mediated sport for viewers and, especially, sport fans (e.g., see 
Crawford, 2004; Crawford & Rutter, 2006, 2007; Rowe, 2004).  Thus, at a basic 
level, I suggest that my processes of transmediality are experienced not only 
across but also through these media in terms of the embodied, sensory and 
perceptual functions they contain and enhance (McLuhan, 1964).   
Film phenomenologists offer a more advanced conceptualisation of mediated 
engagement and embodiment, suggesting that film evokes and involves our carnal 
senses (Sobchack, 2004) through processes which reproduce modalities of 
embodied experience and sensory perception.  Thus, for Marks (2000, 2002), film 
has a skin which, through its materiality and circulation, we also inhabit, feel and 
touch; while Sobchack (1992) considers film to possess a body and accords “the 
signifying activity of embodied vision” (p. xvii) with the power to invoke our 
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carnal thoughts (Sobchack, 2004).  These experiential, sensory and embodied 
elements afford an explanation for the sense of engagement I have when drawing 
on different Formula One metatexts, especially the live televised coverage or 
when playing Formula One video games.  In particular, both authors suggest that 
the relationship between the viewer and image is based on a concept of mutual 
embodiment (Marks, 2000, 2002; Sobchack, 1992, 2004) which, as I noted in 
Chapter Five, is a fundamental aspect of the televised and gaming point-of-view 
perspectives and the viewer/player positionings these provide.  Additionally, a 
sense of mutual embodiment underpins my watching of live telecasts.  For 
example, in my narrative accounts of „viewing‟ the screened image, I am also 
„engaging‟ with the representation of Formula One and Jacques by evoking an 
embodied response.  Hence, the celebratory gestures, constant motion and other 
bodily sensations (e.g., the chill up the back of my spine) are embodied responses 
to the images and mediations, while constituting part of my engagement with the 
materiality or „skin‟ of the Formula One media text.  Moreover, these embodied 
practices are not only drawn upon as a response to the screened image, but are 
evoked due to the specific intensity of my engagement with the mediation.   
Arguably, such carnal senses, „intensities‟ and mediated/embodied 
engagements can be located in and theorised through Grossberg‟s (1992b) concept 
of affect.  That is, Villeneuve is invested in and made to „matter‟ through a 
broader set of affective relations which require my navigation of socio-cultural 
and economic structures, popular culture, a plethora of media texts and other 
temporal and spatial dynamics and dimensions which will be traced in due course.  
Significantly, here, we have mapped a first layer for fandom: exploring the 
intensities of mediated engagement that influence, shape and constitute a key 
aspect of contemporary fan practices.  Furthermore, we have intimated that the 
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body and mutual embodiment „occupy‟ a central role in processes of mediated 
engagement while becoming a prime site for fan intensities and investments 
through notions of affect.  While affect will be more fully conceptualised later in 
this chapter, our attention now turns to a second layering for fandom; the role of 
consumption in contemporary fan practices.   
Commercialisation, Commodification and Fans as Consumers  
As a primary reading, it would be easy to suggest that, through my fandom, I have 
become a „duped‟ consumer.  Indeed, most days on campus I can be seen in 
Formula One or Jacques Villeneuve merchandise which, often branded with 
transnational corporate logos, potentially reduces my display of fandom to a 
marketing ploy for these companies (e.g., I literally and „voluntarily‟ become a 
walking billboard on their behalf).  Listing this merchandise reveals the extent of 
my consumption; purchasing (over a ten year period) over 33 items of clothing, 
plus model cars, helmets, flags, bags, calendars and posters since 1999.  In 
addition, there is the burgeoning collection of other Formula One materials, such 
as books, magazines, video games, video tapes and DVDs which, of course, I 
have also tried to „legitimise‟ as sources for my research and essential for my role 
as an academic-fan (see discussion of sources in Chapter Two).   
Consumer Society 
On a macro-social level, many scholars have explored the nature of contemporary 
consumer society (Bocock, 1993, 1994; Clarke, 2003; Cohen & Rustky, 2005; 
Featherstone, 1991, 2007; Horne, 2006; Slack, 2004; Whannel, 2008).  Thus, 
dominated by capitalism and its associated practices of both commercialisation 
(e.g., the socio-economic processes that turn a sport, such as Formula One, into a 
business) and commodification (e.g., transforming Formula One into a set of 
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commodities, such as t-shirts, caps and other assorted merchandise and 
paraphernalia, for exchange and profit), the explanatory notion of a consumer 
society assumes that a society previously orientated around production is now 
reliant upon and dominated more by the model of consumption (Baudrillard, 
1998).  Therefore, the capitalist processes of commercialisation and 
commodification have combined to make consumption, not production, the new 
model in contemporary culture (Baudrillard, 1975).  Furthermore, for social 
individuals, the work ethic is no longer geared towards production but, rather, 
towards having the necessary means (and compulsion) to consume, especially in 
one‟s leisure time and activities.  Not surprisingly, numerous authors suggest that, 
collectively, human „agents‟ become mere consumers, as we are driven by the 
need to consume (Bocock, 1993, 1994; Gabriel & Lang, 1995; Gottdiener, 2000), 
seduced by the possession of material goods and their commercially derived 
meanings (Baudrillard, 1990b; Featherstone, 1991) and, in the process, that we 
become empty receptacles of desire (Eagleton, 1996).  For example, Giddens 
(1991), notes that in contemporary times, “to a greater or lesser degree, the project 
of self becomes translated into one of the possession of desired goods and the 
pursuit of artificially framed styles of life” (p. 198), while Lyon (1994) suggests 
that, “the postmodern is rightly associated with a society where consumer 
lifestyles and mass consumption dominate the waking lives of its members”  
(p. 56).   
However, Baudrillard views consumption as a much more complex and 
varied phenomenon than many of these other scholars.  For example, in relation to 
the profusion and packaging of household appliances, he notes that, (1998) 
The shop-window, the advertisement, the manufacturer and 
the brand name, which here plays a crucial role, impose a 
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coherent, collective vision, as though they were an almost 
indissociable totality, a series.  This is, then, no longer a 
sequence of mere objects, but a chain of signifiers, in so far 
as all of these signify one another reciprocally as part of a 
more complex super-object, drawing the consumer into a 
series of more complex motivations.  (p. 27, italics in 
original) 
In particular, Baudrillard (1998) observes that contemporary consumption 
operates both as a process of signification and communication and as a process of 
classification and social differentiation.  Therefore, integral to Baudrillard‟s 
thinking is the recognition that consumption is not merely about the payment for 
and acquisition of consumer goods but that these practices are implicated in a 
broader structure and range of processes that shape consumption as a determining 
cultural force in contemporary times.  Thus, in this consumer culture, fashion and 
tastes are eclectic, opportunities seemingly endless and new market niches 
constantly emerge, each with underpinning and overlapping consumptive 
structures, processes and signifying practices.  Moreover, transnational 
corporations reflect these multi-variable structures; organising and deploying their 
pool of labour through networked configurations (Castells, 1996), forming 
influential strategic alliances and mergers, while ownership is often confined to a 
relatively few major companies that wield immense power in their specific 
industries/fields (e.g., Time-Warner and News Corporation in the global media 
industry; Nike and Adidas in the global sport-apparel industry).   
With the rise of global conglomerates and networks of communication and 
information, advertising in the twentieth-century became a dominant new 
language through which we, the supposed masses, have been compelled to 
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consume (e.g., Jackson & Andrews, 2005; Odih, 2007; Poster, 1990; Pountain & 
Robins, 2000; Savan, 1993; Slade, 2002; Williams, 1993).  Baudrillard (1998) 
notes more subtly that „mega-corporations‟ attempt to forge links with „micro-
consumers‟ through the use of personalisation within advertising and that 
ultimately such attempts at individuation are used to construct difference (social, 
semiotic, communicative, etc; see also Schirato & Webb, 2004).  He argues that, 
(1998) 
Advertising as a whole has no meaning.  It merely conveys 
significations.  Its significations (and the behaviours they 
call forth) are never personal: they are differential; they are 
all marginal and combinatorial.  In other words, they are of 
the order of the industrial production of differences - and 
this might, I believe, serve as the most cogent definition of 
the system of consumption.  (p. 88, italics in original) 
In this way, the specific consumable commodities are judged according to 
appearance and design, not their use or exchange values.  Hence, the practice of 
consumption takes on a symbolic or sign value, with Baudrillard (1998) 
conceptualising a shift from economic to social and cultural definitions of class 
through this “social logic of differentiation” (p. 91).  Other authors have also 
recognised the significant role symbolic consumption plays in displaying social 
status and imparting levels of distinction and difference (e.g., Bourdieu, 1984, 
1990, 1993; Weber, 1968).  For example, Veblen‟s (1926) notion of conspicuous 
consumption is indicative of how consumption practices are strategically 
considered and used as markers for displaying one‟s social status and worth.  
Veblen critiqued the practices of les nouveaux riches (new rich) in the United 
States during the late nineteenth-century, noting how they consumed to gain 
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prestige and social acceptance.  Thus, consumption was being used as a 
conspicuous act, as les nouveaux riches were both being seen and wanting to be 
seen procuring symbolic and status-laden products of value, as well as seeking 
recognition for the distinctions and differences that obtaining these goods suggest 
(see also Wearing and Wearing [2000] on the use of smoking by adolescent 
women to impart status and identity).
2
   
However, Baudrillard (1998) rejects Veblen‟s central thesis, arguing that, “it 
is important to grasp that this personalization, this pursuit of status and social 
standing, are all based on signs.  That is to say, they are all based not on objects or 
goods as such, but on differences” (p. 90, italics in original).  Thus, according to 
Baudrillard, Veblen overstates the „ostentatious display‟ of actual consumer 
goods, while differentiation provides a broader awareness of how specific 
practices of consumption also have a symbolic value (e.g., through specific 
processes Baudrillard identifies, such as „underconsumption‟, „anti-consumption‟, 
„metaconsumption‟ and „inconspicuous consumption‟).  We will return to notions 
of differentiation and conspicuous consumption shortly through a discussion of 
Formula One‟s expensive merchandise which, I will argue, becomes a symbolic 
marker for financial, social and „Formula One insider‟ status through the practices 
of differentiation and the acts of conspicuous consumption deployed by fans; but 
with Baudrillard‟s cautionary observations also very much in mind. 
Sport Fans as Consumers 
Not surprisingly, with assertions of a contemporary consumer society, many 
scholars have suggested that fans are often „duped‟ and/or primarily operate as 
consumers (e.g., see Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998; Crawford, 2004; 
Guttmann, 1986; Hills, 2002; Sandvoss, 2005; Schirato, 2007b).  For example, 
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Giulianotti‟s (2002) taxonomy of spectator identities in football suggests that 
„fans‟ are consumers, market-centred and develop brand loyalty.  In particular, 
Giulianotti (2002) notes that while “the fan is hot in terms of identification; the 
sense of intimacy is strong and is a key element of the individual‟s self” (p. 36), 
this identification is “authenticated most readily through the consumption of 
related products” (p. 36).  Gruneau and Whitson (1993) provide a similar 
viewpoint on fans, suggesting that they are addressed as „free-floating consumers 
rather than customers with assumed loyalties” (p. 243).  Thus, despite 
acknowledging the intimate or emotional investment of fans, many authors render 
(sport) fans as primarily reliant upon economic investments to display their levels 
of support.  Such practices are often also paradoxical for, although fans develop 
„brand loyalties‟ to particular teams and/or stars (Giulianotti, 2002; Gruneau & 
Whitson, 1993), their market-orientation makes such „loyalty‟ fickle, ephemeral 
and often dependent on either the particular consumer items that they can procure 
or that are fashionable at a given time (e.g., Michael Jordan and Chicago Bulls 
merchandise in the 1990s, or David Beckham football apparel in the 2000s).   
Other authors provide a framework for locating and understanding the 
significance of consumption in fan practices.  For example, Crawford (2004) 
notes that fans and, in a broader socio-cultural sense, audiences, at some level all 
consume sport.  Crawford (2004) suggests that this consumption occurs in a 
myriad of ways (through media, technologies, attendance, consumer goods and 
everyday life) which do not necessarily determine, dupe, subsume or transform 
fans into „powerless‟ consumers.  Moreover, he observes that consumption plays 
an important role in how we define and make sense of our „self‟, as well as 
distinguish our „self‟ from others.  Crawford (2004) is also explicit about the 
connection that sport-related goods have for fans, noting that these goods allow 
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sport supporters to “display their identity and membership to a particular 
supporter community” (p. 114).  Through a layered analysis, such displays 
potentially can be explained through the three theoretical concepts of narcissism, 
conspicuous consumption and cultural literacy (such „literacy‟ will be explained 
in due course).  Rather than pursuing a strictly psychoanalytical approach that 
links fans and their objects of fandom to „transitional‟ phases or internalised 
theories of projection or introjection, understanding narcissism as a process of self 
reflection in a broader socio-cultural and mediated context has proven to be more 
useful (e.g., see Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998; Hills, 2002; Sandvoss, 2005).  
In particular, Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) suggest that narcissism 
underpins and shapes our ongoing performance of media consumption given „our‟ 
everyday performances as an always diffused audience engaging with media 
spectacles.  Therefore, narcissism constitutes the public display of performance as 
diffused audiences in quotidian settings, with the visual signifiers of fan 
consumption (i.e., the items procured and displayed) essential to such 
performative (and narcissistic) displays.  This performative display of consumer 
goods has clear links with Veblen‟s (1926) concept of conspicuous consumption 
outlined earlier, as he asserts that people strategically use consumption as a 
conspicuous and symbolic act to display their social status and worth (see also 
Baudrillard, 1998; Rojek, 2000; Wearing & Wearing, 2000).   
Thus, at this stage, we have identified and briefly sketched the social, cultural 
and economic „functions‟ and implications underpinning the consumption 
practices and use and display of consumer goods by fans.  However, rather than 
rendering this as an abstract and underdeveloped explanation, the application of 
these concepts within a specific Formula One context is needed.  Recalling my 
own first experience of „live‟ Formula One provides a useful starting point. 
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Consumer Goods as Cultural Capital: „Authentic‟ Team Gear and „Insider‟ Status 
within the Formula One Fan Community 
Friday, Practice Day, 2002 Australian Grand Prix.  
I rush through the gates and make my way towards the Fangio stand.  Wearing 
my 1999 Villeneuve cap and JV t-shirt, I‟m feeling pretty good, making it clear 
who I‟ve come to support.  I confrontationally return the stare of any rival team 
or driver fan.  „Why are some of these dickheads wearing V8 Supercars clothing?‟ 
I ponder.  „Who cares about the Holden/Ford battle?  This ain‟t about the V8 
races, all their cars are shit!  I can‟t wait for the Formula One cars to come out 
on track and show them what real speed is‟.  As I press on I begin to feel slightly 
underdressed.  Scything through the vast crowds, I observe the number of people 
in team shirts and gear.  Just like the teams themselves wear.  A guy in a Benetton 
F1 shirt walks past.  „Man he looks so cool.  They all look like authentic F1 
people‟.  An easy decision is made: „I‟ve got to get myself a team shirt!‟   
After the first thrilling day of seeing live Formula One cars in person, I join 
the masses on the tram back to the city.  A nondescript shop near Spencer Street 
Station seems to have attracted a throng of F1 attendees.  Pressing through the 
sweaty sea of bodies, I strike gold.  Inside the shop they have a rack of team 
shirts, although I quickly become agitated.  „What‟s with all this Ferrari gear, is 
there any BAR stuff?  Aha, here‟s one.  This looks like last year‟s shirt.  Shit!  Is 
that how much it costs? I guess I won‟t be getting any other gear‟.  I know I can 
only afford one but I‟ve got to have it.  Bubbling inside, I take the shirt up to the 
counter.  Since I‟m parting with (Aust)$300, the guy inquires if I want to see other 
„exclusive‟ team gear not on display before purchasing.  I don‟t hesitate to say yes 
and am ushered into a cramped back room.  Like a child in a candy store, my eyes 
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devour the items in front of me.  Unfortunately, most of the items are Ferrari but I 
look at what BAR gear there is.  I see a signed JV cap, but the asking price is 
nearly equivalent to the shirt.  I contemplate buying this but politely decline, 
purchasing the BAR shirt instead.  I can‟t wait to wear this at the track tomorrow. 
 
Reflecting on my first „live‟ experience of Formula One, the symbolic role 
and value of „authentic‟ team gear is evident within this narrative.  As a first 
layering, my purchase of the BAR shirt is consistent with Veblen‟s (1926) 
concept of conspicuous consumption.  Procuring and displaying this team shirt 
operates as a symbolic marker; signifying an economic status (the expense of the 
item), in addition to a social distinction based on perceived social status and 
worth, especially when related to Baudrillard‟s (1998) notion of the symbolic 
value of consumptive practices and goods as a means for social differentiation.  
There is clearly also a second, self-reflective display of self to others through the 
BAR shirt, reinforcing the performative and narcissistic dimensions of consumer 
goods used to associate the fan-self with his/her particular object(s) of fandom.  
More significantly, these two theoretical concepts facilitate the recognition of a 
„hierarchical‟ layering of fandom within the Formula One community, as the 
ownership and display of „authentic‟ Formula One gear seems to bestow a „status‟ 
on these fans/consumers.  Those who can afford to (or chose to) invest in this 
practice create an elite subsection within the Formula One fandom community, 
which I label „Formula One insider‟ status.   
Crawford‟s (2004) thoughts on the use of consumer goods at live sport events 
endorse how I perceive the „Formula One insider‟ status to operate.  He suggests 
that, (2004) 
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It is through consumer goods that the „fan‟ can increase their 
knowledge, and more importantly, display their commitment 
through conversation and the consumer goods they own and 
display, which allows them to progress along their individual 
career path and feel increasingly integrated within their 
chosen supporter community.  (p. 81) 
For „real‟ fans of Formula One, the ability to locate (there are limited outlets for 
Formula One merchandise in both Australia and especially New Zealand), afford 
financially (the exorbitant costs already noted) and socially display this 
„authentic‟ gear in public (and primarily Formula One-specific) spaces accords a 
sense of belonging to or integration within a „Formula One insider‟ community.  
One key way that members of the „insider‟ community display their fandom, 
knowledge and interest in the sport is through their purchases.  Semiotic and 
cultural relations also come into force, with logos and symbols used to buttress 
this display and permeate the encoded knowledge (Hall, 1996) inscribed in 
„Formula One insider‟s‟ merchandise.  In this manner, logos and symbols become 
a form of „cultural capital‟ (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986) for fans, allowing them to 
recognise and/or reveal the team and/or driver that the „insider‟ is supporting 
through adornments such as team, sponsor or driver symbols: for example, for 
driver-specific fans, the racing number, national flag, helmet design and/or 
signature on merchandise and paraphernalia.  Bourdieu‟s notion of cultural capital 
is significant for theorising this „Formula One insider‟ status and fandom more 
broadly in terms of cultural literacy.   
Recalling the overview of Bourdieu‟s concepts of habitus, dispositions and 
distinctive cultural fields traced in Chapter Two, we are reminded that it is within 
these diverse fields that an individual‟s habitus takes on either an enhanced or 
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lessened value, based primarily on an individual‟s social relations, position and 
exchange within a specific cultural field.  In particular, an individual‟s symbolic 
capital (prestige, status, authority), cultural capital (culturally-valued attributes, 
skills, tastes) and his/her ability to read and engage with the rules, discourses and 
knowledge of the field (cultural literacy) influence the „subject‟ position of the 
individual, as well as his/her level of power within a specific cultural field (see 
Harker, Mahar & Wilkes, 1990; Jenkins, 2002; Schirato & Yell, 1996; Webb, 
Schirato & Danaher, 2002).  This notion of cultural literacy is significant for the 
forthcoming argument, for as Schirato and Webb (2004) note, it implies “not just 
familiarity with a body of knowledge; it also presupposes an understanding of 
how to think and see in a manner that is appropriate to the imperatives and 
contexts of the moment” (p. 18).  Collectively, these ideas are evident in Formula 
One fan practices.  For example, the „Formula One insider‟ status ascribes a 
degree of prestige and authority (symbolic capital) to those fans who procure and 
display „authentic‟ team gear inscribed with the „correct‟ team and/or driver logos 
(a form of cultural capital), and who are culturally literate in their readings, 
discussions and demonstrations of Formula One‟s forms of cultural capital (e.g., 
through „authentic‟ merchandise and being highly knowledgeable in race 
strategies, driver statistics, team information, etc.).   
These forms of capital and literacy also reflect the hierarchies that operate 
more broadly within fan communities.  Although primarily focusing on sport, 
media and regimes of subjectivity, Schirato (2007b) identifies two key means for 
distinguishing sports fans from sports spectators which have links with the ideas 
traced thus far.  Schirato (2007b) suggests that “sports fans become literate with 
regard to the field precisely because they consider that the „game‟ of watching and 
seeing with a knowledgeable and cultivated eye is worth playing” (p. 96), while 
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also noting that particular spectators (which presumably can be labelled as fans) 
“were „emotionally committed consumers of sports‟ whose (visual) experience of 
the game was filtered through or at least inflected by that emotional attachment” 
(p. 96).  Thus, using these distinctions, we can argue that the „spectator‟ may not 
only be less emotionally invested in the sport before them but also less able to 
„read‟ this than the literate and attached „fan‟.  Drawing on Bourdieu (1991), 
Schirato (2007b) offers the binary of casuals (or „laymen‟ in Bourdieu‟s terms) 
and connoisseurs in contemporary sport spectatorship (either televisual or in 
attendance), which seems to reinforce the distinctions noted.  That is, the 
connoisseur operates akin to what we have labelled a fan by finding something 
significant within a specific sport (and its viewership), forming an emotional 
attachment and being able to comprehend its subtle nuances compared to the 
casual spectator whose interest and identification is more ephemeral.  As a 
Formula One-specific example, the „casual spectator‟ may find the repetitive 
lapping of a circuit by indistinguishable driver/team combinations banal and 
pointless compared to the emotionally invested „fan‟ (or connoisseur) revelling in 
this trackside/televised viewership and his/her recognition of specific drivers 
and/or teams, as well as the minutiae of Formula One (e.g., how specific lap times 
relate to the overall performance).  In a more simplistic manner, Schirato (2007b) 
correctly observes that fans place a value and/or worth in sport as a cultural field 
which is demonstrable through their practices (e.g., as spectators, consumers, etc.) 
while, clearly, the traced distinctions relate predominantly to the varying degrees 
of cultural capital and literacy that fans (or connoisseurs) and (casual) spectators 
possess. 
Returning to the concept of „Formula One insider‟ status, self-evidently this is 
a version of what we would label fandom more generally, while the „insider‟ 
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status operates as a form of symbolic capital in relation to the vagaries of both 
cultural capital and cultural literacy that Formula One attendees possess.  Derived 
from personal observations, a brief sketch of distinctions between Formula One 
attendees at the Australian Grand Prix (2002-2004; 2006) will afford a specific 
site for analysis of the „Formula One insider‟ in operation.  First, there is the 
„casual‟ attendee relatively illiterate in Formula One who can be overheard in the 
grandstands completely „lost‟ in deciphering the race order, strategies, or what is 
actually „happening‟ in a given session (e.g., flummoxed by the fuel-burning 
phase of a third qualifying session in 2006 in which cars continually lap to reduce 
their fuel loads rather than set competitive times).  Similarly, these „casual‟ 
attendees are observable in shops „being illiterate‟ in what or who particular 
merchandise refers to and are often misinformed in order to make a sale (e.g., I 
observed a man purchase a supposed „Fernando Alonso/Renault‟ t-shirt in 
Melbourne in 2006 when the logos and symbols - racing number and helmet 
design - clearly referenced his teammate, Giancarlo Fisichella).  Second, there are 
also the V8 Supercars fans in Australia who attend the event primarily to follow 
the V8 support races, wearing this team gear and enthusiastically supporting those 
races with little knowledge or interest in the Formula One sessions themselves 
(the „fans‟ derided in my earlier narrative).  Finally, there are the „corporate‟ 
attendees who, although resplendent in particular team regalia, often demonstrate 
low cultural literacy (or uninterest) in the sporting side of Formula One (e.g., 
rules, drivers, teams, etc.) and, arguably, are often only present for the „free‟ 
hospitality and entertainment as corporate guests.  These three observable „types‟ 
of Formula One attendees reflect variations of the „casual‟ spectator identified and 
discussed by Bourdieu (1991) and Schirato (2007b). 
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Conversely, my argument is that the „Formula One insider‟ operates as a 
culturally literate, emotionally attached fan who acquires symbolic capital through 
his/her cultural capital and literacy.  Hence, „Formula One insiders‟ utilise 
conspicuous consumption through their purchases and (narcissistic) displays as 
they are highly literate in recognising and articulating markers of social 
differentiation and distinction.  Of course these symbolic displays and practices 
are easily understood or „read‟ by other, culturally literate, „Formula One insiders‟ 
when ascertaining the value of such forms of cultural and symbolic capital.  Thus, 
in my own consumption practices, I am offering a strategic demonstration of 
literacy by procuring only Villeneuve-specific merchandise which, although I 
know may be undiscernible when displayed for the majority of attendees 
(although perhaps a team association will be made – e.g., BAR in 2002), can be 
read, interpreted and understood by the culturally literate „Formula One insider‟ 
(even if the object of fandom differs).  Clearly, time and place also have a role in 
this process too, for Crawford‟s (2004) observations, quoted earlier, emphasise 
the role of the sporting venue in constructing the sense of community and 
belonging associated with consumer goods.  Therefore, my wearing of Villeneuve 
clothing is likely to confer limited recognition or levels of cultural literacy when 
worn on the University of Waikato campus or around Hamilton city (except, 
perhaps, at a basic dismissive level of being a „duped‟ consumer or „co-opted‟ 
commodity).  However, with the exception of the majority of the „illiterate‟ 
attendees outlined, when worn and „displayed‟ at either Albert Park or within the 
Melbourne CBD over the Australian Grand Prix weekend, there is an expectation 
that „Formula One insiders‟ will read and recognise the explicit link to Villeneuve 
in my merchandise.  Thus, value is also ascribed to the „authenticity‟ of these 
goods and I perceive „authentic‟ team gear to be socially, culturally, economically 
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and, of course, symbolically important within the Formula One sport fandom 
community 
3
 and a means to acquiring „insider‟ status, albeit given some 
contextual variations.   
Thus far, we have examined the role of consumer goods in Formula One fan 
consumption, noting the significance of the „authentic‟ team gear for structuring a 
hierarchal „insider‟ status within the Formula One fan community.  To offer an 
additional theoretical „layering‟ to consumption in relation to specific Formula 
One fan practices, we can turn to the Grand Prix venue as a specific site and 
context for Formula One fan consumption.   
The Grand Prix as a Public Site for Fan Consumption and Commodification 
Crawford (2004) and Rinehart (1998) have suggested that with the excessive 
commercialisation of live sporting events (through entertainment, merchandise 
and enhancing the spectacle) live sport becomes a commodified „experience‟ with 
events intended to “make the „consumer‟ feel like a „fan‟” (Crawford, 2004, p. 
81).  Thus, Crawford (2004) suggests, “sport venues become increasingly geared 
towards creating an „experience‟ for the paying public to consume” (p. 79).  
Grands Prix are marketed as an „experience‟, with many of the sport‟s popular 
narratives traced in Chapter Three, most notably the spectacle of risk, racing, 
stardom and gendered notions of „glamour‟, drawn upon to sell attendance to 
consumers and/or fans.  Of course, given the ephemeral nature of races around 
global localities, the „event‟ is also evident in marketing and press coverage that 
emphasises the significance of the transitory Formula One „circus‟ through 
parochial, nationalistic and global discourses (e.g., with local press coverage often 
repeating the elitist and „pinnacle‟ popular narratives discussed in Chapter Three, 
usually also underpinned by a degree of parochial pride in staging the race).   
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Furthermore, Rinehart (1998) suggests that the commodification of the 
„experience‟ is central to sport tourism, observing that for those who travel to and 
attend live sport, “it is as if, for many, the collection of the experience, not the 
experience itself, has become paramount” (Rinehart, 1998, p. 16).  Such a process 
has also been described by Grossberg (1992a) as the „hyperconsumerist‟ 
sensibilities of fans, in which consumer pleasure is ingrained in the “compulsive 
consumption of the mass media” (p. 56).  This, according to Grossberg (1992a), 
makes the act of consumption, rather than what is being consumed, most 
significant for consumers (e.g., a collector who enjoys the process of collecting 
far more than the objects collected).  Within Formula One, attendees and/or fans 
are obviously interpellated as consumers, while being afforded the opportunity to 
operate as hyperconsumerist collectors.  The Grand Prix (both as „experience‟ and 
„event‟) is commodified through an array of official merchandising that allows 
attendees to „collect the experience‟ and confirm that „they were there‟ long after 
the event (e.g., I still have Australian Grand Prix t-shirts for 2002 and 2003, even 
if the materiality of „memory‟ has faded more quickly than the fabric of cotton).  
This also underscores Rinehart‟s (1998) notion that often the “markers of the 
experience serve to replace the actual experience” (p. 16) and my own „collecting‟ 
of experiences (e.g., procuring merchandise, filming events and keeping 
souvenirs, such as Grand Prix and airline tickets) can serve to displace the „real‟ 
experience itself.  Additionally, my own practices both at the track and within the 
Melbourne CBD (as well as Montreal in 2005) during Grand Prix weekends 
demonstrate „my‟ hyperconsumerist pleasure in „collecting‟ Villeneuve-specific 
merchandise.  In particular, the Grand Prix venue provided a specific temporal 
moment and spatial site for Formula One consumption that, otherwise, was 
generally unavailable for myself (e.g., there are no Formula One outlets in New 
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Zealand) and less fettered in terms of a variety of merchandise, sizes and prices 
(when compared to internet sites).  In many respects, some of the 
hyperconsumerist pleasure was in locating and procuring these items (as my 
earlier narrative pertaining to buying a BAR shirt intimated).  However, despite 
actively seeking such merchandise, my „pleasure‟ and emotional investment in the 
consumed item(s) is as symbolic and cultural capital aligned to the object of my 
fandom; that is, the pleasure resides in acquiring „symbolic‟ Villeneuve items, not 
solely in the act of consumption itself.   
On a macro-social level, Schirato (2007b) suggests that the mediated and 
commericalised dynamics of contemporary sport have also constructed 
spectators/fans as commodities.  He notes that, (2007b) 
Whereas at the beginning of modern professional sport the 
value of the game as commodity is largely attested to by the 
crowd it draws, by the end of the twentieth century this is 
reversed – the value of the spectators as commodity 
(television viewers, passionate spectators/fans that create 
noise and atmosphere) is to some extent predicated on the 
game (hence the idea of television delivering up Super Bowl 
or World Cup final audiences to advertisers).  (p. 90) 
Schirato is making an important link to mediation here, noting the often-
guaranteed televised audience being sold to advertisers associated with specific 
sports (e.g., Formula One‟s assumed large, global audience discussed in preceding 
chapters).  More salient for our present purposes is his second notion of the 
performative role of spectators/fans in attendance at the game.  As media 
consumers of sport we primarily see, experience and understand what constitutes 
„live‟ or attending spectators/fans through their mediated representation.  
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Therefore, it is through mediated images of sport (particularly the televisual) that 
we, in turn, learn patterns of behaviour for our own performances as fans (or 
spectators) at live events (Crawford, 2004; Rinehart, 1998; Schirato, 2007a, 
2007b; Siegel, 2002).  For example, when we watch a televised game of football, 
rugby or cricket, we are provided with images of „real‟ fans; that is, live attendees 
dressed in various regalia, reacting to on-field action yet also creating their own 
performances through crowd activities (e.g., Mexican waves), engagements with 
mediated aspects (music, large screen displays, etc.) and attempts to be seen on 
television.  When we attend live events we reproduce similar performances 
through our display and participation which is derived from these preceding 
images of fandom (and will be recycled by future attendees).
4
  Through its 
constant reproduction and seeming lack of a specific origin, fandom becomes 
hyperreal in a Baudrillardian sense, as “the real is not only what can be 
reproduced, but that which is always already reproduced, the hyperreal” 
(Baudrillard, 1983b, p. 146, italics in original).   
Formula One offers two points of distinction due to the fan being less 
prominent than on many other major televised sports.  First and foremost, the fan 
contribution to the „atmosphere‟ identified by Schirato (2007b) is less obvious in 
Formula One given the incessant pitch and timbre of the cars drowning out crowd 
noises (e.g., chants, reactions, celebrations, etc.).  Thus, the simultaneous 
„eruption‟ and response of crowds to significant moments of play in other sports is 
seldomly audible in Formula One (e.g., only occasionally crowd cheers are heard 
for a significant change of position and, given the largest grandstands and crowd 
numbers are often on the pit-straight, these are most notable when it occurs during 
a pit-stop).  Second, while most televised sport coverage focuses on the on-field 
action, the use of sweeping crowd shots and, especially, reaction shots in many 
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sports often draws on crowd reactions to specific on-field action; for example, the 
recycled image of fans cheering for a boundary hit in cricket, the rugby try or the 
netball goal.  In contrast, Formula One telecasts tend to remain focused on the 
track action for the entire race which is, on average, approximately one hour and 
30 minutes in duration.  During this race coverage, Formula One telecasts seldom 
incorporate crowd reaction shots, only providing extensive crowd shots pre- and 
post-race (e.g., the anticipation and finale shots) while, additionally, Formula One 
usually contains only fleeting images of crowds during the race through framing 
which foregrounds the cars from cameras at a distance to the track (see also 
Whannel, 1992).
5
  Thus, the image of Formula One fandom and its model for 
reproduction as an attendee is less pronounced than for other sports, due both to 
the absence-presence of the attending Formula One fan and the duration of a 
sustained on-track televisual framing of the cars, as explored in detail in the 
previous chapters.   
Hyperfandom – Fandom as Inauthentic Consumption? 
If television is less effective in constructing a hyperreal model for Formula One 
fandom, the ideas (and „my‟ narrative) pertaining to authentic‟ team gear as forms 
of cultural and symbolic capital through conspicuous consumptive practices and 
narcissistic displays must have a broader significance for Formula One fandom.  
Giulianotti (2002) has conceptualised the „hypercommodification‟ of 
contemporary football, in which global processes, flows and the exchange of 
mediation and commercialisation have intensified the commodification of world 
football (see also Sandvoss, 2003).  Applying hypercommodification to the 
domain of sport merchandising reveals the increasing range of commodified items 
available that have little connection to the actual object or subject of 
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commodification.  For example, there is a proliferation of Manchester United or 
New York Yankees consumer items that increasingly seem detached from the 
actual club, sport or a sense of fandom but, rather, seem to circulate in either a 
fashion and/or collector‟s realm (Crawford, 2004; Grossberg, 1992a).  Formula 
One seems to merge the three themes of hyperreality, hypercommodification and 
hyperconsumerist sensibilities into a new theoretical conceptualisation, here 
defined as hyperfandom.  In hyperfandom, the fandom for an object, individual or 
team is expedited by these commercialised, commodified and mediated 
opportunities, extending fandom to an act of hyperconsumption that locates 
fandom in the realm of hypercommodification.  In this sense, fandom also 
becomes hyperreal, as the fan concurrently reinterprets his/her affection as a fan 
within a process of continually recognising and reproducing this fandom to the 
point where the act of reproduction supersedes the origin of affection.  Supported 
by the processes of hypercommodification and hyperconsumption, which 
increasingly permit, extend and, to an extent, define contemporary fandom, 
hyperfandom becomes a continual construction of the fan enacting his/her own 
fandom.  As with the Elvis impersonator who both impersonates and re-enacts his 
own fandom concurrently (or the collector who collects and revels in the process 
of collecting), the hyperfan not only experiences fandom for an object or subject 
but, also, continually experiences pleasure through the (re)enactment or 
performance of this fandom (we will return to notions of fan performativity in due 
course).   
Moreover, hyperfandom also reveals how Formula One fandom operates as 
both a paradox and simulation: authentic Formula One fandom is inauthentic 
fandom represented as authentic.  Reflecting the corporate nature of the sport, 
„authentic‟ fandom is simulated through the conspicuous consumptive practices 
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and narcissistic displays of „authentic‟ team gear.  As forms of cultural capital, 
these commodities define what constitutes symbolic capital and „real‟ fandom 
within the Formula One fan community.  Therefore, the reproduction and 
circulation of these items by the Formula One corporate and transnational 
community seeks to replace an „authentic‟ experiential sense of fandom (e.g., 
affect and investment) with an inauthentic hyperconsumerist version.  While the 
act of buying fandom is antithetical to most concepts of fandom (Abercrombie & 
Longhurst, 1998; Crawford, 2004; Grossberg, 1992a; Hills, 2002; Jenkins, 1992, 
2006a, 2006b; Lancaster, 2001), Formula One reconfigures passions and pleasures 
experienced through and for the sport into „brand loyalties‟ (Giulianotti, 2002; 
Gruneau & Whitson, 1993) to simulate and commodify fandom, with obvious 
financial benefits for the teams and corporate sponsors.  These ideas are 
reinforced by the absence of a „real‟ referent for the Formula One fan; that is, the 
absence of mediated or „live‟ versions of the Formula One fan which are widely 
available in other sports.  With no recycled referent to model fandom on, Formula 
One fans are instead offered a commercially-derived variation; the constantly 
reproduced and hypercommodified team gear.  As forms of cultural capital, these 
items simulate authentic fandom to actually become the „real‟ or „authentic‟ 
version which the culturally literate „Formula One insider‟ must „buy‟ into 
(economically and figuratively) to articulate and demonstrate their level of 
symbolic capital within the Formula One fan community.   
The ideas traced in this section reveal the uneasy tension that exists between 
fandom and consumption.  Clearly, at a basic level, consumption is fundamental 
to most (if not all) forms of media fandom.  However, as my examples of Formula 
One merchandise, the Grand Prix location and „insider‟ status demonstrate, there 
are multifaceted dynamics and dimensions to how consumption inflects fan 
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practices, constructs hierarchies and social relations, and to the salient role that 
consumer goods, place and consumptive displays play in fan communities.  As 
should be clear from the foregoing argument, we fail to understand fandom if we 
simply dismiss fans as mere commodities or „duped‟ consumers.  So, despite the 
fatalistic overtones of inauthenticity that underpin the „Formula One insider‟ fan 
community, this is arguably (and more broadly on a macro-social level), a 
reflection of its operation as a corporate sport.  Fundamentally, such „duped‟ fans 
also clearly see something of worth and/or value in the sport and forge their 
emotional attachments accordingly.  Thus, to further investigate Formula One 
fandom, our focus turns now to the role of performance and performativity, as 
well as the affective investments and intensities within specific public and private 
displays (primarily on a micro-social level) as a third theoretical layering for 
examining contemporary fandom.  Another Grand Prix autoethnographic narrative 
facilitates reader entry into fan performances. 
Performativity, Narcissism and Affect  
Saturday, Australian Grand Prix 2002 
Back at the track, I am feeling really good!  With my hair spiked up, 4-day 
stubble, yellow tinted sunglasses and the resplendent BAR team shirt, I am feeling 
like and, in my mind, looking like Jacques.  I‟ve also made sure that no one needs 
to guess which driver I‟ve come to support, as I‟m carrying a large Canadian flag 
with the name Villeneuve emblazoned on it.  Now I‟m feeling authentic.  I am, in a 
figurative sense, submerged in a sea of red, being heavily outnumbered by the 
Ferrari-clad fans.  Unperturbed, I feel unique in my display of driver and team 
allegiance, as very few are dressed in BAR regalia, and I only see one other 
replica shirt like mine with the large Lucky Strike logo.  I also imagine there is a 
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sense of individuality with my hairstyle, glasses, stubble and comportment, 
although of course I am trying to replicate Jacques and lack any real sense of 
displaying my own individuality.  Walking back through the food court crowd 
after my own „pit-stop‟, I can feel a lot of eyes on me.  I try to remain detached 
and outwardly „cool‟, playing out in my mind how real I look, like an F1 insider 
and, hopefully, like Jacques too.  Some guys take a second look, while the pretty 
girls smiling at me certainly boost my confidence.  Perhaps I‟m having the effect 
that the Benetton F1 guy had on me yesterday. 
 
Through my public display at Albert Park, I am providing a symbolic 
connection to Villeneuve as the object of my fandom, while ingrained in my 
performances is also an assumption that, to some degree, Villeneuve has become 
an „extension‟ of my fan-self (McLuhan, 1964).  That is, the performative 
dimensions that I evoke within my narrative contain an assumed link to 
Villeneuve through reproducing and resembling his appearance for which, as a 
fan-performer, I am seeking broader audience awareness (see also Stacey [1991, 
1994] on female fans, film stars and resemblance).  Underscoring these points is 
the primacy for display of the site and temporal moment, with Albert Park, as the 
venue for the Australian Grand Prix, conducive to such performances (see earlier 
discussion of [hyper]consumption and locality).  In fact, my narrative reveals that 
I am revelling in the specificity of this temporal moment and spatial site as it 
provides an audience for my performances, facilitates levels of recognition for the 
apparent merging of fan and object and, conjecturally, provides positive 
reinforcement for my performative display of fandom.  For example, the merged 
fan-self-star public image is performed for (and potentially can be read by) both 
the culturally literate „Formula One insider‟ fans and the casual attendees, while 
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even the „gendered‟ appraisals and their purported degree of „admiration‟ reinvest 
a sense of self-value into my own performances (and, arguably, inspite of whether 
any Villeneuve link is being explicitly made or not by these „pretty girls‟; the 
mere fact that they noticed me „mattered‟ for sustaining, reinforcing and providing 
impetus to the performance).   
Narcissism, in a socio-cultural rather than psychoanalytical context, can be 
read into such a display.  Returning to Sandvoss‟ conceptualisation of narcissism, 
he suggests that, (2005) 
The theoretical challenge here is to account for the dual 
function of the object of fandom as experienced not in 
relation to the self, but as part of the self, despite constituting 
an external object.  The basic premiss of my argument, then, 
is that the object of fandom, whether it is a sports team, 
television programme, a film or a pop star, is intrinsically 
interwoven with our sense of self, with who we are, would 
like to be, and think we are.  (p. 96) 
Within my narrative and performative display are Villeneuve as the „external 
object‟ separate to my self but also Villeneuve as the sought after „part of the self‟ 
through this performative act (e.g., I aspire to [re]present or resemble Villeneuve).  
The consumptive practices and narcissistic displays traced earlier reflect the 
interwoven nature of the self and the object of fandom.  That is, my acts of 
consumerism (through selectivity, procurement and display) were all orientated 
towards Villeneuve and a broader public awareness of this fan-self-star 
relationship (again, with a recognition that cultural literacy affords varying 
degrees of „readership‟ for such embedded practices).  However, Villeneuve also 
becomes interwoven into my sense of self through the location and manifestation 
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of a performance that draws on my body as a specific site of and for articulating 
fandom.  As Sandvoss (2005) suggests, the objects of fandom act as extensions of 
self and are enacted in ways that reveal both their centrality and the assumed 
highly personal relationship being entered into.  So, in this respect, Villeneuve is 
not reflective of self-identity but constitutes a part of self through the embodied 
articulation of performance (e.g., interweaving the „object‟ into self with 
embodiment manifesting this extension of self).  Moreover, given that narcissism 
is also associated with processes of self-reflection, Sandvoss (2005) notes that, 
“the first and foremost audience for the performance of fans is the fan him- or 
herself” (p. 98).  This is applicable to my public display, as the above narrative 
reveals an embodied performance that is modelled on the physical and external 
Villeneuve, yet the centrality of appearance is carefully groomed and coiffured to 
ensure a presentation that satisfies „my‟ self in the first instance.  The 
„authenticity‟ strived for in the above narrative requires representing and 
performing a fan-self-star public image that, while intended to replicate or 
reproduce Villeneuve in a specific social environment, first must meet my own 
„private‟ level of expectations (e.g., my narrative eschews the private moments of 
manipulating and approving of this image, literally through self-reflection in 
mirrors, for public display).  Of course, thus far, I have also privileged the public 
sites for display, while the private and micro-social performances and enactments 
of the fan-self-star clearly feed back into the „intensity‟ of the affective 
relationships and investments which we will return to shortly.   
Taking for granted the recognition that my role as a fan is performative rather 
than „passive‟ as a recipient of and for my object of fandom (e.g., Crawford, 2004; 
Jenkins, 1992, 2006b; Lancaster, 2001; Sandvoss, 2003, 2005), Hills‟ (2002) 
concept of „performative consumption‟ offers an insight into the performativity at 
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play in my public and private displays.  For Hills (2002), performative 
consumption “characterises media fandom – i.e. media fandoms presuppose 
consumption and are expressed through consumption” (p. 159).  Clearly, my 
narrative emphasises the Villeneuve-specific consumer goods drawn upon to 
publicly display my fandom, and can be linked to the notions and interrelationship 
of conspicuous consumption, narcissism and cultural literacy detailed in the 
previous section on consumption.  The salience of consumption is also reinforced 
by Hills, who acknowledges that fan performances are always enmeshed in 
consumption rather than trying to reconcile or distinguish these two terms (e.g., 
privilege performance over consumption).  Nevertheless, rather than commodified 
or duped assumptions of the fan interrelationship with objects, Hills (2002) also 
recognises an “iterable space of fan cultural identity” (pp. 159-160) which enables 
the performer to express a degree of fan identity through his/her performance(s).  
For example, although Nightingale (1994) offers a distinction between 
impersonation as slavish citation and improvisation as individual expression, Hills 
finds a space for cultural identity within the performances of Elvis impersonators.  
Refuting Nightingale‟s binaries, therefore, Hills (2002) suggests that these 
concepts often co-exist; hence an Elvis impersonator is a project, impersonating 
the archival record yet also improvises “the fan‟s lived experience as a fan” 
(Hills, 2002, p. 165, italics in original).  Thus, the impersonator consumes the 
Elvis image and material goods, performs as Elvis while, simultaneously, 
performing his or her own lived experience as an Elvis fan.   
These ideas resonate for my Villeneuve-specific performance contained in the 
above narrative.  In particular, performative consumption recognises and reveals 
the intersecting and simultaneous layerings of consumption (e.g., the consumer 
goods), performance (as Villeneuve-specific replication and resemblance) and 
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performativity in being a fan (in terms of the various guises, processes and 
practices that are enacted to be „a [Villeneuve] fan‟).  Of course, on a broader 
theoretical level, this specific instance of my performative consumption also 
reinforces the notion of hyperfandom detailed earlier, as through my reproduction 
of acts of fandom, fandom itself is continually constructed as a pleasurable site for 
renewal, (re)investment and (re)enactment.  For example, within the above 
narrative, one could potentially locate narcissistic traces in the self-reflective 
display as a fan (e.g., a self-pride in appearance) rather than being solely 
embedded in or orientated towards Villeneuve as an external object of fandom 
(e.g., only striving to replicate Villeneuve) through my performances.   
Crawford has adapted Hills‟ (2002) concept in relation to consumption, 
identity and sport fandom, observing that, (2004) 
Hills‟ (2002) discussion of „performative consumption‟ 
offers an understanding of how consumer (and other 
material) goods and resources are frequently drawn on by 
fans, along with their own lived experiences and other 
influences, in the construction of identity.  Identity then is 
not something simply bought off the shelf…but rather needs 
to be understood as a „project‟, where consumer goods and 
mass media resources may be drawn on by fans to fuel their 
performances and the construction of their identities.   
(p. 123) 
Therefore, while both authors contextualise fandom within a model of 
consumption, they recognise a degree of „agency‟ within the performative 
practices of fans.  Such a perspective is articulated more broadly within the works 
of the „third wave‟ of fan studies scholars who, collectively, emphasis that fandom 
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should be conceived as fluid, performative and productive, or even as a project or 
„career‟ subject to change given the adaptative, diverse and often contradictory 
ways fans enact, perform and sustain their fandom (Abercrombie & Longhurst, 
1998; Crawford, 2004; Hills, 2002, 2005; Jenkins, 1992, 2006a, 2006b; Sandvoss, 
2003).  Sandvoss (2005) notes that, “the object of fandom in this sense is not so 
much a textual possession; nor does it only define the self.  It is part of the fan‟s 
(sense of) self” (p. 101) which reflects the performative dynamics that shape, 
construct and determine (or can undermine) the practices and processes of 
fandom.  This viewpoint also dismisses simplistic assumptions that fans either 
„actively‟ engage with specific media texts or that the object of fandom „reflects‟ 
one‟s identity (e.g., in psychology-orientated typologies, such as the „sensation-
seeking‟ Villeneuve fan, critiqued earlier); rather, performance, performativity 
and performative consumption reveal the multifacted dimensions to the enactment 
and actualisation of fandom that are often overlooked or misunderstood.   
A further layering to these performative processes also recognises and locates 
the fan in an overlapping set of relations pertaining to why such practices actually 
„matter‟ to the fan, and explain the emotive and embodied investments that 
constitute the spatial and temporal terrain of everyday life.  Revisiting 
Grossberg‟s (1992b) concept of affect, introduced in Chapter Two, we can recall 
that within his account of structured mobility are the affective relationships which 
anchor social individuals in both „reality‟ at a macro-social level, and within 
specific contexts and particular practices within „their‟ daily life at a micro-social 
level.  Rather than advancing a „subjective‟ sense of „experience‟, however, 
Grossberg‟s evocation of „daily life‟ at the micro-social level is significant for, as 
he notes, (1992b) “„daily life‟ refers to the socially organized material pattern and 
events of people‟s existence.  I use it, rather than „experience‟, to avoid assuming 
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the centrality of the experiencing subject” (p. 401).  Moreover, Grossberg (1992b) 
suggests that, conceptually, affect is not „conscious‟ nor „subjective‟ but, “is itself 
articulated in the relation between practices” (p. 83), operates on a “plane of 
effects” (p. 80) and that this „affective plane‟ is “organized according to maps 
which direct people‟s investments in and into the world” (p. 82).  Thus, affect 
offers a dynamic theoretical account of „pleasure‟ and „meaning‟ that, previously, 
has been conceived of in a manner that often either failed to recognise the macro-
social world (e.g., the focus on individuals via „uses and gratifications‟) or could 
not always adequately „anchor‟ or articulate the pleasure (whether subjective or 
collective, private or public) of micro-social „moments‟ through abstract terms 
such as jouissance, the carnivalesque, the liminal, scopophilia or „media erotics‟ 
(e.g., see Bakhtin, 1968; Barthes, 1975; Bataille, 1986; Duncan & Brummett, 
1989; Kuhn, 1982; Mulvey, 1975; Ott, 2008; Whannel, 2008).   
By defining affect as an investment and plane of effects that temporarily 
anchor social individuals in specific moments and practices, Grossberg is 
recognising both the structured social world already in existence and the varying 
degrees of „mobility‟ human agents have in navigating this socio-cultural terrain 
and the vagaries of their affective relationships.  Turning to an explanation of 
affect, Grossberg (1992b) suggests that, 
Affect is closely tied to what we often describe as the 
„feeling‟ of life.  One can understand another person‟s life, 
share the same meanings and pleasures, but still not know 
how it feels.  Such „feeling‟ is a socially constructed domain 
of cultural effects.  Some things feel different from others, 
some matter more or in different ways than others.  The 
same experience will change drastically as its affective 
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investment or state changes.  The same object, with the same 
meaning, giving the same pleasure, is very different in 
different affective contexts.  Or perhaps it is more accurate 
to say that different affective contexts inflect meanings and 
pleasures in very different ways.  Affect operates across all 
of our sense and experiences, across all of the domains of 
effects which construct daily life.  Affect is what gives 
„color‟, „tone‟ or „texture‟ to the lived.  (pp. 80-81) 
Grossberg is offering a notion of pleasure which, although clearly socially 
orientated, also recognises the individual „feelings‟ that are evoked or experienced 
without assuming that these remain consistent or constant. Nor is it assumed that 
they are collective or commonplace via „shared‟ associations, such as through 
specific text or audience groupings (e.g., taste or identity) as critiqued in Chapter 
Two.  To understand these „feelings‟ and how affect provides „colour‟ to daily 
life, Grossberg employs an intersecting set of terms that construct and shape both 
the activation of affect and how it operates on a micro-social level for social 
individuals.  Central to notions of affect are investments (the caring or passion for 
something), mattering maps (how social individuals chart their investments and 
make particular things „matter‟), intensity (literally the energy or intensity of the 
investment) and excess (the often ideologically linked explanation for why certain 
things matter more than others).  To further clarify each of these points, the terms 
are now developed within the context of „my‟ practices and processes in daily life 
as a Villeneuve-specific fan. 
Clearly, as my thesis has revealed, it is evident that Villeneuve is the 
subject/object for my investment.  Although I am part of a collective (imagined) 
community that both follows Formula One and Villeneuve more specifically, 
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there is something „personal‟, as Grossberg‟s (1992b) quote above indicates, 
about this affective investment.  That is, while others may „share‟ Villeneuve 
(e.g., in terms of both the communal mediated images and through the 
explanatory framework of taste), and while the „experiential‟ investment and 
affect (in terms of caring, passion, emotion, etc.) in Villeneuve seemingly 
replicates the meanings and pleasures of others, the „feeling‟ is itself inscribed 
differently for social individuals.  That is, „my‟ „feeling‟ for Jacques differs to 
other Villeneuve-specific fans and, of course, also always differs for „myself‟ 
within varying affective contexts.  For example, the Grand Prix as a temporal and 
spatial site is more significant for enacting my affective engagement compared to 
„my‟ national, regional or domestic settings which, comparatively, foster often 
reduced but also paradoxically, very specific affective moments and performative 
roles (e.g., these settings are „my‟ prime spatial location for accessing Formula 
One and activate specific affective [temporal] moments through, for example, 
televised viewing, accessing the internet, etc.).  These degrees of „feeling‟ are 
shaped through investment but socially are „felt‟ through intensity (e.g., my 
accounts of mediated fandom discussed earlier may resonate for readers, in terms 
of shared orientations or pleasures, but the „feelings‟ will differ).  Unfortunately, 
although he recognises the varying levels of energy that are associated with and 
activated by specific investments, Grossberg does not adequately develop 
„intensity‟ as a term.  However, I would suggest that intensities, the plural, appear 
fundamental to how affective investments operate, a point I will return to shortly.   
Constructing these broader affective investments are the „mattering maps‟ 
that provide some coherency to those aspects of popular culture that are made to 
matter in daily life.  Grossberg (1992b) notes,  
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Mattering maps also involve the lines that connect the 
different sites of investment; they define the possibilities for 
moving from one investment to another, of linking the 
various fragments of identity together.  They define not only 
what sites (practices, effects, structures) matter but how they 
matter.  And they construct a lived coherence for those 
enclosed within their spaces.  (p. 84) 
This sense of multiple investments that need to be (re)assembled and 
(re)organised is useful for understanding how fandom operates in daily life.  
Although my thesis has privileged a concentrated focus on Formula One (and 
Villeneuve) fandom specifically, clearly fandom does not operate in such a 
simplistic manner.  Indeed, many scholars (e.g., see Crawford, 2004; Gray, 
Sandvoss & Harrington, 2007; Hills, 2002, 2006; Jenkins, 2006a, 2006b; 
Sandvoss, 2005) have emphasised the multiplicity to fandom(s) and avoid a „one-
dimensional‟ representation of fan practices which arguably characterised the 
earlier waves of fan studies and their almost exclusive orientation towards cult 
media.  Thus, there are numerous moments of „colour‟ that I invest in (with 
varying degrees of energy and intensity) which provide affective „moments‟ 
across a given day, week, month, year, etcetera within my daily life.  Hence, my 
fandom for other sports (e.g., rugby league and cricket), forms of music (death, 
speed and thrash metal), as well as regular viewing of specific television shows or 
films (e.g., Beavis and Butthead, Clerks 2, Extras, Fear and Loathing in Las 
Vegas, South Park, The Young Ones) require maps that articulate a coherence to 
lived reality and make sense of why these cultural forms „matter‟ in some 
capacity.  In this regard, Grossberg‟s (1992b) notion of excess offers the 
explanatory framework and/or justification for these investments and their 
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differential ordering on „my‟ mattering maps (and, arguably, why other cultural 
formations, such as „pop‟ music - do not matter and are not invested in).  He 
notes, (1992b) 
The affective investment in certain sites demands a very 
specific ideological response, for affect can never define, by 
itself, why things should matter...Because something 
matters, it must have an excess which explains the 
investment in it, an excess which ex post facto not only 
legitimates but demands the investment.  (p. 86) 
Clearly, articulating this excess is not always a simple process.  As a basic 
explanatory framework, I would suggest that Formula One‟s elite, global status 
operates as the ideological excess for justifying my investment in the sport (e.g., 
this is the pinnacle of motorsport and is worthy of the investment) while also 
serving to make most other forms of motorsport not „matter‟ (e.g., they are less 
worthy of attention given their lower status, weaker economic/global position 
and/or significance, such as the V8 Supercars).  With Villeneuve, the excess is 
difficult to articulate but he appears to „matter‟ through the maverick, rogue and 
rebel traces that seemingly distinguish Villeneuve from the other drivers and the 
broader machinery of Formula One (see Chapters One, Three and Seven).   
Although these points offer, to a degree, the theoretical maps and means for 
articulating why Villeneuve (and other popular cultural forms) are invested in, 
made to „matter‟ and how they are justified or legitimised, thus far, these points 
have rendered an „abstract‟ account of fandom.  Returning to the concept of 
intensities affords us a means for locating and examining the specificity of 
concrete contexts and practices in which the affective relationship and investment 
are „felt‟ by the social individual: in this instance, through my fandom.  Grossberg 
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(1992b) notes that, “popular culture often inscribes its effects directly upon the 
body: tears, laughter, hair-tingling, spine-chilling, eye-closing, erections, etc.”  
(p. 79).  This evocation of embodiment clearly not only links the body to affective 
relationships but, also, makes the specificity of intensities crucial to how these 
investments operate on the body both as a specific site and in various guises 
dependent on the intensities of affect; hence the On-Board Camera (OBC) in 
Formula One footage does not necessarily operate with the same intensities for all 
viewers despite its construction of a participatory perspective as discussed in 
Chapters Four and Five.  Moreover, while intensities clearly operate within and 
through our bodies, in all likelihood, Grossberg‟s list of bodily reactions may 
overlap but, arguably, they would not all be enacted simultaneously (e.g., at the 
same, specific instance).  Therefore, the intensities and levels of energy drawn 
upon and/or exerted clearly fluctuate at specific temporal and spatial moments 
(which, as outlined in Chapter Two, Grossberg [1992b] refers to as territorializing 
machines and regimes of jurisdiction).  Thus, the embodied reactions I noted 
earlier in this chapter pertained to a specific temporal and spatial instance of live 
televised Formula One viewership that would not necessarily be enacted at other 
„moments‟, such as the temporal and spatial implications of the presence of other 
people while viewing television or as a „live‟ spectator at the track where (self) 
surveillance often curtails excessive public displays.  Conversely (and leaving 
aside the possible presence of other viewers), an OBC perspective from 
Villeneuve‟s car yields an abundance of energies and embodied intensities that are 
difficult to articulate but are „felt‟ through my body and in an affective sense due 
to the (apparent) accessibility to my subject/object of investment at that specific 
spatial and temporal moment (i.e., being visually intertwined with Jacques). 
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These territorializing machines also impact on the broader intensities of 
fandom in daily life.  Clearly there are moments when the intensity of affect is 
piqued as a Formula One fan, and other moments where the intensity expends less 
energy on or through the body within daily life.  With the Formula One season 
operating between approximately March – October most years, there are peaks 
and troughs in the intensity of affect for a fan (although clearly the affective 
relationships and investments will differ for social individuals anyway).  One can 
assume that the off-season is experientially less intense than within the racing 
season, with the intensities becoming more prevalent over the Grand Prix 
weekend (and for the immediate days both preceding and following), leading 
towards a crescendo of intensity on the day of the event.  Nevertheless, it would 
be simplistic to suggest that this is solely how intensity operates (e.g., the day of 
the event), as not every race accords the same level of intensity or affect: I have 
found myself falling asleep or losing interest during the more procession races on 
the calendar (e.g., Grands Prix at Spain, Monaco and Hungary) despite the 
affective investment in Villeneuve.  In fact, it is often the fleeting moments and 
traces of recognising Villeneuve‟s performances within a Grand Prix that provide 
the intensities of „feeling‟, energy and embodied reactions (e.g., seeing him on 
television, noting a good lap time on the internet, getting an OBC perspective, 
etc.).  For example, one of my favourite races is his non-finish at Austria 2002; 
despite the lack of a result, this Grand Prix provides energised and embodied 
moments of intensities when (re)viewed due to his regular „presence‟ on the 
televised coverage (comparative to most races), while he is framed overtaking 
opponents and generally out-performing his car (even his hasty exit from the 
stricken, smokey car add to the sense of his mastery over the machine).   
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Fundamentally, the interrelationship between territorializing machines, 
intensities (of energy and „feelings‟) and embodiment cater to a broader 
recognition of the contradictions or paradoxes in fan practices and processes.  In 
particular, interweaving these terms facilitates an understanding of fandom being 
enacted, activated or mobilised at specific moments, rather than always being 
„on‟.  Three separate examples explain how intensities mobilise fandom.  First, 
there is the almost daily public display of fandom by wearing Formula One or 
Villeneuve apparel.  While these displays are conceivably read by others as 
demonstrating an always „active‟ fandom, this overstates Formula One‟s 
domination or territorialization of my daily life.  In particular, as an aspiring 
academic, there is an expectation to „perform‟ the role of an „aca-fan‟ (Hills, 
2002; Jenkins, 1992, 2006b) and to demonstrate my possession of cultural and 
symbolic capital through the attire and posters adorning my office walls, while, as 
a more simplistic „functional‟ explanation, the vast majority of clothing I own is 
Formula One orientated (and there is clearly a social expectation to be clothed!).  
On a „deeper‟ theoretical level, rather than an always „active‟ fandom, wearing the 
Formula One or Villeneuve apparel may itself constitute a banal act which lacks 
in specific intensity.  Billig (1995) demonstrates that flag waving operates as a 
nationalistic or patriotic act in specific instances (e.g., the territorializing moments 
of intensity, such as celebratory „national‟ days or public holidays) but, for the 
majority of the time, these flags are flaccid and generally unnoticed in our daily 
life (e.g., national flags fluttering in the breeze on university campuses).  
Therefore, Billig suggests that these public displays of the flag constitute a form 
of „banal nationalism‟ which arguably can be transposed on to my own practices 
in daily life.  That is, there are clearly intensities in operation when and where the 
Villeneuve attire is intentionally worn after a strong result and is both inflected 
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with and mobilised through the intensities of energy and „feeling‟ to explicitly 
articulate fandom.  However, traces of a „banal fandom‟ also reside in the attire 
being adorned despite a crash, non-finish and especially since his departure from 
the sport post-2006.  Therefore, the act of wearing attire does not necessarily 
relate to the degrees of intensity (as „feelings‟, energy and embodied practices) 
that operate at different, specific moments as the following examples reveal in 
more detail.   
The second example pertains to my „fandom‟ as multidimensional and 
incorporating more than just Formula One as something that „matters‟ or my only 
source of investment.  So, for example, due to my fandom for rugby league (and 
particularly, the Sydney-based Wests Tigers), I not only make sure I view every 
Tigers game live during a National Rugby League (NRL) season but I am clearly 
invested in my Tigers fandom at these specific territorializing moments.  Hence, 
the intensities of „feeling‟ are evident through the energy I exert and my embodied 
reactions both during the live telecast but, also, more broadly over the weekend 
where (and when) I try to replicate the moves of their star player, Benji Marshall, 
by incorporating „his‟ side-steps or no-look passes within my weekly games of 
touch with friends.  At these specific spatial sites and temporal moments, my 
Formula One fandom is less intense and arguably dormant; it does not „matter‟ 
within this specific instance of my daily life and certainly not to the same degree 
(as an intensity, „feeling‟ or embodied investment) during the NRL telecast (or 
game of touch) compared to a Formula One telecast.  Moreover, there are the 
specific moments when my Formula One fandom is concealed.  As a third 
example, due to my fandom for the much maligned metal music, Formula One 
fandom and corporate branding are jettisoned as either a public display or topic of 
conversation given metal‟s anti-corporate and anti-commercial stance (albeit with 
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its own set of contradictions, in terms of the branded equipment and band 
merchandise that serve as cultural and symbolic capital within this musical field).
6
  
Thus, the intensity of either playing or attending a performance is located (and 
literally embodied as a drummer) in this specific „metal‟ instance before the 
Formula One fandom is re-mobilised outside of these territorializing regimes of 
jurisdiction.   
In an interrelated manner, although accessing Formula One internet sites 
operates through specific intensities (and certainly is piqued when there is positive 
coverage of Villeneuve), the notion of concealment is also evident.  In particular, 
although this chapter has mapped my implication in mediation, consumption, 
performative public practices and the affective investments and intensities 
pertaining to Villeneuve, within my daily life there is also a non-communal 
dimension to fandom.  That is, although I have acknowledged that I am always 
implicated in an imagined Formula One community through mediations, I am not 
„participating‟ in these specific communities in either the conventional (e.g., 
publicly disseminated fan-art, fiction, etc.) or innovative (e.g., DIY multi-media 
production) ways that characterise contemporary fandom.  Thus, for example, the 
productive processes and interactive dynamics that Jenkins‟ (1992, 2006a, 2006b) 
identifies for fans are less obvious in my practices.  This is not to overstate or 
render an „exceptional‟ dimension to my fandom, nor to consign its operation as 
an asocial or acultural process; rather, it is a recognition that there are less 
communal aspects than Jenkins‟ interactive audiences implies in daily life.  
Specifically, while I watch televised coverage, read the magazines and access 
Formula One sites, and clearly “archive, annotate and appropriate” (Jenkins, 
2006b, p. 135) specific Villeneuve content, the crucial „interactive‟ productivity, 
contributory and recirculatory contexts do not exist (aside from obviously 
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producing a Ph.D. thesis, complete with an attached DVD, taping races and 
gameplay, and the public performance as a fan, specifically at a Grand Prix 
venue).  Thus, throughout my fandom, I have not contributed in any capacity to 
the Formula One media sources outlined in Chapter Two (e.g., via blogs, letters, 
subscriptions, etc.), have not joined any fan clubs and have intentionally avoided 
engaging with Formula One on-line communities; I read the content rather than 
contribute to these interactive, participatory and knowledge communities (Jenkins, 
2006b).  This is also evident in the more „isolated‟ context for my often „solo‟ 
Formula One viewership which, equally, applies to playing Formula One video 
games „alone‟ (e.g., competing against the console not „real‟ or „on-line‟ 
opponents).   
Baudrillard‟s (1983a, 1990a) evocation of „fatal strategies‟ may partially 
explain the deployment of a lessened interactive, participatory or productive 
dimension to my fandom.  Baudrillard (1983a) notes that just because “the silent 
majority (or the masses) is an imaginary referent does not mean they don‟t exist.  
It means that their representation is no longer possible” (p. 20, italics in original).  
Nevertheless, Baudrillard (1983a) advocates that „hyperconformity‟ is actually a 
cunning ploy adopted by the masses to remain “an imaginary referent” (p. 20).  
The strength of the masses, Baudrillard (1983a) asserts, “consists in their silence, 
in their capacity to absorb and neutralise” (p. 3).  Hence, within my mediated, 
consumptive and performative practices there is a simulation of conformity (i.e., 
hyperconformity) but, ultimately, also the opportunity (or „strategy‟) to remain 
silent, unknown and left relatively unfettered by either the corporate machinery of 
Formula One or the supposed „knowledge‟ of on-line fan communities.  So, in the 
first instance, via the procurement of merchandise and magazines, I can operate as 
a „duped‟ or „fatigued‟ consumer (Giulianotti, 2004) while being afforded the 
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opportunity to (re)appropriate and (re)define my affective investment and 
intensities in and through these items.  That is, I can simulate conformity to the 
branded display of corporate culture yet use the authentic team gear as 
(re)articulations of my fandom for Villeneuve, even if these displays fluctuate 
between „excessive‟ and „banal‟ performances.  Additionally, the continued 
purchases of F1 Racing magazine maintains my hyperconformity to the authority 
of this publication despite, post-2001, rejecting much of its coverage of 
Villeneuve and drawing on this source to compile an assemblage of textual 
information and images, to scavenge for Villeneuve-specific quotes and to furnish 
my „private‟ affective investment in him (e.g., over and above the often 
unfavourable reporting of the magazine).  Finally, the readership but non-
participation in Formula One websites (and associated on-line fan communities) 
facilitates an anchoring within, and broader awareness and understanding of 
Formula One but also grants a degree of mobility to my fandom.  Hence, I can 
navigate this terrain without having to engage either in the often trivial and banal 
diatribes, nor establish or relinquish any form of „expertise‟ within this field (e.g., 
the combination of uninsightful comments and the petty „flaming‟ of „experts‟ and 
other members repelled me from participating on-line).   
Being „isolated‟, „alone‟ or outside of either the corporate machinery of the 
sport (through hyperconformist practices), or the „authority‟ of the on-line 
communities (through non-participation), lends not only to the playfulness or ruse 
of fatal strategies within fan practices but affords a private dynamic to daily life as 
a fan.  That is, these moments and practices are generally operating outside of the 
public performances, evocations and activations of fandom detailed throughout 
this chapter.  Potentially, this reveals another layering to intensities too; for as 
specific territorializing moments, the private and less communal dimensions 
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clearly play a role in further intensifying, reinforcing and solidifying the affective 
investment and relationship a social individual constructs, enacts and engages 
with through the object of fandom.  For example, the non-communal playing of 
Formula One games provides specific temporal and spatial moments of 
hyperfandom (e.g., the pleasure in performing as a fan while both being a fan and 
actively [re]creating Jacques‟ stardom) unfettered by communal relations or other 
overt social influences.  Hence, PlayStation allows me to simulate my fandom 
while simulating driving as a simulation of Villeneuve in a simulated Grand Prix 
within a simulated Formula One season.  In broader theoretical terms, PlayStation 
reconciles the affective investments and intensities by reducing and redefining the 
„textual‟ and „lived‟ gap between fan and object.  That is, as a specific site for 
investment, PlayStation allows me to become Jacques Villeneuve and actively 
(re)play, (re)create and favourably manipulate Villeneuve‟s Formula One 
performances in a manner that is more than „authentically‟ possible given the 
actual performances of most of his teams post-1997.  Clearly, this also feeds into 
the simultaneous (re)invigoration of my performances, intensities and investments 
as an affective fan.   
In this respect, this chapter has identified two key points.  First, that the 
autoethnographic vignettes reveal and anchor the specific „lived‟ moments within 
structured mobility by detailing the affective investments and relationships of an 
individual.  Thus, as a method and writing strategy, autoethnography has both 
evoked and articulated the „slippery‟ and affective moments of being a Jacques 
Villeneuve fan embedded in the specific and concrete practices of daily life (e.g., 
via mediation, consumption and performance).  Second, that intensities, through a 
combination of varying energised and embodied processes, mobilise fandom at 
specific temporal and spatial moments which enact, navigate and anchor affect 
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within these diverse practices and spaces (both public and private).  Taken 
together, these ideas also suggest that, within certain contexts and particular 
practices, intensities may replace communities conceptually as a theoretical 
framework for understanding the operation of affect (and fandom) in specific 
instances.  This possibility, combined with other concepts developed in the thesis, 
will now be addressed in the final chapter in order to complete the thesis‟ 
mapping of the layered trajectories of a fan. 
 
                                                 
1
 Although the focus here is on Formula One, such points should not be read as implying that 
Formula One was the basis of our relationship or the chief „shared‟ activity.  Often, in fact, Tina 
expressed or showed disinterest in Formula One or Villeneuve.  Clearly, in relationships, many 
„couple-based‟ activities are reliant on a degree of compromise.  Thus, although Formula One was 
one such activity, so too was „our‟ viewing of romantic-comedy films or television shows, such as 
Desperate Housewives, as a shared experience despite these often holding little interest for me; 
conversely, Tina refused to watch telecasts of either cricket or rugby league as a „shared‟ or 
„couple-based‟ activity.  On a broader, theoretical level these trends reflect and support the 
„gendered‟ assumptions that identify sport as predominantly a bastion of masculinity (e.g., 
Connell, 1995; Messner, 1992; Messner & Sabo, 1990, 1994; Whannel, 1999, 2002) and television 
soaps or romantic-comedies as primarily feminine (e.g., Ang, 1985, 1996; Glaessner, 1990; 
Harrington & Bielby, 1995; Stacey, 1991). 
2
 Veblen was not strictly referring to a society of consumption as I may be implying.  In fact, it 
should be acknowledged that Veblen was a champion of the work ethic and production (and 
perhaps blind to consumption being an integral part of the mode of production).  Nevertheless, he 
identifies the emerging practice of visible and strategic consumption for social gains in status and 
value.  
3
 I use the term Formula One sport fandom community as a distinction to suggest this applies to 
fans of the sport.  As I have noted, owning and displaying Formula One merchandise is not limited 
only to culturally literate, „insider‟ fans but can also be obtained by casual attendees, corporate 
guests (and even V8 Supercars fans in Australia if they are so inclined).  The position that I am 
arguing for is that the „Formula One insider‟ status is only applicable to the culturally literate, 
knowledgeable (and assumably emotionally invested) Formula One sport fandom community.  
4
 The exception may be for sports which have little mediated exposure, especially televisual.  
Thus, for New Zealand sports that receive minimal media coverage, such as Badminton, 
Gymnastics and Touch, the lack of a constantly reproduced image or model for performing 
fandom, as well as an arguably smaller fan base, means that these less mediated sports do not 
necessarily lend themselves to an easily replicated, hyperreal model of fandom.  Nevertheless, 
„generic‟ models of display (e.g., dressing in particular colours, face painting, etc.) are arguably 
deployed, especially if inscribed with a nationalistic significance (e.g., „hyperreal‟ New Zealand 
supporters primarily using nationalistic colours and symbols, such as the kiwi, silver fern and/or 
black clothing) which are visible at other New Zealand sports and within most New Zealand sport 
fan communities. 
5
 Of course, on occasions, a section of the viewing crowd will be made visible due to the camera‟s 
positioning or the proximity of a spectator grandstand to the track yet the cameras primarily 
foreground the cars and racing action. 
6
 This „anti‟ stance arguably has connections to the notion of „anti-fandom‟ (Gray, 2003; 
Thedoropoulou, 2007) in which „anti-fans‟ have a particular dislike of a popular cultural form or 
text yet operate in an identical manner to fans due to the intensity of their affective „dislike‟ and 
through the energy they expend to demonstrate this (e.g., see Sconce‟s [2007] discussion of the 
„stop Ashlee [Simpson] petition‟ and movement).   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Reassembling Fandom: Structured Mobility, Reflexivity and the 
Strategy-Intensity Field 
In the previous chapter, Grossberg‟s (1992b) concept of structured mobility was 
drawn upon to articulate how affective relationships anchor social individuals, in 
this case fans, in specific concrete contexts of lived reality.  In particular, by 
conceiving fandom as a highly mobilised process, Grossberg‟s (essentially 
morphogenetic)
1
 notion of intensity was extended to the plural form, intensities, to 
trace the varying degrees and levels of energy fans activate and utilise in their 
practices and performances at specific spatial and temporal „moments‟.  As such, 
by using my own fandom as a case study for analysis, the previous chapter 
recognised that fandom is not always „on‟ but, rather, is multifaceted, temporally 
differentiated and multi-dimensional in its actualisation.  Thus, it is at various 
spatial and/or temporal moments that fandom is enacted and activated (e.g., the 
Grand Prix site, live televisual broadcast or the PlayStation video game for 
Formula One), while these moments are defined by a fluidity in the degrees of 
energy and emotional investment deployed by individual fans (e.g., the resultant 
piquing[s] of attention and variations in the intensity of affect in their daily lives).  
Additionally, the previous chapter also suggested that such intensities are 
strategically deployed in terms of how social individuals construct, activate and 
demonstrate their fandom.  This strategic dimension, which ranges from the banal 
to the fatal, will be returned to later in this chapter.  Moreover, as a means to map 
the trajectories and anchorings of fandom, the facets of intensity and strategy will 
be further refined within this chapter, culminating in their transposition onto what 
I term the strategy-intensity field (presented in due course).  Finally, this chapter 
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will conclude by reassembling and tying together the key themes developed over 
this thesis.  First, however, the notion of intensities requires further elaboration in 
order to advance our understanding of contemporary Formula One fandom in the 
context of forms of popular cultural fandom more broadly. 
Intensity 
Dyer (1981) provides an early and compelling evocation of intensities in popular 
entertainment which is worth revisiting for our present purposes.  Focusing on 
musicals, he examines how popular entertainment „works‟ but eschews 
privileging either a structured (e.g., entertainment as patriarchal-capitalist 
ideology) or agential (e.g., entertainment gives people what they want) binary 
presentation.  Rather, according to Dyer, popular entertainment is underpinned by 
a utopian impulse, reacting to specific „real‟ societal values while, simultaneously, 
often defining and reinforcing those values.  Dyer (1981) observes, “entertainment 
offers the image of „something better‟ to escape into, or something we want 
deeply that our day-to-day lives don‟t provide” (p. 177) but that such a utopian 
vision is “contained in the feelings it embodies.  It presents, head-on as it were, 
what utopia would feel like rather than how it would be organised” (p. 177).  
Hence, the utopian impulse of much entertainment is organised according to 
emotional significance, signification and sensibilities which, according to his 
analysis, tend to deny the validity of class, race and sex as necessarily 
accompanying „problems‟.  There is a displacement into the realm of affect.   
By charting the socio-cultural contexts, complexities and broader spatial-
temporal dimensions that envelop both the construction and reception of „utopia‟ 
in musicals (e.g., the „learnt‟ responses to encoded, embodied and representational 
regimes of sensibilities), Dyer identifies five key categories of affective 
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displacement for utopian sensibilities in entertainment: energy, abundance, 
intensity, transparency and community respectively.  Dyer‟s (1981) description of 
a „one-dimensional‟ capitalist ideology2 provides a succinct summation of these 
displacements: 
The ideals of entertainment imply wants that capitalism itself 
promises to meet.  Thus abundance becomes consumerism, 
energy and intensity personal freedom and individualism, 
and transparency freedom of speech...At our worse sense of 
it, entertainment provides alternatives to capitalism which 
will be provided by capitalism.  (Dyer, 1981, pp. 184-185, 
italics in original)  
It should be noted that community is absent from this particular quotation, 
although Dyer (1981) loosely defines community elsewhere as “togetherness” and 
a “sense of belonging” (p. 180).  Additionally, while Dyer is clearly presenting an 
interesting conundrum (and turn of phrase) in relation to capitalism as structure 
and its imposition of limited degrees of human agency, we have already examined 
how „Villeneuve‟ implies a want (as a contestable „rebel‟ image) that Villeneuve 
simultaneously promises to meet (both as commodity image-system and via fan 
consumerist practices) in Chapters One and Six.  So, our attention turns now 
towards a deeper understanding of Dyer‟s notion of intensity. 
In his initial categorisation of intensity, Dyer (1981) uses the term to mean 
the “experiencing of emotion directly, fully, unambiguously, „authentically‟, 
without holding back” (p. 180).  However, he is also aware that such a 
conceptualisation remains unfinished, noting, (1981)  
The categories are, I hope, clear enough, but a little more 
needs to be said about „intensity‟.  It is hard to find a word 
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that quite gets what I mean.  What I have in mind is the 
capacity of entertainment to present either complex or 
unpleasant feelings (e.g. involvement in personal or political 
events; jealously, loss of love, defeat) in a way that makes 
them seem uncomplicated, direct and vivid, not „qualified‟ 
or „ambiguous‟ as day-to-day life makes them, and without 
those intimidations of self-deception and pretence.  (p.182) 
Grossberg‟s (1992b) concept of affect, with its subset of accompanying terms 
which explain how affective relationships are forged, invested in and made to 
„matter‟ (e.g., investment, mattering maps, intensity and excess), seems in effect 
to „finish‟ the central premise behind Dyer‟s notion of intensity.  That is, affect 
incorporates the complexity of feelings experienced by social individuals and 
recognises that „pleasure‟ can oscillate on continuums ranging from immense 
satisfaction to forms of displeasure (as well as the fluctuating levels of energy 
expended) in spite of the seemingly unproblematic way popular entertainment 
represents such feelings.  Grossberg‟s notion of affect giving „colour‟ to the 
otherwise drab and „grey‟ existence of daily life is also indebted Dyer: the direct 
or vivid „moments‟ that particular forms of popular entertainment provide are 
energising and immense in their potential for being emotionally experienced 
(whether this is „pleasurable‟, complex or unpleasant of course).  However, it 
should be noted that Dyer (1981) discriminates energy as a separate category, 
suggesting that energy is the “capacity to act vigorously; human power, activity, 
potential” (p. 180).  For the moment, eschewing Dyer‟s precise definition of 
energy (and its allusion to broader theories of human agency), by reinvesting the 
centrality of energy within Grossberg‟s notion of intensity and affective 
relationships (e.g., the varying levels of energy drawn upon and/or expended by a 
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social individual in his/her affective investments), we have the preliminary 
theoretical tools for understanding how popular entertainment can be both direct 
and vivid while, equally, being ambiguous and neither qualified by nor reliant on 
forms of self-deception and pretence (Dyer, 1981).   
While he does not provide the plural term, intensities, Dyer (1981) 
demonstrates that the „experiencing of emotion‟ (i.e., intensity) is indeed multiple 
and fluctuates across various entertainment forms.  In fact, rather than a static 
diagram, Dyer‟s five categorical sensibilities (energy, abundance, intensity, 
transparency and community) need to be continually reconceptualised depending 
on the popular entertainment form under examination.  Thus, Dyer presents three 
musicals showing differing relationships with the sensibilities listed, before 
adding a further comparative dimension in relation to how these sensibilities are 
(re)enacted and/or disrupted by other entertainment forms; in this instance, 
westerns and the news.  Most significantly for the present project, we can 
extrapolate that each category also has its own trajectory; thus, as some categories 
decline, other categories can increase in importance (although this remains 
underdeveloped in Dyer‟s own work).  While Dyer‟s diagram is an abstract and 
„generalised‟ application of the specific sensibilities enacted for collective 
viewership of a given popular entertainment form (rather than atomised accounts 
of the experiential), it does afford a further layering for both fandom and the 
notion of intensity.  For example, in my practices of Formula One fandom 
documented in the previous chapter, the category of intensity (as a direct 
experience of emotion) arguably has an increased significance within my daily life 
while, consequently, the sense of community (i.e., togetherness and sense of 
belonging), especially in a „physical‟ or nationalistic capacity, has a lessened 
significance, points I will return to later in this chapter.  Moreover, the concept of 
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intensities (i.e., emotional experiences as fluid) complements the territorializing 
machines and regimes of jurisdiction that Grossberg (1992b) evokes in relation to 
the spatial and temporal moments of intensity that underpin and inflect the 
emotional investments, affective relationships and broader anchoring of social 
individuals within concrete contexts and specific practices in their daily lives.   
Thus far, intensity has been presented in a relatively straightforward manner; 
that is, when linked to emotional experience (Dyer, 1981) or investment 
(Grossberg, 1992b), the „intensity‟ has been conceptualised in accordance with its 
notional amount or whether it is of a high or low level (inclusive of varying 
degrees of energy, experience, investment, affect and so on).  However, a further 
theoretical layering to intensity is possible through a subtle shift in emphasis from 
the amount towards the quality of the intensity which, potentially, is furnished by 
Archer‟s (2007) conceptualisation of reflexivity.  As will be argued, reflexivity 
exposes both the quality of the intensity and, implicitly, the strategic imperatives 
social individuals deliberatively deploy to negotiate and navigate the terrain of 
daily life.  In fact, a specific aim of this chapter is to devise and map some of the 
reflexive processes, practices, intensities and strategies of fandom onto what will 
be labelled the strategy-intensity field.  First, however, a broader sketch of the 
concept of reflexivity is required.  
Reflexivity and Internal Deliberation 
According to Archer (2007), reflexivity and its various processes of „ruminations‟, 
„self-talk‟ or „mulling things over‟ are significant for how we, as social 
individuals, make our way through the world.  As has been noted in Chapter Two, 
Archer repudiates traditional sociological theories of „routine actions‟ as no longer 
carrying sufficient weight to explain the contemporary social mobility of 
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individuals.  Rather, she counters, it is the “underexplored, undertheorised and, 
above all, undervalued” (Archer, 2007, p. 1) concept of reflexivity which provides 
some explanatory purchase for how social individuals are able to negotiate and 
navigate their quotidian existence.  In defining reflexivity, Archer (2007) notes 
that “reflexivity itself is held to depend upon conscious deliberations that take 
place through „internal conversation‟” (p. 3), while expanding this definition 
further to assert that, “„reflexivity‟ is the regular exercise of the mental ability, 
shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their (social) 
contexts and vice versa” (p. 4, italics in original).  Thus, rather than being ascribed 
to a merely subjective, asocial or self-indulgent practice, she views reflexivity as 
both pertaining to and inflecting broader social practices and functions.  Archer‟s 
work is again anchoring us in the structure/agency debate through her attempts to 
articulate a satisfactory account of the problematic nature of agential „powers‟, as 
well as degrees of agential mobility, highlighted throughout this thesis (e.g., 
Grossberg‟s [1992b] „structured mobility‟ or Urry‟s [2000] pluralistic concept of 
mobilities).  However, at this point, structure/agency as a meaningful binary does 
indeed start to collapse in theoretically productive ways.  In particular, Archer 
seeks to refine the concept of „routine actions‟, theorised as central to traditional 
accounts of society, structures, practices and „subjectivities‟, by accommodating 
reflexivity as a potential explanatory framework for both the emerging, 
contradictory conditions and the diverse mobility of individuals in our 
contemporary social world. 
Within Archer‟s conceptualisation of reflexivity, socio-cultural factors are not 
jettisoned but readily acknowledged as constraints and enablements for social 
individuals which they must face and can, potentially, negotiate and navigate 
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(e.g., the various structural and/or cultural properties that shape, define and, to an 
extent, determine the social world).  Archer (2007) notes,  
In contradistinction, the account given here of the different 
kinds of internal conversation, prevailing at any given time, 
are always held to depend on various combinations of 
„contexts and concerns‟, neither of which can be reduced to 
individual terms.  The „context‟ confronted by any subject at 
any time – be it their natal context or subsequent contexts 
they encounter – is never of their making or of their 
choosing.  The „concerns‟ they can adopt as value-
commitments are similarly dependent upon the contents 
lodged in the cultural system – which are not of their making 
or choosing either.  (p. 315, italics in original) 
Equally, Archer is attempting to reinvest degrees of „governance‟ with social 
individuals, rather than ascribing „subjectivity‟ as merely a delimited and 
routinised response to such impositions (e.g., as imposed by habit or class).  Thus, 
she conceives of the agential capacity of individuals to discern (reflectively, 
retrospectively and prospectively) their desiderata of concerns, to deliberate on 
these clusters of concerns (e.g., what is desirable and what some likely demands, 
merits and consequences may be) and to act on these concerns through dedication 
(e.g., prioritising, relegating or eliminating courses of action).  Of course, as has 
been noted, all such concerns and courses of action are context bound, are 
structurally and culturally-laden and are not „free‟ in their orientation, design or 
ultimate outcome.  That is, no matter what reflexive deliberations we engage in 
and the specific courses of action these may enable for us, ultimately we are still 
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constrained by, for example, the socio-economic imposition, forces and associated 
by-products of a capitalist society.   
Nevertheless, a simplistic deployment of the structure/agency binary misses a 
good deal that matters.  As Archer (2007) notes, “in particular, it omits the part 
reflexivity plays in enabling subjects to design and determine their responses to 
the structured circumstances in which they find themselves, in the light of what 
they personally care about” (p. 11).  In contradistinction to the reductive and 
impugnable structured orientation towards individuals as passive „subjects‟ (e.g., 
who are allegedly construed, impinged and imposed upon as social constructs), 
she advances an acknowledgement of the „responsiveness‟ of individuals through 
their reflexive actions.  Therefore, internal conversations are fundamental for 
individuals to consciously develop their concerns, define „projects‟ and formulate 
resultant courses of action in response to both the socio-cultural contexts and 
aspects (or objects) of social life that they care about.  But such reflexive 
deliberations, concerns and courses of action are personalised, not collective, in 
orientation (see Archer‟s critique of Bourdieu and habitus in Chapter Two).  So 
each of us deliberates and accordingly responds in atomised and contextually-
distinctive ways (with varying degrees of planning, activation and/or „success‟ it 
might be added) to the impositions of capitalist, commercialised and commodified 
forces in our experiencing of the contemporary social world. 
While Archer herself then dips into problematic evocations of „personal 
power‟ in relation to reflexivity, a vexed conceptual move in light of the broader 
structure/agency debate (and hence not a vocabulary adopted in this thesis), her 
ideas do have two significant contributions to what we have derived from other 
scholars thus far.  First, through her conceptualisation of the salient role that 
reflexive deliberations and internal conversations have for social individuals in 
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their daily lives, she provides an important correction to Dyer‟s (1981) ultimately 
impersonal theorisation of utopian sensibilities.  In so doing, Archer implicitly 
confronts Dyer‟s assertion that the intensity of popular entertainment forms is not 
experientially „qualified‟; in contrast, Archer is embellishing the significance of 
what social individuals actually care about.  We can extrapolate her likely 
argument that, as audiences, social individuals are reliant on forms of inner 
dialogue to „make sense‟ of the mediated representation, content and context, as 
well as to further clarify their atomised responses (e.g., the direct and vivid 
experiences of jealously, defeat, loss of love and so forth that Dyer evokes).  
Alternatively, such internal conversations may potentially facilitate 
temporal/spatial moments of self-deception and pretence as a reflexive strategy.  
For example, the self-reflexive individual who „knows‟ that the soap-opera he/she 
is watching is not real, that these are merely actors, etcetera, yet allows him/her-
self to be engrossed in the specific scenes and evocatively respond in kind, be it 
sorrow, joy or anger, as one would over real friends or family members.  Is this a 
designed response, not self-delusion?  These notions of reflexive and non-
reflexive intensities, and their accompanying strategies, will be returned to 
shortly. 
Second, Archer‟s conceptualisation does appear to dovetail with Grossberg‟s 
(1992b) theory of affect.  In particular, reflexive deliberations and internal 
conversations appear to describe what Grossberg referred to as „excess‟ and the 
means by which individuals justify and legitimise their own affective concerns 
(investments) and the hierarchical layering or mapping (mattering maps) for such 
affective relationships in their daily lives.  However, one significant point of 
departure is that Grossberg, possibly through a need to reorientate his notion of 
excess and „legitimacy‟ to the socio-cultural, renders the articulation of such 
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excesses as for the most part ideologically determined.  Conversely, Archer finds 
what she calls ideational clustering (through theories of discourse, ideology and so 
forth) arbitrary and difficult to attribute neatly or categorically to all the internal 
conversations of social individuals.  Archer (2007) notes, “there are indeed 
structural properties, such as vested interests, and cultural properties, such as 
ideology, which can motivate by encouraging and discouraging people from 
particular courses of action without their personal awareness” (p. 17) yet, 
ultimately, “ideologies, however hegemonic, are not in themselves influences, but 
rather attempts to influence” (p. 16).  Hence, she conceives the reflexive 
deliberations of social individuals to be multifaceted.  In Grossberg‟s terms, the 
excess overspills the influence.  Contained within these internal conversations are 
both the influences of structured, epistemological and knowledge-carrying 
external formations (e.g., discourses and ideologies), as well as more distinctive 
and contextually-bound first-person articulations (e.g., personalised meanings, 
understandings, designs and abbreviated formations which often do not require 
further elaboration or forms of self-monitoring and/or censoring compared to an 
external conversation).
3
  Thus, the social individual uses his/her reflexive 
deliberations to assemble, sort and clarify in varying degrees (but seldom in a 
commensurate or resolute fashion) these combined dimensions as a means to 
proceed with a designed (but not necessarily appropriate or effective) course of 
action or set of choices and interests.   
Again, this is not to overstate degrees of „personal power‟, nor to reproduce 
passive models of inchoate human subjects, as the old structure/agency binary 
encouraged.  Archer (2007) suggests instead that, “it is agential reflexivity which 
actively mediates between our structurally shaped circumstances and what we 
deliberately make of them” (p. 16).  Moreover, both authors stress that these 
376 
processes and practices of either affect (Grossberg, 1992b) or reflexivity (Archer, 
2007) are seriously atomised in their temporal and spatial occurrences for social 
individuals in their daily life.  As Archer (2007) elaborates,  
What reflexivity does do is to mediate by activating 
structural and cultural powers, and in so doing there is no 
single and predictable outcome.  This is because subjects can 
exercise their reflexive powers in different ways, according 
to their very different concerns and considerations.  (p. 16) 
Thus, while elements of a shared or collective dimension may occur (e.g., the 
„shared‟ affective investment in a media star, such as Villeneuve), reflexivity and 
affect are bound in the contextual specificities of a social individual‟s 
circumstances and his/her particular practices and equivocal experiences, 
thoughts, „feelings‟ and sensibilities within any given temporal and spatial 
moment.  So there is an atomistic containment of the „shared‟ at the moment of its 
impact.  Much of this thesis has documented the strength of that atomisation in the 
context of this writer‟s life. 
This returns us to the contribution that Archer offers to refining intensity with 
a reflexive element.  As noted earlier, the works of both Dyer (1981) and 
Grossberg (1992b) respectively enable us to trace the nominal level of emotion or 
energy that particular activities or responses to mediation entail (e.g., both can be 
deployed to map the intensities and practices fans engage in with their 
subject/object of attention).  Thus, such accounts cater to quantifying the 
emotional dimension of intensity in terms of elaborating what sensibilities are 
enacted via mediations and, more particularly, to extrapolate the degrees of 
intensity evoked on a continuum of low to high (inclusive of the emotional 
investment and levels of energy these experientially involve).  Reflexivity now 
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seemingly furnishes a further theoretical layering for intensities as, potentially, the 
quality of such intensities can be mapped through integrating the reflexive 
deliberations, ruminations and the designs of social individuals.  The dual 
composition of both the socio-cultural and atomised dimensions which „construct‟ 
reflexivity has already been suggested here.  However, Archer also points to the 
mobilising effects these internal conversations have in allowing individuals to 
select courses of action within the options offered by the social world, with clear 
links to Grossberg‟s central premise of the structured mobility of social 
individuals who use their affective relationships to anchor themselves in an 
ongoing way within specific temporal and spatial circumstances.  Such reflexive 
practices are therefore infused with both fluctuations in intensity and strategic 
dynamics as individuals devise projects that matter to them.  My attachment to 
Villeneuve is one such project, forensically examined in these pages as 
themselves a further extension of that project. 
As such, understanding intensity only in relation to its emotional content (or 
degrees of energy) does not take us far enough since individuals will be further 
qualifying their „intensities‟ through variations of reflexivity (i.e., via degrees of 
reflexivity).  Thus, the quality of the intensity will be marked by the degrees of 
reflexive deliberation, as are the carefully considered courses of action undertaken 
which assign significance to a particular socio-cultural object (e.g., Formula One 
as worthy of affective investment by a fan), and which distinguish this object from 
others (e.g., why Villeneuve is more worthy of investment than other drivers – 
with clear links therein to Grossberg‟s notions of excess and mattering maps); and 
which further construct particular projects and/or practices (e.g., the expense of 
Grand Prix attendance, regular late night televised viewing of races, or 
committing to a Ph.D. project).  Again, such designs may themselves be 
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ineffective, either directly for the social individual or are deemed as such by 
external sources (thus, to others, the vast sums of money „wasted‟ on Formula 
One merchandise or hours „lost‟ playing PlayStation games).  However, by 
(re)investing intensity with a qualitative rather than merely quantitative property 
we come closer to understanding both the prominence of reflexivity as part of the 
process and, more significantly for the present project, how the quality of the 
intensity is underscored by the reflexive element of those designs that shape the 
concerns, actions and mobilities of social individuals in their daily lives.  These 
theoretical perspectives will be re-grounded in particular concrete, context-
specific examples of fandom shortly.   
However, for further clarification, we should note that these variations in the 
intensity of reflexive deliberations will oscillate from the perfunctory to the 
profound in our quotidian existence.  So, these comprise examples ranging from 
self-reminders to buy milk on the way home or self-evaluations of whether we 
„look good‟ in a particular piece of clothing (the perfunctory), to the lengthier, 
complex and layered internal conversations we have as researchers when trying to 
convey ideas through writing or external conversations (the profound).  My 
preference here is to marry conceptualisations of intensity with the strategic and 
then to plot these as constitutive of a particular field – herein offered as the 
strategy-intensity field.  Aligning these two terms acknowledges that internal 
conversations are simultaneously always inflected both by strategic imperatives 
and by variations in the intensity of the reflexive deliberation.  Thus, the terms 
strategy and intensity operate as vectors within the strategy-intensity field onto 
which the specific reflexive and strategic dimensions of particular practices can be 
traced.  The composition of this strategy-intensity field, as well as a theoretical 
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mapping of my fandom onto this field, will be an intended culmination of this 
thesis.  First, however, an elaboration of the notion of strategy is required. 
Fatal and Banal Strategies 
Baudrillard‟s (1983a, 1990a) notion of fatal strategies was introduced earlier in 
this thesis and can now be returned to.  Initially, fatal strategies were presented as 
a strategic tool utilised by the masses to simulate their existence and their 
conformity to the prevailing hyperreal culture and social reality that they were 
„subject‟ to.  However, it was also suggested that these fatal strategies bestow a 
degree of „agential‟ power, with the masses deploying such strategies as forms of 
ruse and artifice to simulate their passivity and inertia as a means to escape 
attempts at detection or social classification in the face of immensely determining 
forces.  We can extrapolate these points to incorporate further distinctions within 
these strategies.  In his summation of fatal strategies, Baudrillard (1990a) says, 
There is perhaps but one fatal strategy and only one: theory.  
And doubtless the only difference between a banal theory 
and a fatal theory is that in one strategy the subject still 
believes himself to be more cunning than the object, whereas 
in the other the object is considered more cunning, cynical, 
talented than the subject, for which it lies in wait.  The 
metamorphoses, the ruses, the strategies of the object surpass 
the subject‟s understanding.  The object is neither the double 
nor the repressed of the subject...it has its own strategy and 
holds the key to the rules of a game, impenetrable to the 
subject, not because they are deeply mysterious, but because 
they are infinitely ironic.  (p. 181) 
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Therefore, on the one hand we can argue that the subject is actually implementing 
a banal strategy as a member of the „masses‟ which, in fact, is not a passive, 
simulated act but, in itself is simulating indifference through the pretext and 
pretence of conforming (Baudrillard, 1983a, 1988a, 1990a).  Therefore, the 
subject‟s acts of supposed evasion and guile retain an assumed superiority to the 
object and constitute a banal strategy.  On the other hand, we can assert that the 
subject‟s integration into the masses (in a symbolic and simulated capacity) 
becomes a fatal strategy, as it is the masses‟ spongy collectivity that becomes the 
object in such relations and they, the masses, are the object being sought for 
investigation, analysis, opinion and so forth.  In this respect, the masses as object 
can be deemed supreme in such relations, with their collectivity and assumed 
passivity, inertia and conformity comprising cunning fatal strategies that are being 
deployed to escape detection.  Through our discussion and mapping of fandom 
onto the strategy-intensity field, we will see how these subject/object relations, 
banal/fatal strategies and their associated assumptions of supremacy play out in 
the social domain of fandom.   
More broadly, Baudrillard is suggesting that simulation and hyperreality are 
creating a fatal (but not apocalyptic) destiny which transgresses the traditional 
limits of, for example, meaning, knowledge and information.  Indeed, in its 
fatality, such definitional terms are themselves mocked and surpassed in what he 
labels „objective irony‟.  Baudrillard (1988a) advocates that, “for critical theory 
one must therefore substitute a fatal theory, to bring this objective irony of the 
world to completion” (p. 83), while also suggesting that, “this is no longer the 
irony of the subject faced with an objective order, but the objective irony of things 
caught in their own devices” (p. 83).  Thus, this returns to us to the notion of 
strategies and, particularly, the primacy of supremacy first bestowed on objects in 
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the hyperreal (they are fatalistic in design, in their destiny, in their centrality and 
through the deployment of their own fatal strategies).  For the subject also to 
participate in the „objective irony of the world‟, the banal strategies they construct 
and implement must also be, to some degree, fatalistic in design.  So Baudrillard 
(1988a) asserts that,  
Against the banal vision (conventional and religious) of the 
fatal, one must set up a fatal vision of the banal.  It is at the 
extremities of this monotony, this insignificance, this 
indifference of our systems, that the sequences, unfolding, 
and processes...appear.  (pp. 84-85) 
Hence, the mundane, monotonous, insignificant and so forth serve as strategies in 
the daily lives of subjects and, although arguably arbitrary in design, fatalistically 
bestow some kind of supremacy to the subject through their deployment (there is 
an unexpected converging of ideas here from Archer and Baudrillard who, 
otherwise, make strange bedfellows).
4
  Often these banal strategies also become 
inhuman (where Baudrillard departs again from Archer), deploying guises such as 
obedience, silence and inertia as a means to accede to the fatalistic and broader 
social (and symbolic) orders, while, ultimately, conferring a supremacy to the 
subject.  Baudrillard‟s fatalistic visions and abstract theories of the social will be 
returned to in due course.  For our present purposes, Archer‟s (2007) concept of 
reflexivity and Baudrillard‟s (1983a, 1988a, 1990a) theory of strategies are 
combined and transposed onto the strategy-intensity field as a means to explore 
the socio-cultural phenomenon of fandom.  
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The Strategy-Intensity Field 
Comprising the intensity vector are the distinguishing terms reflexive and non-
reflexive intensity which consider, obviously, the quality of the intensity 
underpinning the reflexive design and its concrete realisation in specific fan 
practices.  As such, the previous analogy of the perfunctory and the profound does 
not adequately articulate the diverse intensities of reflexive deliberations for fans; 
that is, while fandom is imbued all the time with the perfunctory (e.g., remember 
to pack your Grand Prix ticket), such terms in themselves do not provide 
sufficient explanatory purchase.  Hence, the intensity vector maps the non-
reflexive as being orientated towards affect (and its associated emotional 
dimensions) while, conversely, the reflexive is characterised as being guided more 
by „intellect‟.  Such findings will be supported by embedding Archer‟s (2007) 
three modes of reflexivity (the communicative, autonomous and meta-reflexive) 
within the broader theorisation of these non-reflexive and reflexive intensities.  
The strategy vector comprises Baudrillard‟s (1990a) notions of the banal and the 
fatal, to recognise that the activation of specific social practices (here fandom) and 
their preceding reflexive designs are marked by the differing dimensions, meaning 
and „depth‟ to the strategies social individuals deploy.  Nevertheless, rather than 
constituting a static set of distinctive binaries, the field should be recognised as 
fluid and dynamic.  By doing so, the fluctuating degrees of mobility that the 
intensity of reflexive deliberations, strategic imperatives and the resultant actions 
(e.g., the overlap between strategies and intensities) accord can also be plotted 
onto this field.  In fact, as Figure Four reveals, within each distinctive quadrant 
the overlapping intensities and strategies are inflected with broader social 
dimensions and/or implications (see boxed labels).  It is onto this field that my 
Formula One fandom is now transposed as a means finally for revealing and 
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refining how such strategies and intensities are embedded and actualised in 
particular, concrete practices.  Most pointedly, such an approach also makes 
cognisable Grossberg‟s (1992b) notion of structured mobility by mapping the 
routes, trajectories and temporal/spatial anchoring of a social individual, through 
the processes of fandom, within and across this dynamic field (where in my earlier 
discussion this mobility remained ultimately undefined). 
Figure 4: The Strategy-Intensity Field 
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Fandom and the Strategy-Intensity Field 
Banal/Non-Reflexive 
As our first plotted trajectory on the strategy-intensity field, a banal/non-reflexive 
strategic-intensity can be characterised as both being obedient strategically and 
less critically-informed reflexively.  While the banal/non-reflexive nexus can be 
emotionally-driven or dependent (though conversely, it may not be, as my 
oscillating examples will demonstrate) most significantly, it tends to privilege 
routine and to be activated by habit.  Archer (2007) suggests that for social 
individuals surrounded by their „similars‟ (e.g., a network of close family and 
friends) and „familiars‟ (e.g., contextual continuity in terms of location, vocation, 
existing socio-cultural structures, etc.) the intensity of reflexive deliberations is 
weakened.  Classified by the „communicative‟ mode of reflexivity, such 
individuals often have reduced internal conversations as they turn to their 
interlocutors (e.g., „similars‟) to check, clarify and/or confirm any such 
ruminations externally.  According to Archer (2007), a by-product of this 
communicative mode of reflexivity is social immobility, as these social 
individuals (often guided by their interlocutors) privilege contextual continuity by 
falling back on existing habits and routines.  Such an observation has clear links 
with Bourdieu‟s theories of individual dispositions and the habitus.  Nevertheless, 
Archer (2007) refutes any overly explicit connection between the socio-economic 
and modes of reflexivity, asserting that the reflexivity of her own interviewees, for 
instance, was deliberative (not a mere reflection of circumstances) and used by 
design as a means to maintain and/or retain a close proximity to these „similars‟ 
and „familiars‟.   
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We can argue, however, that such routines and habits must shape the 
banal/non-reflexive nexus for fandom as, strategically, social individuals are 
obedient to these external factors to some considerable extent despite their own 
deliberative capacities.  Hence, as a prime example, an individual‟s habitus shapes 
the particular formation and mode of his/her fandom.  Nationality and nationalism 
are a clear example of this, hailing social individuals to recognise their cultural 
identity and interpellating them into associated practices and processes (Chapter 
Two).  Therefore, for example, sport fandom through nationality is often a 
banal/non-reflective process as fans are drawing on habitual routines to evoke 
their support and to reinforce social immobility (e.g., maintaining a link to 
„similars‟ and „familiars‟).  Hence, as a New Zealander, during my childhood and 
early adulthood rugby was the locus for my sport fandom.  Such fandom was 
clearly inflected with nationalistic sentiments and characterised by the habitual, 
routinised processes, practices and formations that accompany nationalistic 
fandom (and shaped my grassroots participation in the sport).  Thus, for example, 
the communal gathering and viewing of rugby by „similars‟, the evocation of the 
familiar through imagined communities and the habitual reinforcement of this 
social context (e.g., articulations of national pride and unity) were the routinised 
and habitual components of „my‟ New Zealand rugby fandom.  Furthermore, 
through the repetition of such communal activities, such fandom can also 
constitute a form of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995) which potentially becomes 
mundane and drab through the recycling of these habitual routines (e.g., regular 
and regulated viewing of test matches, displaying and/or wearing nationalistic 
symbols, singing national anthems and so forth).  These characteristics can be 
transposed, with socio-cultural and contextual refinements, onto other 
nationalistic forms of fandom (e.g., cricket in India, football in England, ice 
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hockey in Canada and, in a more vexed but interesting manner, onto Formula One 
given its layered and at times contradictory evocation of nationalism – see 
Chapter Two).
5
   
Strategically banal and reflexively uncritical through its obviousness, its level 
of expectation and its obedience to the socio-cultural status quo, the banal/non-
reflexive nexus may be affective in its emotional investment and intensity but, 
seemingly, privileges an awareness and activation of habitual routines in the 
realisation of specific concrete practices of fandom.  Indirectly, Archer (2007) 
captures this perspective by surmising,  
What the practice of communicative reflexivity does is to 
privilege the public over the private, shared experience over 
lone experiences, third-person knowledge over first-person 
knowledge...In short, the speculative realm is severely 
truncated in favour of common sense, common experience 
and common knowledge.  In the process, „similars and 
familiars‟ become still more similar to one another as well as 
familiar with each other.  (p. 273) 
Of course, at this juncture I have viewed the banal/non-reflexive nexus only 
through a nationalistic lens.  Such a lens in Formula One is either blurred, through 
the amalgamation of diverse team, driver and staffing nationalities (and localities), 
or less transparent than in other sports; there is no New Zealand driver, team or 
race catering to nationalistic identification for myself.
6
  However, the banal/non-
reflexive nexus has applicability to the initial stages of fandom, which I herein 
consider my „naive‟ phase of Formula One fandom.  My argument is that as naive 
fans new to a particular sport, these social individuals also fall back on habitual 
practices and routinised processes to develop what we might term their cultural 
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literacy (and, in time, their cultural and symbolic capital).  Such practices may be 
marked by the initial „compulsive‟ forms of consumption which people engage in 
to seemingly (and symbolically at least) quickly acquire forms of capital to 
demonstrate and display to others.  Thus, for example, we are reminded of the 
commercialised and commodified processes embedded in sport (and traced in the 
previous chapter) which, collectively, treat fans as consumers, transform events 
into commodified „experiences‟ and imbue consumer goods with broader socio-
cultural significance within specific fan communities (e.g., Crawford, 2004; 
Giulianotti, 2002; Grossberg, 1992a; Gruneau & Whitson, 1993; Rinehart, 1998; 
Sandvoss, 2005; Schirato, 2007b).  As such, collectively, these commercialised 
and commodified processes are catering to the ephemeral „casual‟ 
viewer/spectator and the more culturally literate fan and facilitate entry into the 
cultural field (or subculture) of specific sports for the naive fan.  That is, due to 
his/her cultural illiteracy, the naive fan adopts a banal/non-reflexive approach to 
sport by falling back on routinised and habitual practices of consumption to 
„become‟ a fan by purchasing the t-shirt, cap and so forth.  Still refining their 
cultural literacy, such naive fans deploy a banal strategy by obeying the expected 
consumerist rules and are non-reflexive in their designs (e.g., as they collect 
merchandise they are generally unaware of the more subtle distinctions embedded 
in consumer goods as cultural capital, nor their possible conformist practices as 
„duped‟ consumers).   
The initial selection of particular sporting individuals to support arguably 
follows similar routinised and habitual lines.  As has been discussed in this thesis, 
star athletes are both central to the televised sport spectacle and to forms of media 
fandom (Chapters Four and Six; see also Whannel, 1992, 1999, 2002).  Hence, 
these sport stars are elevated, given prominence and marked as exceptional in 
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sport mediations.  Both casuals and naive fans may be culturally illiterate in 
certain sports but soon perceive who the star athletes are through their continual 
coverage, circulation and exchange which usually is founded upon some degree of 
success.
7
  So, in contemporary men‟s sports the leading, winning and „champion‟ 
athletes are renowned; most obviously for example, Roger Federer in tennis, Tiger 
Woods in golf, Lance Armstrong in road cycling and, prior to 2007, Michael 
Schumacher in Formula One.  Unless another avenue is constructed for 
identification, such as the nationalistic one noted above (or, for example, other 
„traditional‟ social classifications such as race, gender or class), it is fair to 
generalise and extrapolate that most casual and naive fans will gravitate towards 
the star athletes in their respective sports.
8
  Such a process is orientated by the 
banal/non-reflexive nexus through lacking in an intensity of deliberation and 
being strategically obedient to the predominant mediated images and coverage 
that certain sports garner by privileging their star athletes.  As a naive fan to 
Formula One in 1998, it is fair to say that Villeneuve‟s status as reigning World 
Champion was alluring and provided the aura of the current „star‟ driver in the 
sport.  Naive and culturally illiterate in how central the car was to driver 
performance in Formula One, my deliberations lacked in intensity of engagement 
with the sport‟s subtleties.  Hence, I equated his status as commensurate with 
ability although, of course, I was also becoming increasingly aware through my 
viewing of races that Villeneuve would not be a prime contender for the 
championship.  Nevertheless, he was regularly scoring points and had his status 
sufficiently evoked in the global telecasts (and on the Formula One 1998 
PlayStation One game) to initially reaffirm my naive phase of fandom.  This was 
not the only reason for selecting Villeneuve and such strategies and intensities of 
reflexivity would be refined over time, especially as my cultural literacy in the 
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sport and affective relationship with Villeneuve subsequently increased (these 
refinements will be tracked across the remaining trajectories of the strategy-
intensity field).  Tracing my experience of naive fandom reveals that, although the 
obvious habitual process of selection based upon nationality was not afforded by 
Formula One in 1998, another routinised practice of affinity towards the 
prominent (through mediation) and pre-eminent (through previous achievement) 
sport star Jacques Villeneuve was being formulated and provided a pivotal first 
anchoring on my long-term trajectory as a Formula One fan. 
Fatal/Non-Reflexive 
The banal/non-reflexive nexus revealed a process of fandom often steeped in 
routine and habit which, potentially, can reduce at that point the strategic and 
reflexive dimensions (and possibly the salience of affect too).  In contrast, while 
the fatal/non-reflexive may also become a habitual and routinised process to some 
degree, it tends to privilege both the supremacy of the object and the intensity of 
affect for social individuals.  As was noted earlier, Baudrillard‟s fatal strategies 
impart supremacy to the object which becomes both seductive to and surpasses 
the subject‟s understanding.  Baudrillard (1990a) notes, “the object is always the 
fetish, the false, the feiticho, the factitious, the lure” (p. 184, italics in original) 
which, strategically, fascinate but always confound the subject through the 
object‟s deployment of its own fatalistic strategies of cunning, ruse and artifice.  
Aligned with these dual fatal strategies of object and subject, social individuals 
lack in what we might term more „rational‟, „objective‟ or „intellectual‟ internal 
conversations by privileging the supremacy of such objects.  Archer (2007) notes, 
“the internal conversation is not an area where instrumental rationality has 
hegemony; it is just as much an arena for reviewing the emotional commentaries 
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on our concerns, which are registered internally as we contemplate doing this 
rather than that” (p. 285).  While these deliberations may still be inflected with 
some degree of reflexive intensity, the assertion being made here is that within the 
fatal/non-reflexive nexus, such deliberations tend to be less critical and are 
characterised more by an intensity of affect.  That is, by elevating and conferring 
supremacy to the object, the relationship and nature of such deliberations is also 
predisposed to a higher affective intensity towards the object and a truncated 
critical reflexive deliberation on the rationale for bestowing such a status.   
Archer‟s (2007) second mode of reflexivity, „autonomous‟, demonstrates 
some of these tendencies while conflating others.  For example, although the 
„autonomous‟ are highly reflexive individuals (which will be returned to for the 
remaining trajectories), their orientation towards acquiring procedural knowledge 
and a proficiency of skills in subject/object relations seems to marry with the 
fatal/non-reflexive nexus.  Through this subject knowledge and proficiency, the 
object retains its primacy as the locus for the subject‟s associated affective 
fascination.  Indeed, Archer (2007) notes,  
What the subject knows, and only he [sic] can know it, is the 
intimate satisfaction that he derives from using his skills, in 
the ultimate privacy of the subject/object relationship...these 
sources of satisfaction are matters of first-person knowledge.  
Ontologically, they exist only by virtue of the person 
experiencing them and constitute a deeply intrinsic source of 
satisfaction experienced by the proficient.  (p. 288, italics in 
original)  
While this may also show traces of a banal strategy, in terms of the subject 
assuming they have mastery over the object, ultimately it remains fatal as, 
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strategically, the object retains its pre-eminence in the courses of action 
undertaken by the individual.  Moreover, in a reflexive capacity, the affective 
clearly shapes and moulds the deliberation and orientation of the person towards 
his/her specific object.  These constitutive components of the fatal/non-reflexive 
nexus can certainly be transposed onto fandom.  Due to its prominent layers of 
affect traced in the previous chapter, my own trajectory as a Formula One fan 
affords some genuine insights here as a case study.   
Remaining in the initial phase of naive fandom, the sport of Formula One and 
Villeneuve in particular are the focal (and fatal) objects into which my fandom 
coalesces.  We will return to a consideration of Villeneuve shortly but, as an 
object, Formula One deploys its own fatal strategies to fascinate and seduce 
subjects.  Many of its strategies, rules and ruses have been documented 
throughout this thesis; such as the sport‟s public and popular narratives (Chapter 
Three) and its seductive mediated constructions (Chapters Four and Five).  As a 
naive fan lacking in cultural literacy of the field, these rules and ruses were 
fatalistic in their capacity to draw me in initially and corral my support in 1998 
and 1999.  So, for example, the publicly disseminated evocations of Formula 
One‟s elite status, endorsed by its extravagant costs and technological 
sophistication, and further supplemented by the commentaries of Murray Walker 
(glowing and hyperbolic) and Martin Brundle (technical expertise; see Chapters 
Four and Five), were important aspects for initially acceding supremacy to the 
sport.  What is also discernible in this initial phase of fandom is that such 
deliberations were essentially non-reflexive in scope (e.g., internal conversations 
lacking in complexity) and strategically fatal through my marvelling at and 
conferring a supremacy to the object.  Although a generalised assertion, we can 
assume similar patterns emerge in other forms of sport fandom for naive and 
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culturally less „literate‟ fans who are lured or „seduced‟, in varying degrees, by the 
public narratives, role of commentators and the broader structures and fatal 
strategies deployed by specific sports.
9
   
With the commencement of this doctoral thesis post-2001, arguably my 
fandom became more critically informed through my enhanced levels of cultural 
capital and literacy (as well as symbolic capital) and the resultant „academic 
depth‟ to my reflexive deliberations.  However, in spite of the increased 
awareness of, for example, some of the sport‟s paradoxes and contradictions 
traced in Chapter Three, I would suggest that such fandom was still strategically 
fatal by retaining the primacy of Formula One.  That is, the continuation of my 
Villeneuve fandom for a nine year period (1998-2006) was underscored by the 
fan‟s sustained acceptance of Formula One as a supreme object.  Moreover, while 
the reflexive deliberations may have developed in intensity to match the 
accumulated academic knowledge and sport-specific cultural literacy, 
simultaneously such intensities were affective in terms of the emotive investment 
and orientation towards Villeneuve as the supreme fatal object and locus for 
fandom (i.e., over and above Formula One itself).   
As has been documented throughout this thesis, my Formula One fandom has 
essentially been a fandom for the French-Canadian driver, Jacques Villeneuve.  
While his status as reigning World Champion in 1998 was an important entry 
point for my initial fandom, there was also an increasingly affective intensity 
being forged in my reflexive deliberations and deference to Villeneuve as the 
supreme object; supreme, that is, in the emotional life of the fan.  To demonstrate 
how the fatal/non-reflexive nexus inflected my trajectory as a naive fan, I have 
reproduced my affective internal ruminations on watching televised coverage of 
Villeneuve from 1998 via an autoethnographic vignette (DVD Example 22). 
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Italian Grand Prix, Monza 1998  
Lap 37, finally the cameras cut to Villeneuve.  “About time!” I remind the 
television screen.  I have hardly seen Jacques all race, although he is running in a 
strong fourth place.  A wave of nervous excitement washes over me as I view 
Jacques negotiating the Lesmo turns.  He appears to be quite close to Eddie 
Irvine too.  “Come on Jacques” I urge, “push, get another podium”.  Jacques 
runs very wide on the exit of the first Lesmo, exciting me with his ragged style of 
driving.  Split-seconds later the coverage cuts to another camera as Jacques goes 
flying off the track in the background.  “No!!!!!” I scream.  Replays and 
Brundle‟s commentary reveal Villeneuve running wide before getting sideways 
through the corner, careening into the gravel run-off area.  I leap to my feet, 
kicking the table in front of me while searching for something to throw.  I want to 
see Villeneuve win or at least get podiums, not crashing!  The replays cut to an 
on-board shot of Villeneuve getting sideways and bouncing through the gravel.  
“That was pretty cool”, I surmise, watching Villeneuve‟s helmet frantically 
bobbing from side-to-side as his car jolts across the uneven surface before coming 
to a gentle stop.  Back „live‟, Villeneuve is televised out of the car, flanked by 
track marshals as he removes his helmet.  My anger at the missed opportunity 
quickly evaporates.  “He‟s so cool!” I say to myself.  Anger has turned to 
fascination as I now stare in awe at him.  I‟ve hardly ever seen Villeneuve filmed 
out of the car during my first year of watching Formula One.  But here he is 
clearly visible for the global audience: the baggy red overalls, bleached blond 
hair, nose strip, stubble and focused look of his piercing blue eyes searching for 
an escape from the crash scene.  His face betrays his self-annoyance.  Villeneuve 
rips off his nose strip and throws it to the ground.  He looks over to the crowd, 
giving them an appreciate but shrift wave, seemingly acknowledging their support 
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but recognising his own fallibility before turning to walk away in shame.  And 
with that, Jacques was gone, replaced by the televised images of cars still in the 
race.  Nevertheless, despite the driving error, despite the wasted points, it was 
Villeneuve‟s appearance that remained etched in my memory.  The intensity of my 
fandom for Jacques increased that day knowing that I was supporting the „cool 
guy‟; the blond-haired, unshaven, baggy clothed „maverick‟ World Champion... 
 
Turning to an analysis of this spatial and temporal „moment‟ of my naive 
fandom, we can see that there are banal and perfunctory dimensions embedded in 
the narrative, such as the depthless use of „cool‟ as an adjective (possibly also 
shaped by Vergeer‟s [2004] reference to Villeneuve as „Mr. Cool‟ in my own 
rewriting of the vignette) and the seemingly inane enthralment with Villeneuve‟s 
appearance in 1998.  Equally, however, the narrative reveals how internal 
ruminations are processed and activated during such moments, with the intensity 
of deliberation inflected more by affect than reflexivity.  Hence, while I still 
equated performance with achievement and, as a naive and culturally illiterate fan, 
was frustrated at his crash, the allegedly vacuous fascination with his image was 
cementing an affective relationship and investment in Villeneuve.  Dual processes 
were at play in this particular naive „moment‟ (and would be sustained for the 
duration of my fandom).  First, as has been intimated, Villeneuve‟s mediated 
image was operating in the realm of a fatal strategy.  Eschewing any consideration 
of self-conscious intent or „agency‟ on Villeneuve‟s behalf, as a media object, his 
mediated image and appearance (and we could extrapolate this to his media 
stardom more broadly) was seductive; deploying the „rogue‟, „rebel‟ and 
„maverick‟ traces (image/appearance, risk-taking and dissent) as ruses, guises, 
lures and strategies to captivate and corral Formula One subjects (i.e., my 
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attention as a fan).  Moreover, as a fan, all seductive „power‟ resided with 
Villeneuve as the supreme object that infiltrated my quotidian existence.  Such a 
process, while affective, is not about desire or the homoerotic (see the argued 
disqualifications of this interpretation in Chapter One) and, strategically, 
Villeneuve the media object always evaded attempts at finding a „real‟ Villeneuve 
to care about (he is always already a media star) or be possessed (Villeneuve 
„disappears‟ at that very moment he circulates as a media object, a point 
developed later in this chapter).  Baudrillard (1990a) asserts, “possession is the 
preoccupation and pride of the subject, but not of the object, which is totally 
indifferent to it, as to its liberation.  The object wants only to seduce...the object 
always wins” (p. 124).   
My affective investment was grounded in its own fatal strategy of fascination 
and intrigue with an object that, while seductive, was incoherent, indifferent and 
unobtainable in its supremacy.  Thus, despite my „active‟ and „interactive‟ fan 
processes of poaching, scavenging, re-appropriating and re-producing traces of 
Villeneuve across my fan career (1998-2006; see also Crawford, 2004; Hills, 
2002; Jenkins, 1992, 2006a, 2006b), Villeneuve‟s fatal strategy as an object 
produced its own subterfuge and fragmentation and subverted any subjective 
attempts (real or veiled) at possession or desire.  These points will be refined 
through a further discussion of seduction in the final section of this chapter.   
The second notable process is that the affective intensity of my reflexivity 
persisted in terms of the emotional investment and attachment to Villeneuve over 
my fan career (although as the previous chapter noted, the intensities of affective 
energy and „emotion‟ always fluctuate in any form of fandom, such as the perhaps 
inevitable decrease in affective intensity due to his absence from Formula One for 
much of 2004).  Thus, although my reflexive designs on Villeneuve can be 
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assumed to have become more critically informed as a result of both the 
intellectual rigour of a doctoral thesis and my enhanced cultural capital and 
literacy, the affective dimension remained intact and crystallised around 
Villeneuve.  So, Villeneuve‟s mediated star image continued to fascinate and 
„seduce‟ me despite the transition from a naive to „Formula One insider‟ fan and 
my gravitation towards a more „serious‟ academic vocation.  In contradistinction 
to the first autoethnographic vignette, a second vignette from 2006 anchors my 
fandom in the „Formula One insider‟ phase.  The efficacy of this second narrative 
lies in its affordance of insight into the increasing reflexivity of such 
deliberations, imparted via an external conversation which, nevertheless, 
demonstrates that such deliberations remain embedded in affect. 
BMW Team Launch, January 2006 
“Here he is honey, come look” I call across to Tina.  “Do I have to?” she 
responds, reclining on the couch and seemingly engrossed in the film she is 
viewing.  “Go on, come see him for just a minute” I plead and stretch my arms 
out for an imaginary hug.  Tina relents, pushing the pause button and moves in to 
return my embrace.  “Look there he is, he‟s so cool” I enthuse, motioning 
towards the computer as she goes in for a closer look.  “Yes, very good” she 
proffers, patting my head and gesturing back towards her film.  “And look, he 
didn‟t even shave…so cool” I continue.  Tina is not so impressed and often 
grumbles at me when I can‟t be bothered to shave.  I can sense that Tina will bite 
back as she scrutinises Villeneuve‟s appearance further.  “Yeah, well he looks a 
bit of mess – you shouldn‟t be proud Mister!  And where‟s his hair gone, looking 
a bit old now!” she teases, mocking Villeneuve‟s partially spiked but receding 
hairline.  Tina is enjoying winding me up and I‟m beginning to wonder why I did 
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call for her after all. “Couldn‟t he have at least shaved?” she asks, raising her 
eyebrows in sarcastic disapproval.  I pull Tina closer and kiss her on the 
forehead.  “Exactly honey, how cool is this guy?” I ask rhetorically.  Before Tina 
can disagree I press on, “that‟s the thing, this is the team launch, the big 
promotional day for BMW and its sponsors in front of Formula One and other 
global media.  Add to that, here is Jacques, the guy apparently lucky to still have 
a drive in Formula One, not wanted by the team and all that.  You would think 
that he would be happy just to have a drive and be bending over backwards for 
the team.  But here he is, ever the maverick, doing his own thing, not performing 
to the corporate script” I gush proudly.  “Yeah well, that‟s your thing but I still 
think that he should tidy himself up” Tina responds.  “You know with his salary” 
she continues, “I‟m sure he could afford a razor and comb”.  We both laugh but 
Tina is on a roll, “And what‟s with his glasses?” she asks cheekily, “they look 
more geek than chic”.  I can‟t help laughing at her comments as I focus on 
Villeneuve‟s thick black frames.  “Yeah, I agree” I answer reflectively, “but that‟s 
what‟s so cool about this guy, he always stands out.  I mean look at him; the 
stubble, the thick glasses, the overalls that look two sizes too big for him.  See, 
even in 2006, Jacques is still not conforming to the corporate cookie-cutter for F1 
drivers”. “You and your warped idea of style” Tina grins in a disapproving yet 
friendly manner, “let‟s hope he actually finishes some races this year, buddy!” 
she mutters and heads back over to the couch to resume her film, leaving me to 
pour over Villeneuve‟s first public appearance with BMW in 2006... 
 
It is these „traces of grit‟ within Villeneuve‟s media image (e.g., the stubble, 
glasses, baggy overalls) that persistently resonate in an affective, reflexive manner 
for me.  The narrative from 2006 reveals a more critical component to my 
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reflexive deliberations evinced through the specificity of details discussed with 
Tina in defence of Villeneuve‟s appearance (obtained through a growing cultural 
literacy about the sport and symbolic capital as now something of a „Formula One 
insider‟) and how these are coloured with evident maverick traces that seemingly 
run counter to the corporate expectations that underpin Formula One.  Of course, 
we should remind ourselves of Dyer‟s insight into the system‟s production of 
dissatisfactions that the system then itself satisfies.  Moreover, while the narrative 
also provides a concrete example of the „gentle teasing‟ that plays out in the daily 
lives of fans, their partners and more broadly how fandom is integrated into such 
relationships (see also Chapter Six), it is clearly grounded in affect.  Thus, while 
the reflexivity is critically aware, it privileges a fatal strategy which recognises the 
supremacy of the object, while the critical faculty of reflexivity is subsumed by 
the intensity of affect in a non-reflexive manner (e.g., how the notion of „cool‟ 
persists in an emotive capacity to undermine any rational self-doubt occasioned 
by a partner‟s teasing).  As such, Villeneuve the media object is still pre-eminent 
and lures through his appearance, while affording a non-reflexive pleasure in both 
the recognition and appropriation of these traces of grit, such as his ragged driving 
style, stubble, dyed hair or the baggy overalls noted in both autoethnographic 
vignettes, as something „exceptional‟ and more profound than they might be 
permitted to be in any critical reflexive perspective.  Nevertheless, it should be 
remembered that the strategy-intensity field is fluid and dynamic in its overall 
orientation, with reflexive deliberations seeping into parts of this „non-reflexive‟ 
nexus through the academic and culturally literate acquired forms of knowledge 
(e.g., knowing the marketing significance of such traces of supposed grit within a 
smoothly corporate sport).  We will also see that affect can be married with these 
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critical reflexive forms (and the strategically fatal with the banal) in the remaining 
trajectories, as the banal-reflexive nexus demonstrates. 
Banal/Reflexive 
Thus far, the vectors plotted onto the strategy-intensity field have been 
characterised by a strategically obedient, less critically-informed reflexivity often 
steeped in routine (the banal/non-reflexive nexus) or the strategic supremacy of 
the object, again less critically-informed but principally derived via intensities of 
affect rather than routinised practices (the fatal/non-reflexive nexus).  Our 
attention now turns to the third location on the strategy-intensity field, the 
banal/reflexive nexus.  This nexus, while strategically obedient, primarily moves 
away from habit, routine or affect (although they may still have a degree of 
saliency) to more intense ways of traversing the concrete realities of one‟s 
quotidian existence.  We can usefully return to Archer (2007) and suggest that, 
within this nexus, social individuals might have fewer of the „similars and 
familiars‟ in their social contexts or they may feel less straightforwardly 
assimilated into those alliances and, hence, may rely on more intense reflexive 
deliberations to „mull over‟ their interests and to design (in)appropriate courses of 
action.  This mode of reflexivity was introduced in the previous section as 
„autonomous‟.  For these people, there will be a tendency to operate in a manner 
less dependent on interlocutors, relying instead on internal conversations that 
according to Archer (2007) are “going on „all the time‟” and that can be 
“prolonged and ubiquitous” (p. 284).  She suggests that these reflexive 
deliberations act as a mental resource and as a form of strategic mobility which 
parallels an upward social mobility (primarily in a vocational capacity), although 
Archer acknowledges that these practices never guarantee such upward mobility.  
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Nevertheless, the autonomous reflexive mode is underpinned by the social 
individual‟s ongoing evaluations and appraisals of his/her own designs in light of 
such deliberations.  We can simply summarise this mode for our present purposes 
as being high in reflexive intensity. 
Strategically, the banal/reflexive nexus appears to remain in a largely banal 
locus, with the subject assuming continuing supremacy over the object while 
providing some of what Baudrillard (1990a) refers to as “fatal disobedience to the 
symbolic order” (p. 182).  Hence, strategically, the banal is inflected by a 
knowing (reflexive) subject who now assumes there is depth, cunning and a 
degree of Archer‟s autonomy to his/her own banal strategies.  In fact, given the 
high intensity of reflexivity bestowed on the subject in this nexus, they may also 
be producing what Baudrillard (1990a) refers to as inhuman strategies.  As an 
example of an inhuman strategy, Baudrillard suggests that people use their 
vacations as a means to seek a higher degree of boredom than they can achieve in 
their daily lives, while having the foreknowledge that elements, such as happiness 
and distraction, will confer legitimacy to this boredom.  Baudrillard (1990a) 
argues, “I‟m not joking: people are not looking for amusement; instead they want 
to find a fatal distraction.  Boredom is not the problem – the essential point is the 
increase of boredom; increase is salvation and ecstasy” (p. 184), which he also 
suggests is a hyper-banal strategy through the ruse of the subject and its resultant 
fatalistic overtones.  In fact boredom and Formula One seem, if anything, to offer 
a more persuasive case for Baudrillard here than vacations!  So, we will return to 
Baudrillard‟s evocation of the hyper-banal in due course.  First, however, fan 
practices and processes (or more precisely, reflexivities and strategies) need to be 
transposed onto the banal/reflexive nexus. 
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Many of the central features of the banal/reflexive nexus in relation to 
fandom have in fact been traced in the previous chapter.  Thus, considering 
consumption as a first, prime example which arguably underpins most, if not all, 
forms of media fandom, the proposition of the „duped‟ consumer was discussed 
and, to some extent, dismissed as an explanatory absolute in the processes of 
fandom analysed in Chapter Six.  But by now transposing the banal/reflexive 
nexus onto these consumerist and consumptive practices, we see that while fans 
are certainly operating within the given socio-economic context, many fans are 
also critically aware of their own supposedly determined and duped position.  
Thus, the more highly reflexive social individual recognises his/her own socio-
economically determined position but, equally, sees a value or worth nonetheless 
in his/her sustained cultural fandom (e.g., Bourdieu, 1991; Schirato, 2007b).  
Hence, through some degree of reflexive deliberation, these fans recognise their 
associated consumptive practices as constitutive of contemporary fandom and 
enact them anyway.  Clearly, we need to recognise that this intensity of reflexivity 
is not applicable to all fans; acknowledging the caveat of distinctions mapped in 
the previous chapter between fans and consumers, their casual or connoisseur 
status and their varying degrees of symbolic and cultural capital and literacy as 
still important explanatory factors (see also Bourdieu, 1984, 1986, 1991; 
Crawford, 2004; Giulianotti, 2002; Gruneau & Whitson, 1993; Guttmann, 1986; 
Schirato, 2007b).   
Recalling (without repeating) my own fandom examples and vignettes from 
Chapter Six, I argued that while these practices and processes were clearly shaped 
by socio-economic forces, there were still traces of the culturally literate „Formula 
One insider‟ fan finding affective satisfaction and a cultural worth or legitimacy in 
„playing the game‟.  That is, while being commercialised and consumerist 
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practices, the procurement and display of merchandise was inflected with 
symbolic value, capital and imparted status through the knowledgeable pursuit of 
Formula One-specific forms of cultural capital.  These goods and displays would 
also be fundamental to my performativity as a fan; a process that acknowledges 
and activates an affective pleasure in the game, matched by the intensity of 
reflexive self-awareness.  Collectively, these observations coalesce around the 
intensity of reflexive deliberations and designs.  Clearly, the reflexive capabilities 
vary for social individuals (i.e., it is not an equally „shared‟ or distributed trait) 
and, additionally, can also be inflected with and/or influenced by diverse 
intensities of affect (e.g., my own fandom is clearly also anchored in an affective 
emotional investment).  Nevertheless, there is a critical, highly reflexive 
deliberative process at play for the fan to be perceived as and operate as a duped 
consumer while, simultaneously, being critically aware of this stigmatised 
perception but still pursuing this course of action unflinchingly and often even 
with alternative outcomes in mind (e.g., the symbolic and cultural capital being 
assembled by the „Formula One insider fan‟ described earlier).  
Strategically, consumption and performance remain banal by privileging the 
supposed supremacy of the subject in such relations although, arguably, these can 
often also become fatalistic in their design and implementation.  For example, my 
continual consumption of Villeneuve-specific merchandise is seemingly 
conferring supremacy to the object (i.e., fatalistically elevating Villeneuve as 
object).  Alternatively, though, this supremacy may be blurred in fan 
performativity, as the subject is deploying their own assemblage of banal/fatal 
strategies; for example, manipulating subject/object relations through the fluidity 
of dynamic and endlessly reconstructed, recycled and reproduced displays of the 
fan performing as a fan while recognising his/her own fandom (defined as 
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hyperfandom in Chapter Six).  Hyperfandom also oscillates as a banal and fatal 
strategy as the supremacy of the subject and/or object is never fixed; so, for 
example, in my own practices there is the concurrent fandom for Villeneuve as the 
media object, my (re)enactments as the fan subject and the blurring of both 
through my performances constructing and constituting the fan simultaneously as 
subject and object.  We can extrapolate these points to incorporate Baudrillard‟s 
(1990a) theory of inhuman strategies and, especially, the hyperbanal.  Re-evoking 
his assertion that subjects knowingly and strategically seek out boredom, 
Baudrillard (1990a) notes that for subjects,  
On the contrary, they‟ll make a destiny out of it: intensify it 
while seeming to do the opposite, plunge into it to the point 
of ecstasy, seal the monotony of it with an even greater 
monotony.  This hyper-banality is the equivalent of fatality.  
(p. 184) 
The hyperbanal can be transposed onto fan practices through the regular, 
routinised repetition of fandom whereby the affective intensity most likely 
fluctuates across a continuum ranging from pleasure to monotony.  While the 
mundane and drab aspects of fandom were generally glossed over as insignificant 
in Chapter Six, if we pursue Baudrillard‟s line of thought then, in its most 
hyperbanal form, it maybe the simultaneous escalation and assuaging of 
monotony through perfunctory practices that fans „plunge into‟ to actualise their 
affective intensities.  Problematically, however, such an assertion is also subject to 
the simplistic misinterpretation of fans „escaping‟ daily life when, as Grossberg 
(1992b) counters, it is these very affective investments and intensities that anchor 
individuals in social reality.   
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My own trajectory as a fan also reworks the application of banal strategies 
found in the first nexus, the banal/non-reflexive.  In our current nexus, the 
banal/reflexive, there is a shift away from routine and habit as my Formula One 
fandom is forged along a different path (although the habitual and routinised 
process of supporting star athletes was still acknowledged via Villeneuve as 
reigning World Champion in 1998).  In contradistinction, as a New Zealander, the 
gravitation towards the global sport of Formula One disrupts the „similar and 
familiar‟ of nationalism and the purported significance of certain sports in 
accordance with a more broadly defined habitus – be it location or class-bound 
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1984, 1991).  In fact, the selection of Formula One reveals an 
intensity of reflexive design by rejecting the previously espoused socio-cultural 
elevation of rugby (e.g., the hailing and interpellation of nationalism through 
rugby as „our national game‟ in New Zealand) to a sport that is globally dispersed 
and, as noted earlier, problematises links to the „the nation‟ for a New Zealander.  
With no apparent or intrinsic national link, the selection of the French-Canadian, 
Jacques Villeneuve appears arbitrary.   
My general shift to Formula One and Villeneuve in particular were marked 
by not only a break from habit or routine but by an increased intensity to such 
deliberations (an internal conversation with increased reflexivity).  Therefore, my 
internal ruminations required reflexive negotiations to justify, legitimise and 
solidify a concurrent emerging affective engagement for a global sport and a 
transnational sport star.  These reflexive deliberations recognised that embedded 
within Formula One‟s broader global appeal was the subsidiary, atomised 
temporal/spatial construction of a solitary (non-communal) and isolated form of 
fandom in a broader New Zealand socio-cultural context (married with a reflexive 
awareness of the mediated and global imagined community being forged through 
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Formula One – as explored in Chapter Two).  Moreover, such deliberations 
facilitated the banal strategy of obedience to a new set of imperatives (e.g., 
Formula One‟s fatal strategies) which purportedly allow the navigation towards, 
anchoring in and licensing of isolation as its own cunning strategy that, 
symbolically or real, seemingly produces an exclusive yet not entirely asocial 
domain for oneself as subject.  However, this particular evocation of isolation is 
not in strict adherence to Baudrillard‟s (1994a) theory of the non-event (e.g., the 
implosion of meaning and medium, reality and image and so forth) in which he 
argues that individuals are isolated through technological and mediated 
experiences anyway (i.e., in contrast to „shared experiences‟ or theories of global 
or imagined communities – see also Merrin, 2005).  Rather, my assertion of the 
licensing of isolation is supported by Archer (2007), who observes that the 
„autonomous‟ reflexive individual tends to carve out “the space for the lone 
pursuit of his leisure pursuits” (p. 297).  Hence, the reflexive and strategic aura of 
isolation is inflected by an affective „personalised‟ payoff as Formula One affords 
an intense space for reflexivity through my internal conversations and affective 
anchoring in temporal and spatial moments (while, of course, remaining broadly 
aware of the sport‟s public construction, structures and fatal strategies).   
The traces of grit that Villeneuve provides contribute to these reflexive 
deliberations and banal strategies as he is codified as the „maverick‟, the „rebel‟, 
the „dissenter‟, the „risk-taker‟ and so forth and, thus, seemingly offers an 
example of the maverick individual within the literal and corporate machinery (or 
grit within the cog) of Formula One.  Hence, the public site and social domain of 
Formula One, filtered through Villeneuve the alleged „maverick‟ individual driver 
also provides a „private‟ space to license isolated and individualised reflexive 
temporal/spatial moments.  Thus, for example, isolation in the predominantly 
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casual crowd at a Grand Prix through my „insider‟ knowledge and non-
communally based support for Villeneuve;
10
 isolation with the driver through 
point-of-view shots via the limited and rare occurrences of on-board camera 
coverage from Villeneuve‟s car (or more sustained and interactively „controlled‟ 
through video game play); and (re)isolation as a television viewer through solitary 
viewing practices (e.g., generally not shared with Tina or others, despite the 
sport‟s mediated imagined community).  This inflects my broader social relations 
in everyday life by my being perceived as the „Formula One guy‟ by colleagues, 
associates and friends (imparting, in turn, fluctuating forms of symbolic capital or, 
conversely, suspicion of the duped consumer through my displays of cultural 
capital) and re-isolates me in specific spatial-temporal moments (e.g., the 
exclusion from or uninterest in rugby-related conversations and screenings in my 
New Zealand setting).
11
  These observations bring us inexorably to the final 
trajectory on the strategy-intensity field.   
Fatal/Reflexive 
In the fatal/reflexive nexus, there is a continuation of the intense reflexivity 
characterising the previous nexus, as well as an oscillating intensity to how 
individuals strategically navigate and anchor themselves in social reality.  More 
broadly, the fatal/reflexive nexus encompasses social individuals who, through the 
activation of their own fatal strategies, are simulating their surrender to the 
supremacy of the object (e.g., the fatal strategy of the object).  These individuals 
deploy a diverse array of strategic imperatives, such as the banal, hyperbanal and 
inhuman discussed in the previous section, to facilitate this illusory and simulated 
occurrence in their daily lives.  As Baudrillard (1990a) notes, “when I speak of the 
object and its fatal strategies, I‟m also speaking of people and their inhuman 
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strategies” (p. 184).  Thus, in specific contexts and practices, the subject is 
accorded some space for responding to and navigating the social and symbolic 
terrain of the fatalistic supremacy of the object (i.e., such as the aura of fan 
isolation „embedded‟ within and constructed through both Formula One and 
Villeneuve as discussed in terms of the previous nexus).  We have already noted 
Baudrillard‟s (1990a) link between boredom and leisure activities but, in broader 
subject/object relations, it is within the “ecstatic deepening of anything” 
(Baudrillard, 1990a, p. 184) that the subject can reclaim a symbolic, simulated and 
ultimately fatalistic role.  Baudrillard (1990a) argues that,  
“There is no liberation but this one: in the deepening of 
negative conditions.  All forms that tend to project a 
dazzling and miraculous liberty are only revolutionary 
homilies.  Liberating logic is basically understood only by a 
few; essentially it is a fatal logic that wins out”.  (pp. 184-
185)  
In the fatal/reflexive nexus it is the fatal logic and inhuman strategy of plunging 
into the object through excess that reconstructs such relationships.  I recognise a 
significant aspect of my own fandom in this.  In particular, this „ecstatic 
deepening‟ seemingly privileges the object as supreme while being infused with 
both the banal (through the cunning and ruse of the subject) and the fatal 
(facilitating a simulated subservience) in its strategic deployment and blurring of 
subject/object relations.  We will return to some final concrete examples of the 
actualisation of this fatal strategy in fandom shortly. 
Underscoring this simulated, fatalistic strategy is the high intensity of 
reflexivity that people utilise to frame such relationships.  Like the banal/reflexive 
nexus, social individuals draw on reflexive deliberations as a mediating process, 
408 
relying on regular internal conversations to discern their assumed matters of 
importance and design responding (in)appropriate courses of action.  We always 
have to leave undecided whether any design is appropriate or not to the actual 
circumstances and best interests of the person concerned.  Such value judgements 
are beyond the remit of this thesis.  Such individuals correspond to Archer‟s 
(2007) „autonomous‟ reflexives, discussed in the previous section, who tend to 
privilege their ruminations over external conversations as a resource for devising 
forms of strategic and social mobility.  Archer‟s (2007) third mode of reflexivity, 
the „meta-reflexive‟, may well also be pertinent to the fatal/reflexive nexus.  
Meta-reflexives, like the autonomous, are characterised by a high intensity to their 
deliberations which are also frequently privileged and deployed over external 
conversations.  Nevertheless, „meta-reflexives‟ are considered to be more value-
orientated than the task-orientated „autonomous‟ individuals.  Archer (2007) 
suggests that, “by not sharing many of their (most important) inner deliberations 
with others, the meta-reflexive is insulated from the running commentaries of 
those surrounding her and their pressures to conformity” (p. 301), while also 
noting for such individuals that “it is these values, rather than the opinions of 
others, which are their sounding boards” (p. 301).  In particular, meta-reflexives 
use „moral considerations‟ to shape their concerns and courses of actions to 
acquire lateral, rather than necessary upward, social mobility.  As a result, the 
meta-reflexive individual is often seeking transcendence from his/her existing 
structural limitations and context to achieve lateral social mobility yet, also, 
engages in an ongoing critical reflexive deliberation as to whether he/she is 
actually constructing or implementing the appropriate means to do so.  For our 
present purposes, these „moral considerations‟ will be eschewed due to their 
loaded assumptions and vexed implications for a thesis unconcerned with moral 
409 
judgements.  Nevertheless, in combination, the intensive reflexivity of both modes 
permeates the fatal/reflexive nexus; as the implementation of a fatal strategy and 
simulated adherence to the object requires intensive reflexive deliberation to 
achieve its actualisation in specific social contexts.  Once more, fandom is our 
case study for illuminating the fatal/reflexive nexus, but now a reflexive move is 
needed in relation to the thesis itself.   
Arguably, a doctoral thesis exploring one‟s own fandom provides a salient 
example of the fatal/reflexive nexus enacted and realised as a specific concrete 
practice.  Undertaking such a project requires the activation of a layered and dense 
fatal strategy on my own behalf.  That is, during the doctoral process, I am 
deploying a fatal strategy that recognises the supremacy of the object (Formula 
One and Villeneuve), engages with the rules, ruses and strategies of these specific 
objects (e.g., how these aspects constitute both objects‟ fatal strategies), produces 
a banal strategy (the cunning subject) by assuming that I am knowingly „playing 
the game‟ of submission through the simulated bestowing of such status while, 
simultaneously, folding the object‟s fatal strategies back onto themselves as a 
means to interrogate the object for academic scrutiny.  Hence, throughout the 
thesis, Formula One and Villeneuve are marked as supreme, used as objects for 
analysis and assumptions are made that I am in a privileged position to simulate 
my immersion within this fatality through affective investments as a fan coupled 
with the banal strategy of an emerging critical scholar.  Moreover, outside of the 
thesis, these fatal/banal strategies are then re-deployed in my academic daily life.  
So, for example, the various thesis topics (e.g., fandom, stardom, cultural theory) 
or its fatal objects (Formula One and/or Villeneuve) are drawn upon to teach 
and/or illustrate academic concepts and courses in media studies.  Such a process 
accords its own oscillating fatal/banal strategy through elevating, deconstructing 
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or re-assembling these fatal objects and the assumed symbolic capital of my 
academic-fandom.  
This multilayered strategy is also underpinned by a new-found intensive 
reflexivity to my internal conversations.  Specifically, these ruminations discern 
what aspects are significant for shaping a doctoral thesis (e.g., theories, subject 
matter) and require intense internal deliberations on how to actualise the project as 
a concrete reality in terms of my own cluster of concerns and appropriate courses 
of action (e.g., how to legitimise an examination of Villeneuve and Formula One, 
what is appropriate to „reveal‟ about myself for an academic audience and how to 
ensure the successful completion of a Ph.D.).  Although not according a „moral 
consideration‟ to my thesis, these deliberations have some definite overlap with 
Archer‟s (2007) meta-reflexive mode.  That is, there is a constant critical reflexive 
process at play which scrutinises the depth and clarity of my own deliberations, as 
well as how they are actualised in terms of the written versions.  One final point 
of note on this is how such reflexive processes also vary in their quality and 
intensity, in terms of the constant self-reflection and introspection operating on 
the planes of fandom, stardom and a concurrent academic „voice‟ attempting to 
carry the thesis „in my head‟ and make sense of the project as a theoretically 
coherent whole.
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Through the combination of an oscillating fatal/banal strategy and the 
intensive reflexive processes, the affective investment in Villeneuve undergoes its 
own fluctuations.  Therefore, at times, there is an increased affective intensity 
through my revelling in the pleasure derived from recognising his elevated status 
for me as the supreme object of fandom (e.g., the fatal strategy of Villeneuve the 
media object) while, conversely, the affective dimension/intensity can be 
diminished by the academic requirements of continually pouring over, analysing 
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and needing to make sense of Villeneuve in relation to my fan-self - a process 
which also contributes to both the variations in reflexive intensities and the 
strategies deployed.  Therefore, within the fatal/reflexive nexus, affect is still a 
salient feature, albeit as always via varying degrees of intensity embedded in 
specific temporal/spatial moments.  For example, the affective intensity can be 
diminished when Villeneuve the media object is also reduced through critical 
theorisation and cultural analysis; alternatively, affect may be enhanced by 
recalling, researching and conceptualising my affective investments in relation to 
his „maverick‟ traces of grit, to which I remain attached.  However, the role of 
routine and the habitual seems to be less of a residual feature, with intensive 
deliberations and the fatalistic (or banal) strategic imperatives consigning 
routinisation to a seemingly outgrown non-reflexive place in my Formula One 
fandom (although it still seems to infect my „fan‟ practices post-2006, a point I 
return to shortly).   
Reassembling Villeneuve and Fandom: Towards a Conclusion 
By transposing a doctoral thesis on fandom onto the strategy-intensity field, it 
would seem that the deployment of my own fatal strategy, aligned with the 
intensive deliberations characteristic of the trajectory of the fatal/reflexive nexus, 
requires that I also reassemble the fragmented spatial/temporal moments into a 
coherent narrative of the social-cultural significance of fandom, with myself 
merely as an example.  Indeed, the seemingly „obvious‟ means for wrapping up 
this thesis is to conclude with a tidy summation that repudiates the supremacy of 
the object (Formula One and Villeneuve), rejects the fan practices as ultimately 
consumerist (e.g., the „duped‟ fan) and recognises the folly of the associated 
affective investments, intensities and sensibilities that have shaped my broader 
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processes of fandom.  In other words, the fatal/reflexive position ultimately 
extricates the subject from the entire field.  However, this symbolic bonfire onto 
which all vestiges of a once foolhardy fandom are thrown will not be lit.  Equally, 
the effigy of Villeneuve, the apparent fallen „idol‟ will not be burnt; nor will I 
discard Damion Sturm, the beguiled fan-self, who allegedly transcends to 
enlightened „scholar-self‟ by fanning the flames.  Such an approach itself merely 
becomes a vector within the banal/non-reflexive nexus.  That is, such an 
extricated „theorisation‟ lacks in an intensive and critically-informed reflexivity 
by falling back on the habitual and the routines of „good‟ scholarship (e.g., as 
could be enshrined via a „proper‟ post-structuralist, deconstructionist, neo-Marxist 
or political economy perspective and a disembodied scholarly voice expressing it) 
and leaves the „messy‟ personal fragments within the thesis unresolved.  This 
strategically banal assumption of my ultimate supremacy, and disavowal of 
fandom as a spatial/temporal moment that simply fades or passes, betrays both the 
intensity and the career of fandom (Crawford, 2004; Hills, 2002, 2006; Jenkins, 
1992, 2006a, 2006b) as well as the affective investments that won‟t stop 
anchoring people in concrete, social realities (Grossberg, 1992b).   
More significantly, such an approach (shifting „outside‟ the field, if such a 
place exists) glosses over and fails to admit the thesis questions that still remain: 
for example, despite his absence from the sport since 2006, why does Villeneuve 
still „matter‟, why do his traces of grit still resonate and why is Villeneuve 
merchandise still prominently worn and displayed by myself and others in 2009?  
More broadly, can we extend these simple but irritatingly persistent questions to 
ask what is the „pay-off‟ for fans investing in specific individuals, sports and the 
associated consumer items (e.g., consumer goods, merchandise and live 
attendance), mediated formats (e.g., internet, live telecasts, video games and the 
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new gravitation towards „participatory‟ first-person perspectives) and through 
their forging of affective relationships?  The answer is that there is no „outside‟ to 
the strategy-intensity field.  Many of these questions have been addressed in 
relation to the identificatory mechanisms, functions and roles that mediations 
universally and collectively have for viewers, in addition to their salience for the 
construction and continuation of fandom.  That is, mediations and consumer 
goods facilitate forms of fan identification, performativity and, potentially, afford 
a closer proximity within subject/object relations (e.g., mediated „participatory‟ 
perspectives for subjective identification and proximation with the star athlete in 
Formula One; this also applies to fan merchandise and performativity).  
Additionally, the concept of affect clearly imparts an emotive value, in terms of 
affective intensities and investments, while giving people „colour‟ to their lives.  
More broadly, affect also permits forms of structured mobility by anchoring social 
individuals in temporal/spatial moments of a lived, contextual reality (Grossberg, 
1992b).  And the theorisation of this mobility has been extended through its 
representation as trajectories on a field.  Nevertheless, most poignantly, one prime 
question seems to both underpin the thesis as whole and remain unanswered: why 
Jacques Villeneuve?   
What might be expected is a coherent narrative that ties these fragmented 
moments and pieces together but, as I will suggest, such coherence is ultimately 
illusory.  The strategies and intensities mapped in this chapter have broader 
retrospective application to the thesis as a whole, as well as being the results 
derived from the preceding material.  In fact, by mapping my various trajectories 
across the strategy-intensity field, the current chapter has indirectly revealed three 
stages to my fandom that provide some preliminary explanatory purchase for the 
amalgamation of fandom, affect and structured mobility – with implicit links to 
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the unresolved Villeneuve question.  In summary, the first is the „naive fan‟ 
(approximately 1998-2001) which, transposed onto the banal/non-reflexive nexus, 
illustrated how naive fans often draw on routinised and habitual processes of 
initial, „impulsive‟ consumption and the lure of the predominant and pre-eminent 
star athletes to increase their cultural literacy and capital, as well as their affective 
investments, relationships and anchoring within specific sports.  Most often, naive 
fandom also moves along an adjacent transitional trajectory towards the fatal/non-
reflexive nexus, whereby routinised patterns bestow an affective anchoring in the 
fatal object in a less intensely deliberated, non-reflexive manner (i.e., elevating 
and marvelling at the imaginary supremacy of an object such as Villeneuve and 
Formula One).   
The second phase is the insider (i.e., the „Formula One insider‟ defined in 
Chapter Six) which accompanies the increased capital (cultural and symbolic) and 
cultural literacy that a knowing fan-subject acquires through his/her immersion in 
the sport and its various mediations and commodified forms.  My „Formula One 
insider‟ status (approximately 2002-2006) was highest in its affective intensity 
during Villeneuve‟s presence but, arguably, can be transposed onto all four of the 
strategy-intensity quadrants.  The banal/non-reflexive nexus is the weakest 
trajectory for the Formula One insider yet there is clearly a routinised repetition to 
the process of sport fandom (e.g., continual viewing and accessing of mediated 
and commodified materials).  As was noted, this process is also shaped by both 
the fatal/non-reflexive and banal/reflexive dimensions.  In the fatal/non-reflexive 
nexus, the intensity of reflexive deliberations is also weak and often subsumed by 
the intensities of affect, whereby the supremacy of the object is allowed and 
pleasurable moments are derived from this affective relationship and the fatal 
strategies of the object.  For insider fans, the fatal/non-reflexive also provides a 
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vector leading towards the banal/reflexive nexus, as such fans increase their 
cultural literacy and reflexive deliberations to know the workings of the sport, its 
structured dynamics and their delimited „subject‟ relationship (e.g., reliance on 
material goods as an allegedly duped consumer).  Nevertheless, reflexively and 
affectively, insider fans still find pleasure in „playing the game‟ and in their 
performativity as culturally literate fans.  Clearly, the insider status remains pre-
eminent within the fatal/reflexive nexus, deploying „my‟ capital (symbolic and 
cultural), as well as a cultural literacy to provide the empirical detail and depth 
even to a doctoral thesis. However, the affective intensity and investment 
potentially diminishes when the object on which the affective relationship is based 
disappears – symbolically (Baudrillard‟s [1988a, 1990a, 1990b] notion of 
seduction, developed shortly), literally (Villeneuve‟s absence from Formula One 
since 2006) and theoretically (transforming Villeneuve into an abstracted concept 
for study).   
So, the final phase is what we can term the „academic-fan‟ (approximately 
2007-2009).  With the notable absence of Villeneuve from Formula One post-
2006, the affective intensity that marked the first two phases of my fandom 
wanes; there is no longer the fatal object for affective investments and, 
conversely, he becomes the object of intense scrutiny, theorising and analysis 
(despite or perhaps made easier by his actual disappearance).  Operating within 
the fatal/reflexive nexus, academic fandom (which Jenkins [1992, 2006a, 2006b] 
has more loosely celebrated, while Hills [2002] is more circumspect) constitutes a 
sophisticated balancing of intensive reflexivity and oscillating degrees of strategic 
manipulation; deploying a blend of (simulated) fatal and banal strategies to 
interrogate the object of fandom, the fan-subject and to allow an intense 
reflexivity to enter into these overlapping and simulated strategies.  In the 
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„insider‟ phase of fandom, capital (cultural and symbolic) and cultural literacy are 
primarily registered in the domain of affect (e.g., such acquired knowledge or 
capital reveals that the insider is „passionate‟ or „cares about‟ his/her sport 
immensely).  However, in the academic phase, these forms of capital and literacy 
are an example of Archer‟s (2007) „enablements‟ that are reflexively conceived 
and pursued, while being actualised in the social arenas of fandom and academia 
more broadly.  As such, these forms of capital and literacy facilitate (or are 
intended to facilitate) advancement in the academic field, while further 
legitimising the object/topic as an academic subject for future research and 
analysis.  Hence, as an early-career scholar, fandom grants my entrance into and, 
to an extent, defines my initial route and trajectory across the academic field as an 
area of „expertise‟ for future teaching and publications.  Additionally, this early-
career phase as an academic addresses one of the questions posed earlier in this 
section as, in 2009, the remaining displays of fandom (e.g., wearing the 
merchandise or having the Villeneuve images on my office wall) attempt to re-
appropriate them for a new symbolic status, new acquired knowledge and are re-
legitimised as „academic‟ artefacts (i.e., forms of newly self-aware cultural 
capital).   
Clearly, the academic phase temporarily locates itself in the other nexuses 
plotted on the strategy-intensity field: through the routinised, albeit detached, 
following of Formula One mediations (banal/non-reflexive); the supremacy of the 
object (fatal/non-reflexive); and the knowing subject „playing the game‟ 
(banal/reflexive) although, as has been suggested, ultimately all form part of the 
fatal strategy of simulating these combined processes as an academic enterprise 
for intense deliberation and further analysis.  The banal/non-reflexive nexus 
within the academic phase of fandom is worth briefly developing further.  The 
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„intense‟ emotional attachment to a media object/subject that was established as a 
key definitional criterion for fandom in the previous chapter (see also 
Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998; Hills, 2002, 2006; Sandvoss, 2005) is seemingly 
dormant in my current practices.  Without Villeneuve as the object of my 
attention, post-2006, I still watch every race live despite Villeneuve‟s absence yet 
the affective dimension is reduced to the point of almost being redundant.  That is, 
the race results no longer affectively „matter‟ (I have not supplemented my 
televised viewing with the live timing internet function since Villeneuve‟s 
absence) and I do not emotionally identify with, „care‟ about or invest anything in 
any of the contemporary drivers (other than in an ephemeral fashion, such as for 
the duration of a given race, for the fun of it as it were).  Nevertheless, despite the 
diminished affective component, I still find myself tuning in every race weekend 
and flicking through the Formula One internet coverage most weeks which 
indicates that the processes of habit and routine forged over the preceding nine 
years seemingly persist and sustain my continuing of superficial viewership.  
Moreover, the contextual continuity to my academic Formula One fandom is now 
invested with a reflexive intensity and oscillating fatal/banal strategy of cultural 
currency; ensuring the fan insider status and its associated literacy and forms of 
capital remain accessible, pertinent and deployable as transferable knowledge and 
forms of empirical evidence (i.e., the symbolic capital and cultural literacy in the 
field of Formula One as „my‟ area of expertise).  In short, although the intensity of 
the affective investment in Villeneuve has to a large extent dissipated without his 
presence in Formula One (or regular mediated presence in other forms of 
motorsport), the fandom for Villeneuve has afforded the potential beginnings of 
an academic career that sustains the strategically fatal and reflexively intensive 
investment in Formula One.
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Underpinning the three phases of my fandom (the naive, insider and 
academic), and shaping this doctoral thesis more broadly, is the constant of 
Villeneuve (present or absent).  What has also been traced in the academic phase 
of fandom above is an acknowledgement that much of the affective intensity and 
investment was specifically anchored in Villeneuve directly, and less orientated 
towards Formula One.  Of course, clearly, Formula One provided the platform 
and the structure upon which Villeneuve‟s stardom was constructed and 
exchanged.  Arguably, his construction has broader origins and was more widely 
dispersed: through a famous father, a prior successful IndyCar career and within 
Formula One – the latter merely being the prime mediated construction of 
Villeneuve that I engaged with.  While the contemporary structure and fatal 
strategies of Formula One remain and are accessible via ongoing mediation (and 
commodification); Villeneuve, the media object, has been largely absent since 
leaving the sport.  Nevertheless, what this thesis has also documented is that my 
affective relationship as a fan resides with Villeneuve and not the sport; via the 
fleeting instances of recognition (e.g., the moments of „presence‟ within the 
broader televised presence-absence of Formula One – as explored in detail in 
Chapters One and Three) and the traces of grit he provided within the sport during 
his career, as well as his sparse reappearances in the media post-Formula One. 
These were and are the unshakeable temporal and spatial moments of affective 
investment and intensity.  For example, even in 2009, two separate media stories 
intimated a possible return to active racing which piqued my affective fan 
attention and investment temporarily once again (Appendix One).  So, the 
question still remains – why Jacques Villeneuve?   
Baudrillard‟s (1988a, 1990a, 1990b) theory of seduction, to some degree, 
proffers the means for framing a final response.  According to Baudrillard (1983a, 
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1983b, 1988a, 1994b), the combination of the pervasiveness of the media, their 
images and the fatal strategies deployed by „the masses‟ to simulate their 
existence (and facilitate their indifference), contribute to the construction, 
circulation and exchange of a simulated social reality (see Chapter Two).  As 
such, rituals of transparency (proving our existence) are significant in an obscene 
(depthless or nothing-to-be-seen) and media-saturated (pornographic in his terms) 
image-based, hyperreal culture.  While seduction is elusive to a simplistic 
definition, in this context, Baudrillard (1988a) for once succinctly observes, 
“surface and appearance, that is the space of seduction” (p. 62).  Thus, he is 
proposing that seduction may offer the space for rituals of transparency and, 
particularly, the „ecstatic deepening‟ and excessive plunging into objects 
developed in relation to the fatal/banal inhuman strategies traced in the 
fatal/reflexive nexus (Baudrillard, 1990a).  However, Baudrillard (1988a) also 
cautions that “challenge, and not desire, lies at the heart of seduction.  Challenge 
is that to which one cannot avoid responding, while one can choose not to respond 
to desire” (p. 57).  Therefore, seduction operates on the superficial level of 
appearance although, ultimately, it is upon and through the surfaces, objects and 
images that social reality and our fatalistic, inhuman strategies of existing 
converge.  As such, Baudrillard (1988a) argues that “obscenity and transparency 
progress ineluctably, because they no longer partake in the order of desire but in 
the order of the frenzy of the image” (p. 35).   
Clearly, my thesis has acknowledged that the Jacques Villeneuve I have 
affectively invested in as a fan and analysed as an academic is always already an 
image-based construct.  That is, Villeneuve‟s stardom – comprising of a star 
image, persona and texts (e.g., the narratives surrounding his stardom) – is a 
mediation (or, more precisely, a collection of mediations; see also Dyer, 1979, 
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1986, 1998; McDonald, 2000; Smart, 2005; Whannel, 2002).  Through 
Baudrillard‟s (1998a, 1990b) notion of seduction, it is on this plane of surfaces, 
appearances and the superficial spaces of Villeneuve‟s mediated stardom that the 
affective fan investment has been forged and the academic analyses derived.  In 
fact, for Baudrillard, appearances and disappearances are a crucial aspect of 
seduction, as the disappearance of the object provides the seductive „moment‟.  
Baudrillard (1990a) suggests that “all that has been produced must be seduced 
(initiated into disappearance after having been initiated into existence)” (p. 133, 
italics in original).  We can extrapolate to propose that the „real‟ Villeneuve 
disappears at that very moment when the mediated object of Villeneuve appears 
and is publicly disseminated.  I know that there is no „real‟ Villeneuve that I can 
access or know beyond this seduction while, additionally, I remain implicated in 
the frenzy of and voraciousness for his „image‟.  Moreover, as a media object 
there is not even a coherent whole available for fans to access, exacerbated by the 
specific, fragmented dynamics of Formula One mediations traced throughout the 
thesis (see especially Chapters One, Four and Five).  That is, drivers are framed as 
a presence-absence and are largely anonymous during live Grand Prix telecasts, 
are often reduced to textual references (televisual and internet based – 
occasionally these are supplemented with person-revealing images), or offered as 
an incoherent and fragmented body for identificatory purposes through the point-
of-view perspectives from on-board cameras in either televised coverage or video 
game formats.  Therefore, while there is no „real‟ Villeneuve to access outside of 
mediation, even the media object that circulates within the sport is also a self-
evident assemblage of fragmented, depthless and superficial surfaces.  There is 
not even a pretence of an accessible real to desire.
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Baudrillard (1990a) suggests that, 
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In our philosophy of desire, the subject retains an absolute 
privilege, since it is the subject that desires.  But everything 
is inverted if one passes on to the thought of seduction.  
There, it‟s no longer the subject which desires, it‟s the object 
which seduces.  Everything comes from the object and 
everything returns to it, just as everything started with 
seduction, not with desire...the object seduces through the 
absence of desire.  (pp. 111-112) 
By merging Villeneuve as object with this process of seduction, his mediated 
forms can be read as seductive on two fronts.  First, Villeneuve the media object 
seduces through its fragmentation; there is not a coherent whole to desire but, 
rather, the depthless, superficial surfaces that remain.  Second, as an object, it is 
through the deployment of Villeneuve‟s fatal strategies that I bestow supremacy 
on the lure, the ruse and artifice of his seductive, „maverick‟ mediated 
constructions (tracked along the varying intensity of my trajectory as a naive, 
insider and/or academic fan).  As such, without a coherent wholeness to the 
Villeneuve image for engagement, this thesis has privileged its own fatal strategy 
of adhering to Baudrillard‟s (1984) suggestion that “all that remains to be done is 
to play with the pieces” (p. 24).  Thus, aside from the career sketch in Appendix 
One and a brief, fragmented introductory narrative in Chapter One, there is no 
Villeneuve-specific chapter in this thesis.   
The lack of coherency to his image also elevates the significance of the traces 
of grit that he provides.  These traces become prominent points of analysis, 
affording temporal and spatial moments for anchoring my affective relationship in 
the combined fatal strategies and seductive appearances of Villeneuve.  With 
Villeneuve‟s broader shift from World Champion to a mid-field runner post-1998 
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(see Appendix One), the accompanying Villeneuve fandom became less results 
orientated: the affective pleasure resided in recognising strong race performances 
and, particularly, revelling in the traces of grit he proffered at specific temporal 
and spatial moments.  Hence, an answer to the Villeneuve question emerges.  My 
fandom operated (and still operates on occasions) through a fascination with the 
fragmented surfaces, appearances and fatal strategies that Villeneuve the media 
object provided (and, less frequently, still provides), anchored by an affective 
relationship as emotional investment and intensity which is not explained through 
desire or the homoerotic as a specific form of desire (Chapter One).   
The deliberate dispersal of Villeneuve‟s traces of grit in the machinery and 
some „personalised‟ fan accounts throughout the thesis, often framed through 
autoethnographic vignettes, offer concrete moments of Grossberg‟s (1992b) 
structured mobility in practice.  That is, the combined traces, fan processes and 
autoethnographic presentations are privileged as temporal and spatial sites for 
revealing the specificity of fandom and the anchoring of a social individual within 
particular, concrete contexts of social reality.  Moreover, these affective 
„moments‟ are mapped across various trajectories, differing temporal/spatial 
localities, and through diverse affective, reflexive and strategic forms of intensity 
and investment to reveal the „moments‟, mobilities and enactments of structured 
mobility as a social process.  Arguably, by including the academic study of my 
own fandom as its own object for analysis, the actualisation of structured mobility 
becomes an accessible concrete (rather than abstract) process embedded within 
the empirical evidence that the lived reality of a fan provides. 
                                                 
1
 As explained in previous discussion of Archer (2007) and Urry (2000), „morphogenetic‟ means 
mobility over time within a given structure.  In this chapter a morphogenetic field is taken more 
specifically to be a layered, organised terrain on which an „agent‟, in this case a fan, is able to 
respond to given conditions but in a highly „contained‟ way.   
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2
 Dyer (1981) argues that ideological readings of entertainment are one-dimensional as they fail to 
interrogate the broader complexities and contradictions of these „utopian‟ sensibilities, as well as 
the diversity of entertainment forms. 
3
 A central thrust of Archer‟s (2007) thesis is that internal conversations or reflexive deliberations 
(with the self) are distinctive from external conversations (with others) as you already „know‟ your 
own audience in an internal conversation, in addition to meanings often being derived from one‟s 
personal history.  Hence, these personalised, abbreviated and contextualised internal conversations 
do not warrant further explanation (or forms of either monitoring or censorship – although, of 
course, we may engage in these processes too, dependent on the subject matter); conversely, if the 
conversations we carry in our head were to be reproduced for an external audience they often 
would need expansion, clarification and a more coherent articulation.  For example, I often deploy 
the words „big geek‟ or „stay brutal‟ in internal conversations with myself.  These are personalised, 
abbreviated and context dependent phrases that would need elaboration if utilised in an external 
conversation; so, to clarify their usage for the reader, these phrases are not negative, despite such 
connotations but, rather, are currently used as motivational terms for remaining focused on 
completing the thesis.  It could be asserted that those familiar with me (e.g., close family and 
friends) may get my usage of these terms if utilised in an external conversation but most likely 
would also require some elaboration to grasp its usage and/or meaning fully as this is still context 
dependent (e.g., „brutal‟ clearly oscillates in its usage and intended meaning if I apply it to forms 
of music, sport, filmic depictions or a real life encounter).  As a second separate example, Archer 
(2007) reveals that when students discuss their housing arrangements with her she often 
internalises the words „light bulbs‟ during their external conversations, invoking her own previous 
situation as a student and the particular experience of a landlord who insisted that residents 
inserted their own light bulb when using the bathroom.  
4
 The apparent irreconcilability of Archer's critical realism and the European Continental theorists' 
post-structuralist and postmodernist cynicism about any possibility of actually knowing the real 
world, never mind responding to it in agential fashion, does need a footnote here if we are to 
deploy Archer's notion of reflexivity alongside theoretical convictions unsympathetic to her 
overall critical realist stance.  The first point that needs to be made is that Archer's critical realism 
is an early career characterisation and that reflexivity belongs more with her recent work, where 
the critical realist hostility to the Continental theorists, whether Bourdieu or Baudrillard, is 
tempered by an increasingly subtle use of the 'morphogenetic' picture of mobility within 
constraints that in itself is less incompatible with those who in the past have seen only constraints.  
But it can also be suggested that critical realism has developed beyond, for example, Bhaskar's 
seminal formulations, not least because of the way that the agency/structure binary is now seen as 
having determined in advance the supposed 'irreconcilability' that kept Bhaskar or the early Archer 
and Bourdieu or Baudrillard on separate sides of a now somewhat dated debate.  It is not, in any 
case, critical realism per se but the morphogenetic picture of constrained mobilities that this thesis 
takes up and develops in terms of fandom, culminating in the morphogenetic 'field' model 
presented later in this chapter.  But finally, it could be noted, Bourdieu in his late work was at 
pains to distance himself from those post-structuralist and postmodernist readings of his 
theorisation of agential socialisation in a 'field' that emphasised the field more than the agential. 
5
 Of course, not all social individuals are hailed and interpellated in the same manner, so the 
hailing of nationality through particular sports may interpellate certain individuals to respond 
through indifference, atomisation or even disdain, as much as through collectivism and 
communality. 
6
 As an aside, I have an uncle who „supports‟ McLaren as a „New Zealand‟ team, given its 
foundation by New Zealander, Bruce McLaren in 1963.  Thus, as a „causal‟ spectator (rather than 
the more culturally literate „Formula One insider‟ fan), he is regressing towards the familiarity of 
routine (nationalism) and its banal/non-reflexive inflection to shape his support.  In reality, the 
contemporary link to New Zealand outside of McLaren‟s origins is non-existent; McLaren has a 
transnational, corporately-structured system of ownership, as well as an English base. 
7
 Clearly success is not always fundamental to the circulation and exchange of star athletes.  For 
example, Anna Kournikova disrupts such an assertion with her previous „sporting‟ fame arguably 
based more on appearance than any achievements in tennis while other stars, such as David 
Beckham, Dennis Rodman and Maria Sharapova, arguably can be just as famous for their 
endorsements and/or private lives as they are for their particular sporting talent (e.g., see Coad, 
2008; Dunbar, 2000; Harris & Clayton, 2002; Lafrance & Rail, 2000, 2001; Smart, 2005; 
Whannel, 2001, 2002, 2008).  
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8
 Of course, the appeal of the „underdog‟ or perennial under-achiever cannot be disqualified, such 
as the ground-swell of support for former British ski-jumper, Eddie „the Eagle‟ Edwards, who 
finished last at the 1988 Winter Olympics in Calgary.  He subsequently failed to qualify for any 
more Olympic events.  
9
 The pseudo-sport of professional wrestling arguably illuminates these processes.  As a teenager 
in the late 1980s, I recall my own fascination with the „hype‟ of the then, World Wrestling 
Federation (WWF): the hypermuscular physiques, hyperbolic claims of commentators and the 
hyperreal mediated spectacle of a „sporting‟ event and „world‟ championship (see also Barthes, 
1993).  Other sports provide similar examples, such as the purported „test‟ of character, skill, 
patience, concentration and so forth for test match cricket (see also Schirato, 2007b) or the „hard‟ 
masculinity that contact sports, such as rugby league, rugby and American Football construct and 
circulate (see also Messner, 1992; Pringle, 2003, Trujillo, 1995; Whannel, 1993). 
10
 The 2005 Canadian Grand Prix disrupted this assertion as a symbolic and ironic „home‟ Grand 
Prix for myself among „fellow‟ fans.  However, our shared „commonality‟ was located in the 
object for affective investment but, I suspect, was devoid of similar lines of deliberation for 
constructing such support.  That is, I assume that Villeneuve‟s large support base in Montreal is 
most likely attributable to his Canadian and/or Quebecois identity and, hence, draws on routines 
and the habitual (e.g., primarily through a parochial, regional or nationalistic lens) to forge such 
support; it is less likely to be shaped by a reflexive (or possibly affective) intensity.  In contrast, at 
the Australian Grands Prix between 2002-2004 and 2006, identifiable Villeneuve fans were few 
and far between – although a handful are discernible through their displays of cultural capital at 
the driver autograph session in 2006 (DVD Example 6). 
11
 Arguably my sustained fandom since 1989 for the Sydney-based rugby league team, Wests 
Tigers (formerly the Balmain Tigers), also reproduces the licensing of isolation within my 
quotidian existence.  Despite my affective investment in the Tigers, my viewing practices are 
again often solidarity and not readily the subject for external conversations in social settings.  
Admittedly, there has been a slight shift in interest due to their current star player, Benji Marshall 
also being a New Zealander (and the current national captain in 2009).  However, the limited 
league interest in New Zealand tends to revolve around the „New Zealand‟ Warriors, an Auckland-
based franchise.  As a rugby league fan, I am routinely hailed and interpellated to display my 
allegiance to the Warriors by the New Zealand media (and occasionally by friends), a 
contradiction in terms I reflexively recognise (and draw upon as a defence mechanism) given their 
pseudo-national status.  The nationally-selected New Zealand team is the Kiwis (who I do support 
through an affective nationalistic lens), while the „New Zealand‟ Warriors (replete with an 
Australian captain no less) compete in the Australian National Rugby League competition against 
the Tigers.   
12
 My intention is to reveal these processes (and the intensities to reflexivity), rather than bestow 
any „exceptional‟ or especial status to my own deliberations.  Conversely, I suggest that many of 
the  readers have themselves engaged in far „deeper‟ processes of internal rumination than I have 
throughout  their academic careers (e.g., the self-editing of publications) and arguably lost far 
more sleeping hours to that „inner voice‟ that won‟t switch off in moments of intensive 
deliberation. 
13
 As such, my contemporary viewership maintains the familiar (of the locus of Formula One in a 
globalised and imagined manner) and provides contextual continuity to my quotidian existence 
despite its inherent strategic banality (obedience to the increasingly monotonous, predictable and 
clichéd racing spectacle) and the lack of intensity to my (non) reflexive deliberations (e.g., aside 
from an academic exercise which may, at times, be reflexively intense, the internal ruminations are 
severely curtailed and border on the perfunctory in the absence of an affective investment).  These 
points reaffirm that the specific temporal and spatial „moments‟ must be contextualised in such 
analyses of socio-cultural phenomenon.  That is, my affectively experienced „naive‟ (1998-2001) 
and „insider‟ (2002-2006) phases of fandom have shifted to an academic endeavour and early-
career (2007-2009) phase initially founded upon the academic analysis of fandom. 
14
 Arguably, even the „real‟, embodied Villeneuve visible during the 2005 Canadian Grand Prix 
Driver‟s Parade (DVD Example 4) and at the Driver‟s Autograph signing session at the 2006 
Australian Grand Prix (DVD Example 6) remains a media object; in terms of his incoherent and 
fleeting appearance, his performative role as a sport star in a mediated (and public) space and, of 
course, due to the fact that he has been recorded and reproduced as a media artefact.  In these 
realms, Villeneuve remains seductive as a superficial surface and media object. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Jacques Villeneuve‟s Formula One Career (1996-2006) 
This Appendix traces Villeneuve‟s turbulent career to highlight its „rise-and-fall‟ 
trajectory.  While such information can be read in various guises elsewhere, I have 
provided here „my‟ short fan-researcher account in order to reveal, from that 
perspective, the particular trajectories of Villeneuve‟s career, as well as specific 
concrete moments of the „slippery subject‟ position and traces of grit that 
Villeneuve occupied in relation to the „machinery‟ of Formula One (e.g., teams, 
cars, personnel, sponsors, etcetera).  This career sketch is purely descriptive, 
rather than theoretical, serving to furnish relevant background information for the 
analysis of Villeneuve‟s star image which more broadly informs this thesis. 
„Rise‟: Villeneuve as Second Generation Champion 
The rise narrative commences on the back of Villeneuve winning the Indy 500 
and IndyCar title in 1995, and with his impressive Williams tests securing a drive 
with the team in 1996.  Formula One „ringmaster‟ Bernie Ecclestone had 
allegedly been instrumental in the deal, realising the potency of this famous 
surname returning to the sport (Collings, 1998; Hotten, 1999; Rendall, 2000).  
Vergeer (2004) suggests,  
While he was going from success to success in America, 
some guy called Ecclestone called from Europe, asking 
whether Villeneuve would like to try a Formula One car, a 
Williams.  Straight into the best car in the paddock...With 
Senna dead, Schumacher was threatening to gobble up all of 
Formula One.  Ecclestone needed someone who could stand 
up to him.  Villeneuve was the man.  (p. 193) 
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Paired with another son of a famous father, Damon Hill, Villeneuve competed 
strongly in the Williams package which was the class of the field, winning the 
Constructors‟ Championship with 175 points, over 100 points clear of second-
placed Ferrari.  Indeed, in his first Grand Prix, Villeneuve got pole position, set 
the fastest lap and narrowly missed out on victory, finishing second after letting 
team-mate Damon Hill take the lead four laps from the end due to the loss of oil 
pressure.  Villeneuve went on to claim four victories in 1996 (with five second-
place and two third-place finishes), achieving an overall second in the 
championship behind Hill. 
In 1997, with the departure of Hill to Arrows, Villeneuve was elevated to 
team leader and expected to take the title.  Williams maintained its performance 
advantage in the early races, with Villeneuve qualifying an astonishing 1.7 
seconds ahead of his new team-mate Heinz-Harald Frentzen for pole position at 
the season-opener in Australia.  By mid-season Villeneuve had three wins, spliced 
with some patchy form and rival teams improving their performances, although 
his controversial views on safety and proposed regulations were generating 
negative headlines in the press.  With four more victories in 1997, Villeneuve 
went into the final race one point behind championship leader, Michael 
Schumacher.  With previous titles decided by leaders ramming their rivals off the 
track, most recently Schumacher‟s collision with Hill in 1994, Formula One 
officials clarified their expectations.  However, despite FIA president Max Mosley 
insisting “this time we want the fight to be clean and fair” (Vergeer, 2004, p. 201), 
the race at Jerez was to be another controversial moment in Formula One history.  
Battling for the lead, Villeneuve audaciously out-braked Schumacher on lap 48.  
The pair collided, although Schumacher had turned into Villeneuve, attempting to 
ram him off the circuit.  With Schumacher beached in the gravel, Villeneuve 
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continued, slowing to finish third and claim the Formula One World Drivers‟ 
Championship for 1997.  Villeneuve had become champion with his seven 
victories and total of 81 points, while having the impressive career statistics of 11 
wins from only 33 races.   
Nevertheless, while Villeneuve celebrated his victory, he allegedly was not 
impressed with Schumacher‟s tactics and sportsmanship, commenting in his post-
race interviews that, 
Either Michael had his eyes closed, or somehow his hands 
slipped on the wheel or something.  I don‟t need to explain 
what happened, he turned in on me.  But he didn‟t do it well 
enough because he went off and I didn‟t.  (Vergeer, 2004,  
p. 203)  
Much of the off-season was dominated by press and Formula One reactions to 
Schumacher‟s tactics, discussions of a suitable punishment for his move and 
Schumacher‟s attempts to repair his tarnished reputation (Allen, 2000).  
Schumacher‟s punishment was only to lose his official second place ranking (but 
still keep the points he scored) in the Drivers‟ Championship for 1997.  Vergeer 
(2004) suggests, “the penalty is a joke, of course, but how else can you treat your 
main attraction?” (p. 204).  The press would emphasise a frosty relationship 
between Villeneuve and Schumacher for the rest of their careers.  Villeneuve 
could not defend his title in 1998 with a Williams team in decline.  Through a 
combination of losing key personnel, engine-supplier Renault‟s withdrawal from 
the sport and new tyre regulations, Williams finished a distant third in the 
Constructors‟ Championship.  With only two third places and an overall fifth in 
1998, Villeneuve left for the new British American Racing (BAR) team in 1999, 
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having amassed a total of 180 points over his three seasons (49 races) with 
Williams. 
„Fall‟: The BAR Years   
Villeneuve‟s move to BAR accommodates the fall narrative within his career, as 
he could no longer push for race wins or championships.  In fact, Villeneuve only 
accrued a total of 39 points over five seasons with BAR (1999-2003), including 
two podiums in 2001.  Villeneuve‟s manager and friend Craig Pollock had been 
instrumental in his move to BAR.  Pollock was rumoured to have approached 
tobacco giants, British American Tobacco (BAT), in 1997 to establish a team 
revolving around Villeneuve (“The fall of”, 2002).  BAT bought out but operated 
as the Tyrrell team in 1998, before branding their new team British American 
Racing (BAR) for the 1999 season.  With the estimated $375 million BAT made 
available over five years, and Pollock acting as both team principal and 
Villeneuve‟s manager, Villeneuve was offered a two year contract worth $12 
million a season, double his Williams salary (“The fall of”, 2002).  Armed with 
BAT‟s millions and Villeneuve as their champion driver, BAR proclaimed that 
they would win their first race in 1999.  The season proved to be a disaster, with 
the team failing to score a single point and Villeneuve only completing four races 
in an unreliable car.   
Nevertheless, during the first three BAR seasons Villeneuve was still 
discussed as a champion driver who, through no lack of effort, was blighted by a 
car inferior to his talents (e.g., Bishop, 2000; Clarkson, 1999).  The 2000 season 
was a case in point.  Villeneuve finished only 7th in the Drivers‟ Championship 
with 17 points, yet was rated as the fifth best driver in Autosport magazine‟s 
review of the season (Benson & Noble, 2000), described by F1 Racing magazine 
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as “single-handedly carrying the team” (“Mid-season report”, 2000, p. 62), as well 
as earning the Best Starter and runner-up for Driver of the Year in F1 Racing‟s 
inaugural Man of the Year awards judged by the readers (“Man of the”, 2000).  In 
the Autosport review, former team owner Ken Tyrrell also named BAR as the 
fifth best team, stating, 
BAR‟s trump card in the 2000 season – and last year, too – 
has been Jacques Villeneuve.  If I was starting a Formula 
One team next year I would find a lot of money and pay him 
£20 million to drive for me.  If you take away Michael 
Schumacher and Mika Hakkinen, he is THE guy – by a long 
way.  (cited in Benson & Noble, 2000, p. 37) 
Villeneuve was singled out as the key to the 2001 driver market movements 
(Pitpass, 2000; Bishop, 2000) yet, despite this sought-after status, two podium 
finishes (and a strong fourth at Monaco) crowned what was otherwise a 
disappointing 2001 car and season.  Villeneuve revealed in an interview with 
Samson (2001),  
I‟m not going to say we‟ve had a great year just for the sake 
of saying the right thing.  OK, I could be happy about the 
podiums at Barcelona and Hockenheim, the first two the 
team has ever had.  But I‟m not going to lie to myself.  
Those results were lucky.  They didn‟t happen because we 
were quick but because a whole load of people retired.  This 
year‟s results are not the ones I‟d been promised.  (p. 73) 
With few points on offer, Villeneuve‟s only reward for strong performances was 
the substantial pay packet he was receiving, having signed a new three-year 
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escalating contract in 2001, which started at around $18 million and would 
increase to over $20 million a season (“The fall of”, 2002).  
Villeneuve‟s difficult BAR years between 2002 and 2003, and his eventual 
sacking, reflect the fall narrative for Villeneuve‟s career.  Post-2001, a shift in the 
discourses surrounding Villeneuve was discernible, with his reputation and career 
shrouded in generally negative publicity, especially from the British media.  
Plagued by poor machinery and inconsistent performances, Villeneuve was the 
subject of constant speculation and rumours surrounding his wages, performances 
and future in Formula One (see Grandprix.com‟s coverage of Villeneuve‟s 
options in August 2002 and between July - October 2003; e.g., “Villeneuve‟s 
catch 22”, 2002; “The future of”, 2003; “Why did Villeneuve”, 2003).  
Villeneuve‟s 2002 season began with his mentor Craig Pollock being replaced by 
David Richards.  This was done without Villeneuve‟s knowledge (Reid, 2002a) 
and through his “petulant display” (“The fall of”, 2002, p. 34) at the BAR launch, 
a visibly angry Villeneuve did little to hide his resentment.  The results were also 
disappointing in 2002, with Villeneuve gaining only two points-scoring finishes in 
a fragile and slow car.  Speculation mounted that new boss Richards was keen to 
send Villeneuve on a one-year sabbatical racing in the United States to avoid 
paying his large salary (Samson, 2002), although Villeneuve later refuted that any 
offer was made (Bishop, 2003).  Another dismal year followed for Villeneuve in 
2003, as he was beaten by new team-mate Jenson Button and dogged by poor 
reliability in an improved car, which included eight mechanical retirements in 16 
races, as well as an electronic fault curtailing a points finish in Austria (Noble & 
Hughes, 2004).  Off-track, the British press and Richards fuelled the hype that 
Button would be a future (British) world champion; statements which appeared to 
anger Villeneuve, who suggested that Button “brings to the sport what the boy 
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band brings to music” (Buxton, 2003, p. 71).  The two drivers publicly settled 
their differences but the Villeneuve and Richards relationship deteriorated.  
Villeneuve‟s fall narrative seemed complete when his contract was not renewed 
for 2004 and, with few vacancies left, Villeneuve was without a drive for the 2004 
season, his Formula One career seemingly over. 
„Redemption‟: JV‟s Lacklustre Return  
Persistent rumours of Villeneuve‟s return circulated in 2004 and late in the season 
his career had been publicly redeemed.  Villeneuve signed two contracts in one 
day; firstly, to drive the final three races of 2004 for Renault and, secondly, a two 
year contract with Sauber for 2005 and 2006.  Much was made of his return to 
Formula One with the competitive Renault team, although disappointing 
performances failed to yield any points or move Renault into second in the 
Constructors‟ Championship.  His unexceptional initial performances for Sauber 
in 2005 started the negative rumour mill again.  His first race in Australia, where 
he finished 13th (from fourth on the grid) and was beaten by team-mate Felipe 
Massa who had started 18th, prompted team boss Peter Sauber to comment, "I 
really can't explain the difference, which is a big one at that.  It's actually bigger 
than it seems” (“The mystery of”, 2005, para. 3).  With retirements at the next two 
races, Malaysia (spin, driver error) and Bahrain (accident, hit by Coulthard), 
Villeneuve faced intense media scrutiny between March and April regarding his 
motivation and talent.  Formula One websites questioned if and when he would be 
sacked, linking various drivers to his seat, while F1 Racing magazine ran a two 
page analysis of his abysmal early season, pondering “will Sauber lose its 
Villenerve?” (Pitpass expose, 2005b, pp. 18-19).  Villeneuve seemed to have 
safeguarded his 2005 drive with a strong sixth place at Imola (later promoted to 
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fourth after the BAR team was disqualified) and generally improved 
performances.  The negative rumours re-surfaced mid-season, with Villeneuve 
still often trailing Massa (even colliding with him at Monaco), while tensions 
between Peter Sauber and Villeneuve dominated the headlines at the Canadian 
Grand Prix (see Phillips, 2005a, 2005b).  However, Villeneuve survived the 2005 
season, gaining two further point-scoring finishes, and began to match Massa for 
pace. 
Despite a year to run on his contract, Villeneuve‟s 2006 season was allegedly 
not assured, with doubts expressed within Formula One media as to whether new 
team-owners BMW would retain him (e.g., Bishop, 2005).  After two months of 
media speculation and rumoured attempts to recruit other drivers or possibly buy 
out his contract (e.g., Pitpass news, 2005b; “Who will be”, 2005), Villeneuve was 
confirmed for 2006.  Fortunately for Villeneuve, his performances improved in 
the 2006 season.  Villeneuve fared well against his new team-mate, Nick 
Heidfeld, scoring six points after five races.  By mid-season, a more consistent 
Heidfeld had almost doubled Villeneuve‟s points (13-7), while Villeneuve‟s 
driver error in Montreal and two engine failures in Bahrain and Indianapolis had 
curtailed finishes from points-scoring positions.  Under pressure from the team‟s 
test driver, Robert Kubica, for a race-seat in 2007, an alleged injury from his crash 
at Hockenheim forced Villeneuve to miss the following weekend‟s Hungarian 
Grand Prix.  Villeneuve and BMW parted ways with immediate effect after it was 
reported that BMW would not guarantee his seat for the remaining races (Bishop, 
2006b).  Despite his strong performances in 2006 few rival teams had vacancies 
or even expressed an interest in Villeneuve.   
The „rise-and-fall‟ narrative of his turbulent Formula One career appears now 
to be complete.  Villeneuve left Formula One and turned his attention to both the 
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Le Mans 24 hour race and the American NASCAR series (“Villeneuve and 
NASCAR”, 2006).  In 2007 and 2008, he secured a drive with Peugeot for Le 
Mans (“Villeneuve for Le Mans!”, 2007), retiring on his first attempt, claiming 
second place in 2008 and vowing to return annually until he wins (Lord, 2008), 
although he was notably absent in 2009.  Villeneuve also initially gained a seat in 
NASCAR with Bill Davis Racing late in 2007 (“Davis reveals”, 2007; 
“Villeneuve makes it”, 2007), competing in two races as preparation for the 2008 
season.  Unfortunately, Villeneuve failed to qualify for the first major race in 
2008, the Daytona 500 and, after initially being dropped post-Daytona 
(“Villeneuve out of”, 2008), parted ways with Bill Davis Racing having failed to 
secure sponsorship for the team.  Villeneuve has indicated that he still wishes to 
return to NASCAR (Lord, 2008), although competed in the final two races of the 
inaugural Speedcars Series (a saloon car support category for the GP2 Asia 
competition) early in 2008 and in the second season in 2009 (“Villeneuve signs 
with”, 2008; “Seven F1 men”, 2008).  Additionally, Villeneuve was allegedly 
targeted for an Australasian V8 Supercars drive in 2009 by the Super Cheap 
Racing team (“Villeneuve targeted”, 2009) although this never came to fruition.  
As of July 2009, Villeneuve has reportedly intimated that he would like to return 
to Formula One, with its removal of electronic driver systems and inclusion of 
three new teams, for the 2010 season (“Villeneuve eyes”, 2009; “Villeneuve 
keen”, 2009; “Villeneuve looking”, 2009).  Time will tell if there is a new section 
to be written in the Villeneuve Formula One career biography.   
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